Lebanon's Huey bomber

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Lebanon's Huey bomber

  1. 1. BIOGRAPHY  LTCOL YASSINE, JOINED L.A.F 1983  DEPUTY KLEIAAT AIR FORCE BASE CDR,AIR WING COMMANDER,BASE S2 CHIEF.  CURRENTLY CHIEF OF OPS SECTION IN THE A F HQ  COURSES: 1- IRWAC 1985, FT RUCKER,AL 2-REFRESHER COURSE UH-1H, FT RUCKER, AL.1995 3-SQUADRON CDR COURSE,SYRIA, 1998 4-COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE, LEBANON, 2004 5-AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE, MAXWELL A.F.B.USA 2006.
  2. 2. OVERVIEW  BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT WITH “Fateh Al Islam”.  MISSIONS EXECUTED BY LAF DURING THE CONFLICT.  THE SITUATION BEFORE THE AIR ATTACK.  THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF BOMBING STUDIES.  BOMBING EXECUTION.  RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURES.  STRATEGY OF EMPLOYMENT & MISSION EVALUATION.
  3. 3. Fateh - Al - Islam
  4. 4.  In the 20 th of May 2007 a member of the terrorist groups “Fateh Al Islam” attacked some Lebanese army posts in the vicinity of camp Naher AL bared, killing 20 troops and overtaking their posts.  This group was lead by shaker al absy, reports about their strength and connections and their supporters were not definite. They were ruling the camp by being the most powerful armed and organized group there since 2006.
  5. 5. “NAHER EL 10 km Kleyaat Air force Base Naher Al Bared Camp BARED” CAMP 90km Beirut Air force Base
  6. 6.  Naher Al Bared is a one of the Palestinian refugee camps of 40000 p situated in the north of Lebanon, at 80 km north of Beirut and at 12 Km from KLAYAAT AIR FORCE BASE where most helicopter missions were launched.
  7. 7. “NAHER EL BARED” CAMP AREA = 2 km2 POPULATION= 40.000 H 2007
  8. 8.  Before the crisis the camp surface was less than 2Km2.
  9. 9. “NAHER EL BARED” CAMP OLD CAMP NEW CAMP
  10. 10.  The Camp is divided into 2 parts: the old part and the new one. The political negotiation with the Palestinian authorities between the 23rd and the 30th of May didn’t reach a happy end. This negotiation was aiming to hand over the terrorist members who did the attack at the army posts and at the same time to allow the civilian evacuation from inside the camp.
  11. 11. AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES
  12. 12.  At the beginning of the conflict the LAF had 23 UH1H (50% were out of service due to lack of spare parts), 2 of them were in kleiaat and 4 raven R44 for training.
  13. 13.  One month earlier the LAF has received from UAE 9 gazelles (French anti tank helicopters unarmed, and 3 of them were flyable due to spare parts lack and checks required, and during the battle 0.5 caliber machine guns were installed on 2 ships and anti-tank hot missiles on the third.
  14. 14. MISSIONS EXECUTED DURING THE CONFLICT & EXECUTION STRATEGIE OBSERVATION MISSIONS
  15. 15.  Observation missions, started on the 20th of may 2007.
  16. 16. MISSIONS EXECUTED DURING THE CONFLICT & EXECUTION STRATEGY TRANSPORT MISSIONS
  17. 17.  Escort missions, start with the conflict
  18. 18. Preparing jets & V.I.P TRANSPORT
  19. 19.  Even the R44 had participated in transport and radio relay missions, and the air force start to work on grounded jets
  20. 20. MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS
  21. 21.  Medical evacuation missions: daily missions, day and night, good to mention here that the execution of these missions while trying to preserve the concept of the “golden hour” had kept the moral of our friendly troops very high. (130 MEDEVAC, 23 NIGHTS)
  22. 22. MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS
  23. 23. MEDICAL EVACUATION MISSIONS
  24. 24. AIR-GROUND ATTACKS
  25. 25.  The gazelle had participated in the combat by the execution of some air attack missions on special designated targets like anti- aircraft machine guns, small artillery, fuel tanks.
  26. 26.  The gazelles had also participated in search missions for terrorist members in the northern mountain surrounding the camp.
  27. 27. THE SITUATION BEFORE THE BOMBING STAGE II STAGE I
  28. 28.  The Lebanese armed Forces had initiated different attacks on the camp, controlling first the new part of the camp, and then the east part of the old camp
  29. 29. THE FINAL AREA BEFORE THE BOMBING
  30. 30.  The remaining surface was of 200-250 meters length and 200 meters wide approximately
  31. 31.  The remaining part of the camp is considered to be the densest one and the most dangerous
  32. 32.  On the other hand the tiny small streets inside this area and the immense destruction created a big obstacle for our ground troop’s advance in the camp.
  33. 33.  Facing this situation it has become a priority to find a solution out from anywhere .
  34. 34.  The concept was to find a way to use the 50-250- 400 Kg bombs and to drop them over the camp in a proper way. These bombs were first design to be used on the MIRAGE and HUNTRER fighters 30 years ago and actually were supposed to be demolished  The problem was to create an attachment mechanism that allows a proper bomb release. A quiet challenged task, because no body had ever used a helicopter as a bomber before. . 
  35. 35. THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF BOMBING STUDIES.
  36. 36.  A BLUE team of experience pilots and technicians and engineers had initiated a different studies and research projects in order to make this idea realistic.
  37. 37. THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF BOMBING STUDIES. ELECTRICAL VALVE COMPRESSED AIR HUNTER’S O2 BOTTELS PRESSURED AIR RELEASE PISTON NAVY AXE MISSILE ATTACHEMENT ARM GAZELLE M113 ARMERD PLATE BOMBE ATTACHEMENT HUNTER
  38. 38.  Thus, a helicopter bomber has been created by using old fixed wing and helicopter and navy vessels spare parts.
  39. 39. THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF BOMBING STUDIES.
  40. 40.  Even new bombs had been fabricated by the engineers
  41. 41. THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF BOMBING STUDIES.
  42. 42. CENTER OF GRAVITY CALCULATION WEIGHT MOMENT A/C 5500 7953 - BOMB LATERAL ARM : (96/2)+(50*0.394)=67.7 in CREW 600 356.8 CARGO 1060.72 1295.433 FUEL 1400 2131.5 TOTAL 8560.72 11736.73 WEIGHT MOMENT BOMB 550 37235 - LATERAL CG = 37235/8560.72= 4.34 in (LIMIT IS 5 IN)
  43. 43. 2- CENTER OF GRAVITY CALCULATION WEIGHT MOMENT WEIGHT MOMENT A/C 5500 7953 A/C 5500 7953 CREW 600 356.8 CREW 600 356.8 CARGO 1628 1994.07 CARGO 1628 1994.07 FUEL 1400 2131.5 FUEL 480 629.5 FUEL QUANTITY WITH max FW CG CG=133.3 CG=132.2 CG LIMITE (132.6/143.3) CG LIMITE (130/144)
  44. 44.  At the same time a series of studies had been lunched concerning the CG calculation and the GPS features characteristics
  45. 45. TRIAL PROCEDURES
  46. 46.  Trial time had begin using non explosives external weights
  47. 47. TRIAL PROCEDURES
  48. 48. BOMB 250 KG
  49. 49. 400 KG
  50. 50. RELEASE POINT CALCULATION Dx = Dv + GPS CORRECTION + SYSTEM CORRECTION Dv : distance ( 633 meters) GPS Corr : 1/4 second ( 10 meters) (delay) SYS Corr : 1/5 second ( 7 meters) 5 kts A/S 100 feet Alt/feet A/S Kts Dx Error Alt.Error Time 3000 90 650 35.1 m 6.9 13.6 1500 90 447.1 24.84 m 9.8 9.6 RELEASE POINT PROJECTILE Dx
  51. 51. TRIAL PROCEDURES ACTUAL RELEASE POINT GPS RELEASE POINT THIS DELAY ID DUE TO: - NUMBER OF SATELLITES CAPTURED - GROUND SPEED - ACTUAL (AGL) ALTITUDE
  52. 52.  At the same time finding a way to correctly calculate, define and properly identify the release point was a big concern, due to the delay in the GPS reception and the delay in the release system itself, bearing in mind that the margin of error is so small due to the small dimensions of the remaining area to be bombed, and that even small error is not allowed
  53. 53.  Several trying sorties had been executed and the results were impressive, at the same time sorties over the camp at low level, day and nights set the field ready.  Finally a mathematical procedure had been reached and implemented.
  54. 54. 07-08-2007
  55. 55.  The trial had started on the 7th of August in the Bekaa Valley in a fire field for heavy arms
  56. 56. 09-08-2007
  57. 57.  Only Two days later we started bombing the camp
  58. 58. 5 BUILDINGS COMPLETELY DESTROYED
  59. 59.  The efficiency and efficacy of the bombing had been a dramatic surprise over the terrorists whom they found themselves forced to even try to escape from the camp or to surrender. And that was achieved on the 2nd of Sep 2007.
  60. 60. RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURES  Target selection (starting with the one away from our friendly troops.  Protection measures taken from our ground troops.  Cease of our indirect fire over the camp .
  61. 61.  Measures taken to minimize collateral damage and utmost safety for flights:  This issue was one of our priority concerns. Examples of measures taken:  Target selection (starting with the ones away from our front lines)  Protection measures for our ground troops.  Cease of friendly indirect fire during the bombing.  A cover ship for rescue and assess the raid result
  62. 62. STRATEGY OF EMPLOYMENT & MISSION’S EVALUATION.  DIRECT COORDINATION.  TIME OF BOMBING  LIAISON OFFICERS..  TARGET PRIORITY.  DIRECT OBSERVATION.  AERIAL PHOTOS .
  63. 63.  Strategy of employment & mission evaluation  The bombing missions were executed with a direct coordination with the ground troops through the presence of an air force liaison officer in the front lines and in the OR.  Different timing was implemented for the bombing with different gape of time between one mission and another.  The targets had been chosen according to a certain priority given by the mission commander officer starting with the anti-aircraft weapons, fortification, fateh al Islam main offices, water sources, fuel tanks, under ground shelters, arriving to designated area to easy our friendly troops advance.
  64. 64. MISSION EVALUATION
  65. 65. MISSION EVALUATION
  66. 66. MISSION EVALUATION Axes of attack
  67. 67.  - Evaluation of the bombing mission was done on aerial photos taken by helicopters due to the absence of drones.  - The air bombing contribute to victory on terrorism.  - It raises the morals of the ground troops after a long time of exhaustion.  - It opens the field for more inventions and tactics with the fact that no other means were available.  - winning the war on terrorism is possible when determination and sacrifice and will are present  - No area in Lebanon could be a blockade for Lebanese security and law enforcement.
  68. 68. MISSION’S DETAILS 20/5 – 4/9 MISSION SORTIES DAY NIGHT NUMBER HOURS HOURS MEDEVAC 165 179,05 32,10 OBSERVATION 76 62,35 7,25 & PHOTO BOMBING 98 41,55 4,35 ESCORT 13 22.4
  69. 69. Questions???

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