Security Testing for Testing Professionals

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Today’s software applications are often security-critical, making security testing an essential part of a software quality program. Unfortunately, most testers have not been taught how to effectively test the security of the software applications they validate. Join Jeff Payne as he shares what you need to know to integrate effective security testing into your everyday software testing activities. Learn how software vulnerabilities are introduced into code and exploited by hackers. Discover how to define and validate security requirements. Explore effective test techniques for assuring that common security features are tested. Learn about the most common security vulnerabilities and how to identify key security risks within applications and use testing to mitigate them. Understand how to security test applications—both web- and GUI-based—during the software development process. Review examples of how common security testing tools work and assist the security testing process. Take home valuable tools and techniques for effectively testing the security of your applications going forward.

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Security Testing for Testing Professionals

  1. 1.       rial      Presented by:  Jeff Payne  C   Brought to you by:      340 Corporate Way, Suite   Orange Park, FL 32073  888‐2 MF  AM Tuto 4/7/2014  8:30 AM          “Security Testing for Testing Professionals”      overos, Inc                   300, 68‐8770 ∙ 904‐278‐0524 ∙ sqeinfo@sqe.com ∙ www.sqe.com   
  2. 2.                              Jeff Payne is CEO and founder of Coveros, Inc., a software company that builds eros y s        Jeff Payne Coveros, Inc.   secure software applications using agile methods. Since its inception in 2008, Cov has become a market leader in secure agile principles and has been recognized by Inc. magazine as one of the fastest growing private US companies. Prior to founding Coveros, Jeff was chairman of the board, CEO, and cofounder of Cigital, Inc., a market leader in software security consulting. Jeff has published more than thirt papers on software development and testing, and testified before Congress on issue of national importance, including intellectual property rights, cyber terrorism, and software quality.
  3. 3. 1© Copyright 2013 Coveros Corporation. All rights reserved. Security Testing for Test Professional
  4. 4. 2© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Coveros helps organizations accelerate the delivery of secure, reliable software  Our consulting services: – Agile software development – Application security – Software quality assurance – Software process improvement  Our key markets: – Financial services – Healthcare – Defense – Critical Infrastructure Areas of Expertise About Coveros
  5. 5. 3© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Agenda  Introduction to Security Testing – Information security – Software security – Risk assessment – Security testing  Security Requirements & Planning – Functional security requirements – Non-functional security requirements – Test planning  Testing for Common Attacks  Integrating Security Testing into the Software Process
  6. 6. 4© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Trainer Jeffery Payne jeff.payne@coveros.com Jeffery Payne is CEO and founder of Coveros, Inc., a software company that helps organizations accelerate the delivery of secure, reliable software. Coveros uses agile development methods and a proven software assurance framework to build security and quality into software from the ground up. Prior to founding Coveros, Jeffery was Chairman of the Board, CEO, and co-founder of Cigital, Inc. Under his direction, Cigital became a leader in software security and software quality solutions, helping clients mitigate the risk of software failure. Jeffery is a recognized software expert and popular speaker at both business and technology conferences on a variety of software quality, security, and agile development topics. He has also testified before Congress on issues of national importance, including intellectual property rights, cyber-terrorism, Software research funding, and software quality.
  7. 7. 5© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Introduction to Security Testing
  8. 8. 6© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. When you hear the term “Information Security” or “Security Testing” … What do you think it means? What comes to mind? What is Information Security?
  9. 9. 7© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Definition of Information Security  Information Security means protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, perusal, inspection, recording or destruction.  The key concepts of Information Security include: – Confidentiality – Integrity – Availability – Authenticity – Non-Repudiation What is Information Security?
  10. 10. 8© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. The Software Security Problem Our IT systems are not castles any longer!
  11. 11. 9© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Why Software Security is Important
  12. 12. 10© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. How to Define Security Risk in Software Understanding Risk  Common Security Nomenclature – Risk: a possible future event which, if it occurs, will lead to an undesirable outcome – Threat: A potential cause of an undesirable outcome – Asset: Data, application, network, physical location, etc. that a threat may wish to access, steal, destroy, or deny others access to – Vulnerability: Any weakness, administrative process, or act of physical exposure that makes an information asset susceptible to exploit by a threat. – An exploit is a piece of software, a chunk of data, or sequence of commands that takes advantage of a vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer software, hardware, or something electronic. – Attack: the approach taken by a threat to exploit a vulnerability  Denial of service, spoofing, tampering, escalation of privilege
  13. 13. 11© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Risk Assessment  A risk assessment is commonly carried out by a team of people who have subject area knowledge of the business and product. Members of the team provide a qualitative analysis based on informed opinion of threats that will later be used in a more quantitative analysis.  The team should also define what is an acceptable amount of risk that the organization can assume. We assume we can’t identify all risks nor eliminate them; this is often referred to as residual risk. Understanding Risk
  14. 14. 12© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Risk Assessment  Break into teams of 2-3 people.  Each team will identify potential threats to a software application described on the next slide. – Who would want to compromise this application? – What assets would they be after if they did?  Once each threat is identified, provide impact and likelihood ratings (High, Medium, Low) for each threat. – Justify your answers  Exercise Time Limit: 15 Minutes Exercise
  15. 15. 13© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Your company, SecureTelco, has developed an instant messaging program to be used for private use in customers homes and for companies and government agencies.  SecureChat requires users to sign up with an account prior to using the system. After authenticating with a username and password, each user can message other users and expect their conversations to be private.  Users have the ability to add/remove friends from their contact list, search for friends based on their email, block users from IMing them, become “invisible” to all users on demand.  Messages archives and activities logs document user behavior and can be retrieved by the user or a SecreTelco Administrator through the application or by the administrative console, respectively. Risk Assessment Exercise
  16. 16. 14© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Risk Assessment Questions  Business / Mission Motivation – What is the importance/criticality of the system? – What assets exist in the system? – What is the impact if C, I, A principles violated?  User Capabilities and Exposure – How is access different for user roles? – What operations can each performed by different users?  Threat Motivation – Why might someone attack the system? – Who might want to attack? (insiders, outsiders) – What might attackers accomplish? – What’s the cost of failure? Exercise
  17. 17. 15© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Threats to system Assets of interest Exercise Results
  18. 18. 16© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. What? How?  Security Testing is testing used to determine whether an information system protects its data from its threats.  Security Testing is not a silver bullet for your enterprise security. Security Testing doesn’t fix your security, it only makes you aware of it. Security must be built into your software  A sound Security Testing process performs testing activities: – Before development begins – During requirements definition and software design – During implementation – During deployment – During maintenance and operations Security Testing
  19. 19. 17© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Provides a level of confidence that your system performs securely within specifications.  Security Testing is a preventative way to find small issues before they become big, expensive ones. – The 2007 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey performed an analysis of the average cost of a web security breach. The average loss reported in the survey was $350,424.  Security Testing ensures that people in your organization understand and obey security policies.  If involved right from the first phase of system development life cycle, security testing can help eliminate flaws in the design and implementation of the system. Why is it important? Security Testing
  20. 20. 18© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Major goals of security testing – Test the security features of a system – Test the security properties of a system – Test whether the system is implemented in a secure fashion  Security features are controls you’ve implemented to protect your system – Authentication, Authorization, Encryption, etc.  Security properties are closely associated with non- functional security requirements  Secure implementation means the software does not have embedded vulnerabilities due to poor design or coding practices Aspects of Security Testing Security Testing
  21. 21. 19© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Testing security features/controls is most akin to normal functional testing – Functional security requirements drive this testing – Integration of security features into overall application  Testing security properties requires tests that cross many features of the system – Develop tests based on non-functional security requirements and identified risks / threats – Tests that assure the implementation does not include known flaws and vulnerabilities Testing Aspects of Security Security Testing
  22. 22. 20© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Security Requirements
  23. 23. 21© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. What are Security Requirements? What is a Security Requirement?  Security Requirements describe functional and non- functional requirements that need to be satisfied in order to achieve the security attributes of an IT system or application. What does that mean?  Functional Security Requirements  Additions to functional requirements that define what the software should not do.  Requirements that define security controls  Non-Functional Security Requirements  Additional non-functional requirements that define what overall security the system must provide
  24. 24. 22© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Functional Requirements Your Standard Definition  Functional Requirements: These are statements of services the system should provide, how the system should react to particular inputs and how the system should behave in particular situations. In some cases, the functional requirements may also have explicitly state what the system should not do. Where does the Security fit in?  Security features should already have functional requirements associated with them  Don’t assume they are good or adequately address what the software should not do  Misuse and abuse cases should be defined to understand risks that a threat may utilize to attack the system  Make sure you check all features for misuse cases
  25. 25. 23© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Part of your security requirements involve security features, or security controls, that help protect your system  They define the way your system will behave with respect to other security properties and non-functional requirements  Examples: – Authentication and Identity Management – Authorization and Access Control – Input Validation & Encoding – Encryption – Error and Exception Handling – Auditing and Logging Security Features (aka Security Controls) Functional Security Requirements
  26. 26. 24© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Use cases describe functionality of how someone might use a system  Misuse cases describe how someone might (perhaps unintentionally) do something in the system with a negative security impact  Abuse cases describe how a malicious attacker might deliberately misuse your system to his advantage We use misuse and abuse cases to understand what our system must protect against and help design security tests Misuse and Abuse Cases Functional Security Requirements
  27. 27. 25© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Functional Security Requirements  Break into teams of 2-3 people.  Each team will identify potential misuse cases with the following security requirements, if any exist.  If a misuse case is identified, write a replacement or additional functional requirement(s). – It would be best to make sure no misuse cases can be derived from your new requirement(s).  Exercise Time Limit: 15 Minutes Exercise
  28. 28. 26© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  SecureChat Authentication Requirements – When a user attempts to authenticate with a valid username and an invalid password, the application shall not authenticate the user and return them to the authentication page. – The system must alert the user that their attempt to authenticate has failed due to an incorrect password (“Invalid Password”) utilizing the standard error text formatting. – When a user attempts to authenticate with a invalid username, the application shall not authenticate the user and return them to the authentication page. – The system must alert the user that their attempt to authenticate has failed due to an incorrect username (“Invalid Username”) utilizing the standard error text formatting. – What a user attempts to authenticate using a username and a valid password, the application shall authenticate the user and redirect them to the homepage. Functional Security Requirement Examples Exercise
  29. 29. 27© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Authentication Use Case (as requirements are written) Exercise Enter username and password User authentication Show invalid ID error msg Show invalid password msg SecureChat User SecureChat Server
  30. 30. 28© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Authentication Use/Misuse Case Artifact Exercise Enter username and password User authentication SecureChat User SecureChat Server Threat Threatens Mitigates Securitycontrols Attacks
  31. 31. 29© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Non-Functional Requirements Your Standard Definition  Non-Functional Requirements: These are constraints on the services or functions offered by the system.  Availability, Reliability, Performance, Scalability, Testability, Security Where does Security fit in?  Security is one of the cross-cutting concerns that must be addressed during testing  Threat modeling, architectural analysis, and code analysis are often used to enumerate risks and drive non-functional security testing  Tools can assist testing professionals with these efforts  Conformance with standards and regulations
  32. 32. 30© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Non-Functional Requirements Example Non-functional Security Requirements  Confidential data will not be accessible by users other than through the SecureChat client  SecureChat shall have an availability of 99.9% at all times  All communication with the Securechat central server must be encrypted using 128-bit encryption  SecureChat shall process a minimum of 8 transactions per second.  All SecureChat code shall be reviewed against our internal coding standards prior to release
  33. 33. 31© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Security Test Planning  Functional security tests based upon the functional security requirements should be planned, designed, and executed along with the rest of the functional testing – Typically covered by a combination of unit, feature, and integration testing activities – Don’t forget integration … COTS security features are often integrated incorrectly  Non-functional security tests should be planned, designed, and executed as followed: – Unit level: secure code scanning to identify vulnerabilities – Feature level: web application security testing plus any specific non- functional security requirements that can be performed at this level – Integration/System levels: more of the above based upon threats & risks – System level: end-to-end testing and penetration testing that must be done a production-like environment What goes where
  34. 34. 32© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Testing to Mitigate Common Attacks
  35. 35. 33© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Input Validation  Most common application security weakness: failure to properly validate input – From client – From environment (often overlooked)  Leads to many of the major vulnerabilities found in applications – Interpreter injection (SQL, JavaScript, XML, Command, …) – Locale/Unicode attacks – File system attacks – Buffer overflows  Data from a client application or a user should never be trusted as they are susceptible to injection attacks Common Attacks
  36. 36. 34© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Injection attacks result when input from a user is interpreted by a command processor or formed to manipulate the program stack/heap – These are, by far, the most rampant category of attacks over the past 20 years What are Injection Attacks? Common Attacks <body><p> <? $msg = “Hi, “ + $name + “.”; echo $msg ?> </p></body> <body><p> Hi, Joe. </p></body> $name = Joe <body><p> Hi, <script src=“http://www.bad.com/attack.js”/>. </p></body> $name = <script src=“http://bad.com/attack.js”/>
  37. 37. 35© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Input characters that aren’t expected – More input than expected – Different input than expected – Executable input that is unexected  Input encoded strings – Automatically converted/decoded by browsers and other frameworks These “mistakes” are what attackers leverage to trigger input vulnerabilities in our systems Common Input Mistakes Common Attacks
  38. 38. 36© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Types of Input Validation  Integrity Checks – Ensure that the data has not been tampered with and is the same as before. – Integrity checks must be included wherever data passes from a trusted to a less trusted boundary, such as from the application to the user's browser in a hidden field, or to a third party payment gateway, such as a transaction ID used internally upon return. – The type of integrity control (checksum, HMAC, encryption, digital signature) should be directly related to the risk of the data transiting the trust boundary.  Validation - Ensure that the data is strongly typed, correctly syntaxed, within length boundaries, contains only permitted characters or that numbers are correctly signed and within boundary ranges. – Validation must be performed on every tier. For example, the presentation layer should validate web related issues, persistence layers should validate for persistence issues, etc. Common Attacks
  39. 39. 37© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Input Validation Approaches  Accept Known Good – Check the data is one of a set of tightly constrained known good values – “Whitelist” validation – Only works when set of good values is small or previously identified  Reject Known Bad – Reject strings that contain potentially unacceptable characters (ex. If you’re not expecting JavaScript, reject %3f) – “Blacklist” validation – A dangerous strategy because the possible set of bad data is infinite; causes constant maintenance of blacklist  Sanitize – Rather than accept or reject, change the input into an acceptable format – Sound software engineering practice Validating Input
  40. 40. 38© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  A very common vulnerability  Allows an attacker to inject script into a vulnerable web system that attacks the user  Example: Cross-Site Scripting Common Input Attack #1 Type your name: Joe http://myweb.com/index.php Hi, Joe! http://myweb.com/index.php?name=Joe  What happens if we type our name as: <script>alert(“Joe Hacker!”)</script>
  41. 41. 39© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Reflected Cross-Site Scripting  Testing for Reflected Cross-Site Scripting – Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is another name for non- persistent XSS, where the attack doesn’t load with the vulnerable web application but is originated by the victim loading the offending URI using the victim’s credentials.  Commonly, an attacker creates and tests an offending URI, in which the victim loads the URI on their browser.  Attackers typically leverage these vulnerabilities to install key loggers, steal victim cookies, perform clipboard theft and change the content of the page – Testing Process  Detect Input Vectors  Analyze Each input vector to detect potential vulnerabilities. Input data is typically harmless, but triggers web browser responses.  Report on Findings  Analyze report and attempt to exploit with an attack that has a realistic impact on web application security. Cross Site Scripting
  42. 42. 40© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Stored Cross-Site Scripting  Testing for Stored Cross-Site Scripting – Stored XSS is the most dangerous type. Web applications that allow users to store data are potentially exposed to this type of attack.  This occurs when a web application gathers malicious input and stores, unfiltered, that input in a data store for later use. As a consequence the malicious data will appear to be part of the web site and run on the user’s browser.  The more privileges the end user has the more dangerous this attack is. – Testing Process  Identify input forms  Analyze HTML Code  Test for Stored XSS  Report on Findings  Analyze report and attempt to exploit with an attack that has a realistic impact on web application security. Cross Site Scripting
  43. 43. 41© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Cross Site Scripting Patterns (cont.)  Testing for DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting – DOM-based XSS is the name for bugs which are the result of active content on a page, typically obtaining user input and doing something unsafe with it to lead to a XSS bug.  In comparison to other cross site scripting vulnerabilities (reflected and stored XSS), where an unsanitized parameter is passed by the server, returned to the user and executed in the context of the user’s browser, a DOM based cross site scripting vulnerability controls the flow of the code by using elements of the Document Object Model (DOM) along with code crafted by the attacker to change the flow. – Manual testing is almost always required for this type of XSS attack and requires knowledge of the code, especially around any use of JavaScript. Cross Site Scripting
  44. 44. 42© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Cross Site Scripting Patterns (cont.)  Testing for Cross Site Flashing – ActionScript is the language used by Flash applications when dealing with interactive needs due to some poor implementation patterns.  New versions of Flash player are often released to mitigate some attacks, but poor programming practices often still result in exploits. – Manual testing is almost always required for this type of XSS attack and requires knowledge of the code, especially around any use of ActionScript. Cross Site Scripting
  45. 45. 43© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. SQL Injection  What is SQL Injection? – An SQL injection attack consists of the insertion or “injection” of an SQL query via input data from the client to the application. A successful exploit could read sensitive data, modify data, execute administrative operations, recover the content to a given file and, in some cases, issue commands to the operating system.  Types of SQL Injection – Inband – Data is extracted using the same channel that is used to inject SQL code. In the simplest form, the retrieved data is presented directly to the application web page. – Out-of-band – Data is retrieved using a different channel (e.g., an email with the results of the query is generated and sent to the tester). – Inferential – Data is not transferred, but the tester is able to reconstruct the information by sending particular requests and observing the resulting behavior of the DB Server. Common Input Attack #2
  46. 46. 44© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. SQL Injection Example  Consider the following SQL query: – SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Username='$username' AND Password='$password'  Assume the values of the input fields are obtained from the user through a web form. Suppose we insert the following Username and Password values: – $username = 1' or '1' = '1 – $password = 1' or '1' = '1  The query will be: – SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Username='1' OR '1' = '1' AND Password='1' OR '1' = '1' Common Attack #2: SQL Injection
  47. 47. 45© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. SQL Injection Example (cont.)  Another test involves the use of the UNION operator. We suppose for our examples that the query executed from the server is the following: – SELECT Name, Phone, Address FROM Users WHERE Id=$id  We will set the following Id value: – $id = 1 UNION ALL SELECT creditCardNumber,1,1 FROM CreditCardTable  NOTE: we have selected other two values. These two values are necessary, in order to avoid a syntax error.  We will have the following query: – SELECT Name, Phone, Address FROM Users WHERE Id=1 UNION ALL SELECT creditCardNumber,1,1 FROM CreditCardTable  The keyword ALL can be used to get around the DISTINCT keyword. SQL Injection
  48. 48. 46© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Testing for SQL Injection (cont.)  Where to look for SQL Injection – Authentication forms: Chances are high that the user credentials are checked against a database that contains all usernames and passwords (or their password hashes) – Search Engines: Strings submitted could be used in a query that extracts relevant records from a database. – E-Commerce Sites: Products and their characteristics are very likely to be stored in a database. – Use your inherent knowledge of your application to pinpoint your testing efforts. SQL Injection
  49. 49. 47© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  Testing for all cases of injection attacks can be laborious  There are lots of tools out there to help  Leverage tools but also make sure validation code is correct  Understand architecture to test unique components that include scripting / executable capabilities Use Tools! Common Attacks
  50. 50. 48© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Integrating Security into Your Testing Process
  51. 51. 49© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. How do you add Security in? Software Development Life Cycle Define Use/Abuse cases Security requirements Assess threats and assets Design Threat modeling Security test planning Develop Deploy Static Analysis Risk-based security testing Penetration testing
  52. 52. 50© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Classes of Tools  Risk-based security testing tools – Proactive web app scanners – Proxies – Fuzzers  Secure code scanning tools  Threat modeling (planning tool)  Network scanning tools  Password Crackers Tools to Support Security Testing
  53. 53. 51© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Web Application Scanners and Proxies  Where to use? – Looking for XSS, Injection and input validation vulnerabilities; some tools will attempt to actively exploit vulnerabilities.  Free Tools – Zed Attack Proxy – Nikto – W3af – Paros – Skipfish – Wapiti – wfuzz  Paid Tools – Netsparker – WebSecurify – Big Commercial: IBM AppScan, Cenzic Hailstorm, HP WebInspect Tools to Support Security Testing
  54. 54. 52© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Password Crackers & Brute Force Tools  Where to use? – When you want to break the default credentials or test your authentication mechanisms against common security tools.  Free Tools – THC Hydra – Cain and Abel – Wfuzz  Paid Tools – John the Ripper Tools to Support Security Testing
  55. 55. 53© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Network Security Tools  Where to use? – Scanning for mis-configurations – Testing for OS, application and network vulnerabilities  Free Tools – OpenVAS  Paid Tools – Nessus – Core Impact Tools to Support Security Testing
  56. 56. 54© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Wrap-Up
  57. 57. 55© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved.  OWASP Foundation, “OWASP Testing Guide v3”, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Project, 2008  Hope and Walther, “Web Security Testing Cookbook: Systematic Techniques to Find Problems Fast,” O’Reilly, 2008  Whittaker and Thompson, “How to Break Software Security,” Addison-Wesley, 2003  Schneier, Bruce, “Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World,” Wiley, 2000 References
  58. 58. 56© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Questions? Contact Information: http://www.coveros.com info@coveros.com 703.431.2920
  59. 59. 57© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Answers to Exercises* * There are numerous possible answers to some exercises, these show one possible answer
  60. 60. 58© Copyright 2013 Coveros, Inc.. All rights reserved. Formal Authentication Use/Misuse Case Artifact Exercise Enter username and password User authentication Show generic error message Lock account after N failed login attempts Validate password minimum length and complexity SecureChat User SecureChat Server Hacker Brute Force Attack Guess User Accounts Dictionary Attacks Threatens Mitigates Mitigates Mitigates Mitigates

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