Ocean of DiscoveryFACULTY OF MARINE SCIENCE AND MARITIME TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT OF MARITIME TECHNOLOGY By O.O. Sulaiman PhD, CEng, CMarEng
Ocean of DiscoveryRisk and Hazard Operability Process Of Deep Water Marine System Sulaiman1, W.B. Wan Nik2, A. H. Saharuddin3, A.S.A.kader4, M.F. Ahmad5 O 12/9/2010 28
i. INTRODUCTIONii. RELATED WORKiii. RISK PROCESS/ HAZOP PROCESSiv. CONCLUSION
Introduction the word of water, maritime accident and consequential casualties. increasing deep sea operation challenge of design for safety , environment, reliability and sustainability uncertainty associated with deep sea operation, system complexity , environmental impose and human errors warrant need for the use of scientific , reliability and risk base model for sustainable, efficient and reliable system design Uncertainty associated with HAZID -> use of HAZOP as one of the best method for HAZID 11/23/2012 4
Related Problem i. Alpha piper ii. BP oil spill iii. Exon ValdezGHG Amount Industrial contributionCO2 67.5%, Combustion energy sector accounted for 86.7% of total CO2 emissions, landfills (46.8%) and fugitive emissions from oil and gas (26.6%)CH4 32.4% landfills (46.8%) and fugitive emissions from oil and gas (26.6%) accounted for 73.4% of total CH4 emissionsN2O 0.1% Traditional biomass fuels accounted for 86.4% of total N2O emissions 11/23/2012 5
KEY STUDIESInternational Maritime Organisation (IMO)., (2006): Amendments to theGuidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO RuleMaking Process. 2006., MSC/ – MEPC.2 / Circ 5 (MSC/Circ.1023 –MEPC/Circ.392).Parry, G. (1996), The Characterization of Uncertainty inProbabilistic Risk Assessments of Complex Systems. ReliabilityEngineering and System Safety. 54:2-3., 119-126.N. ,, Soares, C., A. P. Teixeira. (2001).Risk Assessment in MaritimeTransportation. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 74:3.,.,299-309.UK, HSE, 1999, Offshore Technology Report” Effective CollisionRisk Management for Offshore Instalation, UK, London
2.LIERATURE REVIEW Major References Best Practice Human Error Data and ProcessUS “The US Coast Guard’s (USCG) risk-based decision-making guidelinesCoast categorize human error into four categories, which form a matrix: intentionalGuard’s errors, unintentional errors, errors of omission, and errors of commission”(USCG) “An error of omission occurs when an operator fails to perform a step or task. An error of commission occurs when an operator performs a step or task incorrectly .”Nivolian “ Technical factors are more readily resolved than human factors throughitou et. technological and regulatory “fixes” leaving human-related errors andal (2004) breakdowns as the probable cause of industrial accidents.”Hee et. “ Hee et. al concluded that human inputs to technological and engineeringal (1999) processes may actually contribute to accident risks from the begin stages of equipment design.” Human 11/23/2012Factors vs. Human Errors 7 (based on Gordon, 1998)
Best Practice Institution Studies Model Application DrawbackThe Norwegian Guidelines on how to apply risk analysis to meet its Brown et al Environmental performance of tankers Damage analysis (1996) deal only with oil spillPetroleum regulationsDirectorate Sirkar et al Consequences of collisions and Difficulties on (1997) groundings quantifyingUK Health & Guidance on risk assessment in the context of consequence metricsSafety Executive Offshore Safety Cases Brown and Hybrid use of risk assessment, Oil spill assessmentCanada- Guidance on installation Safety Analysis to help Amrozowicz probabilistic simulation and a spill limited to use of fault (2000) consequence assessment model treeNewfoundland operators meet its regulationsOffshore Petroleum Sirkar et al Monte Carlo technique to estimate Lack of cost dataBoard (1997) damage and+ spill cost analysis for environmental damageAmerican Recommended practice for design and hazardPetroleum Institute analysis offshore production platforms. IMO (IMO 13F Pollution prevention index from Lack (Sirkar et al (1995) probability distributions damage and (1997) rational oil spill.The UK Offshore Procedure for the conduct of formal safety Research Alternative rational approach to Lack employment ofoperators assessment of offshore installations, with very brief Council measuring impact of oil spills stochasticAssociations coverage of hazard assessment. Committee(199 probabilistic methods 9)Pitblado & Turney Introduction to QRA for the process industries,(1995) Prince William The most complete risk assessment Lack of logical risk Sound, Alaska, assessmentAven (1992) Discussion of offshore QRA, focusing in particular (PWS (1996) framework (NRC on reliability analysis. (1998)) Volpe National Accident probabilities using statistics Lack employment ofCrook (1997) Qualitative review of recent technical and Transportation and expert opinion. stochastic methods regulatory developments in the field of safety Center (1997)). against fire, inherently safer design, and human factor. Puget Sound Simulation or on expert opinion for Clean up cost and Area, USCG cost benefit analysis environmentalBrian Veitch Rescue and evacuation from offshore platform (1999)) damage omission 11/23/2012 8
3.0 Qualitative Analysis Process Methods: Case study Baseline data• Qualitative: Determine and collect the ship paint• constructivist, naturalistic, application parameters and standards. interpretive, postpositivist or postmodern perspective.(Creswell, Interviews:- Industry, ship Owner, classification 2003) Society (Lloyd’s Register of Shipping), - Manufacturer• Used to describe the overall Phone calls framework/procedure• used to look at reality,• based on a philosophical stance Data analysis- HAZOP, expert rating - models identify basic concepts and describe what reality is like, and the conditions by which we can study it. Deductive recommendation - ideas identified in models are refer to concepts.
DATA ANALYSIS POP&C – POLLUTION PREVENTION & CONTROL Safe Transportation of Hazardous Goods by Tankers PASSIVE SAFETY ACTIVE SAFETY P2 P3 C alibration of P5 P6 Probabilis tic Index-A us ing pertinent s ce rio na s to match his torical ris k Po llu tio n Preven tion En v iro n m tal Impact A s en sessmnt e LOSS OF WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY LO SS O F D AMAG E FIR E/ EX PLOSION STA BILITY / p f1 SIN K A GE Pfd(Waterways and vessel OIL OU TFLOW- Co RISK RED U CTIO N COLLISION/ MEA SU RES/ Database) STA Y A FLOAT HAZID GR OU N DING LOSS OF V ESSEL-Cp IN CID EN T P fi MA N A G EMENT p f2 P4 Rf LOSS OF D EA TH/IN J UR Y - Cl STR U C TU RA L STRU CTU RA L P7 FA ILU R E IN TEG RITY p f3 P fs Po llu tio n Mitig atio n an d Con trol C alibration of En v iro n m tal Impact A s en sessmnt e Pf through pertinent s cenarios , us ing s tructural reliability, to match his torical ris k Formalised Risk Assessment or Risk -Based Design of Tankers Risk = Σ w. Pfi x Σ w. C i. Rf 11/23/2012 10
Qualitative and Quantitative TechniquesQualitative Application Quantitative tools ApplicationMethods Frequency and Consequence Involve analysis of causalChecklist Ensure that organizations are complying with standard practice Analysis factor and impact of accident Failure Modes and Effects Use to analyse the componentsSafety/Review Identify equipment conditions or operating procedures that could Analysis (FMEA) (equipment) failure modes andAudit lead to a casualty or result in property damage or environmental the impacts on the surrounding impacts. components and the systemWhat-If Identify hazards, hazardous situations, or specific accident events that could lead to undesirable consequences. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Use to analyse combinations of equipment failures andHazard and Identify system deviations and their causes that can lead to human errors that can result inOperability undesirable consequences and determine recommended actions to an accidentStudy reduce the frequency and/or consequences of the deviations. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Use to analyse various(HAZOP) consequences of events, bothPreliminary Identify and prioritize hazards leading to undesirable failures and successes that canHazard consequences early in the life of a system. lead to an accident.Analysis(PrHA) Determine recommended actions to reduce the frequency and/or Technique for Human Use to analyse human error consequences of prioritized hazards. Performance Reliability Prediction (THERP) Components ofrisk based method 11/23/2012 11
Components of Risk based MethodsComponents of RBM Cause of Accident Process Suitable techniquesHAZID HAZOP, What if analysis, FMEA, FMECARisk analysis FTA, ETARisk Influence diagram,evaluation decision analysisRisk control Regulatory, economic,option environmental and function elements matching and iterationCost benefit ICAF, Net BenefitanalysisHuman Simulation/ ProbabilisticreliabilityUncertainty Simulation/probabilisticRisk Simulation/ probabilisticMonitoring
HAZOP PROCESS• A HAZOP analysis is detail HAZID, it mostly divided into section or nodes involve systemic thinking and assessment a systematic manner the hazards associated to the operation. Hazard operability (HAZOP) is done to ensure that the systems are designed for safe operation with respect to personnel, environment and asset.• In HAZOP all potential hazard and error, including operational issues related to the design is identified. The quality of the HAZOP depends on the participants. Good quality of HAZOP participants are (HSE, 1999): Politeness and unterupting To the point discussion- avoid endless discussion Be active and positive Be responsible Allow HAZOP leader to lead
HAZOP PROCESS• It involve How to apply the API 14C for those process hazard with potential of the Major Accident.• Dynamic simulation for consequence assessment of the process deviation, failure on demand and spurious function of the safety system, alarm function and operator intervention is very important for HAZOP study.• Identification of HAZOP is followed with application of combined Event tree and Fault tree analysis for determination of safety critical elements, training requirement for the operators and integrity and review of maintenance manuals.
HAZOP PROCESS• HAZOP process is as followed:• Guide word/ brainstorming -> Deviation -> Consequence -> Safeguard - >Recommended actionPropulsion failure HAZOP could follow the following:• Guide word :i.e. No pitch, No blade• Description: I.e. No rotational energy transformed, object in water break the blade• Causes: i.e. operation control mechanism• Safety measurement to address implementation of propeller protection such grating, jet• Also important HAZOP, is implementation of IEC61511 to assess the hazards associated to failure on demand and spurious trips,• In HAZOP record the worksheets efficiently to cover all phases also play important role.
HAZOP PROCESS• Advance HAZOP can also e implemented through Simulation operations to identify, quantify, and evaluate the risks. SIMOP Methodology includes:• Consequence Assessment• Frequency Analysis• Risk Calculation• Risk Analysis• Safety Criticality Elements• HAZOP is not intended to solve everything in a meeting. Identified hazard is solved in the closing process of the finding from the study. Table 2 shows typical HAZOP report.• Safety barrier management involve optimisation between the preventive and mitigation measures fundamental.• To determination of the safety critical elements (SCE), performance standards for the design of safety Critical Elements and in integrity assurance.
HAZOP PROCESS• Safety level integrity (SIL) involves assessment and verification according to IEC61508 and IEC61511Qualitative SIL assessment uses the risk graphs and calibration tables during the brainstorming sessions where the required SIL is assigned to the safety systems.• dynamic simulation could be optimised with greater accuracy. This saves a significant effort, time and cost for the project. It involve application of HAZOP & SIL assessment Alarm Management Fire & Explosion Stud Case study
Fire Accident Scenario AnalysisCompression Fire Hot work 3areaManifold area Toxicity Radio active 4 productsHP gas area PPE 2Separation Management If PTW is not 3area of work followed correctly permit (A) , the accident may happenCompressor Fire & 3 Loading Condition Loading Conditionarea Explosion Model ModelProcess area Handling Halting of 4 Engine Engine proximity of room room Fire Protection Model Fire Protection Model process under pressure CONSEQUENCEUntility area Fire fighting No availability of 2 Cargo leakage Model Cargo leakage Model Fire Explosion Fire Explosion system Fire Fighting Model consequence consequence Model Accommodation Accommodation systemSeparation Fire & Escape routes are 3 LPG Hazard Model LPG Hazard Model Explosion obstructed PPE Contractor not 2 Suvivability Model Suvivability Model using PPE Compressor Compressor PPE 3 room room Evacuation model Evacuation modelTank area Fire No Fire & Gas 2 detectionCompression Explosion Escape routes are 3area obstructedCompression Fire Hot work 3areaManfold area Toxicity Radio active 4 products
Data and ModelAssessment of rainfall-Runoff modelAssess the impacts of wind loadingAssessment of wave loadingAssessment of system designAssessment of disposalAssessment of dynamic positioningAssessment of energy systemAssessment of passing vesselAssessment of human reliability analysisAssessment of locationAssessment of historical data11/23/2012 21
(v). ACCIDENT DATA Primary data Secondary data from UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)Categorized different types of marine casualties and incidents Risk based regulation risk based operation risk based design Total risk concept Risk based method Technolohgy element Environmetal elements Human elementRisk (R) = Probability (P) X Consequence (C) 11/23/2012 22
System Risk Analysis: Components of System Vs Standard Compliance Analysis High level goal assessment / Safety and environmental protection objective Tier -Standards requirement 1&2 - Functional requirement Goal Analysis criteria compliance verification of Goal based Tier 3 Regulatory instruments/ Classification rules, industrial Tier 4 standards Class guides, technical procedure Design process process Approval Secondary standards for company or individual system - Code of practice, safety and quality systems Tier 5 shipbuilding, operation maintenance and manning11/23/2012 23
System Level Analysis -Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Simplified Processes of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Action & Check STEP 1: Identify a Failure Mode Risk Priority STEP 2: Number Determine (RPN) Severity FMEA STEP 4: STEP 3: Determine Determine Detectability Occurrence11/23/2012 25 RPN = Severity Rating x Occurrence Rating x Detection Rating
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)Five steps of FTA: Define the undesired event to studyi. Obtain an understanding of the systemii. Construct the fault treeiii. Evaluate the fault treeiv. Control the hazards identified Output event Output event Basic Undeveloped Event EventAND ORGate Gate Input events Input events Figure 1: Logic Gates & Typical Primary Events11/23/2012 26
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)ETA process:i. Define the system.ii. Identify the accident scenarios.iii. Identify the initiating event (IE).iv. Identify pivotal events.v. Build the event tree diagram.vi. Obtain the failure event probabilities.vii.Identify the outcome risk. 11/23/2012 27
Accident Consequence Modeling C11Causes Accident C12 Categories d an ort ate nsp F ra T C1 C2 C3 Failures, Human and Organizational Errors, Environmental Stressors Safeguards, Barriers, Operational Controls, Risk Control Options C 28 Consequences
As Low as Reasonable Possible Principle (ALARP), RiskAcceptability Criteria, cost Effectiveness Assessment (CEA) Scenario Probability Consequence Cumulative Probability S1 P1 C1 P1=P1+P2 S2 P2 C2 P2=P3+P2 Si Pi Ci Pi=Pi+3+Pi Sn+1 Pn+1 Cn+1 Pn-1=Pn+Pn+1 Sn Pn Cn Pn=Pn11/23/2012 29
Cost Benefit Analysis, RCO• Risk control measures are used to group risk into a limited number of well practical regulatory and capability options. Risk Control Option (RCO) aimed to achieve (David, 1996): – Preventive: reduce probability of occurrence – Mitigation: reduce severity of consequence• In estimating RCO, the following are taken into consideration:• DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Years) or QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Years)• LQI (Life Quality Index)• GCAF (Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality)• NCAF (Net Cost of Averting a Fatality)• ICAF (Implied Cost of Averting Fatality 11/23/2012 31
Sustainability Analysis costt Diferent between cost of polution control and environmetal damage Minimum sum of cost Cost of polution control High damage cost with no control No economic gain from polusion control Cost of damage from polution Minimum sum of cost11/23/2012 32
Validation Frequency model Consequence Model ALARP11/23/2012 33
Validation of HAZOPExpert Rating workshop:Industry ManufactureClassification SocietyOperatoraccademecian
Conclusion• Following need for maritime activities to operate in much harsh condition, institutions are adopting system based approach that account for total risk associated with system lifecycle to protect the environment and prevent accident.• Employment of risk method to address each contributing factor to accident is very important. Qualitative risk in system description and hazard identification can best be tackled through HAZOP.• The outcome of HAZOP can be processed in quantitative analysis which may include probabilistic and stochastic dynamic simulation process for system level analysis, while fault tree and event tree quantitative analysis can be utilized to determine risk index• Translation of dynamic risk analysis can be translated into ALARP influence diagram can provide decision support risk cost control option towards sustainable, reliable, efficient propulsion technology choice y for system design and operability.