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CAUSAL MODEL FOR THE FORENSIC INVESTIGATION OF STRUCTURAL FAILURES_SEMC2013

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CAUSAL MODEL FOR THE FORENSIC INVESTIGATION OF STRUCTURAL FAILURES_Arangio, Crosti, Bontempi_SEMC2013

CAUSAL MODEL FOR THE FORENSIC INVESTIGATION OF STRUCTURAL FAILURES_Arangio, Crosti, Bontempi_SEMC2013

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  • 1. CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA, 2-4 SEPTEMBER 2013 CAUSAL MODEL FOR THE FORENSICCAUSAL MODEL FOR THE FORENSIC INVESTIGATION OF STRUCTURAL FAILURES Stefania Arangio, Chiara Crosti, Franco Bontempi ““SapienzaSapienza” University of Roma,” University of Roma, stefania.arangio@uniroma1.itstefania.arangio@uniroma1.it,, chiara.crostichiara.crosti@uniroma1.it@uniroma1.it,, francofranco.bontempi.bontempi@uniroma1.it@uniroma1.it
  • 2. OUTLINES •STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY •DEVELOPMENT OF FAILURES (Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model) •BREAKDOWN OF THE PROBLEM BASIC CONCEPTS OPERATIONAL TOOLS FRAMEWORK OF THE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES 2/20 •ANALYSIS OF THE TIMELINE TOOLS •ASSIGNMENT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY PROFILES chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 3. 3/20 COUPLING INTERACTIONS/CONNECTIONS Tight Perrow, 1984 COMPLEXITY EXISTING ADJACENT MASONRY BUILDINGS. chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it BEHAVIOR Linear Nonlinear UNCERTAINTIES Low High Loose
  • 4. 4/20 COMPLEXITY EN 1998-3: 2005 (E) chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 5. 5/20 NTC 2008 (Italian Building Code) AGGREGATE OF BUILDINGS •Delimited by an open space; •Composed by various adjacent non uniform constructions; •Built in different epochs; •Built with different materials; COMPLEXITY chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it •Built with different materials; •They had different owners; •Experienced different uses and modifications during time Neglecting these aspects can have significant consequences on the structures even up the occurrence of catastrophic collapses
  • 6. OUTLINES •STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY •DEVELOPMENT OF FAILURES (Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model) •BREAKDOWN OF THE PROBLEM BASIC CONCEPTS OPERATIONAL TOOLS FRAMEWORK OF THE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES 6/20 •ANALYSIS OF THE TIMELINE TOOLS •ASSIGNMENT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY PROFILES chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 7. ERRORI LATENTI A LIVELLO LOCAL BEHAVIORS LATENT ERRORS ACCIDENTAL CONDITIONS LATENT ERRORS IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND DESIGN 7/20 Reason, 1991 DEVELOPMENT OF FAILURES SWISS CHEESE MODEL PRECURSORI PSCOLOGICI AZIONI CHE AGISCONO ACTIONS THAT IINFLUENCE THE SAFETY PSICOLOGICAL PRECURSORS INTRINSIC SAFETY FAILURE chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 8. OUTLINES •STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY •DEVELOPMENT OF FAILURES (Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model) •BREAKDOWN OF THE PROBLEM BASIC CONCEPTS OPERATIONAL TOOLS FRAMEWORK OF THE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES 8/20 •ANALYSIS OF THE TIMELINE TOOLS •ASSIGNMENT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY PROFILES chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 9. DEFINITION OF PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS / GLOBAL PARTS DEFINITION OF INTERFACE VARIABLES / COMPONENTS DEFINITION OF DEFINITION OF PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS / GLOBAL PARTS DEFINITION OF INTERFACE VARIABLES / COMPONENTS DEFINITION OF 9/20 BREAKDOWN TOP-DOWN APPROACH BOTTOM-UP APPROACH DEFINITION OF DETAILED FUNCTIONS / LOCAL ELEMENTS DEFINITION OF DETAILED FUNCTIONS / LOCAL ELEMENTS chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it Reverse Engineering Approach – Back Analysis Techniques
  • 10. AUTORIZZATI I PERITI - AD ESEGUIRE IL SOPRALLUOGO SUI LUOGHI DI CAUSA; - AD ACQUISIRE E PRENDERE VISIONE DELLA DOUMENTAZIONE GIA' IN ATTI; - AD ACQUISIRE EVENTUALE ULTERIORE DOCUMENTAZIONE RITENUTA NECESSARIA PRESSO UFFICI PUBBLICI E PRIVATI (previo avviso e eventuamente alla presenza dei consulenti di parte) 1) Accertino i periti la casua del disastro colposo di cui all'imputazione provvisoria sub A), con particolare riferimento anche alla: 1-a) correttezza o meno (sotto il profilo tecnico) della progettazione e della direzione dei lavori da parte dell'arch. Giovanni PAPARELLA; 1-b) correttezza o meno - del "piano di demolizione" elaborato nel febbraio 2008 dal geom. Vincenzo ZAGARIA, - del "piano di sicurezza e coordinamento" elaborato dal medesimo ZAGARIA, e - del "piano operativo di sicurezza' redatto da 2) 3) 4) Riferiscano quant'altro necessario e utile ai fini di giustizia. Iperitisarannotenutiatenerecontodelleosservazionichesarannoformulatenelcorsodelleoperazioniperitalidaiconsulentitecnici,nominatidalleparti,ea renderneloroadeguatamotivazionenellarelazioneperitale. 2-a) Accertino i periti la legittimita' degli atti del procedimento amministrativo sfociato nella deliberazione del consiglio comunale della Citta' di Barletta n.4 del 10.1.2008 e degli atti anche di provenienza privata, a quella deliberazione conseguiti, comprese la d.i.a. prot. n. 7001 dell'1.2.2008 e allegati e la successiva d.i.a. prot.50018 del 3-a) Effettuino i periti un esame comparato degli elaborati grafici posti a corredo delle due denunce di inizio attivita', la n.7001 dell'1.2.2008 e la n. 50018 del 18.8.2010, al fine di constatare se il restringimento operato sulle planimetrie allegate alle due d.i.a. riguardasse il solo lato confinante con l'edificio prospiciente di Via de Leon o anche gli altri lati del quadrlatero interessato dall'intervento edilizio Giannini; 1 2 3 BREAKDOWN10/20 chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it Salvatore CHIARULLI nell'agosto 2008; 1-c) correttezza o meno delle modalita' di demolizione concretamente poste in essere a far data dall'ottobre 2008; 1-d) violazione o meno delle norme per la prevenzione degli infortuni sul lavoro eziologicamente influenti sulla produzione del disastro; 1-e) correttezza o meno delle determinazioni assunte dall'Ing. Rosario PALMITESSA all'esito del sopralluogo del 30.9.2011, tenuto conto del reale stato dei luoghi; 1-f) correttezza o meno della condotta tenuta dall'Ufficio Edilizia Pubblica e Privata del Comune di Barletta a fronte della comunicazione prot. n. 56024 del 21.9.2011 inviata dall'arch. Giovanni PAPARELLA al Dirigente del Settore Edilizia arch. Francesco GIANFERRINI, in considerazione delle problematiche concernenti la pubblica e privata incolumita' da quell'Ufficio gia' affrontate in relazione all'immobile con accesso da via De Leon n.6;; 1-g) violazione o meno della normativa in tema di costruzioni in zona sismica. Iperitisarannotenutiatenerecontodelleosservazionichesarannoformulatenelcorsodelleoperazioniperitalidaiconsulentitecnici,nominatidalleparti,ea renderneloroadeguatamotivazionenellarelazioneperitale. 18.82010; 2-b) Accertino i periti se, a fronte della perizia giurata dell'arch. Giovanni Paparella del 29.5.2006 con gli allegati relativi (gia' in atti), vi fosse l'obbligo, fissato espressamente da una norma di legge, per l'Ufficio Tecnico del Comune di Barletta di verificare la corrispondenza della situazione dei luoghi, rappresentati nella perizia giurata, alla situazione reale degli stessi, tenendo anche conto del Regolamento Edilizio Comunale vigente al momento dei fatti. 3-b) precisino e specifichino i periti, la natura e le modalita' esecutive delle indagini finalizzate all'esecuzione delle palificate ed iniezioni sui confini, alle quali l'arch. Paparella fa riferimento nell'Ordine di Servizio del 21.9.2011 e alle cui operazioni quell'ordine di servizio e' anche finalizzato, sia all'interno del cantiere sia nelle proprieta' confinanti e specifichino la compatibilita' e la possibilita' di esecuzione di tali indagini con lo stato dei residui corpi di fabbrica, al netto di quanto gia' demolito alla data del 21 settembre 2011, come rappresentato negli elaboati grafici e fotografici, gia dpositati a corredo della consulenza del pubblico ministero; 3-c) verifichino e accertino i periti la storia amministrativa e strutturale dell'intero edificio crollato, con specifico riferimento agli aspetti tecnico-costruttivi e agli eventuali interventi di ristrutturazione, ampliamento, sopraelevazione, sostituzione o modifica di parti strutturali, nonche' alla regolarita' amministrativa e progettuale di tali opere, ove e nella misura in cui siano state effettuate.
  • 11. EXAMPLE OF BACK ANALYSIS PROCESS: COLLAPSE OF AN AGGREGATE OF BUILDINGS BREAKDOWN A B 11/20 chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 12. BREAKDOWN [1] Master Thesis : “Analisi non lineare di aggregati edilizi in muratura”, Student: Molinaro S., Advisor: Bontempi F., Co-Advisor: Arangio S. Geometry Finite Element Model [1] 12/20 chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 13. BREAKDOWN [1] Master Thesis : “Analisi non lineare di aggregati edilizi in muratura”, Student: Molinaro S., Advisor: Bontempi F., Co-Advisor: Arangio S. 13/20 chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it Mechanical properties of the masonry Volume weight w 18 kN/m3 Longitudinal elastic modulus E (cracked conditions) 500 N/mm2 Tangential elastic modulus G (cracked conditions) 200 N/mm2 Compression strength fm 200 N/cm2 Design compression strength fd 166.7 N/cm2 Shear strength (o fvm0) in absence of normal stress 3.5 N/cm2 Design shear strength t0d (o fvd0) in absence of normal stress 2.9 N/cm2 [1]
  • 14. Modeling of the various steps of the demolition BREAKDOWN common wall Horizontal actions due to vaulted ceilings [1] 14/20 chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it step 1 step 2 step 3 Step 1: represents the situation before demolition Step 2: shows an advanced condition of demolition where most of vaults of building A have been eliminated and the lateral thrust of the vaults of building B are sustained mainly by the buttresses Step 3: the remaining part of building A was demolished and the wall alone could not sustain all the actions.
  • 15. BREAKDOWN Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 15/20 chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it In color only the deformation between 0.0028 and 0.015 (limit in the Italian Building Code) [1]
  • 16. OUTLINES •STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY •DEVELOPMENT OF FAILURES (Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model) •BREAKDOWN OF THE PROBLEM BASIC CONCEPTS OPERATIONAL TOOLS FRAMEWORK OF THE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES 16/20 •ANALYSIS OF THE TIMELINE TOOLS •ASSIGNMENT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY PROFILES chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 17. DESIGN/STRUCTURAL ASPECTS NOT ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXISTING STRUCTURAL SYSTEM (AGGREGATE OF BUILDINGS) DEFICIENT DESIGN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE TECHNICAL CODE STARTCOLLAPSE TIMELINE DESIGN PHASE REALIZATION PHASE EXAMPLE OF BACK ANALYSIS PROCESS: COLLAPSE OF AN AGGREGATE OF BUILDINGS 17/20 CONSTRUCTION ASPECTS/ SAFETY AT WORK NOT ADEQUATE DEMOLITION ACTIVITIES SCARCE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES SCARCE CONTROL ACTIVITIES/ DIRECTION/ SAFETY RELATED ACTIVITIES DEFICENT DEMOLITION PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION URBAN AUTHORIZATION chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES
  • 18. DESIGN/STRUCTURAL ASPECTS NOT ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXISTING STRUCTURAL SYSTEM (AGGREGATE OF BUILDINGS) DEFICIENT DESIGN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE TECHNICAL CODE STARTCOLLAPSE TIMELINE DEMOLITION /RECONSTRUCTION OF A BUILDING THAT ENDED WITH A COLLAPSE CAUSAL JOINT 18/20 CONSTRUCTION ASPECTS/ SAFETY AT WORK NOT ADEQUATE DEMOLITION ACTIVITIES SCARCE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES SCARCE CONTROL ACTIVITIES/ DIRECTION/ SAFETY RELATED ACTIVITIES DEFICENT DEMOLITION PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION URBAN AUTHORIZATION chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 19. OUTLINES •STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY •DEVELOPMENT OF FAILURES (Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model) •BREAKDOWN OF THE PROBLEM BASIC CONCEPTS OPERATIONAL TOOLS FRAMEWORK OF THE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES 19/20 •ANALYSIS OF THE TIMELINE TOOLS •ASSIGNMENT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY PROFILES chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it
  • 20. DESIGN/STRUCTURAL ASPECTS NOT ADEQUATE DEMOLITION ACTIVITIES NOT ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXISTING STRUCTURAL SYSTEM (AGGREGATE OF BUILDINGS) DEFICIENT DESIGN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE TECHNICAL CODE STARTCOLLAPSE Responsability RESPONSIBILITY PROFILE20/20 CONSTRUCTION ASPECTS/ SAFETY AT WORK ACTIVITIES SCARCE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES SCARCE CONTROL ACTIVITIES/ DIRECTION/ SAFETY RELATED ACTIVITIES DEFICENT DEMOLITION PLAN ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION URBAN AUTHORIZATION chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it Time
  • 21. ATTRIBUTES RELIABILITY FAULT DEPENDABILITY of STRUCTURAL AVAILABILITY SAFETY MAINTAINABILITY it is a defect and represents a potential cause of error, active or dormant INTEGRITY A way to assess the dependability of a system the trustworthiness of a system which allows reliance to be justifiably placed on the service it delivers SECURITY High level / active performance Low level / passive performance ATTRIBUTES RELIABILITYRELIABILITY FAULT DEPENDABILITY of STRUCTURAL AVAILABILITY SAFETY MAINTAINABILITY it is a defect and represents a potential cause of error, active or dormant INTEGRITY A way to assess the dependability of a system the trustworthiness of a system which allows reliance to be justifiably placed on the service it delivers SECURITY High level / active performance Low level / passive performance 3/22 THREATS MEANS FAILURE ERROR FAULT TOLERANT DESIGN FAULT DETECTION FAULT DIAGNOSIS FAULT MANAGING STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS permanent interruption of a system ability to perform a required function under specified operating conditions the system is in an incorrect state: it may or may not cause failure ways to increase the dependability of a system An understanding of the things that can affect the dependability of a system THREATS MEANSMEANS FAILURE ERROR FAULT TOLERANT DESIGN FAULT TOLERANT DESIGN FAULT DETECTIONFAULT DETECTION FAULT DIAGNOSISFAULT DIAGNOSIS FAULT MANAGINGFAULT MANAGING STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS permanent interruption of a system ability to perform a required function under specified operating conditions the system is in an incorrect state: it may or may not cause failure ways to increase the dependability of a system An understanding of the things that can affect the dependability of a system chiara.crosti@uniroma1.it

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