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  • Abstract Responsibility, Accountability and Enablement in Civil Society Engagements with the Direction of Innovation   This paper will start by examining mainstream European policy debates around 'knowledge society', 'innovation union', 'public engagement' and 'responsible innovation'. It will argue that these should not be taken at face value. Though some opportunities are presented for progressive 'opening up' of the politics of science and technology, there are also countervailing forces. Indeed (in areas like health, energy, materials and 'security'), many such policy initiatives are better understood as means by which powerful incumbent interests secure instrumental legitimation of favoured directions for innovation.   It will be shown how - despite interesting developments - conventional academic innovation studies systematically neglects the diverse impacts of civil society in 'innovation governance'. It will explore similar neglect of the crucial roles for democratic politics in studies of 'transitions to sustainability'. At root, lies the lack of any healthy critical political discourse about the general property of 'direction' in innovation (and social progress more widely). Altho 'linear models' are frequently disavowed, 'one track race' (indiscriminately 'science based', 'pro-innovation') rhetorics continue to thrive. Yet innovation - of all kinds - is actually known to be a complex, distributed, networked, relational process. So, the importance should be clear of institutions, discourses, practices (and methods of appraisal) that address the crucial property of 'direction'.   Far from being in tension with underlying 'Enlightenment' notions of scientific and social progress, it will be argued that recognition of this point is, ironically, actually entirely consistent with this mainstream theme in high level European political culture. But the implications are potentially very radical. The paper will end by exploring some of these implications for 'opening up' notions of responsibility and accountability towards a more democratic European politics of science, technology and innovation. In this task of 'pluralising progress', the diverse, contending roles of civil society become recognised as central. In short, this agenda is about moving beyond mere 'enlightenment' concerning the simple possibility of social advance, towards the enablement of more plural directions for real social progress.

S12j security for dstl S12j security for dstl Presentation Transcript

  • “Social, Ethical and Cultural Challenges”in UK security-related research presentation to workshop on the ESRC / MoD research call on Security and Science, Institute of Physics, London, 1st November 2012 Andy Stirling SPRU & STEPS Centre
  • “S&T Opportunities and Threats”2012 ESRC/DSTL Call:…•How the risks to defence and security that emerge from futuredevelopments in S&T can be better assessed and addressed?•The influence of cultural, historical, ethical, economic and societalfactors on how S&T is developed and harnessed in future to presentopportunities and threats for defence and security. …
  • “S&T Opportunities and Threats”2012 ESRC/DSTL Call:…•How the risks to defence and security that emerge from futuredevelopments in S&T can be better assessed and addressed?•The influence of cultural, historical, ethical, economic and societalfactors on how S&T is developed and harnessed in future to presentopportunities and threats for defence and security. …Rigorous social science and humanities thinking on ‘security’- requires broadening out and opening up traditional terms of debate. (Call: divergent views … preventive co-operation … economic factors … Blackett Review … Solana Report )Robust research requires understandings of how future S&T “emerge”:- governance challenges on ‘direction’ as well as ‘rate’, ‘risk’ and ‘race’ (Call: “… the vanguard … the rate of advance in S&T…”)
  • Mainstream Research Policy“you can’t stop progress” … - The Economist PROGRESS“well restore science to its rightful place”… ` - President Obama“Our hope … relies on scientific andtechnological progress” - Premier Wen Jiabao“One can not impede scientific progress.” - President Ahmadinejad TECHNOLOGYall innovation is progress… Lisbon Strategy for: “pro-innovation action” - EU Council of Ministers “we need more pro-innovation policies” - PM Gordon Brown “… the Government’s strategy is … SCIENCE pro-innovation” - PM David Cameron
  • The One-Track, Hard-Wired Innovation Race PROGRESS TECHNOLOGYLord Alec Broers, President, RAEng The challenge of government: …“history is a race to “to strive to stay advance technology” in the race”…Technology: The role of the public: “will determine the future “to give technology of the human race’” the status it deserves”…
  • Conventional Innovation Policy “OPPORTINITIES & THREATS” TECHNOLOGYTreats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … noalternatives… no politics … no choice!
  • Conventional Innovation Policy “OPPORTINITIES & THREATS” TECHNOLOGYTreats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives … no politics … no choice !Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much? how fast? … who leads?
  • Conventional Innovation Policy “OPPORTINITIES & THREATS” TECHNOLOGYTreats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives … no politics … no choice !Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much? how fast?’ … who leads?Seriously neglects questions over: which way? …what alternatives? says who? …why?
  • Innovation as Branching Social PathwaysConstituted by institutions, practices, discourses, imaginations…For instance... “sustainable energy”knowledges of many kinds … as well as science and technologyBUT: not all that is conceivable, feasible, viable – will be fully realisable
  • Innovation as Branching Social PathwaysIntended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathwayssocial shaping (Bijker, 85) co-construction (Misa, 03)studies: expectations (Brown, 03) imaginations (Jasanoff, 05)
  • Innovation as Branching Social PathwaysIntended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathwayshistory: contingency (Mokyr, 92) momentum (Hughes 83) path-dependence (David, 85) path creation(Karnoe, 01)
  • Innovation as Branching Social PathwaysIntended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathwaysphilosophy: autonomy (Winner, 77) closure (Feenberg, 91)/politics entrapment (Walker, 01) alignment (Geels, 02)
  • Innovation as Branching Social PathwaysIntended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathwayseconomics: homeostasis (Sahal, 85) lock-in (Arthur, 89) regimes (Nelson & Winter, 77) trajectories (Dosi,82)
  • Research and Innovation for Security?Does UK security research consider alternative directions for investment?Is UK research itself somewhat ‘locked in’ to military applications?Are concepts of ‘security’ in UK research sufficiently balanced? ?Non-nuclear defence? Relinquished force projection? Resilience not coercion?1/3 UK public funding is military (higher in robotics, nanoscience, aerospace?)Is ‘security’ predominantly about capacity to project military force?
  • Research and Innovation for Security?Does UK security research consider alternative directions for innovation?Is UK research itself too ‘locked in’ to security-related applications?(Call: “majority of reported global S&T advancement is associated with civil research” ) ?Non-nuclear defence? Relinquished force projection? Resilience not coercion?1/3 UK public funding is military (higher in robotics, nanoscience, aerospace?)Is ‘security’ predominantly about capacity to project military force?
  • Research and Innovation for Security?Does UK security research consider alternative directions for innovation?Is UK research itself too ‘locked in’ to security-related applications?Are concepts of ‘security’ in UK research sufficiently balanced? ?Non-nuclear defence? Relinquished force projection? Resilience not coercion?1/3 UK public funding is military (higher in robotics, nanoscience, aerospace?)Do military paths offer best security? How much security from security industry?
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?• Beyond organised violence to ‘human security’ (eg: Solana Report)?
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?• Beyond organised violence to ‘human security’ (eg: Solana Report)?• Ethical issues (eg: mass destruction, robotic systems, violence)?
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?• Beyond organised violence to ‘human security’ (eg: Solana Report)?• Ethical issues (eg: mass destruction, robotic systems, violence)?• “Dual use” (eg: rising global integration, infrastructure dependency?)
  • “Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?• Beyond organised violence to ‘human security’ (eg: Solana Report)?• Ethical issues (eg: mass destruction, robotic systems, violence)?• Dual use” (eg: rising global integration, infrastructure dependency?)• Opportunity? geopolitics (interdependence, soft power, hegemony)? - reduced relative power raises UK benefits of nonviolent security strategies?