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Space policy swat-future space strategies-13-unclassified

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How to fight and win the next space war.

How to fight and win the next space war.

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  • (U) Title Slide This briefing summarizes studies, analyses, strategies, algorithms and software tools developed by Paul Szymanski for Space Control and Space Situational Awareness support. There are separate briefings that discuss in further detail almost every chart of this summary brief. In addition, charts at the back of this briefing give more detail to some of the slides in the main portion of this brief. <br /> [This Page Does Not Print as Facing Page] <br /> [For Duplex Printing Use: “Open to Top”] <br />
  • (U) SWAT Purpose <br />
  • (U) SWAT Purpose <br />
  • (U) SWAT Purpose These space warfighting tools are based on the author’s 34 years continuous experience in space control analyses, with military concepts and methods from terrestrial warfare applied to new strategies for space. They form one of the first consistent structures for thinking about space warfare, and provide a starting point for lab research on space battle management and Space Situational Awareness (SSA) sensor requirements. They are also immediately applicable to operational use in a militarized space environment for developing strategy, tactics and attack detection procedures. <br />
  • (U) Why SWAT? <br />
  • (U) Value of Surprise A National Defense University study looked at the major conflicts of this century up to the 1960’s. They categorized battles in these diverse conflicts according to whether the defenders were surprised by the attacking force. After assessing casualty exchanged rations they found that being able to surprise your adversary improves your casualty exchange ratios 8.5 times. Certainly surprise in any conflict is a key force multiplier. This is one of the main impacts of space systems: the eyes and ears in space minimize the ability of forces to conduct surprise attacks. <br />
  • (U) Current Space Surveillance Network Of course, avoiding a single US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) sensor site might be difficult enough, but continuously avoiding all sensors for an extended period of time would be near impossible. However, small amounts of thrusting that would change an adversary’s orbit as frequently as it takes the SSN to re-correlate an unknown space object to a known satellite (an adversary would get “inside” the US OODA [Observe, Orient, Decide, Act] loop) might effectively “hide” a satellite among all the other space objects NORAD tracks. <br />
  • (U) Missing Space Objects It is actually easier than most people think to “lose” the location of a satellite. Any kind of maneuver (e.g. in the South Pacific with no coverage from US sensors) can confuse the next set of sensors that cannot correlate their track with a known space object. Some space objects have been “lost” for many years, and have only been found when some other country publishes information about the satellite. One was lost for 20 years. Some of these “lost” objects have large Radar Cross Sections (RCS), as illustrated in the chart. <br />
  • (U) Space Choke Points This chart zooms in even more than the previous chart, and shows one particular “slot,” where all satellites can maneuver to any other location of a space object, when the time phasing of the maneuver is right. This shows that if a particular satellite must be defended against attacks by potential space weapons on any other object in this graph (whether live, or playing dead), that it is a very challenging Space Situational Awareness problem to monitor 100’s of potential attacking satellites. However, this is still less of a problem than monitoring the entire space catalog of thousands of space objects, many of which can be a potential anti-satellite (ASAT). <br />
  • (U) Avoid Space Radar – Hopper A study was conducted of the means by which a satellite could avoid detection by a ground-based sensor system, such as a RADAR (Ascension Island Space Surveillance Radar is used as an example.) This avoidance technique, called a “Hopper”, uses a 3.5 Newton continuous burn thrusting maneuver starting at the South Pole (to avoid burn detection), and manages to “hop” above the vertical range of the Ascension Island RADAR, by increasing orbital altitude. The above chart shows the sequence of events for this “Hopper” avoidance of the RADAR site. <br />
  • (U) Avoid Space Radar – Slider Another way to avoid a space surveillance site is to place the orbit underneath the limits of its sensor cone. This is due to some sensor’s inability to detect objects all the way down to the horizon because of clutter returns. The above example shows how a sensor that can only go down to 80 degrees declination (from a vertical vector) can miss detecting some orbital passes. <br />
  • (U) Avoid Space Radar – Skipper A third way to avoid a space surveillance site is to maneuver the satellite outside the sensor’s horizontal range. In the above example, a 2.6 Km/sec one-impulse burn at the South Pole would allow the satellite to avoid the sensor altogether, at least for the next orbital pass. <br />
  • (U) One Impulse Maneuver Effects This chart graphs the range of delta-v a satellite would require for maneuver to essentially become an Uncorrelated Target (UCT), by changing the time it is expected to enter a sensor cone, or changing its expected altitude. The blue lines, giving normal altitude bands for imaging satellites, shows the range of altitude change a satellite might make to become a UCT, yet still remain within its operational limits. The green line denotes when NORAD declares a satellite a UCT due to abnormal sensor cone entry time changes; and the orange line denotes the same thing for inclination changes. As can be seen, it takes very little for a satellite to maneuver and confuse NORAD as to which target it really is. <br />
  • (U) Hide Satellite Another way to “hide” a satellite from a country’s sensors and space tracking abilities is to come close to another satellite to confuse end-game targeting algorithms. This chart shows the orbital traces of several commercial and civil imagery satellites along with the amount of delta-v it would take to match their orbits from the Naxing-1 satellite (yellow bowtie symbol). <br />
  • (U) Backup The following charts are not part of the main briefing, but serve to further illustrate the points already made in the main body. In most instances, they provide more detail and examples of what is covered in the front portion of this brief. <br />
  • (U) SWAT Tools This, and the subsequent two slides lists the main features of tools and algorithms developed by Paul Szymanski that help space operators and analysts determine critical space control and Space Situational Awareness factors leading to informed decision making for space Courses Of Action (COA’s). <br /> (U) Auto Space Object ID An algorithm was developed to automatically classify the mission of an unknown space object. This technique compares orbital and physical characteristics of a space object, as measured by ground or space sensors, and statistically matches it to an extensive database of satellites with known missions. This detection algorithm will be covered in more detail in a later slide. <br /> (U) Auto Red Space COA ID An additional algorithm was developed to automatically determine the most probable attack strategy that an adversary may be conducting against US and allied space systems. It takes sometimes obscure intelligence indicators, and compares them to those indicators related to possible adversary strategies in space warfare. In addition, other algorithms and software calculations limit the range of attack possibilities that an analyst must consider when determining that high-value space assets may soon come under attack, or have actually already been attacked. These tools include: <br /> (U) Space Threat Envelopes Provides a graphical representation of what regions of space are most threatening to a particular satellite, based on assumptions of adversary satellite size and delta-v maneuver constraints. <br /> (U) Space Weapons Range Calculates the amount of delta-v a satellite would require to get to any region in space, and provides an analysis with graphical representation of when a satellite may be within view / range of an adversary space weapon. <br /> (U) Space Choke Point Maps Provides a graphical representation of what regions of space (altitude vs inclination) that space objects concentrate in, whose boundaries are limited by delta-v maneuver constraints. <br /> (U) Most Probable Attack Time Maps These maps show a world chart with colors to designate when is the best time for an attack on a satellite based on the relative positions of both US and adversary ground-based satellite surveillance systems and tracking, telemetry and control (TT&C) systems. <br /> (U) State Change Detection This algorithm is similar to the automatic space object mission identification tool, only now it compares satellite orbits and characteristics with other satellites of the same mission, and with its own historical data. The satellites with the most significant changes would be presented to the space warfare operator so that he can task space surveillance sensors to determine if anything suspicious is happening with this satellite or space object. This code is currently being designed under the SWAT (Space Warfare Analysis Tools) software. This tool may also be able to automatically predict when a satellite is preparing to maneuver, re-configure to an anti-satellite (ASAT), or is beginning to fail. <br />
  • (U) Space IPB The SWAT (Space Warfare Analysis Tool) software has a database and user interface to allow the space analyst to implement a full space Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). <br /> (U) Satellite Characteristics Database The SWAT software has a database of space object characteristics that is a combination of the Satellite Assessment Center (SatAC) Satellite Information Database (SID) and additional satellite data researched by Paul Szymanski. This SWAT database has extensive statistics generation capabilities to allow the user to gain insight into selected categories of space objects. <br /> (U) Satellite Failures Database The SWAT software has a database of satellite failure history that enables the analyst to better determine if an anomaly with a satellite is caused by intentional, unintentional or natural forces. <br /> (U) Space INTEL Tasking Prioritization The SWAT software has a space Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace tool that allows the analyst to task intelligence collection assets based on prioritized need. The INTEL tasking prioritization can be automatically generated by SWAT based on most probable adversary attack strategy that SWAT has estimated. <br />
  • (U) Blue COA Generator The SWAT (Space Warfare Analysis Tool) software has extensive lists of possible space strategies, military objectives, vulnerable space centers of gravity (Blue and Red), and space principles of war. In addition, the Space and Information Analysis Model (SIAM) software tool invented by the author, automatically ranks satellites and terrestrial space-related elements for their value in assisting the flow of worldwide critical military data on the battlefield. <br /> (U) Space Control Scenario A space control scenario has been developed based on exercise data that shows the relationships of terrestrial battlefield actions to space events. This includes Operational Objectives, Tactical Objectives, Tactical Tasks, Success Criteria, and Success Indicators. Battlefield tempo for both space and terrestrial forces is contained in Microsoft Project scheduling software. <br />
  • (U) Backup The following charts are not part of the main briefing, but serve to further illustrate the points already made in the main body. In most instances, they provide more detail and examples of what is covered in the front portion of this brief. <br />
  • (U) Principles of War The Principles of War have been a well-established concept for many years. This study took the Principles of War as defined by US Air Force, Army and Navy doctrine, along with Principles of War defined by British and Russian manuals, and extended these to warfare in space. A separate briefing is available on this subject. An example chart defining one of these Principles of War for “Mass” is given in the next slide. <br />
  • (U) Space Principles of War Example An example defining one of the Principles of War for “Mass” is given above. Some may believe that the Principles of War are outdated for space, particularly for such a terrestrial concept as “massing” firepower on a target, but this is still just as applicable to space. Because of the remoteness of space, and the inability of nations to have total coverage of all regions of space, an adversary attacking a satellite may want to “mass” multiple weapons of the same or different phenomenologies against one target to increase their confidence in kill probability (kill assessment may be difficult). In addition, just eliminating one or two satellites might not have the overall effect of “shock and awe” to forces who may have become over-dependent on space capabilities. For example, just taking out one or two Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) might not significantly reduce the overall GPS-derived navigational accuracy on the battlefield. In the GPS case, an adversary would have to “mass” his attacks to take out a significant portion of the GPS network of satellites. Also, the concept of “mass” would be applicable to timing of attacks. Overwhelming combat power must be applied at the decisive place and time and not implemented in many piecemeal attacks stretched out over long periods of time that allow the adversary to recover his lost capabilities, or at least recover from the shock of a massive loss of space capabilities. <br />
  • (U) Space Escalation Ladder This graph shows a possible escalation ladder for use in future conflicts. This first phase of the escalation ladder is for pre-conflict kinds of “attack” that do not include destruction. Most of these kinds of “attack” are deterrence oriented, or include hiding from sensors. The Campaign Phase column gives the types of attack used by SIAM (Space and Information Analysis Model) for four levels of seriousness in attack effect. <br />
  • (U) Space Escalation Ladder (Continued) This chart gives the next conflict phase of the escalation ladder, where more destructive weapons are employed. Linked attacks are those where a terrestrial asset is attacked, or threatened, if an adversary uses space systems against us. Alternate country attacks are when an adversary’s ally is deterred from using space assets when he sees what we do to the prime adversary’s space assets. <br />
  • (U) Space Strategies Example A separate briefing delineates ten different possible space strategies and the battlefield tempo when they may be implemented. Above is a description of one of these ten strategies. The essential nature of this specific space strategy is to deny the adversary country the use of its space intellectual capital, represented in its technically trained personnel. <br />
  • (U) SSA Requirements Study Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is a loosely defined concept. The purpose of this study was to start with fundamental military doctrine, and derive baseline SSA characteristics to determine sensor requirements. It was concluded that Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) was the best template to use for defining SSA features. Terrestrial IPB development is a well defined process described in Service and Joint Publications. This study took these well-defined terrestrial IPB concepts, and extended them to the space environment, right down to designing space IPB forms for user data entry. At the same time, space strategies, tactics, Centers Of Gravity (COG’s) vulnerabilities and intelligence collection requirements were defined down to 50 columns of data times 1,900 different requirements. All of this information was placed in an Excel spreadsheet, and as a checklist in SWAT (which is a Microsoft Access database). In addition, these SSA sensor requirements define what a space NIIRS (National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale) would be; also they define by many examples what is meant by Basic, Detailed and Exquisite Characterization of space objects. <br />
  • (U) Example SSA Requirements Matrix These are a few examples of the 1,900 different requirements in the space IPB matrices. They show some of the intelligence indicators related to answering the question: “Is an adversary weapon system preparing or powering up for use?” This example shows the INTEL requirements needed to answer this question, what the corresponding INTEL indicators are, and the resolution and sensor phenomenology required to detect these INTEL indicators. <br />
  • (U) NIIRS Space Equivalents A NIIRS (National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale) for terrestrial systems was extended for space systems. This gives the user a definition for quality of imagery data for both terrestrial and space systems. GRD means Ground Resolved Distance, and is used in a similar way for space systems. This rating system is similar to the Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) SORS (Space Object Rating Scale), except this Space NIIRS definition includes Ratings 1 and 2, which SORS does not. <br />
  • (U) SSA Requirements Tracking This is an example Requirements Tracking screen from SWAT. It shows one SSA requirement and how it fits into an overall Strategies-to-Task Space IPB framework. It tracks what is already known as far as one characteristic of a satellite (thruster type), and what is required in terms of sensor resolution, lighting conditions, and satellite face to observe. Some example output summary charts are shown on the right side of the chart. <br />
  • (U) Space Centers of Gravity Model Col John Warden’s 5-Ring Center Of Gravity (COG) Model was used in Desert Storm as part of the Checkmate targeting cell in the Pentagon. This same structure used for terrestrial systems targeting (green text) has been extended to include concepts for space systems targeting (blue text). Essentially, both these models state that the closer to the center one gets in targeting, the better to enable toppling over the whole structure and degrading an adversary’s ability to wage war. Targeting the leadership structure can cause confusion and delay in responding to military actions, but ultimately new leadership takes hold. The best way to target leadership is to, in reality, target their perceptions and mindset as to the status of their own military, the opposing side’s military and intentions, and as to what is their best Courses Of Action (COA’s). <br />
  • (U) Example Space Centers of Gravity This is a partial list of some of the more unique Centers Of Gravity (COG) associated with space systems and space control. These were derived from considerable strategic thought based on extensive space control analyses over 30 years and the unique characteristics of the space environment. It should be noted that a Center Of Gravity can be a physical location (a mountain pass or crowded satellite orbit) or a weakness in strategic doctrine concerning the use of space systems, etc. AFDD 2-2.1 2, (August 2004) states that a Center Of Gravity is defined as “Those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02) [In Air Force terms, a COG is a primary source of moral (i.e., political leadership, social dynamics, cultural values, or religion) or physical (i.e., military, industrial, or economic) strength from which a nation, alliance, or military force in a given strategic, operational, or tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight]”. <br />
  • (U) Example Space Centers of Gravity This is a partial list of some of the more unique Centers Of Gravity (COG) associated with space systems and space control. These were derived from considerable strategic thought based on extensive space control analyses over 30 years and the unique characteristics of the space environment. It should be noted that a Center Of Gravity can be a physical location (a mountain pass or crowded satellite orbit) or a weakness in strategic doctrine concerning the use of space systems, etc. AFDD 2-2.1 2, (August 2004) states that a Center Of Gravity is defined as “Those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02) [In Air Force terms, a COG is a primary source of moral (i.e., political leadership, social dynamics, cultural values, or religion) or physical (i.e., military, industrial, or economic) strength from which a nation, alliance, or military force in a given strategic, operational, or tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight]”. <br />
  • (U) Example Space Centers of Gravity This is a partial list of some of the more unique Centers Of Gravity (COG) associated with space systems and space control. These were derived from considerable strategic thought based on extensive space control analyses over 30 years and the unique characteristics of the space environment. It should be noted that a Center Of Gravity can be a physical location (a mountain pass or crowded satellite orbit) or a weakness in strategic doctrine concerning the use of space systems, etc. AFDD 2-2.1 2, (August 2004) states that a Center Of Gravity is defined as “Those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02) [In Air Force terms, a COG is a primary source of moral (i.e., political leadership, social dynamics, cultural values, or religion) or physical (i.e., military, industrial, or economic) strength from which a nation, alliance, or military force in a given strategic, operational, or tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight]”. <br />
  • (U) Example Space Centers of Gravity This is a partial list of some of the more unique Centers Of Gravity (COG) associated with space systems and space control. These were derived from considerable strategic thought based on extensive space control analyses over 30 years and the unique characteristics of the space environment. It should be noted that a Center Of Gravity can be a physical location (a mountain pass or crowded satellite orbit) or a weakness in strategic doctrine concerning the use of space systems, etc. AFDD 2-2.1 2, (August 2004) states that a Center Of Gravity is defined as “Those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02) [In Air Force terms, a COG is a primary source of moral (i.e., political leadership, social dynamics, cultural values, or religion) or physical (i.e., military, industrial, or economic) strength from which a nation, alliance, or military force in a given strategic, operational, or tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight]”. <br />
  • (U) Example Space Centers of Gravity This is a partial list of some of the more unique Centers Of Gravity (COG) associated with space systems and space control. These were derived from considerable strategic thought based on extensive space control analyses over 30 years and the unique characteristics of the space environment. It should be noted that a Center Of Gravity can be a physical location (a mountain pass or crowded satellite orbit) or a weakness in strategic doctrine concerning the use of space systems, etc. AFDD 2-2.1 2, (August 2004) states that a Center Of Gravity is defined as “Those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02) [In Air Force terms, a COG is a primary source of moral (i.e., political leadership, social dynamics, cultural values, or religion) or physical (i.e., military, industrial, or economic) strength from which a nation, alliance, or military force in a given strategic, operational, or tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight]”. <br />
  • (U) Example Space Centers of Gravity This is a partial list of some of the more unique Centers Of Gravity (COG) associated with space systems and space control. These were derived from considerable strategic thought based on extensive space control analyses over 30 years and the unique characteristics of the space environment. It should be noted that a Center Of Gravity can be a physical location (a mountain pass or crowded satellite orbit) or a weakness in strategic doctrine concerning the use of space systems, etc. AFDD 2-2.1 2, (August 2004) states that a Center Of Gravity is defined as “Those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02) [In Air Force terms, a COG is a primary source of moral (i.e., political leadership, social dynamics, cultural values, or religion) or physical (i.e., military, industrial, or economic) strength from which a nation, alliance, or military force in a given strategic, operational, or tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight]”. <br />
  • (U) Example Space Centers of Gravity This is a partial list of some of the more unique Centers Of Gravity (COG) associated with space systems and space control. These were derived from considerable strategic thought based on extensive space control analyses over 30 years and the unique characteristics of the space environment. It should be noted that a Center Of Gravity can be a physical location (a mountain pass or crowded satellite orbit) or a weakness in strategic doctrine concerning the use of space systems, etc. AFDD 2-2.1 2, (August 2004) states that a Center Of Gravity is defined as “Those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02) [In Air Force terms, a COG is a primary source of moral (i.e., political leadership, social dynamics, cultural values, or religion) or physical (i.e., military, industrial, or economic) strength from which a nation, alliance, or military force in a given strategic, operational, or tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight]”. <br />
  • (U) Example Attack Locations This chart shows where on the earth a potential satellite attack may occur. If one assumes that an attack will occur where the US has the fewest space surveillance assets to monitor potential attacking space objects, then the redder the above map is, the fewer US space surveillance assets exist, geographic-wise. The bluest portions of the map are a geographic average of the locations of US space surveillance assets. For illustrative purposes, the redder portions of the map give the geographic average of SPOT ground data receiver and Tracking, Telemetry & Control (TT&C) stations. <br />
  • (U) Example Space INTEL Indicators This is a small sample of some of the intelligence indicators that SWAT uses in determining whether our space systems are under attack, and what kind of attack it is. These, and other intelligence indicators, are linked in SWAT to potential adversary attack strategies, or Courses Of Action (COA’s). <br />
  • (U) Example Space Objectives Many space objectives were collected over the decades from military exercises. In addition, many others were developed from translating terrestrial objectives to space-related ones. Also, considerable strategic thought was devoted to developing entirely new space objectives based on extensive space control analyses over 30 years and the unique characteristics of the space environment. There are currently approximately 5,000 objectives in this Microsoft Access database. <br />
  • (U) Backup The following charts are not part of the main briefing, but serve to further illustrate the points already made in the main body. In most instances, they provide more detail and examples of what is covered in the front portion of this brief. <br />
  • (U) Space Defense Definitions (1) xxxxx. <br />
  • (U) Space Defense Definitions (2) xxxxx. <br />
  • (U) Space Defense Definitions (3) xxxxx. <br />
  • (U) Space Defense Definitions (4) xxxxx. <br />
  • (U) Space Defense Definitions (5) xxxxx. <br />
  • (U) Space Defense Definitions (6) xxxxx. <br />
  • (U) Backup The following charts are not part of the main briefing, but serve to further illustrate the points already made in the main body. In most instances, they provide more detail and examples of what is covered in the front portion of this brief. <br />
  • (U) Traditional Orbital View This chart shows the same data as the previous chart, only with the more traditional view of satellites around the Earth. As can be readily observed, the AVIS charts concept simplifies considerably the user data overload and his ability to detect an adversary positioning for a future attack. <br />
  • (U) SAW – All Altitudes This chart illustrates the concept of space choke points. SAW stands for Satellite Attack Warning chart, and illustrates where space objects concentrate in certain orbits. This particular chart shows all space objects, and three typical orbits are noted. The red points represent potential adversary space objects, blue are US and allied space objects, and green are neutral country space objects. <br /> (U) These displays were developed in SWAT to delineate the current space situation in terms of Predictive Battlespace Awareness. These AVIS (Altitude Versus Inclination Survey [i]) plots attempt to simplify the space situation view for the warfighter by only illustrating orbital and other changes for space objects, while “fixing” the actual orbital movements to prevent user data overload. In the above chart each dot represents an individual space object. These space objects are distributed on the graph only according to their altitude and inclination – the two most important factors when assessing the amount of delta-v it would take for any of the objects to maneuver closer to its neighbor. Even if the space object is on the other side of the Earth from a target satellite, in the orbital space defined by the above chart, it is considered “close” because the attacker can chose the time and phasing of its attack (using bi-elliptical transfer, if necessary). This chart assumes an RPO (Rendezvous and Proximity Operations) type of attack, where the attacker essentially matches the orbit of the target (co-orbital attack). For the case of a glancing attack where the orbits do not match, but the orbital tracks meet (COSMOS 2251 and Iridium 33 collision which had a 12 degree difference in inclination, but the same orbital altitude [ii]), this AVIS chart would show all objects of the same altitude as a horizontal line that have the possibility of collision / attack. This glancing attack mode is the subject of subsequent SAW display development. In this chart the color of the labels denotes the country affiliation of the satellite, rocket booster or space debris. One can see that certain altitude-inclination regions have a preponderance of one country’s space objects over another. When a potential threat country’s object is in a usually associated Blue zone, than this can cause an analyst to further explore these threat objects. [i] Metatech Corporation, “Choke Points Displays,” Paul Szymanski, 12 September 2008. <br /> [ii] Space.com, “U.S. Satellite Destroyed in Space Collision,” Becky Iannotta and Tariq Malik, web site: http://www.space.com/news/090211-satellite-collision.html, 11 February 2009. <br />
  • (U) SAW – Icons This chart shows some of the space-related military icons that were developed in accordance with Mil-Std-2525B[i] to display space objects according to country affiliation, mission, and operational status. 220 new space icons were drawn and added to the 44 already existing in Mil-Std-2525B. [i] Department of Defense, “DOD Interface Standard - Common Warfighting Symbology,” MIL-STD-2525B, 7 March 2007. <br />
  • (U) SAW – View 1 This chart zooms into the previous AVIS chart (“SAW – All Altitudes”), and shows only Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space objects. Notice how the country and mission of each space object are denoted by MIL-STD-2525B compliant SWAT-designed space icons. In addition, the orbital history of the space objects over an operator-designated time period is denoted by the trailing lines, and can imply attack if it appears to be matching the orbit of a potentially targeted satellite. <br />
  • (U) SAW – View 2 This chart is another view of Low Earth Orbit, and shows the debris cloud generated by COSMOS 2421. MIL-STD-2525B compliant supplementary info surrounds each icon and gives data date-time group (EPOCH), country of origin, mission, launch date, mass, specific orbital parameters, the Space Defense Region this object occupies, its space catalog number, and a SWAT-calculated degree of change score (9.9 – the higher the score, the more change this space object has experienced in orbit, size, shape, RCS, optical cross section, etc.) along with the main reason for the state change (mass). <br />
  • (U) SAW – SDIZ This chart shows the same AVIS chart (“SAW – All Altitudes”) with the Space Defense Identifications Zone (SDIZ) designations turned on. These SDIZ definitions are extensions of Air Defense terminology, and help in managing space control assets and warning trip-wires. <br />
  • (U) SAW – Simulated Attack Against GPS This chart illustrates how a simulated attack against GPS navigation satellites would look in the AVIS displays. In the center of the display, Red launch vehicle rocket boosters appear to be maneuvering towards GPS satellites. The boosters previous history have always been at altitudes and inclinations different than GPS, thus defining a Blue zone” where US navigation satellites operate. <br />
  • (U) SAW – “Dead” Stages as ASATS The above chart zooms in on the previous chart, and shows the Red boosters change in orbital values by the trace lines leading towards GPS satellites. <br />
  • (U) SAW – Multiple Attacks Against One GPS The above chart zooms in even further than the previous chart in the AVIS display to show the final approach of the Red ASAT’s and their Mil-Std-2525B derived symbology with associated text values expressing technical characteristics and SWAT-calculated State Change scores for each space object. For the Red rocket stages in this notional scenario, the State Change scores are large because the RADAR Cross Sections (RCS) have radically changed to reflect changes in attitude of these stages as they orient themselves for orbital maneuvers. <br />
  • (U) SAW – 3D View 3-dimensional globe views were developed for SAW to enable terrestrial space surveillance and attack envelopes to be assessed. <br />
  • (U) SAW – Flat Map View A flat map view was developed for SAW to enable terrestrial space surveillance and attack envelopes to be assessed, and to support the AFRL ACE Wargame event. <br />
  • (U) Backup The following charts are not part of the main briefing, but serve to further illustrate the points already made in the main body. In most instances, they provide more detail and examples of what is covered in the front portion of this brief. <br />
  • (U) SWAT Display Requirements (1) xxxxx. <br />
  • (U) SWAT Display Requirements (2) xxxxx. <br />
  • (U) Threat Assessment Chart (TAC) xxxxxx <br />
  • (U) TAC Chart Explained xxxxxx <br />
  • (U) Multiple TAC Charts Can Predict Simultaneous Space Attack xxxxxx <br />
  • (U) Threat Assessment Summary (TAS-1) xxxxx <br />
  • (U) Threat Assessment Summary (TAS-2) xxxxx <br />
  • (U) Threat Assessment Summary (TAS-3) xxxxx <br />
  • (U) Threat Assessment Summary (TAS-4) xxxxx <br />
  • (U) Threat Assessment Summary (TAS-4) xxxxx <br />
  • (U) Threat Assessment Summary (TAS-5) xxxxx <br />
  • (U) Threat Assessment Summary (TAS-6) xxxxx <br />
  • (U) Threat Envelope Chart (TEC) View 1 The software tool called SPACE (Space Power Analysis Computational Elements) is used to conduct Monte Carlo calculations for satellite maneuvers. This chart illustrates calculations for threat envelopes surrounding a potentially targeted satellite (red asterisk in center), assuming the attacking satellite is using a low thrust maneuver profile. Spreading out from the targeted satellite into regions of space are locations (circles) where potential space control satellites can maneuver from to close approach the satellite target. The size of each circle corresponds to the amount of delta-v that is required to rendezvous with the targeted satellite. The color of each circle corresponds to the amount of time it would take to achieve this rendezvous. Thus, higher inclination attacking satellites would need to expend more fuel and take more time to reach the targeted satellite. This implies a bigger attacking satellite that can carry more fuel, thus being more easily detected when initiating attack orbital maneuvers, or the defending satellite has more time to detect and prepare for attack. If one can assume maximum sizes of threat satellites, and thus maximum delta-v constraints, then these can also be plotted on this chart to give an accurate picture of how much attack warning time does the targeted satellite have, and where does it have to look in space to detect preparations for attack. <br /> (U) The black boxes towards the center of the chart are actual locations of current live satellites in relation to the targeted satellite (in flattened space), and the gray boxes denote actual locations of dead space objects. If one assumes that an attack would come from a known live satellite, then the defending satellite would need to look towards the black boxes for suspicious activities while they are initiating attack. If one assumes the attack would come from a supposedly “dead” space object, then defensive sensors should concentrate on the gray box locations. Otherwise, if one is concerned about an attack coming from “out of the blue,” then attack detection sensors must concentrate on successive concentric lower probability fans around the defended satellite based on assumed attacking object size, timeliness of detection, and the defending satellite timeline for response. <br />
  • (U) Example Threat Envelope View 2 This is a zoom-in of the previous chart that gives a better view of the threat envelopes and associated space objects, with annotations. <br />
  • (U) Example Threat Envelope View 3 This is a zoom-in of the previous chart that gives a better view of the live (black boxes) and dead (gray boxes) space objects. <br />
  • (U) Backup The following charts are not part of the main briefing, but serve to further illustrate the points already made in the main body. In most instances, they provide more detail and examples of what is covered in the front portion of this brief. <br />
  • (U) SWAT Automatic Space Object Classification Algorithm The SWAT software algorithm that automatically classifies the mission of any unknown space object essentially takes all of the available information on an unknown satellite [such as orbital elements (altitude, inclination, eccentricity, etc.), size, shape, stabilization (spinning, 3-axis stabilized), RADAR Cross Section (RCS), optical cross section, mass, power, drift rate, delta-v, spin rate, etc.] and compares it to the same types of characteristics for satellites of known missions. SWAT calculates the “distance” in multi-dimensional space (each dimension is the value of a satellite characteristic) of an unknown space object to those of known mission. The unknown space object is assessed to be of the mission that is “closest” in this multi-dimensional space. The above chart illustrates this process with one satellite characteristic of inclination (of course this would make a 1-dimensional chart – the chart is shown as 2 dimensions to make it easier for the viewer to understand the process). Green boxes illustrate the range of values of inclination for weather satellites, while green circles show the range of inclination values for science satellites. <br /> (U) As can be seen, some of these ranges of inclination values merge. However, the preponderance of range values do show a statistical separation. The unknown space object inclination value is shown by the red asterix. As can be readily viewed in the above chart, the red asterix is “closer” to the weather satellites inclination ranges, than science satellites. Thus SWAT assesses the unknown space object as having the highest probability of being a weather satellite – at least as far as satellite inclination goes. SWAT than compares the other unknown space object characteristics to those of all possible space missions, normalizes and averages all of the results, and gives an overall score as to its most probable space mission. The user is also able to weight (bias) some satellite characteristics higher than others for particular missions. A list of all possible missions, sorted by the most probable first, is then presented to the user to help him direct intelligence collection resources that will verify those most probable missions [SWAT automatically increases the intelligence collection priority ranking for those space objects needing verification as part of its Space Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (SIPB) algorithms]. <br />
  • (U) Backup The following charts are not part of the main briefing, but serve to further illustrate the points already made in the main body. In most instances, they provide more detail and examples of what is covered in the front portion of this brief. <br />
  • (U) Backup The following charts are not part of the main briefing, but serve to further illustrate the points already made in the main body. In most instances, they provide more detail and examples of what is covered in the front portion of this brief. <br />
  • (U) Example Satellite Radar Cross Section This is an example output from RCS calculations using the commercial Lucernhammer software tool embedded in SWAT. The picture on the right shows the 3-dimensional microsatellite model used in the above calculation results. The AFRL Satellite Assessment Center has hundreds of 3-dimensional satellite models at various classification levels that can be used for these SWAT RCS calculations. <br />
  • (U) Satellite Failures Database A statistical database of satellite failures is in SWAT to enable space operators to compare satellite anomalies with possible anti-satellite attacks. This database is derived from internet sources for commercial satellite failures. <br />
  • (U) Focused Long Term Challenges This matrix lists the Focused Long Term Challenges that are applicable to the software tools, analyses, concepts and algorithms developed under SWAT. This illustrates how these efforts are contributing to major Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) research required by the warfighters to support decisive military space activities. <br />
  • (U) SWAT Automatic Space Object Classification The SWAT software contains algorithms that automatically classify the mission of any unknown space object. This algorithm uses the Satellite Information Database (SID) and the Space Power Analysis and Requirements Keystone Software (SPARKS) databases and compares the satellite characteristics and associated missions of these databases with any known characteristics of the unknown space object. Example satellite characteristics that are matched with the unknown space object include: Radar Cross Section (RCS), optical cross section, orbital elements, stabilization type (spinning or 3-axis), object shape (sphere, cylinder, box), length, width, height, mass, and spin rate. <br /> (U) If the SWAT user knows, at a minimum, the RCS, size (through RADAR imaging) and orbital elements of the unknown space object, then 98% of the time the SWAT tool detects the correct mission within its top three choices. SWAT has even automatically corrected some of the mission designations in the NORAD satellite catalog. <br />
  • (U) SWAT Auto Space Object ID This is a screen shot from the SWAT (Space Warfare Analysis Tool) software tool user input form that automatically classifies the mission of an unknown space object. The bottom portion of the screen is where the user inputs everything he knows about the unknown space object (RSO-0047). Space object characteristics that are not known are left blank. The center of the screen shows the top choices SWAT has made for the mission associated with RSO-0047. In this instance, RSO-0047 is assessed to be a commercial communications satellite. The data on the extreme left of the screen show the true mission of this selected space object, and the data on the extreme right of the screen gives a statistical summary of SWAT accuracy in assessing each unknown space object (100 different objects in this particular test run). <br />
  • (U) SWAT Automatic Determination of Red Space Attack Strategies SWAT has extensive lists of potential adversary attack strategies against space systems. For each of these potential attack strategies, SWAT gives the intelligence indicators that would be present if the strategy was being implemented against US and allied space systems. The SWAT user enters any INTEL indicators that are being currently observed, no matter how insignificant, and SWAT automatically matches these with the most probable attack strategy that an adversary may be implementing towards us. SWAT can also automatically increase the INTEL tasking priority for those factors that would best verify which strategy is being implemented by a potential adversary. <br />
  • (U) SWAT Auto Attack Assessment This is a screen shot from the SWAT (Space Warning and Assessment Tools) software user input form that automatically assesses intelligence indicators to determine what is the most probable attack strategy that an adversary may be implementing against US and allied space systems. The bottom of the screen gives the intelligence indicators that the user has selected from a pull-down list that reflects current status of space systems. The top portion of the screen lists the most likely adversary attack strategy (COA) that is currently being implemented, in order of most probable first. There is a separate briefing that defines each of these strategies. <br />
  • (U) ASAT Range / Access Calculations These are example outputs from the PCSOAP orbital dynamics tool that SWAT automatically interfaces to. It shows several scenarios for theoretical ground, ship and air-based anti-satellite (ASAT) systems; coverage zones for ground based space surveillance systems; and coverage statistics for multiple ground satellite receiver sites. Several of these ASAT scenarios with coverage statistics are pre-canned within SWAT. <br />
  • (U) AFRL The original SHIVA concepts were developed under Air Force Research Labs (Phillips Site) sponsorship. Because of AFRL technology development, they required a tool that would show the value to the warfighter of advanced systems concepts. <br /> (U) SWC After the SHIVA concept development at AFRL, it became recognized that SHIVA could perform future planning analyses along with targeting functions for military exercises. The Air Force Space Warfare Center (now the Space Innovation Development Center [SIDC]) became interested in SHIVA , and sponsored its play in war games, such as JEFX 99 and Blue Flag 97-1. <br /> (U) Software Maturity SHIVA was in development for over ten years. It has been fully tested in several exercises and analyses, and is supported with a User’s Manual, Operations Manual, and Training Manual. SHIVA runs on a PC under Microsoft Access®, which is part of the Microsoft Office Suite. In addition, the user can navigate the SHIVA menus through natural language voice control such as “Show Top Targets,” or “Define Weapons.” This voice input is through the COTS ViaVoice® software, available separately. <br /> (U) Software Availability SHIVA was developed under Air Force funding, and the software is available for use by the Federal Government and its designated contractors under Government Purpose Rights. <br />
  • (U) Methodology This chart summarizes the complete SHIVA concept. All analyses start off with objectives (left side of the chart). Blue objectives are matched with red objectives. For every red objective, a command decision must be made, and this decision requires information (green text). Various sensors, both space-based and terrestrial-based (imagery satellites, RPV’s, aircraft, patrols, etc.), can detect the required information. Some sensors are better than others. For example, SPOT has a steerable sensor, so its probability of being over the battlefield at the right time is much better than LANDSAT, whose fixed sensor might take 60 days to view a particular place on earth, and has lower resolution. Also, RADARSAT may be more useful than SPOT in a severe weather theater because it can see through clouds. All of these factors are taken into account to rank the ability of sensors to detect the critical military info. <br /> (U) Each sensor has a processing center that takes the raw electronic data, and processes it into human-readable format, such as a picture. These processing centers can be on the battlefield (i.e., Eagle Vision), or half a world away in some remote location, such as Madagascar or Antarctica. Each of these processing or receiver stations have communications means to relay the data to the Intel centers in the theater. These communications means could be over satellite, fiber, coax, microwave, radio or submarine cable links, or even by camel courier! Each of these communications means has a probability of success and time delay associated with its use. <br /> (U) The Intel center then receives various forms of information from many info paths, fuses it, and presents it to the commander and his staff. A decision is made based on the received info, and forces are deployed/employed. Of course, the networks are much more complex than illustrated in this chart. The commander has many sources of information, and many different paths to receive it, and also communicate with his forces. These paths usually run in the tens of thousands of possible combinations. <br /> (U) SHIVA calculates the results for all possible information paths to and from the commander. Overall time delays, total path diversity (survivability), info choke points and total combined probability of info receipt are calculated. The results of denying or delaying the info at any point can then be assessed. In SHIVA, the impact on the blue and red objectives are automatically shown as green-yellow-red stop-light charts, as a result of weapons laydown. Also, new sensor and C4I systems (even future conceptual systems) that are more capable or timely can be inserted into the network in minutes, and the overall impact on the commander’s decision process assessed. <br />
  • (U) Scenario Partial Example 2 A further useful tool, as part of the theoretical space control scenario, is the terrestrial vs space battlefield tempo alignment done in Microsoft Project, as illustrated above with a partial example. Such a scenario timeline should have more detailed orbital simulation time data inserted, that can then be placed in Monte Carlo software to determine a statistical range of possibilities. <br />
  • (U) Auto Space Scenario Tool Theoretical space control scenarios can be automatically generated in SWAT. This example shows one (out of a total of 393, including some fake targets to confuse wargame players) of the generic Space Systems templates (possible space mine carrier) that are randomized between user-selectable limits that were then used to generate a total of 2,282 systems for use in the ACE (Advanced Concept Event) exercise. Each template has a generic picture of a space system associated with it (out of a total of 969 generic pictures that were obtained and formatted for SWAT), and a generic proper name based on a database in SWAT of 169,903 random names derived from a world-wide geographic database. Every space system has associated intelligence indicators and probabilities of detection. Each country in the tool is give a random space budget (within minimum and maximum bounds) which is used to “buy” the scenario systems by priority order until all the money is spent. This way each side in the wargame will end up with random (user can also select specific values) numbers of systems and system types so that the value of differing force mixes can be evaluated. In addition, this tool allows for automatic random generation of BE (Basic Encyclopedia) numbers for data tracking purposes. <br />
  • (U) Scenario Partial Example 1 A theoretical space control scenario was developed from previous exercise data. The above chart shows only part of this scenario. It is useful because it contains Military Objectives, Tactical Tasks, Success Criteria, and Success Indicators, that help more fully define warfighter battle management needs. <br />
  • (U) SSA & SAW Integrated Concept This diagram illustrates the overriding algorithm that SWAT employs to support the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Satellite Attack Warning (SAW) missions. This process starts with extensive data on existing satellite and space systems characteristics such as orbital elements, size, shape, RADAR Cross Section, optical cross section, stabilization, size, etc. These characteristics are derived over the long term, and can include historical data over many years. The AFRL Satellite Assessment Center’s (SatAC) Satellite Information Database (SID) provides such a database. This historical database can be considered the “steady state” condition of the space system, and includes the range of data values in which the space system can be considered operating within its “normal” bounds. <br /> (U) The second set of data for satellites, space objects, and terrestrial systems supporting space includes what these systems are currently doing. This is the current status of these space systems. This can be measured by space surveillance, SIGINT and other intelligence collection methodologies. <br /> (U) The third step in the SWAT process is to use change detection algorithms to compare the historical steady-state nature of the space system to what its current state is. Because of the many thousands of space objects in existence today (including live and supposedly dead space objects), only automatic algorithms can identify those space objects that require further analysis and additional data collection/monitoring. This process can then identify those space objects that may be changing status (configuration, orbital maneuvering, or ejecting sub-satellites), and may be threatening other space systems. It should be noted that these processes and algorithms must also be applied to Red, Blue, Gray and “dead” space objects in order to accomplish a complete picture of what the current situation in space is. The change detection for the Blue space systems is required in order to support attack assessment and battle damage assessment (BDA). <br />
  • (U) SSA & SAW Detail 1 This next diagram expands on the previous chart, and lists the data inputs and product outputs of the first two steps of the SWAT algorithms process. In the Red and Blue boxes, AFRL research programs are listed that database or assess intelligence data on space systems. In PowerPoint slide show mode, clicking on each of the programs will move the viewer to the appropriate detail slides describing each of these programs at the back of this briefing. <br />
  • (U) SSA & SAW Detail 2 This diagram expands on the SWAT change detection algorithms, and lists the data inputs and product outputs of the second two steps of the SWAT algorithms process. These process steps are where change detection and Satellite Attack Warning (SAW) are determined in SWAT. In the Red and Blue boxes, AFRL research programs are listed that process or assess intelligence data on space systems. In PowerPoint slide show mode, clicking on each of the programs will move the viewer to the appropriate detail slides describing each of these programs at the back of this briefing. <br />
  • (U) Capt Mike Carlson Leads the SWAT development efforts for the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Satellite Assessment Center (SatAC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico providing real-life tactical battlefield experience. <br /> (U) Paul Szymanski Is the creator of these space control / SSA concepts, and the SWAT architect. He is located in Albuquerque, NM and supports the Satellite Assessment Center (SatAC) of the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL). He has 33 years continuous experience in space control analyses, assessments and development. <br /> (U) Chris Jones Leads the Metatech Corporation office in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and has supported the Satellite Assessment Center (SatAC) for 20 years. <br />
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Space policy swat-future space strategies-13-unclassified Space policy swat-future space strategies-13-unclassified Presentation Transcript

  • UNCLASSIFIED 06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 of 189 Pages 22 July, 2013 “You may not be interested in war … but war is interested in you.” (Leon Trotsky) - Future Space Strategies - SWAT Space Warfare Analysis Tools “The Mother of All Space Strategy Briefings” Paul Szymanski Strategos@spacewarfare.info Space Strategies Center
  • Page 2 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Outline (1) Why SWAT (24 Slides) SWAT Tools Summary (3 Slides) Space Doctrine & Strategy (52 Slides) – Space Principles of War (10 Slides) – Space Escalation Ladder (2 Slides) – Space Strategy Sequence (12 Slides) – Space Strategy Tempo (5 Slides) – Space Strategies (COA’s) (14 Slides) – Space Centers Of Gravity (9 Slides) – Space INTEL Indicators (2 Slides) – Space Objectives (2 Slides)
  • Page 3 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Outline (2) Space Warfare Definitions (5 Slides) Satellite Attack Warning (SAW) Choke Point Displays (35 Slides) Space Tactics (74 Slides) This Brief Is an Encyclopedia for Space Warfare
  • Page 4 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Logic Flow SWAT Provides an Integrated Space Warfare Conceptual Framework Observe – INTEL Indicators – Orbital Elements – RADAR Data – Optical Data Orient – Satellite State Change Detection – Space Choke Point Maps – Red COA Detect Decide – Space COA’s – SHIVA Space Target Ranking Tool Act – Space Choke Point Maps – Satellite State Change – Threat Envelopes Doctrine – Space Principles of War – Space COG – Space War Definitions Strategies – Space Escalation Ladder – Space Objectives – Space Strategies Sequence/Tempo Tactics – Space Tactics – Space Weapon Concepts SWAT Products Listed Inside Boxes
  • Page 5 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Purpose • Develop Original Space Warfare Doctrine, Strategies, Tactics, Concepts & Tools Supporting Future Combat Operations • SWAT Will Support Answering the Following Questions: – Will Space Systems be Under Attack In the Near Future? – Are Space Systems Currently Under Attack? – Who Is Attacking? – What is the Adversary Attack Strategy? – What Damage Has Been Caused? – What Is Optimal Blue Response? Provides a “Unified Field Theory” for Space Warfare
  • Page 6 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Why SWAT? Predict Space Attack Timely Attack Response Win Space Battle Predict Future Space Combat Principles
  • Page 7 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Source of Concepts • Principal Investigator – (Dr. Strangelove of Space) • 35 Years of Continuous Experience in Space Warfare – Space Command & Control (SPADOC 3+) – Space Surveillance (5 Architecture Studies) – Space Systems Survivability – Weapon Systems – Space Exercises (12) • 800 Military History Books In Personal Collection • Reviewed 55 Doctrine Docs, Joint Pubs, Air Force Glossaries, Air Force Instructions, Air Force Pamphlets, Army Field Manuals, National Defense University Handbook, & Multiservice Procedures • Particular Interest In Translating Terrestrial Warfare Concepts to Space Operations – From Ancient Sumerian Warfare to the Future
  • Page 8 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Fundamental Space Threats-1 • World Has Not Yet Experienced a Full-Out Space War • Difficult to Assess What the Likely Conditions, Battlefield Tempo, Strategies & Tactics Would Underlay a Future Space Conflict Space Warfare Future is Unknown
  • Page 9 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Fundamental Space Threats-2 • Despite Best Efforts at INTEL Collection, Many Historical Examples of Surprise Attack – Pearl Harbor – Battle of the Bulge (in Spite of 11,000 Ultra Message Decryptions Indicating Buildup of Major German Forces for Attack) – Yalu River in Korea – Most Israeli-Arab Conflicts • Due to the Distances Involved in Space & Unmanned Nature of the Environment, Surprise Attacks in Space Can Only be Even More Difficult to Detect Surprise Attacks In Space Will Occur
  • Page 10 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index The Value of Surprise • National Defense University Study: – Analysis of 16 Major Conflicts in 20th Century – 138 Cases of Surprise Attacks Assessed • Study Results – Without Surprise - 1 : 1.7 Casualty Ratio – With Surprise - 1 : 14.5 Casualty Ratio
  • Page 11 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Fundamental Space Threats-3 • Many New Weapon Technologies Provided Considerable Advantages to Their First User – Catapult vs. Greek Fortifications – Cannon vs. Castle Walls – Crossbow vs. Shield – Musket vs. Body Armor – Tank vs. Machine Gun – Shaped-Charge vs. Bunker – Airplane vs. Battleship • More Than Likely the Side That First Employs Offensive Weapons Against Space Systems Will “Win” the Space War, & Unbalance US & Allied Use of Space Systems to Support the Terrestrial Battlefield, at Least Over the Short Duration of Any Probable Future Major Conflict. Side That Attacks First In Space Will Win???
  • Page 12 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Fundamental Space Threats-4 • Space Objects Playing “Dead” – “Spent” Stages & Boosters • Large Volume Objects • Many Have Completed ½ of Hohmann Transfer • Natural Perturbations of Orbit Come “Close” (Low Delta-V & Transfer Time) to Many Critical US Satellites • These Space Objects Are Not Frequently Tracked – Can Be a Mother Ship for Space Mines that Maneuver Outside of Space Surveillance Coverage Zones – Low or No Space Surveillance Coverage: Southern Hemisphere; Poles; Equatorial LEO (Intersects All LEO Satellites) Easy to Conduct Surprise Attacks In Space
  • Page 13 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Current Space Surveillance Network
  • Page 14 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index NORAD Catalog Missing Space Objects Number of Lost Satellites By Altitude and RCS 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 0 to 100 >100 to 200 >200 to 300 >300 to 400 >400 to 500 >500 to 600 >600 to 700 >700 to 800 >800 to 900 >900 to 1000 >1000 to 1100 >1100 to 1200 >1200 to 1300 >1300 to 1400 >1400 to 1500 >1500 to 1600 >1600 to 1700 >1700 to 1800 >1800 to 1900 >1900 to 2000 >2000 to 3000 >3000 to 4000 >4000 to 5000 >5000 to 6000 >6000 to 7000 >7000 to 8000 >8000 to 9000 >9000 to 10000 >10000 to 15000 >15000 to 20000 >20000 to 25000 >25000 to 30000 >30000 to 35000 >35000 to 40000>40000 Altitude (km) #ofLostSpaceObjects 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 AverageRCS(dBsm)
  • Page 15 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Choke Points Space Object Altitude vs Inclination - LEO NORAD Satellite Catalog Data as of 2-16-06 600 650 700 750 800 850 900 98.0 98.1 98.2 98.3 98.4 98.5 98.6 98.7 98.8 98.9 99.0 Inclination (Degrees) Altitude(Kilometers) Live Non-Military Satellites Live Military Satellites Dead Space Objects Hohmann Maneuver Envelope at 100 M/Sec Delta-V ORBVIEW-02 SAUDISAT 2 USA 106 CERISE TSINGHUA-1 SNAP-1 USA 172 RADARSAT-I FENG YUN 1D NOAA 18 There are Many Potential Sources of Attack Space Junk
  • Page 16 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Beidou - MEO 2,500 km 250 km
  • Page 17 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Paul’s Favorite ASAT’s (1) • Double The Trouble – Direct Ascent ASAT Has Two KKV’s – 2nd KKV Holds Back In Reserve In Case 1st KKV Fails – If 1st KKV Succeeds, 2nd KKV Hides In Debris Cloud for a Few Days, & Then Maneuvers Away When Over the Poles Many Terrestrial Attacks Use Multiple Weapons Against the Same Target
  • Page 18 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Paul’s Favorite ASAT’s (2) • Hide & Seek – Microsatellite ASAT Covertly Deployed From Multiple Payload Booster – ASAT Attaches Itself to Old Rocket Booster (1960’s?) & Drifts With It for Years – When Natural Orbital Perturbations Bring Junk Booster Within Range, ASAT Maneuvers Close to Target – ASAT Uses Smart Attitude to Steer Away Solar Glints From Earth – Old Space Junk Not Tracked Often, and Is of Little Interest to Satellite Inspectors (Burns Up Too Much Fuel to Visit) Space Attack Will Come “Out of the Blue”
  • Page 19 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Paul’s Favorite ASAT’s (3) • Shot Out of the Blue – Region of Space Between Geosynchronous Orbit & the Moon Is Not Routinely Monitored (Lagrangian Points?) – At Very High Altitudes, Very Little Delta-V Required to Make Large Changes in Inclination / Altitude – Unobserved ASAT Forces Can Make a Surprise Attack on GEO Belt He Who Controls the Lagrangian Points Rules the World?
  • Page 20 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Paul’s Favorite ASAT’s (4) • Equatorial Cutter – Region of Space at Low Inclinations and Low Altitude (LEO) Is Not Routinely Monitored – All LEO Satellites Pass Through This Region – ASAT System Based In This Region Has Access to Many LEO Satellites, But Is Not Easily Tracked (Never Passes Through Space Fence) – ASAT Uses Glancing Attack Methodology (Same As Iridium vs. COSMOS Collision) He Who Controls the Equatorial Belt Rules the World?
  • Page 21 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Paul’s Favorite ASAT’s (5) • Space Flyer – Constantly Thrusting ASAT Confuses Space Surveillance Tracking Network – Difficult to Determine What It Is, Who Owns It, Where Did It Come From, Where Is It Going – GOCE Earth Resources Satellite Already In Orbit Will Be Continuously Thrusting for 20-30 Months Space Attacks Do Not Have to Follow Classical Orbital Dynamics
  • Page 22 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Paul’s Favorite ASAT’s (6) • Pixie Dust – Electrostatically Charged Small Pieces of Fiber Optic Strands Are Sent Towards Target Satellite’s Star Sensors – Satellite Attitude Algorithms Would Be Confused By Multiple Glints From Solar Reflections & May Tumble the Satellite Satellites Not Designed for Unusual Circumstances
  • Page 23 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Avoid Space Radar - Hopper 1 2 3 4 3.5 Newton Continuous Burn
  • Page 24 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Avoid Space Radar - Slider 90° Sensor Cone 80° Sensor Cone
  • Page 25 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Avoid Space Radar - Skipper 1 2 3 4 2.6 Km/Sec Impulse Burn
  • Page 26 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index One Impulse Maneuver Effects 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 InclinationChange(Degrees) 00:00:00 00:07:12 00:14:24 00:21:36 00:28:48 00:36:00 00:43:12 00:50:24 00:57:36 01:04:48 01:12:00 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Delta-V (m/s) DetectionTimeChange (Hours:Minutes:Seconds) 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 AltitudeChange(km) Typical Imaging Satellite Altitude Bands Inclination Change Time Change 25 m/sec Delta-V Gives Results Within Operational Constraints Goal: Avoid Ascension Is. Radar DMSP-Class Satellite Impulse Burns After Leaving Ascension Is. Sensor Cone Small Maneuvers Can Confuse NORAD Space Object Tracking
  • Page 27 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Hide Satellite Among Others 80 m/s Delta-V 500 m/s Delta-V 523 m/s Delta-V 641 m/s Delta-V 144 m/s Delta-V 448 m/s Delta-V 1317 m/s Delta-V 430 m/s Delta-V 26 m/s Delta-V 459 m/s Delta-V 3607 m/s Delta-V 2826 m/s Delta-V 2543 m/s Delta-V 688 m/s Delta-V Goal: Appear Like Nearby Satellite Delta-V Required for 2-Burn Hohmann Transfer Rendezvous Satellites Can Maneuver to Confuse Targeting Assets
  • Page 28 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Issues of Space Grand Strategy • Offense vs. Defense • Whomever Attacks First Wins? • Types of Defense – Passive – Active – Reconstitution – “The Best Defense Is an Offense” • Regions of Space & Time That Must Be Defended at All Costs (Space Choke Points?) • Many Small Satellites vs. Large Battle Stations Only Robust Space Wargaming Can Begin to Solve Some of These Issues
  • Page 29 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Tools SWAT Tools
  • Page 30 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Tools Developed (1) • Automatic Space Object Mission ID • Auto Space Object State Change Detection • Automatic Red Space COA ID • Space Choke Point Maps (SAW – Satellite Attack Warning) Anticipate What an Adversary’s Next Move Is View View View View
  • Page 31 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Tools Developed (2) • SSA Requirements (1,900) • Space INTEL Indicators List (5,000) • Resolution Requirements (Space NIIRS) • Sensor Requirements Tracking Software Determine What We Know & Don’t Know About an Adversary View View View View
  • Page 32 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Tools Developed (3) • Space Blue COA Support – Space Strategies Checklist – Space Principles of War Checklist – Space Military Objectives Database (5,000 Objectives) – Space Centers of Gravity Checklist – Space Escalation Ladder – Auto Joint Space & Ground Target Prioritization – Information Targets Ranking • Space Control Scenario – Automatic Space Scenario Generation Tool SWAT Supports Timely & Decisive Blue Courses of Action Generation View View View View View View View View View View
  • Page 33 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Doctrine & Strategies Space Doctrine & Strategies
  • Page 34 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Principles of War • Objective • Offensive • Mass • Economy of Force • Maneuver • Unity of Command • Security • Surprise • Simplicity Principles of War Equally Applicable to Space & Terrestrial Warfare
  • Page 35 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Principles of War by Country
  • Page 36 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Principles of War (1) • Objective – Terrestrial: “Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective with measurable effects” – Space: Are your objectives to take out a satellite or a system capability that may be supported by both satellites and ground systems. Will taking out the satellite be decisive in denying that category of information. Does it have a measurable impact on the battlefield. Which military objectives does this system support. Is satisfaction of this objective achievable. Are there branches and sequels to space control operations plans if they fail or if they are successful.
  • Page 37 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Principles of War (2) • Offensive – Terrestrial: “Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative” – Space: Is there political will to start a space war at the beginning of conflict and seize the space initiative, or is taking out ground sites supporting space sufficient to achieve objectives. Are we setting the time, place and terms of the space battle. Does the battle tempo include space attacks on a continuing basis to keep the adversary off-balance. Can space weapons sustain continuous attacks. Is there a pre-approved ramp-up of space attack severity to exploit successes for further gain.
  • Page 38 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index • Mass – Terrestrial: “Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time” – Space: Are there sufficient weapons to achieve continuous, or sustained space control. Can the adversary re-configure to avoid attack. Are the space weapons overwhelming to the military function they are trying to deny. Is there political will to implement massed space attack. Can space weapons get into position at the decisive place and time. Do we know the decisive place and time for space weapons application. Can space weapons be synchronized for employment simultaneously. Space Principles of War (3) Space Strategy Planning Has Not Had the Benefit of a Long History
  • Page 39 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Principles of War (4) • Economy of Force – Terrestrial: “Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts” – Space: Are all space control efforts and weapon systems integrated into one deployment/employment plan. Is the target list optimal with minimal weapons use. Are different phenomenology weapons use integrated. Are the results of space control decisive to the battlefield. Are all space control systems employed purposefully at all times of the conflict, even in delay, limited or deceptive kinds of attack that focus the adversary’s attention away from the main space attack.
  • Page 40 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Principles of War (5) • Maneuver –Terrestrial: “Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power” –Space: Have space weapons been deployed in optimal positions and time-space phasing. What is the effect on the adversary of weapons use. Has the “high ground” of space above the battlefield been won. Are there critical orbits/time phasing/launch corridors/communications paths around the world contributing to the battlefield that need space superiority consideration. Has access to space been denied to the adversary & its allies, and optimized for blue side & allies. Has blue freedom of action been maximized while minimizing red freedom of action in space. Are points of application of space control weapons constantly shifted to confuse adversary response, and avoid predictable patterns of operation, for survivability reasons.
  • Page 41 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Principles of War (6) • Unity of Command – Terrestrial: “For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort” – Space: Have space control, info war, and air/ground attack plans been integrated with each other and with intelligence collection requirements. Does the “classic” target allocation process give sufficient consideration of space/info targets. Is there adequate space/info war delineation of chain of command and decision responsibility. Are space target lists traceable back to objectives (both red and blue). Do blue and red commanders appreciate the importance of space to their conduct of the war.
  • Page 42 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Principles of War (7) • Security – Terrestrial: “Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage” – Space: Are space forces, including weapon systems, survivable in the battlefield environment. Have OPSEC and fratricide concerns been met. Have blue space choke points (orbits/time phasing/launch corridors/communications paths), centers of gravity (TT&C and launch sites), logistics, and command structures been identified and protected. Does blue have alternative space-related sensor, processing, command, and communications paths. Are red space strategy, tactics, doctrine, organization, and intentions assessed.
  • Page 43 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Principles of War (8) • Surprise – Terrestrial: “Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared” – Space: Are space control weapons existence known to an adversary, or does he know they have been deployed to the theater, or do they have war operating modes to surprise the enemy by their use. Are there a series of surprise space control weapons that can be alternated in use to maintain cover. Is the use of these weapons detectable or attributable to a specific country by an adversary. Timing and tempo of space weapon use can surprise also, even if their existence is known. Threat of weapon use, even if does not exist, can effectively surprise.
  • Page 44 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Principles of War (9) • Simplicity – Terrestrial: “Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding” – Space: How complex are space weapons, and are the effects of their use easily understandable by non-space blue and red commanders (do they know they’ve been hurt bad). Are there branches and sequels to space control operations if they fail or if they are successful.
  • Page 45 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Other Considerations (1) • Combined Arms –Space vs Terrestrial Attack –Delay vs Kill Effects –Deterrence vs Employment –Covert vs Overt Weapons • Balance –Offense vs Defense
  • Page 46 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Other Considerations (2) • Political Sensitivity –Laws of Armed Conflict –Space Treaties –Public Perception • Rules of Engagement • Space Includes Both Position (Orbits) and Time - Impacts Attack Tempo • Space Attack Phase of Conflict –Would space attack in the pre-conflict phase deter the start of the conflict
  • Page 47 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Gradations of Space Control  Deter - Pre-Conflict - Trans-Conflict  Deceive  Deny  Disrupt  Degrade  Destroy
  • Page 48 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Conflict Levels Peacetime Crisis Covert Military Actions Overt Military Actions Reconstruction/Reconstitution
  • Page 49 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Escalation Ladder Space Actions May Be Conducted Pre-Conflict WBS Conflict Phase Terrestrial Campaign Phase Space Campaign Phase Weapon Type Space Campaign Phase Full Name Weapon Category P.1.A.0 Pre-Conflict Phase 0: Pre-War Buildup (Shape) 1st Wave Attacks Phase A Pre-Conflict Deter 1st Wave Attacks Phase A - Pre-Conflict Deter Overt Weapon; Treaty; Saber Rattling; Space Alliances P.1.B.0 Pre-Conflict Phase 0: Pre-War Buildup (Shape) 1st Wave Attacks Phase B Persuade 1st Wave Attacks Phase B - Pre-Conflict Persuade Diplomatic Request; Economic Action; Legal Action; Administrative Action P.1.C.0 Pre-Conflict Phase 0: Pre-War Buildup (Shape) 1st Wave Attacks Phase C Hide 1st Wave Attacks Phase C - Pre-Conflict Hide Camouflage; Stop Activities; Mobility P.2.A.0 Trans-Conflict Phase I: Deployment / Deterrence (Deter) 2nd Wave Attacks Trans-Conflict Deter 2nd Wave Attacks - Trans- Conflict Deter Linked Attack; Demo Attack; Alternate Country Attack; Covert Attack P.3.A.1 Trans-Conflict Phase II: Halt Incursion (Seize Initiative) 3rd Wave Attacks Phase A1 – Gnd Based From Terrestrial Partial Temporary Kill 3rd Wave Attacks Phase A1 – Terrestrial-to-Space Partial Temporary Effects Delay, Deny P.3.A.2 Trans-Conflict Phase II: Halt Incursion (Seize Initiative) 3rd Wave Attacks Phase A2 – Gnd Based From Terrestrial Total Temporary Kill 3rd Wave Attacks Phase A2 – Terrestrial-to-Space Total Temporary Effects Disrupt P.3.B.1 Trans-Conflict Phase III: Air Counter-Offensive (Dominate) 3rd Wave Attacks Phase B1 – Space Based From Space Partial Temporary Kill 3rd Wave Attacks Phase B1 – Space-to-Space Partial Temporary Effects Delay, Deny P.3.B.2 Trans-Conflict Phase III: Air Counter-Offensive (Dominate) 3rd Wave Attacks Phase B2 – Space Based From Space Total Temporary Kill 3rd Wave Attacks Phase B2 – Space-to-Space Total Temporary Effects Disrupt
  • Page 50 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Escalation Ladder (Cont.) Space Provides Finer Gradations & Thus Better Control During Conflict Escalation WBS Conflict Phase Terrestrial Campaign Phase Space Campaign Phase Weapon Type Space Campaign Phase Full Name Weapon Category P.4.A.1 Trans-Conflict Phase IV: Joint Counter-Offensive to Restore Friendly Pre-Conflict Status (Stabilize Borders) 4th Wave Attacks Phase A1 – Gnd Based From Terrestrial Partial Permanent Kill 4th Wave Attacks Phase A1 – Terrestrial-to-Space Partial Permanent Kill Degrade P.4.A.2 Trans-Conflict Phase IV: Joint Counter-Offensive to Restore Friendly Pre-Conflict Status (Stabilize Borders) 4th Wave Attacks Phase A2 – Gnd Based From Terrestrial Total Permanent Kill 4th Wave Attacks Phase A2 – Terrestrial-to-Space Total Permanent Kill Destroy P.4.B.1 Trans-Conflict Phase V: Joint Counter-Offensive to Capture Adversary Capitol (Enable New Civil Authority) 4th Wave Attacks Phase B1 – Space Based From Space Partial Permanent Kill 4th Wave Attacks Phase B1 – Space-to-Space Partial Permanent Kill Degrade P.4.B.2 Trans-Conflict Phase V: Joint Counter-Offensive to Capture Adversary Capitol (Enable New Civil Authority) 4th Wave Attacks Phase B2 – Space Based From Space Total Permanent Kill 4th Wave Attacks Phase B2 – Space-to-Space Total Permanent Kill Destroy P.5.A.0 Trans-Conflict Phase VI: Defend Against Adversary Counter-Attacks Against Friendly Homeland (Defend Friendly Citizens) 5th Wave Attacks Space-Manned Permanent Kill 5th Wave Attacks - Space- Manned Permanent Kill Degrade, Destroy P.6.A.0 Trans-Conflict Phase VI: Defend Against Adversary Counter-Attacks Against Friendly Homeland (Defend Friendly Citizens) 6th Wave Attacks Space-to-Earth Permanent Kill 6th Wave Attacks - Space- to-Earth Permanent Kill Degrade, Destroy P.7.A.0 Trans-Conflict Phase VII: Defend Against Adversary Use of Nuclear Weapons in Space (Defend Friendly Military) 7th Wave Attacks NBC Use - Space 7th Wave Attacks - NBC Use - Space Degrade, Destroy P.8.A.0 Trans-Conflict Phase VIII: Defend Against Adversary Use of NBC Against Friendly Military Targets (Defend Friendly Military) 8th Wave Attacks; Phase A – Military Targets NBC Use - Space & Terrestrial 8th Wave Attacks Phase A – NBC Use - Space & Terrestrial - Military Targets Degrade, Destroy P.8.B.0 Trans-Conflict Phase IX: Defend Against Adversary Use of NBC Against All Friendly Targets (Defend Friendly Military & Civilians) 8th Wave Attacks; Phase B – Civilian Targets NBC Use - Space & Terrestrial 8th Wave Attacks Phase B – NBC Use - Space & Terrestrial - Civilian Targets Degrade, Destroy P.9.A.0 Post-Conflict Phase X: Post-Hostilities (Reconstruction & Stabilization) 9th Wave Attacks Post-Conflict Deter 9th Wave Attacks - Post- Conflict Deter Diplomatic Request; Economic Action; Legal Action; Administrative Action
  • Page 51 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence Deter (Pre-Conflict) Persuade Confuse Deter (Trans-Conflict) Protect Deny Space Force Enhancement Deny Space Support  Destroy Space Infrastructure  Space-Supported Reconstruction
  • Page 52 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (1) Deter (Pre-Conflict) –Overt Weapon • Demonstrated Capability • Can Be Secretly Linked To Covert –Space Treaty Allows • Embargo Gray Country Space Support – Jam – Blind • Destruction of Threatening Space Systems –Saber Rattling –Space Mutual Defense Alliances
  • Page 53 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (2) Persuade –Diplomatic Request –Economic Action –Legal Action –Administrative Action • Turn-Off Own Systems
  • Page 54 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (3a) Confuse –Hide • Passive –Camouflage –Cease Activities When Sensor Is Overhead –Move Out of the Way of Sensor • Active –Jam –Blind
  • Page 55 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (3b) Confuse (Continued) –Change Adversary Confidence • Covertly Disrupt Space Systems – Adversary Can’t Trust the Reliability Or Validity of His Space Systems –Change Adversary Perceptions • Make Blue Side Look Bigger Than They Are – Fake Forces – Blind Sensors Where No Forces Exist • Make Red Side Look Smaller Than They Are – Adversary Can’t Determine Location & Status of His Own Forces – Convince Adversary Future Space or Terrestrial Weather Is Not Favorable for Attack
  • Page 56 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (4a) Deter (Trans-Conflict) –Linked Attack • Declare That Use of Gray/Red Space Assets Will Precipitate Attack On Terrestrial Systems –Demo Attack • Destroy Derelict Space System To Show Real Space Control Capability & Willingness To Use It –Covert Space Control Capability Can Actually Be Used To Cover for Weak Overt Capability
  • Page 57 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (4b) Deter (Trans-Conflict, Continued) –Alternate Country Attack • Destroying Red Space Systems Deters Gray From Supporting Red –Covert Attack • Red/Gray Space Systems Temporarily Stop Working, Even Though Blue Does Not Admit Attack, The Message Is Clear
  • Page 58 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (5) Protect –Passive • Harden • Maneuver • Hide –Active • Deny Adversary Space Control Capability –Deny Terrestrial Space Control Capability –Deny Space-Based Space Control Capability
  • Page 59 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (6) Deny Space Force Enhancement –Deny Imagery Info –Deny Weather Info –Deny Navigation Info –Deny Missile Warning Info • If Within Rules of Engagement –Deny Communications
  • Page 60 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (7) Deny Space Support –Deny Access To and From Space • Deny Space Launch • Deny Space De-Orbit/Retrieval –Space Planes –Film Capsule Return –Hijacked Satellite Parts –Astronaut Return
  • Page 61 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (8a) Destroy Space Infrastructure –Set Back Adversary Space Capabilities For Years To Come (Watch Out For Poisonous Materials) • Large Earth Terminals & Antennas • Launch Pads & Space Plane Airfields • Space Production Facilities – Rocket Fuel Production – Satellite Construction – Missile Construction • Space Design Facilities & Personnel
  • Page 62 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (8b) Destroy Space Infrastructure (Continued) – Critical Utilities Leading to Space Facilities –Electrical Transmission Towers –Pipelines –Roads, Bridges, Tunnels & Passes
  • Page 63 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategy Sequence (9) Space-Supported Reconstruction –Employ Space Assets for Allied/Red Post-Conflict Rebuilding –Clean Up Space Debris?
  • Page 64 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Control Tempo (1) Determine Most Vulnerable Blue/Gray Assets - Protect These –Satellites –Satellite Control/Receiver Sites –Satellite Tracking Sites –Space Weapons –Terrestrial Non-Space Linked To Space Assets • Communications • Command
  • Page 65 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Control Tempo (2) Determine Most Threatening Red/Gray Assets –Satellites –Satellite Control/Receiver Sites –Satellite Tracking Sites –Space Weapons –Terrestrial Non-Space Linked To Space Assets • Communications • Command
  • Page 66 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Control Tempo (3) Deter Red & Gray Use of Space Assets –Space Escalation Ladder Control • Pre-Conflict • Trans-Conflict –Blue May Not Want to Escalate Space War All the Way • Blue May Have More Space Assets to Lose Than Red • Blue May Force Red to Use Gray Space Assets, Which Blue May Be Self-Deterred From Attacking • Blue May Be Monitoring Red/Gray Space Assets for INTEL
  • Page 67 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Control Tempo (4) Fix Space Assets Into Quiescent State Until Satellite Killers Are In Theater, On-Line, Targets Are Within Range & Employment Authorized – Satellites Cannot Get New Tasking, Re-Configure Into War Reserve Modes, Or Maneuver to Orbits Advantageous on Battlefield • Confuse/Deny TT&C and Tasking of Satellites • Confuse/Deny Data Down-Linked From Satellites • Confuse/Deny Command Centers Requesting Satellite Info • Confuse/Deny Communications Between Command Centers & Space Centers
  • Page 68 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Control Tempo (5) Employ Degrade/Destroy Space Control Weapons Where Authorized (ROE)
  • Page 69 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (1) Title: Sweep The Skies Action: Destroy all Red satellites whether military, civil, or commercial, in a synchronized simultaneous attack so that Red protective/reconstitution measures cannot be implemented in time. Desired Effect: One large synchronized blow keeps red off balance.
  • Page 70 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (2) Title: Sweep The Ground Action: Destroy all prime Red space-related ground targets with a minimum of collateral damage. Desired Effect: With all ground sites destroyed, satellites cannot be tasked or download data. Probably a more politically acceptable solution, but space-related ground sites can be replaced easier than satellites after the war, and data from Gray satellite systems can still be downloaded outside of Red country and transmitted into theater.
  • Page 71 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (3) Title: Periodic Degrade Action: Use degrade type of weapons whose attack cycles are timed to correspond with the reconstitution or replacement time of that target's capability. Desired Effect: As Red starts to bring on-line an alternate space capability, it is negated. This minimizes space weapons employment, but does not have as much shock value as a Sweep The Skies attack.
  • Page 72 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (4) Title: Rolling Disrupt Action: Temporarily disrupt Gray space assets for small lengths of time, then move on to other Gray assets. Use low probability of detection and attribution weapons. This will give the impression of reliability issues with Gray equipment, not intentional attack, and decrease confidence in Gray systems, while also making Gray countries suspicious of Blue willingness to disrupt, but they would not be able to absolutely prove this. This may also confuse Gray countries as to Blue strategies and intent for that Gray country, and deter their support for Red side. Desired Effect: Keep Gray side guessing as to the ultimate fate of their space systems if they continue to support Red side.
  • Page 73 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (5) Title: Herd COMM Action: Selectively destroy or temporarily disrupt specific Red space systems communications assets so that critical Red sensor and C4 info gets directed to known paths that can be monitored by Blue sensors. Desired Effect: Make Red more vulnerable to intelligence exploitation.
  • Page 74 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (6) Title: Funnel COMM Action: Selectively disrupt select Red space systems communications assets so that critical Red sensor and C4 info gets directed to communications paths with low data rates, effectively delaying receipt of critical data beyond its useful life. Desired Effect: Delay receipt of critical info while conserving space control weapons employment.
  • Page 75 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (7) Title: Herd Space Personnel Action: Destroy all Red space-related ground targets, except purposely lightly damage one ground center. Assume that key space support personnel will converge to this lightly damaged site to conduct repairs. 12 hours later, use anti-personnel weapons at this site, with destroy weapons 2 hours later. Desired Effect: Destroys Red country's most import space asset: key technically trained space personnel. Also sends message to international community that foreign personnel supporting Red space efforts will be at risk.
  • Page 76 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (8) Title: Herd Sensors Action: Temporarily deny Red space sensors, or only certain sensors. This will blind them, until they are allowed to use them again when Blue side wants them to observe certain fake Blue force dispositions. This directs Red sensors to see only what Blue side wants them to see. Desired Effect: Control Red perception of Blue strengths and battlefield situation.
  • Page 77 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (9) Title: Hidden Disrupt Action: Employ weapons with low probability of detection and attribution, to minimize world reaction to Blue side counter space. Temporarily disrupt spacecraft operations at random times. Desired Effect: Red side loses confidence in his space systems. He is constantly kept off-balance by repeated disruption of his space capabilities – timed within his decision cycle times. Political implications of space control need not be addressed.
  • Page 78 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies (10) Title: Hidden Negate Action: Employ weapons with low probability of detection and attribution, to minimize Red perception that Blue has begun counter space operations. Slowly increase tempo of Red satellite disruption, starting with minor anomalies easily attributable to natural causes, and building up to major problems. This will make the Red side lose confidence in the operation and data associated with this space system, and will make it less suspicious when the satellite system is finally negated. Desired Effect: Red probably hasn’t used space systems in a real conflict before, and their decreasing reliability under combat stress might be understandable and acceptable to them.
  • Page 79 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Other Space Strategies (1) • Blind Blue capabilities to observe the terrestrial battlefield • Blind Blue capabilities to support the terrestrial battlefield • Blind Blue capabilities to observe space from terrestrial sensors • Blind Blue capabilities to observe space from space-based sensors • Spoof Blue capabilities to observe the battlefield • Spoof Blue capabilities to support the battlefield • Deny Blue ability to launch new satellites • Destroy some Blue space capability as a warning to Gray space systems support to Blue • Wear down Blue Defensive Counter-Space capabilities by instigating multiple false alarm attacks • Attack Blue satellites before the start of the terrestrial conflict • Spoof Blue perceptions of Red space strengths • Conduct surprise attacks on Blue space systems
  • Page 80 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Other Space Strategies (2) • Conduct diplomatic offensive to restrict Blue ability to employ ASAT's • Actively defend key launch corridors and orbits critical to Red conduct of war • Mass Red ASAT forces against high value Blue targets • Preposition Red space assets to maximize their effectiveness at the start of the conflict • Red exploits Blue space systems to Red advantage • Disrupt Blue command and control capabilities for space systems • Embargo Blue access to space systems • Prevent Blue ability to service or re-fuel on-orbit satellites • Develop propaganda campaign against Blue use of ASAT's • Shape and delay Blue plans for space warfare • Deny Blue ability to achieve Space Situational Awareness • Deny Blue ability to use commercial and Gray space assets
  • Page 81 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Other Space Strategies (3) • Destroy Blue space infrastructure to have a long term impact on Blue space capabilities even after the war's end • Disrupt Blue space attacks so they become uncoordinated • Constantly shift points of application of space control weapons to confuse adversary response • Cut off Blue access to satellites • Herd Blue space communications paths to those that are more easily monitored by Red SIGINT assets • Attack key Blue space personnel and technicians • Allocate space defenses according to priority of space system defended • Does Red conduct an active (attack ASAT's) or passive defense (satellite hardening)
  • Page 82 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Other Space Strategies (4) • Does Red conduct ASAT attacks over home territory • What is Red attack priority timelines: terrestrial space systems or satellites first • Disperse Red assets (maneuver satellites) just before launching first attack • All-out first attack or gradual escalation of space attacks • Is the strategy dependent upon a perception of the relative capability of the threat, for example, would Red do something different if the attacker were perceived to be stronger? • Attach new ASAT to old space object that has been dead for a long time (1960's debris?). Maneuver this new "shield" along with your new ASAT. Drift with this debris, maybe making slight maneuvers until needed to attack with a major, final maneuver.
  • Page 83 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Strategies Derived From Sun Tzu • Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War” (544 BC – 496 BC) Used to Derive Modern Space Strategies • Analysis In Progress – 287 Space Warfare Strategies Already Derived – Only 1/3 the Way Through Sun Tzu’s Teachings War Is Eternal
  • Page 84 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Conclusions (1) • Future Space Planning Violates Most of the Rules of War –Space Control Concepts Have Not Been Fully Militarized –Political Sensitivity of Space Weapons Restricts Full Military Use Supporting the Battle Tempo –Senior Decision Makers Reluctant to Authorize Space Counterattacks If Attacker Is Not Verified
  • Page 85 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Conclusions (2) • Space Does Not Fit Into Classic ATO (Air Tasking Order) Targeting Procedures & Concepts – Useful Pre-Conflict (Pre-ATO) To Confuse Red, Warn Gray & Show Resolve Without Affecting Public Emotions – Subtlety of Space Weapon Concepts (Jamming, Blinding, Spoofing) Does Not Fit Into ATO Concepts of Full Kill (Iron Bombs On Target) • Many Space Targets Are Offline From ATO Target Ranking (Most Space-Related Targets Are Not Attacked by Bombers) • No Satellite BE (Basic Encyclopedia) Numbers
  • Page 86 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SSA Requirements Study • Reviewed Doctrine Docs, Joint Pubs, Air Force Glossaries, Air Force Instructions, Air Force Pamphlets, Army Field Manuals, National Defense University Handbook, and Multiservice Procedures – 55 Total Documents Analyzed • Terrestrial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) Principles Extrapolated to Space – ~1,900 Different Space Control / SSA Requirements SWAT Baselines Space Control/SSA Requirements From Fundamental Military Doctrine
  • Page 87 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example SSA Requirements Matrix SSA Requirements Linked to Sensor Resolutions …… INTEL Derived From INTEL Requirements INTEL Indicators Resolution Requirements Space NIIRS Detection Means Technologies Basic Characterization Satellite Current Orientation Attitude Satellite Current Cross Section 1.2 - 2.5 4 Imagery or RADAR Optical or RADAR Basic Characterization Satellite Has Changed Attitude From Spinning or 3-Axis Stability Satellite Cross Section Change 2.5 - 4.5 3 Optical or RADAR Cross Section Optical or RADAR Detailed Characterization Satellite Current Weapons Suite Pointing Direction Satellite Weapons Suite Image 0.20 - 0.40 7 Imagery Optical Exquisite Characterization Satellite Delta-V Remaining Capability Satellite Telemetry Indicates Propulsion Tank Fluid Level N/A N/A RF Signal Monitoring RF Receivers Satellite Propulsion Tank Thermal Image 0.20 - 0.40 7 Imagery Optical-IR Exquisite Characterization Satellite Propulsion Tank Fluid Status Satellite Telemetry Indicates Propulsion Tank Fluid Status N/A N/A RF Signal Monitoring RF Receivers Satellite Propulsion Tank Thermal Image 0.20 - 0.40 7 Imagery Optical-IR Exquisite Characterization Satellite Current On-Board Processor State Satellite Telemetry Indicates On-Board Processor State N/A N/A RF Signal Monitoring RF Receivers Exquisite Characterization Satellite Propulsion Tank Internal Pressure Satellite Telemetry Indicates Propulsion Tank Internal Pressure N/A N/A RF Signal Monitoring RF Receivers Detailed Characterization Satellite Current Detailed Thermal Signature Satellite Thermal Image 0.20 - 0.40 7 Imagery Optical-IR …… Is the weapon system preparing/powering up for use? 1,900 Other SSA Requirements
  • Page 88 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index NIIRS Space Equivalents Defined NIIRS Rating GRD (m) Terrestrial Examples Space Equivalent Examples 0 Interpretability of the imagery is precluded by obscuration, degradation, or very poor resolution Satellite features in shadow 1 9 Detect the presence of aircraft dispersal parking areas. Detect the presence of very large (e.g., International Space Station) space object. 2 4.5 - 9.0 Detect the presence of large (e.g., Boeing 737, 747, Airbus A-300, MD-80) aircraft. Detect the presence of large (e.g., GEO Communications satellite) space object. 3 2.5 - 4.5 Detect medium-sized aircraft (e.g., F-15). Identify an ORBITA site on the basis of a 12 meter dish antenna normally mounted on a circular building. Detect the presence of a medium (e.g., DMSP) space object. 4 1.2 - 2.5 Identify the wing configuration of small fighter aircraft (e.g., F- 16). Detect large (e.g., greater than 10 meter diameter) environmental domes at an electronics facility. Detect if large (e.g., TDRS) solar panel has deployed. 5 0.75 - 1.2 Distinguish between single-tail (e.g., F-16) and twin-tailed (e.g., F-15) fighters. Detect automobile in a parking lot. Identify the metal lattice structure of large (e.g. approximately 75 meter) radio relay towers. Determine large (e.g., TDRS) solar panel design configuration. Determine satellite attitude/spin rate. Determine if satellite has broken up into large pieces. 6 0.40 - 0.75 Detect wing-mounted stores (i.e., ASM, bombs) protruding from the wings of large bombers (e.g., B-52). Identify the spare tire on a medium-sized truck. Determine existence of medium-sized (TDRS SGL Antenna) satellite antennas. 7 0.20 - 0.40 Identify antenna dishes (less than 3 meters in diameter) on a radio relay tower. Identify individual 55-gallon drums. Detect small marine mammals (e.g., harbor seals) on sand/gravel beaches. Identify ports, ladders, vents on electronics vans. Identify individual rail ties. Determine attitude of medium-sized (TDRS SGL Antenna) satellite antennas. Determine large area degradation of solar panel optical quality. 8 0.10 - 0.20 Identify the rivet lines on bomber aircraft. Detect horn-shaped and W- shaped antennas mounted atop BACKTRAP and BACKNET radars. Identify windshield wipers on a vehicle. Identify limbs (e.g., arms, legs) on an individual. Identify individual horizontal and vertical ribs on a radar antenna. Determine medium-sized (TDRS SGL Antenna) satellite antenna damage. 9 <0.10 Identify screws and bolts on missile components. Detect individual spikes in railroad ties. Identify individual rungs on bulkhead mounted ladders. Identify vehicle registration numbers (VRN) on trucks. Detect orbital thruster damage. Detect internal fuel reserves by IR means. NIIRS = National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale Space NIIRS Based on Equivalent Terrestrial NIIRS Definitions Similar to AFRL SORS (Space Object Rating Scale)
  • Page 89 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SSA Requirements Tracking SSA Requirements Linked to Military Requirements
  • Page 90 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Centers of Gravity Model Based On Col John Warden’s (Checkmate) 5-Ring COG Model Space Equivalent 5-Ring COG Model Space Systems Strategic Targeting Is Similar to Terrestrial Targeting Strategies
  • Page 91 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Centers Of Gravity - Strategic COG (1) - • Launch Corridors • GEO Belt Sectors – Above AO – Atlantic/Pacific COMM Relay Points • Sun-Synchronous LEO Orbits • GEO Transfer Orbits • Earth-Lunar Orbits • Space Launch Facilities • Petrochemical Facilities Producing Rocket Fuel • Terrestrial-Based Space Telemetry & Control Systems • Space-Related Command Centers • Space-Related Commanders
  • Page 92 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Centers Of Gravity - Strategic COG (2) - • Terrestrial-Based Space Weapon Systems • Space-Based Space Weapon Systems • Terrestrial-Based Space Surveillance Systems • Space-Based Space Surveillance Systems • Space Weather Systems • Terrestrial-Based Satellite Heavy Communications Terminals • Space Technicians • Space Scientists • Electric Grid Serving Ground Space Facilities • Roads, Bridges, Tunnels & Passes Serving Ground Space Facilities • Space Design & Manufacturing Facilities • Space-Related INTEL Centers
  • Page 93 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Centers Of Gravity - Strategic COG (3) - • Leader's Confidence In Their New Space Technologies • Blue & Red Side Political Will to Start & Continue a Space War • Key Phases of the Battle – Pre-Conflict Use of Space War – Just Before Major Terrestrial Offenses – Just Before the End of the Conflict • Space-Related Decision Cycle Times (OODA Loops) • Knowledge Of Classified Space Systems Existence or War Reserve Modes • Status of Space Forces • Attack on Alternate Country Space Systems • Blue May be Self-Deterred From Attacking Gray Space Systems • Space Alliances & Treaties
  • Page 94 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Centers Of Gravity - Strategic COG (4) - • Low Delta-V/Transit Time Points In Space to Reach High Value Targets • Points In Space With High/Low Coverage From Space Surveillance Assets • Regions of Space & Time With Advantageous Solar Phase Angles • Gravity Wells at GEO Disposal Orbits Where Dead Satellites Tend to Group • Space Radiation Belts • Times of High Solar Storm Activity • Zones Outside a Satellite's or Constellation's Collective Sensors' Field Of Regard
  • Page 95 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Centers Of Gravity - Strategic COG (5) - • Times When Adversary Military Is Concentrating on In- theater Actions, & Is Less Aware of Space-related Actions on the Other Side of the Globe • On-Orbit Spares or Launch Replenishment or Ability to Reconstitute Space Capability With Terrestrial Systems • Antipodal Nodes 180 Degrees From Launch Sites Around the World • Other Satellites Being Launched on the Same Booster • Manned Launch (Shuttle, Space Station) of Satellites • Times When a Full Moon Degrades an Adversary's Ability to Optically Track Dim Space Objects From Terrestrial Locations
  • Page 96 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Centers Of Gravity - Tactical COG (1) - • Space Tactics, Techniques & Procedures • Initial Satellite Checkout After Launch or Orbital Insertion • GEO Satellites Changing Orbital Position • Periods of Solar Eclipse for Satellites • Periods When a Satellite Has a Low Battery Charge • Approach Trajectories Outside the Field Of Regard Of the Target's On-Board Sensors • Approach Trajectories When the Sun/Moon/Earth Is In the Background of a Target's Sensors • Approach Trajectories Outside Normally Employed Orbits
  • Page 97 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Centers Of Gravity - Tactical COG (2) - • Near a Satellite's Thrusters • Near a Satellite's High Power Antennas • Anti-Satellite Launch/Attack Rate • Just After Loss of Contact With Adversary Satellite Ground Controllers • Just After Loss of Contact With Adversary Space Surveillance Assets • Times of Cloud Cover/Weather/Natural Disasters for Terrestrial-Based Space Weapons Systems • Times of Cloud Cover/Weather/Natural Disasters for Terrestrial-Based Space Surveillance Systems • Times When the Satellite Passes Through Space Radiation Belts • Communications or Telemetry Frequencies That Can be Jammed or Spoofed
  • Page 98 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example Attack Locations Optimized for Space Surveillance Some Parts of a Satellite's Orbit May Be More Vulnerable than Others
  • Page 99 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example Space INTEL Indicators Are a small number of Blue and Gray satellites experiencing anomalies over a long time period Are a small number of Blue and Gray satellites losing contact with terrestrial controllers Are a small number of new Red satellites appearing in orbit Are a small number of Red satellites changing orientation Are a small number of Red satellites changing shape Are a small number of Red satellites changing thermal signatures Are a small number of Red satellites concentrating towards potential Blue and Gray satellites Are Red ASAT forces appearing to line up in a sequence of timed attacks against Blue and Gray assets Are Red forces capable of attacking space-related terrestrial sites in Blue countries appearing to line up in a sequence of timed attacks Are Red SIGINT assets appearing to line up in a sequence of timed operations against Blue and Gray Communications assets Are there indications of Red aircraft activities that appear to concentrate on space-related terrestrial sites around the world Are there indications of Red missile activities that appear to concentrate on space-related terrestrial sites around the world Are there a small number of new satellite launches from Red facilities Many Insignificant Space Indicators May Add Up to Predicting a Major Attack
  • Page 100 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index INTEL Indicators Details
  • Page 101 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example Red National Military Space Objectives • Deny Blue Ability to Use Space as a Force Multiplier of the Terrestrial Battlespace • Gain & Maintain Red Space Superiority • Seize & Retain the Initiative in Space Warfare • Show the World Red Technical & Military Capabilities • Show Resolve to Inhibit Blue Military Actions • Take Revenge Upon Blue by Destroying Space Assets • Assure Red Access to Space • Deny Blue Ability to Attack Red Space Systems • Suppress Blue National Capacity to Wage Space War • Verify International Space Agreements • Control Space Escalation Ladder
  • Page 102 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example Red Space Campaign Objectives … Blind Blue capabilities to observe the terrestrial battlefield Blind Blue capabilities to observe space from terrestrial sensors Blind Blue capabilities to observe space from space-based sensors Spoof Blue capabilities to observe the battlefield Deny Blue ability to launch new satellites Destroy some Blue space capability as a warning to Gray space systems support to Blue Wear down Blue Defensive Counter-Space capabilities by instigating multiple false alarm attacks Attack Blue satellites before the start of the terrestrial conflict Spoof Blue perceptions of Red space strengths Conduct diplomatic offensive to restrict Blue ability to employ ASAT's Actively defend key launch corridors and orbits critical to Red conduct of war Preposition Red space assets to maximize their effectiveness at the start of the conflict Disrupt Blue command and control capabilities for space systems Embargo Blue access to space systems Prevent Blue ability to service or re-fuel on-orbit satellites Develop propaganda campaign against Blue use of ASAT's Shape and delay Blue plans for space warfare Deny Blue ability to achieve Space Situational Awareness Disrupt Blue space attacks so they become uncoordinated Constantly shift points of application of space control weapons to confuse adversary response Herd Blue space communications paths to those that are more easily monitored by Red SIGINT assets Attack key Blue space personnel and technicians Disperse Red assets (maneuver satellites) just before launching first attack … 5,000 Other Space Objectives SWAT Has Space Objectives for Both Red & Blue Sides
  • Page 103 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Warfare Definitions Space Warfare Definitions
  • Page 104 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Defense Definitions (1) • Space Sovereignty - A nation’s inherent right to exercise absolute control and authority over the orbital space near its satellites. Also see Space Sovereignty Mission. • Space Sovereignty Mission - The integrated tasks of surveillance and control, the execution of which enforces a nation’s authority over the orbital space near its satellites. • Space Control Operations - The employment of space forces, supported by air, ground and naval forces, as appropriate, to achieve military objectives in vital areas of concern to space systems. Such operations include destruction of enemy in- space assets, space-related ground systems and surface-to- space forces (launch), interdiction of enemy space operations, protection of vital space lines of communication (links from ground to space to ground), and the establishment of local military superiority in areas of space operations. Definitions Derived from Joint Pub 3-01.1 Modified for Space Control
  • Page 105 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Defense Definitions (2) • Space Autonomous Operation - In space defense, the mode of operation assumed by a space system after it has lost all communications with human controllers. The space system assumes full responsibility for control of weapons and engagement of hostile targets, based in accordance with on-board surveillance and weapon system control logic. This automatic state may occur on a regular basis due to orbital movements outside regions of ground coverage and control. • Space Positive Control - A method of space control which relies on positive identification, tracking, and situation assessment of spacecraft within a Space Defense Area, conducted with electronic means by an agency having the authority and responsibility therein. • Space Weapons Free - In space defense, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may be fired at any target in orbital space of defined altitude and inclination, not positively recognized as friendly. • Space Weapons Hold - In space defense, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may only be fired in self defense or in response to a formal order. • Space Weapons Tight - In space defense, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may be fired only at targets recognized as hostile. Definitions Derived from Joint Pub 3-01.1 Modified for Space Control
  • Page 106 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Defense Definitions (3) • Active Space Defense - Direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile space actions. It includes the use of anti-satellite weapon systems, defensive counter space weapons, electronic warfare, and other available weapons not primarily used in a space defense role. See also Space Defense. • Passive Space Defense - All measures, other than Active Space Defense, taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of damage to space systems caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the initiative. These measures include camouflage, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction and design. See also Space Defense. • Space Centralized Control - In space defense, the control mode whereby a higher echelon makes direct target assignments to fire units. • Space Decentralized Control - In space defense, the normal mode whereby a higher echelon monitors unit actions, making direct target assignments to units only when necessary to ensure proper fire distribution or to prevent engagement of friendly spacecraft. See also Centralized Control. • Broadcast-Controlled Space Interception - An interception in which the interceptor is given a continuous broadcast of information concerning the space defense situation and effects interception without further control. • Close-Controlled Space Interception - An interception in which the interceptor is continuously controlled to a position from which the target is within local sensor range. Definitions Derived from Joint Pub 3-01.1 Modified for Space Control
  • Page 107 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Defense Definitions (4) • Suppression of Adversary Counterspace Capabilities - Suppression that neutralizes or negates an adversary offensive counterspace system through deception, denial, disruption, degradation, and/or destruction. These operations can target ground, air, missile, or space threats in response to an attack or threat of attack. (AFDD 2-2.1) • Space Control Sector - A sub element of the space control area, established to facilitate the control of the overall orbit. Space control sector boundaries normally coincide with space defense organization subdivision boundaries. Space control sectors are designated in accordance with procedures and guidance contained in the space control plan in consideration of Service component and allied space control capabilities and requirements. • Space Deconfliction In The Combat Zone - A process used to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of space systems. Space Deconfliction is provided in order to prevent fratricide, enhance space defense operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Space Deconfliction does not infringe on the authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. Also called combat space deconfliction; space deconfliction. • Space Point Defense - The defense or protection of special vital elements, orbital positions (geosynchronous slots, and advantageous orbits, such as sun-synchronous) and installations; e.g., command and control facilities, space launch facilities, Tracking, Telemetry and Control facilities, space surveillance sensors, and high-value satellites. Definitions Derived from Joint Pub 3-01.1 Modified for Space Control
  • Page 108 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Defense Definitions (5) • Space Defense Operations Area - An area and the orbital space around it within which procedures are established to minimize mutual interference between space defense and other operations; it may include designation of one or more of the following: Space Defense Action Area, Space Defense Area; Space Defense Identification Zone, and, or firepower umbrella. • Space Defense Action Area - An orbit and the space around it within which friendly spacecraft or surface-to-space weapons are normally given precedence in operations except under specified conditions. • Space Defense Area - 1.) A specifically defined orbit for which space defense must be planned and provided. 2.) An orbit and a region surrounding it of defined dimensions designated by the appropriate agency within which the ready control of spaceborne vehicles is required in the interest of national security during an space defense emergency. • Space Defense Region - An orbital subdivision of a Space Defense Area. • Space Defense Sector - An orbital subdivision of a Space Defense Region. • Space Defense Division - A geographic subdivision of a Space Defense Region. • Space Defense Identification Zone (SDIZ) - Orbital space of defined parameters within which the ready identification, location, and control of spaceborne vehicles is required. • Space Defense Battle Zone - A volume of space surrounding a space defense fire unit or defended area, extending to a specified orbital altitude and inclination, in which the fire unit commander will engage and destroy targets not identified as friendly under criteria established by higher headquarters. In other words, this would be a free-fire zone around a defended satellite. Definitions Derived from Joint Pub 3-01.1 Modified for Space Control
  • Page 109 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Defense Definitions (6) • Space Weapon Engagement Zone (SWEZ) - In space defense, orbital space of defined altitude and inclination within which the responsibility for engagement of space threats normally rests with a particular weapon system. • Direct-Ascent Engagement Zone (DAEZ) - In space defense, that orbital space of defined altitude and inclination within which the responsibility for engagement of space threats normally rests with a direct-ascent anti-satellite system of terrestrial launch origin. • Directed Energy Engagement Zone (DEEZ) - In space defense, that orbital space of defined altitude and inclination within which the responsibility for engagement of space threats normally rests with a directed energy (laser or microwave) ASAT or electronic warfare system of terrestrial location. • Electronic Warfare Engagement Zone (EWEZ) - In space defense, that orbital space of defined altitude and inclination within which the responsibility for engagement of space threats normally rests with an electronic warfare system of terrestrial location. • Close Attack Engagement Zone (CAEZ) - In space defense, that orbital space of defined altitude and inclination within which the responsibility for engagement of space threats normally rests with an ASAT system that is stationed within 10 kilometers of its target. • Long Range Engagement Zone (LREZ) - In space defense, that orbital space of defined altitude and inclination within which the responsibility for engagement of space threats normally rests with long range space defense weapons, that are space-based, but are normally stationed at more than 10 kilometers from its target. • Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ) - In space defense, that orbital space of defined altitude and inclination within which multiple space defense systems (from both terrestrial and space- based locations) are simultaneously employed to engage space targets. Definitions Derived from Joint Pub 3-01.1 Modified for Space Control
  • Page 110 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Choke Point Displays - Satellite Attack Warning (SAW) - Space Choke Point Displays
  • Page 111 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Traditional Orbital View
  • Page 112 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – All Altitudes GEO MEO LEO Space Has Choke Points As In Terrestrial Systems – They Just Are Not Stationary Military Choke Point: A region of earth or space where systems of military consequence concentrate due to operational, environmental or geophysical constraints.Red Objects In Normally Blue Zone
  • Page 113 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – Icons Make SAW Maps Similar to Terrestrial Situation Maps • Based on Mil-Std-2525B • 220 New Space Icons Adversary UnknownNeutralFriend
  • Page 114 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – View 1 Space Objects Orbital Changes Are Easy to Identify JB-3C Altitude Increase
  • Page 115 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – View 2 COSMOS 2421 Breakup Space Debris Clouds & Their Source Can Easily be Viewed
  • Page 116 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – SDIZ SSA Detection Zones Help Partial Out Operational Responsibility Space Defense ID Zones (SDIZ)
  • Page 117 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – Simulated Attack Against GPS Space Debris Clouds & Their Sources Can Easily be Viewed Red Objects Approaching Blue GPS Zone New Space Objects Conducting GEO Transfer Orbital Maneuvers
  • Page 118 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – “Dead” Stages as ASATS Simultaneous Attack Maneuvers Can Easily be Detected Orbital Change Over Time Launch Vehicle Stages With Hidden ASAT Capabilities
  • Page 119 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – Multiple Attacks Against One GPS Space Objects Playing Dead Can be Detected With Unusual Movements Red Rocket Stages Have Large SWAT State Change Scores for RCS (Stages Have Changed Orientation)
  • Page 120 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – 3D View SAW Displays 3D Space Situation Maps
  • Page 121 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SAW – Flat Map View SAW Displays Geographic Space Situation Maps
  • Page 122 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Other Potential Displays Other Potential Displays
  • Page 123 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Display Requirements (1) • Delta-V Potential (Estimated From Mass & Orbital Lifetime) – Direct Burn – Hohmann Transfer – Other? • Time to Intercept (Or Range) – Real (Current Orbital Parameters) – Potential (Estimated Delta-V) – Increasing or Decreasing Range to Target
  • Page 124 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Display Requirements (2) • Type of Intercept – Rendezvous – Flyby / Impact • Country of Origin • Space Object Status – Live – Dead (Once was Live) – Booster – Debris • INTEL Threat Assessment Ranking
  • Page 125 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Threat Assessment Chart (TAC) Live Dead Boosters Debris 20253 Time to Target by Direct Burn Threat Assessment (Line Thickness) Time to Target by Hohmann Transfer Object Pointed at Target = Orbit Is Decreasing Range Object Pointed Away From Target = Orbit Is Increasing Range Arrow Open (Unfilled) = Maneuver to Proximity Ops Arrow Solid (Filled) = Maneuver to Impact / Flyby Arrow Full Color = Currently Detected Maneuver Arrow Grayed Out = Potential Maneuver SDIZ Green SDIZ Yellow SDIZ Red Arrow Blue = US / Allied Countries Space Objects Arrow Green = Neutral Countries Space Objects Arrow Red = Red Countries Space Objects 5 Min 1 km 20 Min 10 km Flashing Arrow Red = Red Country Space Object Entering SDIZ Red Zone and Range to Potential Target is Decreasing SDIZ = Space Defense Identification Zone >20 Min 21233 24551 23541 29521 20784 21233 19273 32851 31923 24811 One View to Determine Space-to-Space Attack
  • Page 126 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index TAC Chart Explained Live Dead Boosters Debris 20253 Time to Target by Direct Burn Threat Level (Line Thickness) Time to Target by Hohmann Transfer Object Pointed at Target = Orbit Is Decreasing Range Object Pointed Away From Target = Orbit Is Increasing Range Arrow Open (Unfilled) = Maneuver to Proximity Ops Arrow Solid (Filled) = Maneuver to Impact / Flyby Arrow Full Color = Currently Detected Maneuver Arrow Grayed Out = Potential Maneuver SDIZ Green SDIZ Yellow SDIZ Red Arrow Blue = US / Allied Countries Space Objects Arrow Green = Neutral Countries Space Objects Arrow Red = Red Countries Space Objects 5 Min 1 km 20 Min 10 km Flashing Arrow Red = Red Country Space Object Entering SDIZ Red Zone and Range to Potential Target is Decreasing SDIZ = Space Defense Identification Zone >20 Min 21233 24551 23541 29521 20784 21233 19273 32851 31923 24811 Red Live Satellite that INTEL Denotes as High Threat Entering SDIZ Zone Red (5 Min to Possible Impact) with Range Decreasing Red Satellite Playing Dead In SDIZ Zone Yellow (20 Min to Possible Rendezvous) with Range Decreasing Red Booster that Can Potentially Impact / Flyby Target with Range Decreasing Different Space Attack Possibilities Immediately Recognizable
  • Page 127 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Multiple TAC Charts Can Predict Simultaneous Space Attack Large Space Attacks May Provide Indications & Warning of Impending Terrestrial Assault Live Dead Boosters Debris 20253 SDIZ Green SDIZ Yellow SDIZ Red 5 Min 1 km 20 Min 10 km >20 Min 21233 24551 23541 29521 20784 21233 19273 32851 31923 24811 Live Dead Boosters Debris 20253 SDIZ Green SDIZ Yellow SDIZ Red 5 Min 1 km 20 Min 10 km >20 Min 21233 24551 23541 29521 20784 21233 19273 32851 31923 24811 Live Dead Boosters Debris 20253 SDIZ Green SDIZ Yellow SDIZ Red 5 Min 1 km 20 Min 10 km >20 Min 21233 24551 23541 29521 20784 21233 19273 32851 31923 24811 Live Dead Boosters Debris 20253 SDIZ Green SDIZ Yellow SDIZ Red 5 Min 1 km 20 Min 10 km >20 Min 21233 24551 23541 29521 20784 21233 19273 32851 31923 24811 Live Dead Boosters Debris 20253 SDIZ Green SDIZ Yellow SDIZ Red 5 Min 1 km 20 Min 10 km >20 Min 21233 24551 23541 29521 20784 21233 19273 32851 31923 24811 Live Dead Boosters Debris 20253 SDIZ Green SDIZ Yellow SDIZ Red 5 Min 1 km 20 Min 10 km >20 Min 21233 24551 23541 29521 20784 21233 19273 32851 31923 24811
  • Page 128 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Threat Assessment Summary (TAS) - Nearby Space Objects Potential Maneuvers - Blue Space Order Of Battle (SOB) Gray Denotes Less Important Satellites Colors Denote Degree Satellites are Threatened by Nearby Objects (See Previous TAC Charts) Future Time
  • Page 129 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Threat Assessment Summary (TAS) - Surveillance - Color Denotes Degree Satellite Is Able to be Tracked by Red Space Surveillance Assets
  • Page 130 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Threat Assessment Summary (TAS) - Direct Ascent ASAT - Color Denotes Degree Satellite Is Threatened by Red Direct Ascent ASAT
  • Page 131 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Threat Assessment Summary (TAS) - Ground-Based Laser - Color Denotes Degree Satellite Is Threatened by Red Ground-Based Laser
  • Page 132 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Threat Assessment Summary (TAS) - Attack Potential Summary Inputs - Surveillance Direct Ascent ASAT Ground-Based ASAT SummarySatellite Status + + + + = Maneuvers
  • Page 133 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Threat Assessment Summary (TAS) - Attack Potential Summary - Colors Denote Degree Satellites Are Vulnerable to All Red Threats It Appears that Red is Lining Up ASATs & Supporting Space Surveillance Assets for Simultaneous Attack (Space Pearl Harbor)
  • Page 134 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Threat Assessment Summary (TAS) - Actual Satellite Status - Colors Denote Actual Satellite Status as Reported
  • Page 135 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Threat Envelope Chart (TEC) View 1 Some Orbits are Easier to Maneuver to Than Others
  • Page 136 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example Threat Envelope View 2 Circle Size Denotes Amount of Delta-V to Reach Target From This Position In Space Color of Circle Denotes Amount of Time to Reach Target From This Position In Space Red Asterisk Denotes Location of Target Black Boxes Denote Locations of Live Satellites Gray Boxes Denote Locations of Dead Space Objects Some Regions of Space May be More Threatening than Others
  • Page 137 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example Threat Envelope View 3
  • Page 138 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index State Change Algorithms State Change Algorithms
  • Page 139 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT State Change Parameters Analyzed (26 Total) • Radar Cross Section (RCS) • Optical Cross Section • Flashing or Not • Flash Period • Stabilization Type (Spinning or 3-Axis) • Object Shape (Sphere, Cylinder, Box) • Length • Width • Height • Mass • Spin Rate • Delta-V • Satellite Position (Geosynchronous) • Beginning of Life On-Board Power • Major COMM Antennas & COMM Signals • Major Optics On-Board • Retro Reflectors On-Board • Inclination • Eccentricity • Mean Motion • Mean Anomaly • RAN • Argument of Perigee • BStar • 1st Mean • 2nd Mean Physical Characteristics Orbital Characteristics SWAT Assesses State Changes Beyond Orbital Characteristics
  • Page 140 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Automatic Space Object State Change Algorithm Unknown Space Objects Compared to Those of Known Mission Characteristics Inclination Range of Values for Weather Satellites Range of Values for Science Satellites Value for Unknown Satellite * *
  • Page 141 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Data Correction & Segmenting •Correct Mission Designations – e.g.: “Science” vs. “Scientific” Missions •Correct Data Values – e.g.: Zero vs. Null Data •Change Zero Values to Null for Mass •Change Null Values to Zero for Spin •Segment Missions – By Satellite Status (Dead vs. Live) – By Space Object Orbital Location
  • Page 142 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Orbital Location Segmenting Region Region Definition SDR GEO Space Defense Region Geosynchronous SDR GEO ASIA Space Defense Region Geosynchronous over Asia SDR GEO EU Space Defense Region Geosynchronous over Europe SDR GEO ME Space Defense Region Geosynchronous over the Middle East SDR GEO US Space Defense Region Geosynchronous over the United States SDR GEO-G-A Space Defense Region Graveyard Orbit Above Geosynchronous SDR GEO-G-B Space Defense Region Graveyard Orbit Below Geosynchronous SDR GEO-I Space Defense Region Geosynchronous Inclined SDR HEO Space Defense Region Above Geosynchronous (High Earth Orbit) SDR LEO-E Space Defense Region Low Earth Orbit Highly Eccentric SDR LEO-H Space Defense Region Low Earth Orbit - High (>600 and <5,000 km) SDR LEO-L Space Defense Region Low Earth Orbit - Low (<=500 km) SDR LEO-M Space Defense Region Low Earth Orbit - Medium (>500 and <=600 km) SDR LEO-R Space Defense Region Low Earth Orbit Retrograde SDR LEO-S Space Defense Region Low Earth Orbit Sun-Synchronous SDR MEO Space Defense Region Medium Earth Orbit (>=5,000 and <25,000 km) SDR MOLY Space Defense Region Molniya SDR NOE Space Defense Region No Orbital Elements
  • Page 143 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Correlation Types •Current Correlations – All Objects (Dead & Live) Against All Objects for Current Analysis Date •Historical Correlations – All Objects (Dead & Live) Against All Objects for Current & Past Dates (4,117,708 records) •Self Correlations – All Objects (Dead & Live) Against Their Own Historical Characteristics
  • Page 144 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example State Changes • GPS • ECHOSTAR 5 • MOLNIYA • Beidou MEO • Beidou GEO • SJ’s
  • Page 145 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index ECHOSTAR 5 Maneuver Orbital Maneuver Detected In State Change Algorithms Orbital Maneuver (57 km) 1st Derivative of Altitude
  • Page 146 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index ECHOSTAR 5 Correlations Orbital Maneuver Affected RAN, Arg Perigee, Mean Anomaly, Sat Position, Inclination, Eccentricity, Mean Motion, RCS, and Visual Mag Correlations Against Other GEO Satellites.
  • Page 147 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index MOLNIYA Decay 3,097 Km Loss of Average Altitude
  • Page 148 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Beidou - MEO 2,500 km 250 km
  • Page 149 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Beidou - GEO Maneuver 251 Km Above GEO
  • Page 150 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SJ’s 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 1.5000 2.0000 2.5000 3.0000 3.5000 4.0000 4.5000 11/15/200811/22/200811/29/2008 12/6/200812/13/200812/20/200812/27/2008 1/3/2009 1/10/2009 1/17/2009 1/24/2009 1/31/2009 2/7/2009 2/14/2009 2/21/2009 2/28/2009 3/7/2009 3/14/2009 3/21/2009 3/28/2009 4/4/2009 4/11/2009 4/18/2009 4/25/2009 5/2/2009 5/9/2009 5/16/2009 5/23/2009 5/30/2009 Data Date RCS(dBsm) 33408 33409 COD FYL FYL FYL FYL FYL SHY SHY COD FYL FYL FYL BLE FYL
  • Page 151 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SJ’s Orbits
  • Page 152 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index What Makes SWAT State Change Algorithms Different • SWAT Assesses All Space Objects – Particular Emphasis On Potentially Threatening Space Objects Playing “Dead” • SWAT Analyzes 26 Characteristics of Space Objects Simultaneously – Assessments Go Beyond Orbital Elements Alone – Simultaneous Changes (e.g. Maneuver & RCS) Increase State Change Scores • SWAT Compares Each Space Object To All Other Space Objects of Same Mission – Discovers Unusual Characteristics Out of Norm
  • Page 153 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT State Change Benefits • Filters 11,496 Space Objects Down to Top 10-20 With Most Activity for More Detailed Assessment by Other Space INTEL Assets • Possible Discovery of Hidden Adversary Intent • May Indicate Dying or Dead Satellites Before JSpOC Assessment • Helps Evaluate Friendly Satellite Cover Stories • AFRL Success – Working Now & Ready for Operational Evaluation
  • Page 154 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Tactics Backup
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 155 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #1 – Ground Based Laser (GBL) Probability of Deployment (2025) – HIGH Security – Within national borders / HIGH Surprise – Quick ramp-up under cover before employment / HIGH Uses - 1) Peacetime 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military Strategies - 1) Periodic Degrade 2) Herd Sensors 3) Hidden Negate OBJECTIVES – 1) Deny access to battlefield by blinding EO sensors 2) Degrade EO sensors by damaging parts of the focal plane 3) Degrade mission by damaging parts of the solar array 4) Destroy mission by damaging optics POOR – 1) Expensive per site cost. Significant continuous personnel requirements. Short runtimes for chemical systems. 2) Extensive space segment intelligence needed for subtle/low power effects. 3) Very complex power source and optics. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Fuels delivery to site Remove optical covers Time of Engagement Sensor data degradation Solar array thermistors Post-Battle Sensor data degradation Various housekeeping thermistors Range – LEO Availability – High for first use, significant recharge time needed for next event. 4) Limited targeting angles
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 156 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #2 – Direct Ascent KEW SYSTEM PROVEN IN TESTS Security – Within national borders or placed with large forces / HIGH to GOOD Surprise – Can require full launch site support or stored with other large tactical missiles / HIGH to POOR Uses - 1) Crisis 2) Overt Military Strategies - 1) Sweep the Skies 2) Herd Sensors SEVERE POLITICAL REACTIONS ALREADY SEEN OBJECTIVES – 1) Destroy mission by using a ground-to- space missile/homing warhead GOOD – 1) Reasonable per unit cost. Existing support personnel for usual missile support. Existing missile production can be used. 2) Little intelligence required past orbit parameters. 3) Proven technologies. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Launch site preparations or ground/sea units moving to launch position High use of orbit determination assets for accurate targeting Time of Engagement Increased optical/radar signatures Loss of telemetry Post-Battle Debris cloud detection and spread N/A Range – LEO Availability – High 4) Many targeting opportunities
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 157 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #3 – Co-Orbital KEW System may have been completely tested in orbit during 1980s Security – Within national borders at launch. May be stealthy to avoid detection / HIGH Surprise – Maneuvers can take a long time. Allows detection and avoidance if radars can detect the object / FAIR Uses - 1) Crisis 2) Overt Military Strategies - 1) Periodic Degrade 2) Herd Sensors 3) Herd Comm OBJECTIVES – 1) Destroy mission by using a satellite- mounted HEE warhead FAIR – 1) Complete to-orbit launch system needed. Existing support personnel for usual launch activities can be used. Existing booster production can be used. 2) Little intelligence required past orbit parameters. 3) Proven technologies. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Launch site preparations or ground/sea units moving to launch position Launch into particular inclinations and altitudes Time of Engagement Increased optical/radar signatures Loss of telemetry or anomalous behaviors Post-Battle Debris cloud detection and spread or rapid degradation of bus/payload N/A Range – Booster-Dependent Availability – Moderate 4) Typical orbital constraints apply
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 158 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #4 – Space-Based Laser (SBL) Prob. of Deployment (2025) - MODERATE Security – Must be negated with another ASAT weapon / MODERATE Surprise – Maneuvers can take a long time / POOR Uses - 1) Crisis 2) Overt Military Strategies - 1) Sweep the Skies (?) 2) Periodic Degrade 3) Rolling Disrupt 4) Herd Sensors OBJECTIVES – 1) Destroy mission by inflicting severe damage on solar array, payload, thermal control components, and/or structure 2) Degrade mission by inflicting controlled amounts of damage on solar array and/or payload 3) Deny access to the battlefield by blinding EO payload or forcing an avoidance maneuver 4) Disrupt satellite operation with high thermal loads on external surfaces (especially radiators) POOR – 1) Large to-orbit launch system needed. Existing support personnel for usual launch activities can be used. High per-unit payload cost. Fuels limit run times. 2) Some S&T intelligence required past orbit parameters. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Orbital maneuvers to position for engagement TLM indicates activation of payload (warm-up) Time of Engagement N/A Temperature rise in several TLM channels Post-Battle Loss of payload and bus functions. Possible loss of earth/star lock in ACS Component temperatures above acceptable or qualification limits Range – Booster-Dependent / Propulsion Subsystem Dependent Availability – Moderate 3) Most basic technologies proven 4) Typical orbital constraints apply
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 159 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #5 – Space-Base High Power RF Weapon Prob. of Deployment (2025) - MODERATE Security – Must be negated with another ASAT weapon / MODERATE Surprise – Maneuvers can take a long time / POOR Uses - 1) Peacetime 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military Strategies - 1) Periodic Degrade 2) Rolling Disrupt 3) Herd Sensors 4) Herd Comm OBJECTIVES – 1) Destroy mission by inflicting severe damage on RF apertures and electronics 2) Deny access to the battlefield by blinding RF payload or forcing an avoidance maneuver 3) Disrupt satellite operation with RF jamming 4) Deny communication over wide ground segment POOR – 1) Large to-orbit launch system needed. Existing support personnel for usual launch activities can be used. High per-unit payload cost. 2) Some S&T intelligence required past orbit parameters. 3) Most basic technologies proven MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Orbital maneuvers to position for engagement TLM indicates activation of payload (warm-up) Time of Engagement N/A Noise increase in many comm channels Post-Battle Loss of payload and bus functions. Numerous SEUs detected Massive loss of bus functions if central processor is affected. Range – Booster-Dependent / Propulsion Subsystem Dependent Availability – Moderate 4) Typical orbital constraints apply
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 160 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #6 – Ground Based RF Hijack System Prob. of Deployment (2025) - MODERATE Security – Within national borders / HIGH Surprise – Not expected to work / HIGH Uses - 1) Peacetime 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military 4) Covert Military Strategies - 1) Sweep the Skies (?) 2) Periodic Degrade 3) Herd Sensors 4) Herd Comm OBJECTIVES – 1) Deny use of the satellite by introducing new commands or software to stop normal operations. 2) Destroy satellite by introducing software to negate critical housekeeping functions or activate EOL functions POOR – 1) Inexpensive system. Existing ground segments can be used. 2) Perfect S&T intelligence needed for TT&C and Comm subsystems. 3) No new technology needed. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement Central processor executing unplanned commands Unexpected command verification messages Post-Battle Loss of payload and bus functions. No response to new commands Normal payload and bus functions stop. Range – Unlimited Availability – Moderate 4) Numerous sites required for coordinated attacks.
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 161 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #7 – Permanent Paint Mine Prob. of Deployment (2025) - HIGH Security – Very small objects to find / HIGH Surprise – SAME / HIGH Uses - 1) Peacetime 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military 4) Covert Military Strategies - 1) Sweep the Skies 2) Periodic Degrade 3) Herd Sensors 4) Hidden Disrupt OBJECTIVES – 1) Destroy mission by blinding EO sensors or ACS sensors. 2) Degrade EO and ACS sensors by controlled contamination of optics. 3) Degrade mission by decreasing solar array output. 4) Degrade mission by changing radiator thermal characteristics. FAIR – 1) Inexpensive system. Existing launch facilities can be used. Small boosters will suffice. 2) Moderate S&T intelligence needed to locate certain components. 3) May need system with intelligent targeting. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Unidentified launch Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement Degradation of payload data despite no error flags Rapid, but not instantaneous change in electrical power. Loss of ACS lock. Post-Battle Degradation of payload data despite no error flags. Temperatures rise above limits. ACS mode changes. Component temperatures increase. Range – Unlimited Availability – High 4) Many units needed for reliability.
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 162 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #8 – Sublimating Paint Mine Prob. of Deployment (2025) - HIGH Security – Very small objects to find / HIGH Surprise – SAME / HIGH Uses - 1) Peacetime 2) Crisis Strategies - 1) Herd Sensors 2) Hidden Disrupt OBJECTIVES – 1) Deny mission by blinding EO sensors or ACS sensors temporarily. 2) Deny mission by temporary reduction of available electric power. 3) Deny mission by forcing a change in ACS mode. FAIR – 1) Inexpensive system. Existing launch facilities can be used. Small boosters will suffice. 2) Moderate S&T intelligence needed to locate certain components. 3) May need system with intelligent targeting. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER Range – Unlimited Availability – High 4) Many units needed for reliability. INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Unidentified launch Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement Degradation of payload data despite no error flags Rapid, but not instantaneous change in electrical power. Loss of ACS lock. Post-Battle Recovery of payload data and/or power. Operators able to recover ACS. ACS mode changes
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 163 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #9 – Communication Jamming Proven System Security – Systems need to be deployed in several places for maximum effects / LOW Surprise – Systems may not be distinguishable from common deployed Comm equipment / LOW Uses - 1) Peacetime 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military Strategies - 1) Herd Comm 2) Rolling Disrupt OBJECTIVES – 1) Deny mission by jamming RF payloads. 2) Deny mission by jamming command and TLM channels. FAIR – 1) Inexpensive system. No space segment items required. 2) Moderate S&T intelligence needed to identify channels and apertures. 3) Intel needs may increase to confirm effects. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER Range – Limited by Antenna Size Availability – High 4) Many units needed for reliability. INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary N/A Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement Loss or degradation of com channels Loss or degradation of com channels Post-Battle N/A Recovery of Comm channels
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 164 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #10 – Solar Reflector Prob. Of Deployment (2025) - HIGH Security – Large Sail Structure easy to find with ground-based optics and radar / LOW Surprise – Cannot be maneuvered rapidly / LOW Uses - 1) Peacetime 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military 4) Covert Military Strategies - 1) Herd Comm 2) Herd Sensors 3) Hidden Disrupt OBJECTIVES – 1) Deny mission by creating adverse thermal environment. 2) Deny mission by forcing operators to shut down equipment or maneuver. GOOD – 1) Inexpensive system based on solar sail technology. Existing launch facilities can be used. 2) Low S&T intelligence requirements. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER Range – Booster-Limited Availability – High INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Movement of objects detected by orbit determination assets Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement Temperature increase in internal components Increase in EPS shunt currents followed by slow decrease. Increase in temperature of external components Post-Battle N/A Temperatures decrease to nominal levels
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 165 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #11 – Solar Blocker Prob. Of Deployment (2025) - HIGH Security – Large Sail Structure easy to find with ground-based optics and radar / LOW Surprise – Cannot be maneuvered rapidly / LOW Uses - 1) Peacetime 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military 4) Covert Military Strategies - 1) Herd Comm 2) Herd Sensors 3) Hidden Disrupt OBJECTIVES – 1) Deny mission by decreasing available solar array output. 2) Deny mission by creating adverse thermal environment. 3) Deny mission by creating unbalanced torques on satellites with large appendages GOOD – 1) Inexpensive system based on solar sail technology. Existing launch facilities can be used. 2) Low S&T intelligence requirements. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER Range – Booster-Limited Availability – High INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Movement of objects detected by orbit determination assets Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement Temperature decrease in internal components. Increasing motion from induced nutation. Change in ACS modes. Decrease in EPS shunt currents. Decrease in temperature of external components Post-Battle Recovery of attitude control through normal progression of modes Temperatures increase to nominal levels
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 166 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #12 – Sticky Sheet Mine Prob. Of Deployment (2025) - HIGH Security – Can be a small and difficult to find in orbit / HIGH Surprise – SAME / HIGH Uses - 1) Clear the Skies (?) 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military 4) Covert Military Strategies - 1) Sweep the Skies 2) Herd Comm 3) Herd Sensors 4) Hidden Disrupt 5) Rolling Disrupt 6) Periodic Negate OBJECTIVES – 1) Destroy mission by covering sensor EO apertures. 2) Destroy or mission by decreasing emissivity of thermal radiators 3) Degrade mission by changing patterns of various antennas GOOD – 1) Inexpensive system based on solar sail technology with less structure. Existing launch facilities can be used. 2) Low S&T intelligence requirements. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER Range – Booster-Limited Availability – High INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Unidentified Launch Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement Loss of EO payload data. Change in RF ground footprint. Growing object detected in payload FOV Post-Battle Temperatures above operational or qualification levels Temperatures increase
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 167 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #13 – Parasite Mass Prob. Of Deployment (2025) - HIGH Security – Can be a small and difficult to find in orbit / HIGH Surprise – SAME / HIGH Uses - 1) Clear the Skies (?) 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military 4) Covert Military Strategies - 1) Sweep the Skies 2) Herd Comm 3) Herd Sensors 4) Hidden Disrupt 5) Rolling Disrupt 6) Periodic Negate OBJECTIVES – 1) Degrade or Destroy mission by confusing ACS with changes in inertia matrix. FAIR – 1) Reliable attachment device must be developed. 2) Moderate S&T intelligence requirements. 3) Operators may be able to reprogram ACS to negate effect. MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER Range – Booster-Limited Availability – High INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Unidentified Launch Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement N/A Initial attachment detected by IMU Post-Battle Unable to maintain earth/star lock in ACS Unusual motions during rate damping
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 168 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #14 – Javelin KEW Prob. Of Deployment (2025) - LOW Security – Can be a small and difficult to find in orbit / HIGH Surprise – SAME / HIGH Uses - 1) Clear the Skies (?) 2) Crisis 3) Covert Military Strategies - 1) Sweep the Skies 2) Herd Comm 3) Herd Sensors 4) Hidden Disrupt 5) Rolling Disrupt 6) Periodic Negate OBJECTIVES – 1) Destroy mission by negating specific components. POOR – 1) Precise tracking and targeting required. May need intelligent targeting system. 2) High S&T intelligence requirements for identifying aimpoints. 3) Residual motion may lead to attribution MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER Range – Booster-Limited Availability – High INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Unidentified Launch Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement N/A Immediate TLM indicating component has stopped functioning Post-Battle N/A Unusual motions
  • UNCLASSIFIED Index06/30/14 08:22 PM P. Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 169 of 251 Pages Space Segment COA #16 – Solvent Grenade MASS / ECONOMY / MANUEVER Range – Booster-Limited Availability – High INDICATORS Long-Term Short-Term Preliminary Unidentified Launch Comm traffic indicating possible use of system Time of Engagement N/A Immediate TLM indicating component has stopped functioning Post-Battle N/A Unusual motions FAIR – 1) Inexpensive system. Existing launch facilities can be used. Small boosters will suffice. 2) Moderate S&T intelligence needed to locate certain components. 3) May need system with intelligent targeting. 4) Many units needed for reliability. 5) Residual motions can lead to attribution Prob. of Deployment (2025) - MODERATE Security – Very small objects to find / HIGH Surprise – SAME / HIGH Uses - 1) Peacetime 2) Crisis 3) Overt Military 4) Covert Military Strategies - 1) Sweep the Skies 2) Periodic Degrade 3) Herd Sensors 4) Hidden Disrupt OBJECTIVES – 1) Destroy mission by blinding EO sensors or ACS sensors. 2) Degrade EO and ACS sensors by controlled contamination of optics. 3) Degrade mission by decreasing solar array output. 4) Degrade mission by changing radiator thermal characteristics.
  • Page 170 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index BACKUP Backup
  • Page 171 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example SWAT Satellite RADAR Cross Section Radar Cross Section Calculations Can be Performed on SatAC Models Satellite Model Used In Calculations
  • Page 172 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Example Satellite Optical Cross Section Frame 21 (El = 46 deg) OCS = 0.155 m2 /sr Mv = 5.56 Frame 54 (El = 60 deg) OCS = 0.300 m2 /sr Mv = 4.41 Frame 91 (El = 80 deg) OCS = 0.537 m2 /sr Mv = 3.44 Frame 131 (El = 58 deg) OCS = 718 m2 /sr Mv = 3.50 Frame 21 OCS = 0.133 m2 /sr Mv = 5.86 Frame 54 OCS = 0.225 m2 /sr Mv = 4.67 Frame 91 OCS = 0.547 m2 /sr Mv = 3.31 Frame 311 OCS = 0.708 m2 /sr Mv = 3.49 SOR Field Data from JD 104, 2000 TASAT Simulation w/ pose (11, -15, -1)
  • Page 173 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Satellite Failures Database Satellite Failures Data Help Space Analyst Determine If Natural or Man-Made Attack
  • Page 174 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Focused Long Term Challenges Linkages Tool Development Focused On Satisfying War-Winning Requirements Number Space Control Tools / Algorithms Focused Long Term Challenges A uto Space O bjectC lassification A uto R ed C O A ID Space IPB G eneration Support Satellite D atabase & Statistics Satellite Failures D atabase Space IN TEL Tasking Prioritization Space B lue C O A G enerator Space C ontrolScenario Number FLTC #1 Anticipatory Command, Control and Intelligence (C2I) PS 1.1 Discover Threatening Systems & Objects X X X X X X TC 1.1.4 Define the behavior of potential threat entities X X X X X X X TC 1.1.5 Assessment of both current and most likely future situations X X X X X X X PS 1.2 Predict Adversary Behaviors X X X X X X X TC 1.2.1 Development of expected futures, their impacts and potential threats X X X X X X X TC 1.2.2 Identifying decision/leverage points for center of gravity analysis X X X X X X X TC 1.2.3 Generating and evaluating outcomes X X X X X X X TC 1.2.4 Visualization methods of adversary models of future states X X TC 1.2.5 Ensuring awareness of adversary deceptive behaviors X X X X X X X PS 1.3 Perform Near Real-Time Decision Management X X X X X X X TC 1.3.1 Generating multiple courses of action X X X X TC 1.3.5 Generate nondeterministic, nonlinear causal linkages under ambiguous conditions X X X X X X X TC 1.3.9 Develop automated target development and weaponeering tools X X X X X X X FLTC #2 Unprecedented Proactive Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) PS 2.3 Assure Closed-Loop C2ISR Sensing and Processing (anticipatory) X X X X X X TC 2.3.1 Accurately detecting all space objects X X X X X X TC 2.3.4 Exquisitely characterizing all high-value objects for vulnerability assessment X X X X X X X PS 2.6 Provide Comprehensive Space Situational Awareness X X X X X X TC 2.6.2 Timely understanding of newly launched space objects & change/threat detection X X X X X X TC 2.6.3 Comprehensively characterizing and assessing all space objects X X X X X X TC 2.6.5 Collaborative tools for integration of multisensor space object recognition X X X X X X FLTC #5 Assured Operations in High-Threat Environments PS 5.2 Detect and Defeat Threats Through Defenses X X X X X X TC 5.2.2 Identifying, characterizing, and reporting all spacecraft threats and/or attacks X X X X X X PS = Problem Statement TC = Technology Challenge Space ToolsFLTC’s
  • Page 175 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Automatic Space Object Classification • Unknown Space Object Characteristics Compared to Selected Space Objects In SID + SPARKS Databases • 98% of the Time the Correct Mission for the Unknown Object is Within the Top 3 Choices SWAT Automatically Makes • SWAT Has Corrected NORAD Satellite Catalog Mistakes In Mission Assessments SWAT Helps the Satellite Analyst In Determining Surveillance Tasking Priorities
  • Page 176 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Auto Space Object ID SWAT Helps the Satellite Analyst In Narrowing Choices for New Space Objects ID
  • Page 177 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Automatic Determination of Red Space Attack Strategies • Database of Possible Red Space Attack Strategies are Linked to Checklist of INTEL Indicators of Space Systems Activities • Most Probable Red Space Strategy Is Determined Based On Currently Observed INTEL Indications of Space Activities • SWAT Automatically Increases Space INTEL Collection Priorities In IPB Tasking Forms Based On Probable Red Actions SWAT Helps the Satellite Analyst Determine If Space Systems Are Under Attack
  • Page 178 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Auto Attack Assessment SWAT Helps the Satellite Analyst In Assessing Strategic Warning
  • Page 179 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index ASAT Range / Access Assessments
  • Page 180 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Info Choke Points Network Analyses • SHIVA (Space Highest Information Value Assessment ) – AFRL (Phillips Site) Concept Development – SWC (SIDC) Support – PC-Based In Microsoft Access – Performs Links & Nodes Network Analysis Showing Value of Information to the Warfighter – Can Conduct Red Or Blue Targeting/Vulnerability Analyses – Algorithms & Software Validated by RAND SHIVA Can Show the Value of Space Systems
  • Page 181 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SHIVA Methodology Info 3 Info 2 Info 1 Processing 1 Processing 2 INTEL Command Decision Force Employment Success Criteria Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3 Probability Info Receipt Total Number of Paths Overall Time Delay Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx Military Objectives SHIVA Calculates All Possible Paths Between Sensors and Shooters Overall Data Rates
  • Page 182 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Scenario Partial Example Scenario Time Lines in Microsoft Project – Requires Orbital Simulations for Details
  • Page 183 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Auto Space Scenario Tool Quick Generation of Alternative Space Scenarios
  • Page 184 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Scenario Partial Example 1 US Tactical Objective S2-8. Deny North Korea space-based surveillance and reconnaissance information Purpose: Deny North Korea ability to gather information on coalition forces using space-based assets Success Criterion: S2-8.1: North Korea unable to receive space-based surveillance and reconnaissance information Concept: Increase time and resources required for North Korea to gather information on coalition strength and force disposition Tactical Tasks: S2-8.1.1: Prevent North Korea forces from gathering ISR information using indigenous space-based assets Concept: Eliminate North Korea surveillance and reconnaissance assets affecting the Coalition operations Success Indicator: IND: North Korea surveillance and reconnaissance interrupted IND: Coalition space-based surveillance and reconnaissance capability remains uninterrupted S 2-8.1.2: Prevent North Korea forces from acquiring third- party/commercial ISR information Concept: Deny North Korea ability to purchase/obtain ISR data from third- party/Commercial sources Deny third party capability to image selected protected areas Success Indicator: IND: No commercial source sells North Korea ISR data IND: Third parties unable to pass ISR data to North Korea IND: Third party unable to collect ISR data over selected protected area Detailed Space Control Scenario Available for Analyses
  • Page 185 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Space Systems Nominal Characteristics (Space & Terrestrial Including Launch & Weapon Systems) SSA & SAW Integrated Concept Predict an Adversary’s Intentions & Next Moves Against Space Systems Red Blue Space Systems Current Status (Change of Location, Size, Shape, Thermal Signature, New Launch, etc.) Red Blue Threat / Change Detection Algorithms (Nominal vs Current Characteristics) Red Blue Space Attack Warning (SAW) Space Surveillance / SOI Tasking Optimization
  • Page 186 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index • SID • Predicted RCS • Predicted Optical CS • Vulnerabilities • SHIVA • IDASS Space Systems Nominal Characteristics SSA & SAW Detail 1 Space Characteristics Databases Critical for Attack Detection Red Blue External Inputs Algorithms / Tools Output Data Products Red Doctrine & Training INTEL (SIGINT, Imagery, etc.) Space Surveillance • SID • Space IPB • Predicted RCS • Predicted Optical CS • SHIVA • IDASS Satellite Operators Historical Red SOB Historical Blue SOB Historical Gray SOB Space Systems Current Status INTEL (SIGINT, Imagery, etc.) Space Surveillance Current Red SOB Current Blue SOB Current Gray SOB Launch Detection Red Blue • SID • SHIVA • IDASS •Auto Space Object ID • SID • SHIVA • IDASS • Space WX • Sat Failures Database Satellite Operators Space Networks Links & Nodes Space Weather
  • Page 187 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index SWAT Threat / Change Detection Algorithms SSA & SAW Detail 2 Space Object Change Detection Critical for Attack Warning Red Blue Internal Inputs Algorithms / Tools Output Data Products • Auto Sat Change Detection • Auto Red COA ID • Space Threat Envelopes • Space Choke Points Maps • Sensor Site Weight Maps • Hidden Satellite Prediction • Satellite Attack Timelines • JSARS • SHIVA Space Targeting Space Attack Warning (SAW) INTEL Indicators vs Red COA’s Space Systems Importance Space Weapons Reach Red Blue • Space Principles of War • Space COG Model • Space COA’s List • Space Escalation Ladder • SHIVA Space Targeting SID Most Probable Red COA Red Attack Timelines Direction of Attack Space Systems Vulnerability Space Strategies Inputs Candidate Red Target List Impact on Blue Space Most Vulnerable Regions of Orbital Space Space Sensor Optimized Tasking Space Object ID & Status
  • Page 188 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Contacts Name Organization Telephone Mike Carlson, Capt, USAF Satellite Assessment Center AFRL/RDTE Com: (505) 846-4786 DSN: 246-4786 Paul Szymanski Metatech Corporation (505) 314-1381 Chris Jones Metatech Corporation (505) 314-1355 “Vision without action is daydream. Action without vision is nightmare” (Old Japanese Proverb)
  • Page 189 of 189 Pages UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Index Contents of DVD Handout • This Briefing (SWAT-Future Space Strategies-09.ppt) • SWAT Details Brief (SWAT-Summary-09.ppt) • SWAT Summary Brief (SWAT-General Brief.pptx) • SWAT 1 Chart (SWAT 1 Chart.ppt) • Space BMC3 Requirements (Space BMC3 Requirements 1-Pictures.ppt) • Space BMC3 Measures (Space BMC3 Measures.ppt) • Space Threat Envelopes (Threat Envelope.ppt) • Space Target Ranking Tool (SHIVA Introduction-2008.ppt) • Space Target Ranking Tool 1 Chart (SHIVA 1 Page Description.ppt) • SWAT Space Wargame Auto Scenario Generation Tool (SWAT-Space Wargame.ppt) • Space Scenario (Battle in the Blue Space Scenario.ppt) • Satellite Design Course (Satellites for Newbies-Print Version.ppt) • SSA Requirements (SSA-Requirements.ppt) • Space IPB, SSA Requirements & Strategies Lists (SSA-Requirements-Details.xls) • JSpOC Characteristics (U JSpOC CTA.PDF) • Metatech-SatAC Resumes of Support Personnel • Attack Detection Diagram (Attack Detection.jpg) • Space Screen Saver / Desktop Photos – 443 Photos • Space Pictures – 34,316 Pictures • Space Control Papers – 332 Papers • Space Icons (Inspired by MIL-STD-2525B) – 550 Icon Files Blue = Prime Documents