Cloud security test

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  • http://onsaas.net/2008/06/03/defining-saas-paas-iaas-etc/
  • http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2009/10/t-mobile-microsoftdanger-data-loss-is-bad-for-the-cloud.ars
  • http://news.cnet.com/twitter-phishing-scam-may-be-spreading/
  • http://community.ca.com/blogs/securityadvisor/archive/2009/12/09/zeus-in-the-cloud.aspx
  • http://www1.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-09/ftp/vmsec/index.html
  • http://www1.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-09/ftp/vmsec/index.html
  • http://www1.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-09/ftp/vmsec/index.html
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography
  • Cloud security test

    1. 1. Cloud Computing SecurityOhio Information Security ForumJuly 16th, 2011James Walden, Ph.D.Northern Kentucky University
    2. 2. Ohio Information Security Forum 2Topics1. What is Cloud Computing?2. The Same Old Security Problems3. Virtualization Security4. New Security Issues and Threat Model5. Data Security
    3. 3. Ohio Information Security ForumWhat is Cloud Computing?
    4. 4. Ohio Information Security ForumWhat is Cloud Computing?―Cloud computing is a model for enablingconvenient, on-demand network access to ashared pool of configurable computing resources(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, andservices) that can be rapidly provisioned andreleased with minimal management effort orservice provider interaction.‖NIST definition of Cloud Computing4
    5. 5. Ohio Information Security ForumCloud Service Architectures as Layers5
    6. 6. Ohio Information Security ForumCloud Service Models Abstraction Layers6
    7. 7. Ohio Information Security ForumMulti-Tenancy7
    8. 8. Ohio Information Security ForumCloud Deployment Architectures8
    9. 9. Ohio Information Security ForumSame Old Security IssuesData LossDowntimesPhishingPassword CrackingBotnets and Other Malware
    10. 10. Ohio Information Security ForumData Loss"Regrettably, based onMicrosoft/Dangers latest recoveryassessment of their systems, wemust now inform you thatpersonal information stored onyour device—such as contacts,calendar entries, to-do lists orphotos—that is no longer on yourSidekick almost certainly has beenlost as a result of a server failureat Microsoft/Danger."10
    11. 11. Ohio Information Security ForumDowntimes11
    12. 12. Ohio Information Security ForumPhishing―hey! check out this funny blog about you...‖12
    13. 13. Ohio Information Security ForumPassword Cracking13
    14. 14. Ohio Information Security ForumBotnets and Malware14
    15. 15. Ohio Information Security ForumVirtualization Security15FeaturesIsolationSnapshotsIssuesState RestoreComplexityScalingTransienceData Lifetime
    16. 16. Ohio Information Security ForumVirtualization Security Features: IsolationUsing a VM for each application provides isolationMore than running 2 apps on same server.Less than running on 2 physical servers16
    17. 17. Ohio Information Security ForumVirtualization Security Features: SnapshotVMs can record state.In event of securityincident, revert VMback to anuncompromised state.Must be sure to patchVM to avoid recurrenceof compromise.17
    18. 18. Ohio Information Security ForumState RestoreVMs can be restored to an infected or vulnerablestate using snapshots.Patching becomes undone.Worms persist at low level forever due toreappearance of infected and vulnerable VMs.18
    19. 19. Ohio Information Security ForumComplexityHypervisor may be simple or not, butIt is often another layer on top of host OS,adding complexity and vulnerabilities.19
    20. 20. Ohio Information Security ForumHypervisor Security20Vulnerability consequencesGuest code execution withprivilegeVM Escape (Host codeexecution)Vendor CVEsKVM 32QEMU 23VirtualBox 9VMware 126Xen 86 Xen CVE-2008-1943VBox CVE-2010-3583
    21. 21. Ohio Information Security ForumInter-VM AttacksAttack via shared clipboardhttp://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/5GP021FKKO.htmlUse shared folder to alter other VM’s disk imageCVE-2007-174421
    22. 22. Ohio Information Security ForumScalingGrowth in physicalmachines limited bybudget and setup time.Adding a VM is easy ascopying a file, leading toexplosive growth in VMs.Rapid scaling can exceedcapacity of organization’ssecurity systems.22
    23. 23. Ohio Information Security ForumTransienceUsers often have specialized VMs.TestingDifferent app versionsDemosSandboxthat are not always up, preventing network fromconverging to a known state.Infected machines appear, attack, then disappearfrom the network before can be detected.Vulnerable systems likewise appear too briefly to bedetected and patched.23
    24. 24. Ohio Information Security ForumData LifetimeAlthough data wascorrectly sanitized fromVM disk and/or memory,snapshots can retainmultiple copies of bothVM memory and diskdata.24
    25. 25. Ohio Information Security ForumNew Security IssuesAccountabilityNo Security PerimeterLarger Attack SurfaceNew Side ChannelsLack of AuditabilityRegulatory ComplianceData Security
    26. 26. Ohio Information Security ForumAccountability26
    27. 27. Ohio Information Security ForumNo Security PerimeterLittle control over physical or network locationof cloud instance VMsNetwork access must be controlled on a host byhost basis.27
    28. 28. Ohio Information Security ForumLarger Attack Surface28Cloud ProviderYour Network
    29. 29. Ohio Information Security ForumNew Side ChannelsYou don’t know whose VMs are sharing thephysical machine with you.Attackers can place their VMs on your machine.See ―Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud‖ paper for how.Shared physical resources includeCPU data cache: Bernstein 2005CPU branch prediction: Onur Aciiçmez 2007CPU instruction cache: Onur Aciiçmez 2007In single OS environment, people can extractcryptographic keys with these attacks.29
    30. 30. Ohio Information Security ForumLack of AuditabilityOnly cloud provider has access to full networktraffic, hypervisor logs, physical machine data.Need mutual auditabilityAbility of cloud provider to audit potentially maliciousor infected client VMs.Ability of cloud customer to audit cloud providerenvironment.30
    31. 31. Ohio Information Security ForumRegulatory Compliance31
    32. 32. Ohio Information Security ForumCertifications32
    33. 33. Ohio Information Security ForumData SecurityData in TransitData at RestData in ProcessingData RemanenceHomomorphic Encryption
    34. 34. Ohio Information Security ForumData SecuritySymmetricEncryptionHomomorphicEncryptionSSLMAC HomomorphicEncryptionSSLRedundancy Redundancy Redundancy34ConfidentialityAvailabilityIntegrityStorage Processing TransmissionPlus data remanence.
    35. 35. Ohio Information Security ForumPublic Key Cryptography35
    36. 36. Ohio Information Security ForumHomomorphic Public-key EncryptionPublic-key Crypto with additional procedure: Evalc*  Evalpk( , c1,…,cn)a Boolean circuit with ADD, MULT mod 2Encryption of inputsm1,…,mn toEncryption of output valuem*= (m1,…,mn)Homomorphic encryption slides borrowed frompeople.csail.mit.edu/shaih/pubs/IHE-S-and-P-day.ppt36
    37. 37. Ohio Information Security ForumAn Analogy: Alice’s Jewelry StoreAlice’s workers need to assemble raw materialsinto jewelryBut Alice is worried about theftHow can the workers process the raw materialswithout having access to them?37
    38. 38. Ohio Information Security ForumAn Analogy: Alice’s Jewelry StoreAlice puts materials in locked glove boxFor which only she has the keyWorkers assemble jewelry in the boxAlice unlocks box to get ―results‖38
    39. 39. Ohio Information Security ForumReferences1. Yanpei Chen, Vern Paxson and Randy H. Katz, ―What’s New About Cloud Computing Security?‖Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2010-5,http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2010/EECS-2010-5.html, Jan. 20, 2010.2. Tal Garfinkel and Mendel Rosenblum. ―When virtual is harder than real: security challenges invirtual machine based computing environments.‖ In Proceedings of the 10th conference on HotTopics in Operating Systems - Volume 10 (HOTOS05), Vol. 10. USENIX Association.3. Craig Gentry. ―Computing arbitrary functions of encrypted data.‖ In Commun. ACM 53, 3 (March2010), 97-105. DOI=10.1145/1666420.16664444. Doug Hyde. ―A Survey on the Security of Virtual Machines.‖http://www1.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-09/ftp/vmsec/index.html, 2007.5. Tim Mather, Subra Kumaraswamy, and Shahed Latif, Cloud Security and Privacy: An EnterprisePerspective on Risks and Compliance, O’Reilly Media, 2009.6. T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage. ―Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud! ExploringInformation Leakage in Third-Party Compute Clouds.” In S. Jha and A. Keromytis, eds.,Proceedings of CCS 2009, pages 199–212. ACM Press, Nov. 2009.7. NIST, DRAFT A Definition of Cloud Computing, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-145/Draft-SP-800-145_cloud-definition.pdf, January 28, 2011.8. NIST, DRAFT Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing,http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-144/Draft-SP-800-144_cloud-computing.pdf, January28, 2011.39

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