Strategic Requirement for FW MPA
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Paper covering the subject of FW Maritime Patrol Aircraft for my degree in Applied Aviaiton.

Paper covering the subject of FW Maritime Patrol Aircraft for my degree in Applied Aviaiton.

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Strategic Requirement for FW MPA Document Transcript

  • 1. Is there a strategic requirement for a fixed-wing, long range, maritimepatrol aircraft? i
  • 2. SynopsisThe purpose of this document is to ascertain whether or not there is scope for further research intothe subject: “Is there a strategic requirement for a fixed-wing, long range, maritime patrol aircraft?” In 2010, the British Ministry of Defence elected to cancel the contract for the Nimrod MR2replacement, and as such ended a project that had been in production for over 10 years. £3.6 billionhad already been spent on the project, and none of that money would have been returned to theTreasury upon the project cancellation. This report will lay down some arguments for and against the cancellation of the NimrodMRA 4, discussing whether or not the Ministry of Defence will be able to conduct its elected taskswithout such a maritime presence. The Strategic Defence Review’s of 1998 and 2010 will becompared to try and ascertain what has changed over this period. The UK’s abilities to defend itsinterests at home and overseas will be researched, with particular interest to those roles the Nimrodforce covered and could have developed in the future. The content contained in this document will be weighted towards roles in which the MR2fleet operated, and the expected abilities of the MRA 4. Other maritime patrol aircraft are availablefor purchase, such as the P-3C Orion, however these capabilities will not be discussed, so as to keepthis report subjective and as detailed as possible due to the long standing argument and stream of“experts” offering their viewpoints over the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA 4. ii
  • 3. ContentsIs there a strategic requirement for a fixed-wing, long range, maritime patrol aircraft? ....................... i Synopsis .............................................................................................................................................. ii Nimrod MRA 4 Timeline ...................................................................................................................... 1 1998 SDR – Modern Forces for the Modern World ............................................................................ 2 2010 SDSR – Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty ...................................................................... 3 Roles and Required Equipment .......................................................................................................... 5 Anti-Submarine Warfare ................................................................................................................. 5 Anti-Surface Unit Warfare .............................................................................................................. 7 Overland Operations ....................................................................................................................... 7 Search and Rescue .......................................................................................................................... 8 Communications ............................................................................................................................. 9 Post 2010 SDSR – Select Committee on Defence ............................................................................... 9 Costs of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft vs Other Options ....................................................................... 12 Type 26 Frigate.............................................................................................................................. 12 Merlin ............................................................................................................................................ 12 SOSUS ............................................................................................................................................ 13 What is the threat? ........................................................................................................................... 13 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 14 References ........................................................................................................................................ 16Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 18Table of Figures ..................................................................................................................................... 19 iii
  • 4. Nimrod MRA 4 TimelineIn the November of 1992, the requirement for a replacement maritime patrol aircraft, one tosupersede the Nimrod MR2, was endorsed, and a data gathering phase was authorised. In theJanuary of 1995, 4 companies submitted proposals for this replacement aircraft, BAE Systems beingthe winning bidder on the 25th July 1996. The initial plan was for 21 Nimrod MRA4 aircraft, alongwith all the training and support, which would be delivered between 2001 and 2006. “Technical andresourcing difficulties” (Nimrod MRA4 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft) meant that during1998 the project was delayed, by approximately 3 years. In February 2003, BAE and the MoD came to an agreement over the contract to the effectthat the initial requirement was changed so that the 3 development aircraft would be built, andupon the proven maturity through flight trials, the contract for production would be awarded.(Nimrod MRA4 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft) December 2003, the Defence White Paper reduced the Nimrod MR2 fleet from 21 to 16 andthe MRA 4 fleet was reduced to “about 12”. Production slowed as the development aircraft wentthrough the flight testing phase. 5 further delays pushed the in service date further and further backuntil, in 2009, an announcement was made which brought forward the MR2 out of service date. Finally, under the SDSR of 2010, the Nimrod MRA4 program was cancelled. No directreplacement was planned, the “slack” left by the MRA 4, instead the plan is to “...depend on othermaritime assets to contribute to the tasks previously planned for them [MRA4]” (GOVERNMENT,HM, 2010). 1
  • 5. Figure 1 - Nimrod MRA4 - £3.6 billion1998 SDR – Modern Forces for the Modern WorldIn the July of 1998, while the Nimrod MRA 4 programme was approaching another delay, theSecretary of State for Defence released the latest Strategic Defence and Security Review. Thisdocument was to lay down how the MoD was to align itself to the perceived threats developing inthe 21st Century and onwards to around 2015. The report laid down the Military Tasks in which theUK Forces could be expected to be employed, of interest are the following: (GOVERNMENT, HM,1998) Peacetime Security Security of the Overseas Territories Support to Wider British Interests Regional Conflict outside the NATO area Strategic Attack on NATO This list covers 5 of the 8 broad missions set down by the Government. But these 5 are roleswhich maritime patrol aircraft have been employed on, and could have been expected to in thefuture. Whereas some elements of the military are directed to specific tasks and have singular roles,the maritime forces have always been flexible and deployable to a wide range of theatres andoperations. Nimrod crews over the past 30 years have fought in conflicts from the Falkland Islands, 2
  • 6. through the Cold War, and on to more recent conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and manymore still covered by the official secrets acts. The 1998 SDR, however, was a turning point for the future of the Nimrod force. “The risksand challenges we face are not simply those of the Cold War...” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 1998), thisforward thinking showed that the Government wasn’t expecting large scale battles such as had beenthought throughout the Cold War period. “In part, it was because the scale of the risks involved inthe Cold War obscured the potential importance of the newer style of security risks that wereemerging.” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 1998). This gave the first official signs that we were expecting theMiddle East and such states to be of military interest, no longer would be solely plan on fightinganother major world power. Furthermore, and more specifically, “At sea, the emphasis is continuing to move away fromlarge scale maritime warfare...” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 1998). This view showed that the battlegroundwas no longer going to be the Atlantic Ocean, or areas such as this. But instead, the maritimebattlefield would be within the littoral areas, probably within in 10 miles of the coastline. In relation directly to the subject of this report, there is a single mention of the Nimrod MRA4 in the 1998 SDR: “The RAF’s modernised Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft... will provide a powerfulextension of our anti-submarine (ASW) capability, including in shallower waters...” (GOVERNMENT,HM, 1998). Although there was little mention of the Nimrod fleets in this sizeable doctrine for theArmed Forces, there was little sign that the force could be expected to be removed completely. Wasthere a doctrinal change over the next 12 years that meant Nimrod was no longer required? Or wasthe removal of the capability purely down to cost and politics?2010 SDSR – Securing Britain in an Age of UncertaintyBy the time this document was published, the MRA 4 project was around 10 years late on its originalin service date, and the MR2 had not flown for 7 months. The MoD had managed without a long 3
  • 7. range maritime patrol aircraft for a significant period, and as such it is unsurprising that the MRA 4project was cancelled in this way. As is usual with a strategic document, the new Military Tasks were laid down, all 7 are listedhere: (GOVERNMENT, HM, 2010) Defending the UK and its Overseas Territories Providing Strategic Intelligence Providing a Nuclear Deterrence Supporting Civil Emergency Organisations in times of crisis Defending our Interests by Projecting Power Strategically and through Expeditionary Interventions Providing a Defence Contribution to UK Influence Providing security for Stabilisation Again, looking over the past 30 years, it is possible to directly cross-reference Nimrod Operationswith these 7 Military Tasks. In Nimrod, the UK Government had an asset that was flexible enough tofulfil all of these roles, to some extent at least. The 2010 SDSR describes how the maritime FutureForce 2020 (i.e., force disposition in the year 2020), can be expected to operate.“Future Force 2020 will be able to provide: Nuclear Continuous at Sea Deterrence; Maritime defence of the UK and its South Atlantic Overseas Territories; An enduring presence within priority regions of the world to contribute conventional deterrence” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 2010) The list continues, however the three roles above were roles in which Nimrod was employeddaily and also held on standby in case it was required. Crews regularly flew through the Christmasand New Year holidays whilst supporting the tasks listed above. 4
  • 8. What is the mitigation against such an apparent loss of capability? “Maritime intelligence,surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities based on network enabledwarships submarines and aircraft.” (GOVERNMENT, HM, 2010) This would leave the UK’s maritimeforce with 1 or 2 helicopter landing ships, 19 frigates and destroyers, 7 attack submarines, 4 ballisticmissile submarines, and their fleet Merlin helicopters. The smallest navy ever to be fielded by theRoyal Navy. (KIRKUP, Thomas Harding and James, 2010)Roles and Required EquipmentAlthough the Nimrod MR2 fleet of aircraft conducting a wide selection of roles and responsibilities,they can be summed up into a small list of over-arching headings: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Anti-Surface Unit Warfare (ASuW) Overland Search and Rescue (SAR)These 4 roles cover essentially all the operations and tasks that the Nimrod fleet could be expectedto participate in. We will look at each role and equipment required to conduct these roles.Anti-Submarine WarfareASW was one of the first roles in which maritime air-assets were tasked. The advent of submarinesin WW1 became such that ships were not able to sufficiently defend themselves against any kind ofcapable submarine threat. However submarines of this era “could stay underwater for 12 hours”(British Submarines 1900 to 1918). A submarine would only manage this if its batteries werecompletely charged and it stayed submerged until its batteries were depleted. Modern submarineswill aim to surface when their batteries around 50-60% full, ensuring they’re always in a position tobe tactically effective. 5
  • 9. With an apparent duration of 6 hours submerged, early submarines would regularly befound sailing on the surface, with this information it didn’t take long for Navy’s to start to employlong-range fixed-wing aircraft to give surface vessels warning of approaching submarines, or even todestroy those vessels before they became a threat. There are several sensors which can be employed to detect surfaced and submergedsubmarines: Radar can detect surfaced submarines by transmitting radio energy and receiving back an echo if a contact is within range, (Exactly how does radar work?) Electronic Support Measures (ESM) can detect an enemy transmitting on his radar, Passive Acoustic systems can hear noise being made by the submarines equipment and the noise of water on its hull, Active Acoustic systems work in a similar way to radar, except using wavelengths of noise energy rather than radio energy, Magnetic Anomaly Detectors are used to sense a disturbance in the earth’s magnetic field, a submarine will make a noticeable change to the level of magnetism which an aircraft can detectThere are many more pieces of equipment that could assist in locating and tracking a submarine, butthe 5 above are the most commonly used across all MPA fleets worldwide. 6
  • 10. Figure 2 - Various ASW MPA SensorsAnti-Surface Unit WarfareASuW goes hand in hand with ASW. Submarines, in modern times, would usually operate with afriendly fleet of surface vessels, or against a fleet of enemy surface vessels. This means MPA areusually employed on both ASW and ASuW simultaneously. The main reason this can beaccomplished is because the equipment used is very similar, and in ASuW it is a little simpler. Only radar and ESM tend to be used to conduct ASuW. Radar can detect contacts, anddepending on the model of radar, provide some basic information such as target length and roughoutline (warship, merchant, fishing boat etc). ESM would then be used to further identify contactsfrom the transmissions received by their radars.Overland OperationsOverland operations are generally covered by the term ISTAR, (Intelligence, Surveillance, TargetAcquisition and Reconnaissance), although ASW and ASuW are both ISTAR roles as well. Overlandoperations are generally those in support of conventional (Army/Marines etc) or special (SAS/SBS)forces. For the Nimrod MR2, overland operations in Iraq and Afghanistan involved the use of theWescam MX-15 (Wescam MX-15) multi-spectral imaging sensor. This camera was fitted under one ofthe aircrafts wings and could be used to detect and track targets of interest. The groundcommanders also had the capability to see Full Motion Video (FMV) by means of a downlink; thisensured that vital information wasn’t missed in translation from aircrew to group operatives. 7
  • 11. Figure 3 - Wescam Operators on the Nimrod MR2Search and RescueSAR was, in some ways, the most important part of the Nimrod MR2’s capability. It is difficult toquantify how many lives were saved by the Nimrod fleet in this role. On July 6th 1988, 61 peoplewere saved when the oil platform “Piper Alpha” exploded, several Nimrod MR2 sorties wereconducted as a SAR command platform providing control for the various rescue assets involved. Figure 4 - Piper Alpha 6th July 1988One of the most important pieces of equipment carried by MPA in their SAR roles is the apparatusthat they can deploy to those in need. Known in the UK inventory as the ASR (Air-Sea Rescue),various different styles of deployable dingy and supplies can be dropped from aircraft allowingsurvivors of an incident a much better chance of being rescued. The average human could survive forup to 90 minutes in the North Sea if provided with a standard survival suit (Hypothermia Prevention: 8
  • 12. Survival in Cold Water). This could be extended to several weeks with the equipment available in anASR package.CommunicationsDue to the long ranges MPA work at, and the amount of information they are likely to process, themost vital part of the aircraft is the communications suite. Upon detection of enemy submarine,enemy forces on the ground or survivor in the sea, it is vital that other parties are informed asquickly as possible. Modern MPA can be expected to have around 10 radios covering differentfrequency bands and agencies, as well as automatic data links which provide near real-time datatransmission, cutting down on ambiguities of voice-communications and improving situationalawareness.Post 2010 SDSR – Select Committee on DefenceThe 2010 SDSR brought out a lot of points for argument, not only the MRA 4 decision. Expertsargued over the basis for keeping Tornado over Harrier, the requirement for the future carriers wasin question, closure of bases was also unexpected. However in some ways, not keeping the MRA 4appears to have been the most interesting, what is the point in having 2 carriers if you can’t protectthem from enemy submarines and ships? In July 1988 the oil facility “Piper Alpha” caught fire and subsequently 167 people died.However much of this disaster was averted due to repeated Nimrod sorties which operated as on-scene commander for the rescue operation. The Nimrod crews organised helicopters and ships suchthat many people were saved. The Nimrod MR2 was also employed on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in support ofMulti-National brigades. Its sensor suite was upgraded so that crews were able to locate, monitorand track targets of interest throughout deserts and built up areas. This provided commanders at 9
  • 13. various levels with detailed information on enemy movements and threats to friendly forces withouthaving to send troops into an area. “The MRA4 was not just a submarine-hunter; it was capable of a variety of roles from shipsurveillance to search and rescue. It could act as a communications and disaster co-ordinationplatform and perhaps its most important role would have been as an ISTAR (Intelligence,Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) platform in support of operations inAfghanistan.” (ROBERTSON, Dr Sue, 2011).Indeed, the potential of the MRA 4 as a platform was unmatched. The aircraft was built uponmodular technologies allowing any current NATO weapon system to be employed from it, as well asfuture proofing it for future systems. As such the aircraft would have been able to be refitted for aspecific task within a very short period, maintaining the flexibility shown by its predecessor the MR2. Dr Robertson, in her report, continues: "Loss of the capability offered by the NimrodMaritime Reconnaissance and Attack Mk4 would have an adverse effect on the protection of thestrategic nuclear deterrent, the provision of which is one of the Ministry of Defences StandingStrategic Tasks.” (ROBERTSON, Dr Sue, 2011). The lack of a long range anti-submarine aircraft wouldmean that the UK nuclear deterrent, aboard Vanguard submarines, would have to operate bythemselves in areas also patrolled by many nations’ submarines. It would be very difficult for theVanguard class boats to be able to detect another submarine if it was being followed, and nearimpossible for them to do anything about it. There seems to be little point of having a nucleardeterrent if the enemy can neutralize it easily. In regard to the roles of the MRA 4 and the Governments plans to mitigate the capabilitygap, Dr Robertson produced the table below: (ROBERTSON, Dr Sue, 2011) 10
  • 14. THE ROLES OF THE NIMRODAsset Nimrod MRA4 Merlin Mk1 Type 23 C130TaskSubmarine Detection Yes—6000nm range with 15 Yes—200 nm range with 90 Yes No(ASW) hour mission time minute mission timeShipping Surveillance Yes—to 260nm at 40,000 ft Limited Sensors No Limited—no adequate sensorsFleet Protection Yes Yes Limited Limited—no adequate sensors rangeISTAR (Support of Troops in Yes No No NoAfghanistan)ELINT data gathering Yes No No NoCounter-terrorism Yes No No PerhapsWeapons deployment Yes Yes Yes Yes?Search & Rescue Yes—2400nm range for three Limited—300 nm range with No Limited—600 nm range with hours search one hour search two hours searchEmergency Communications Yes No No YesOverseas Maritime Patrol Yes No No NoCounter-pirate operations Yes No No NoProtection of Trident Yes Limited range Limited NoSubmarines rangeProtection of Future Carriers? Yes Limited range Limited No rangeAlthough the report is undoubtedly biased, its remarks on the capabilities area accurate and ringtrue. The Mk1 Merlin is the easiest platform to compare to the Nimrod when it comes to anti-submarine and surface ship warfare. Although the Merlin has a small fraction of the capability fromits equipment, not to mention a vastly reduced range and endurance. This is mitigated somewhat bydeploying Merlin onto the ships at sea so they can be refuelled and deployed several times, whereasa fixed-wing aircraft requires a large support network at a well established base. The Type 23 frigate is the UK’s anti-submarine ship. There are around 13 in operation in theRoyal Navy. Although it has an excellent suite of ASW sensors, it cannot do a vast range of othertasks to which Nimrod was suited. The Royal Navy could not operate as it does without its fleet ofT23’s, however they are equipped for a specific role and can do little else. Finally, the C-130. SomeGovernment officials thought that since the Hercules transport aircraft could open its cargo doors inflight it would be able to deploy some Search and Rescue apparatus to those requiring them.However, the C-130 has neither the communications suite nor sensors to co-ordinate a rescue orindeed find those in need of rescue. Its poor range when compared to the MRA 4 shows how it is a 11
  • 15. poor asset for such a role, upon talking to some C-130 crewmen, it is doubtful that they could dropSAR equipment accurately enough to be of any use.Costs of a Maritime Patrol Aircraft vs. Other OptionsThe estimated cost of the MRA4 fleet was £200 million per year, this figure is reached from a plan to“save over £2 billion over the next ten years” (COMMITTEE, House of Commons Defence, 2011). Ifwe transpose these costs onto the other 2 main ASW units, then we can see how much value 9Nimrod MRA4 Maritime Patrol Aircraft were likely to be.Type 26 FrigateThe Type 26 Frigate (Now possibly named the Global Combat Ship) is the future replacement for thecurrent Type 23. It is expected to start coming into service in 2020, and will replace the Type 23 on aone-for-one basis. As they have not yet been built, any savings on the MRA4 could easily be used tokeep more frigates operating. Currently, the Royal Navy has 13 Type 23 Frigates, their costs for FY08/09 were £340.3 million, and for FY 09/10 £313.8 million, (Type 23 Frigate). With these costs inmind, and ignoring build costs, the RN could operate an extra 8 Type 26 Frigates purely within thecosts saved by not introducing the MRA4 into service.MerlinDue to the complexity of a modern helicopter, and the requirement to strip the mechanicalelements frequently for servicing, it is unlikely that more Merlin ASW helicopters would be an optionto replace the MRA4. According to thinkdefence.co.uk, the operating cost of a Merlin helicopter is£28,000 per hour (The future of the RAF - Page 18), comparing this to an answer to a parliamentaryquestion, Nimrod MR2 cost £30,000 per hour (WINTERTON, Richard). Even with some paddingadded to cover extra costs we could expect to incur for a more modern MRA4, It is doubtful thatmore than 12-15 Merlins could be employed within the Nimrod cost saving. 12
  • 16. SOSUSSOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) has been employed for many decades as a permanent under-water acoustic detection system. Fields of sensors are deployed at strategically importantchokepoints, which are monitored by a UK/US partnership. The system is used as an early warningsystem, and can queue other assets into an area so that more accurate tracking of a potentiallyhostile submarine can be achieved. The SOSUS system was classified until 1991, and is now also usedby civilian agencies. Figure 5 - Example of Theoretical SOSUS placementsSOSUS is being phased out as an option for ASW, and as such is being replaced by surface vessels,meaning the MRA4 problem has been heightened.What is the threat?There are many countries procuring submarines in various different roles, from coastal insertion ofSpecial Forces, through open ocean maritime warfare and even nuclear deterrence. The Russian Navy has around 50 operational submarines, although it is unlikely that theycould all deploy simultaneously, the weapons on some of them have world-wide reach. 13
  • 17. Figure 6 - 33 Russian Submarines in PortAt last count the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy had 63 active submarines, including at least10 home-built nuclear subs. Argentina is in the process of purchasing several of the latest generationdiesel electric submarines from France, and is investigation converting some to be nuclear powered. Submarines are no longer the machine of the modern military either; drug gangs of SouthAmerica have been seen to employ semi and fully submersible vessels for the purposes oftransporting drugs to mainland USA. (BBC NEWS, 2011). Perhaps more worrying than the military potential of submarines, is their ability to locateand hack into communication cables. Several systems connect Europe and the United States whichutilise transatlantic fibre-optic connections (Transatlantic Telecommunications Cables). SDSR 2010identified that Cyber Warfare is one of the greatest threats that we are facing within the UK theatre.ConclusionThe arguments appear to be weighted; many agree that there is a requirement for a long-rangemaritime patrol aircraft. However, there is more research needed into whether or not those assetsassigned to the roles traditionally covered by the Nimrod force can cover those roles sufficiently. Without considering the financial aspect, assuming the defence of the nation and itsdependencies are more important than international aid etc, perhaps the role of maritime patrol isnow suited to platforms fitted for specific roles, rather than a single platform which can do lots oftasks. Nimrod could have been a victim of its own fame, by appearing to not be a vital unit in anyone area; it appears to have watered down its skill base by covering many roles. 14
  • 18. In answer to the question posed, I would say there is a massive gap in requirement andcapability when it comes to Maritime Warfare. The area covered by 13 Frigates and their associatedMerlins is minute when compared to the whole area of operations (North Sea/North Atlantic). Therecan be little doubt that the effectiveness of the RN to be able to defend against National maritimethreats has been severely reduced by the removal of the Nimrod MRA4 from introduction. However, there is an argument that the MRA4 was too costly and the wrong asset for therequirement. A smaller aircraft such as the Casa C-295M would have much lower running costs, butwith modern equipment would give similar capability in the maritime environment to the MRA4. Anairframe such as this is also modular so could be refitted for different tasks such as transport ormedivac. 15
  • 19. ReferencesBBC NEWS. 2011. Drug submarine seized by Colombian navy. London.British Submarines 1900 to 1918. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:<http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/british_submarines_1900_to_.htm>COMMITTEE, House of Commons Defence. 2011. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and theNational Security Strategy. London.Exactly how does radar work? [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:<http://www.srh.noaa.gov/jetstream/doppler/how.htm>FOX, Dr Liam. 2010. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy -Defence Committee - SDSR.GOVERNMENT, HM. 1998. Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World.GOVERNMENT, HM. 2010. Securing Britian in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence andSecurity Review.GUSTIN, Emmanuel. UK Radars. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:<http://www.uboat.net/allies/technical/uk_radars.htm>HOON, Rt Hon Geoff. 2003. Delivery Security in a Changing World - Defence White Paper.Hypothermia Prevention: Survival in Cold Water. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available fromWorld Wide Web: <http://www.seagrant.umn.edu/coastal_communities/hypothermia>KIRKUP, Thomas Harding and James. 2010. Navy to reduce to smallest size ever to save carriers.[online]. [Accessed 22 Aug 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8049674/Navy-to-reduce-to-smallest-size-ever-to-save-carriers.html>Nimrod MRA4 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft. [online]. [Accessed 22 Aug 2011]. Availablefrom World Wide Web: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/nimrod_mra4.htm>ROBERTSON, Dr Sue. 2011. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National SecurityStrategy - Defence Committee - Written Evidence from Dr Sue Robertson.SELECT COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE. 2002. Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence on MajorProcurement Project Survey (March 2002).The future of the RAF - Page 18. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:<http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/04/the-future-of-the-raf-18-%E2%80%93-vertical-lift-03-a-sensible-future/>Transatlantic Telecommunications Cables. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from WorldWide Web: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transatlantic_telecommunications_cable> 16
  • 20. Type 23 Frigate. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_23_frigate#Running_costs>Wescam MX-15. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www2.l-3com.com/wescam/products/products_services_1g.asp>WINTERTON, Richard. Money down the Drain. [online]. [Accessed 25 Nov 2011]. Available fromWorld Wide Web: <http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2007/11/money-down-drain.html> 17
  • 21. BibliographyFOX, Dr Liam. 2010. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy -Defence Committee - SDSR.GOVERNMENT, HM. 1998. Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World.GOVERNMENT, HM. 2010. Securing Britian in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence andSecurity Review.HOON, Rt Hon Geoff. 2003. Delivery Security in a Changing World - Defence White Paper.KIRKUP, Thomas Harding and James. 2010. Navy to reduce to smallest size ever to save carriers.[online]. [Accessed 22 Aug 2011]. Available from World Wide Web:<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8049674/Navy-to-reduce-to-smallest-size-ever-to-save-carriers.html>Nimrod MRA4 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft. [online]. [Accessed 22 Aug 2011]. Availablefrom World Wide Web: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/nimrod_mra4.htm>ROBERTSON, Dr Sue. 2011. The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National SecurityStrategy - Defence Committee - Written Evidence from Dr Sue Robertson.SELECT COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE. 2002. Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence on MajorProcurement Project Survey (March 2002). 18
  • 22. Table of FiguresFigure 1 - Nimrod MRA4 - £3.6 billion .................................................................................................... 2Figure 2 - Various ASW MPA Sensors ..................................................................................................... 7Figure 3 - Wescam Operators on the Nimrod MR2 ................................................................................ 8Figure 4 - Piper Alpha 6th July 1988 ....................................................................................................... 8Figure 5 - Example of Theoretical SOSUS placements .......................................................................... 13Figure 6 - 33 Rusian Submarines in Port ............................................................................................... 14 19