Administrative Hearing Commission
State of Missouri
ROCHELLE K. WHATLEY, )
vs. ) No. 05-1074 DI
DIRECTOR OF INSURANCE, )
We deny the application of Rochelle K. Whatley for an insurance producer license and
her request for a probationary license.
The Director of Insurance (“the Director”) denied Whatley's application for an insurance
producer license. Whatley filed her appeal with this Commission on July 6, 2005. We held our
hearing on February 21, 2006. Daniel P. Card II, of Beetem and Card, L.L.C., represented
Whatley. Kevin Hall represented the Director. The parties submitted written arguments, the last
filed on August 4, 2006.
Findings of Fact
1. From at least May 1993 until November 1994, Whatley and her husband, Victor,
were engaged in a telemarketing business called Midwest Marketing Concepts, Inc. (“MMC”) in
St. Joseph, Missouri. Whatley was the president and sole shareholder. Victor was the general
manager and consultant. The business involved MMC’s “salespeople” calling individuals to
inform them that they had won a valuable prize if they would purchase “Say No To Drugs”
materials. The salespeople told the “winners” that to get the prize they should send money for
the materials to MMC and then donate the materials to a local church or school.
2. In November 1994, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) raided MMC.
3. Whatley divorced Victor, filing in 1995.
4. On December 6, 1995, a grand jury in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri indicted Whatley, Victor, and nine employees of the business, as
Count 1: Whatley and the other defendants “knowingly combined, conspired and
agreed with each other and with others known and unknown to the grand
jury to commit an offense against the United States, to wit: wire fraud[.]”
Counts 2 through 107: Whatley and the others committed wire fraud by
executing a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and
property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and
promises, when they knowingly and willfully made 105 telephone calls
from MMC to the 50 victims named in the indictment.
Counts 108 through 113: Whatley laundered the money from the defrauded victims
that was deposited into MMC’s business checking account, by withdrawing
funds on six different days from July 1 through December 27, 1993,
“knowing that the transactions involved proceeds of the criminal offense of
wire fraud, with each transaction having a value greater than $10,000.”
5. On November 7, 1996, a jury found Whatley guilty of conspiracy to commit wire
fraud (Count 1) and of five counts of money laundering (Counts 108 – 112). The jury found her
not guilty of wire fraud (Counts 2 – 107) and the remaining count of money laundering (Count
6. On March 5, 1997,3 the court sentenced Whatley to 60 months’ imprisonment for
the verdict on Count 1 and 63 months’ imprisonment on each of Counts 108 through 112. The
court enhanced the sentences under guidelines then in effect because the crimes involved false
representations that MMC was acting on behalf of a charity and because MMC defrauded
unusually vulnerable victims. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently and ordered
Whatley to serve a total term of 63 months.
7. The court also sentenced Whatley to pay restitution to the victims totaling
8. Whatley and the others committed their crimes as follows:4
Working from phone lists obtained from other telemarketing firms,
an MMC salesman would call an individual and say that he or she
had been selected for MMC's “V.I.P. Bonus Round,” and was
guaranteed to win one prize from a list that typically included a
new Saturn automobile, a pair of Lucien Picard watches, a $10,000
savings bond, and a pound of gold, along with other, much less
valuable items (“gimme gifts”). All that MMC asked in exchange
was that the individual purchase “Say No To Drugs” materials and
donate them to a local church or school.
If a customer expressed interest, he or she was sold a “starter box”
of the “Say No to Drugs” materials, which ranged in price from
$400 to $800. The materials were in fact shipped to the specified
organization, but the total cost to MMC of those materials was
Ex. A. We do not make findings on what happened to the other defendants because those facts are
irrelevant and because we do not have a complete record on what happened to the other defendants.
The court records show that the “date of imposition of sentence” was March 5, 1997, and that the document
labeled “Judgment” was signed by the judge and filed on March 7, 1997. Ex. A.
We adopt the summary of the evidence that the United States Court of Appeals provided when affirming
the convictions and sentences of Whatley, Victor, and two salespersons. United States v. Whatley, 133 F.3d 601,
603-604 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 524 U.S. 940, 118 S.Ct. 2347 (1998).
only about $40. The MMC sales representative pushed each
customer into having the materials delivered directly to the
designated organization, so that the customer would not be
disappointed with the amount of materials that his or her money
Customers were chosen for their susceptibility to this scheme.
Sales representatives focused their sales efforts on people whom
they perceived to be old or particularly lonely. They used a variety
of tactics to get individuals to send money to MMC. Although it
was nowhere in MMC’s internal phone scripts, some of the people
called were promised that they would win a specific big prize and
were given false statements as to the value of the “gimme gift.”
When a customer asked what the odds were of receiving the car or
other prizes, sales representatives were told to change the subject
and to repeat the promise that the customer was certain to win one
of the four major prizes.
Individuals who purchased the materials would invariably receive
only the cheapest gift on the list. Their names, however, would be
put back in MMC’s file to be “reloaded,” and they would be called
again and told that they had a chance to win one of the larger
prizes if they bought additional “Say No to Drugs” materials. If a
customer tried his or her luck again, he or she would again receive
a “gimme gift.” No one, whether a one-time donor or one who
was “reloaded,” ever received an award other than a “gimme gift.”
9. The Court of Appeals affirmed Whatley’s enhanced sentences based on the
Mr. and Mrs. Whatley challenge the district court's findings
that the defendants represented falsely that they were acting on
behalf of a charity and that they defrauded unusually vulnerable
victims. We believe that there was sufficient evidence for the
district court to conclude that Mr. and Mrs. Whatley’s organization
misrepresented that it was acting on behalf of a charity. The
telemarketing script indicates that the “Say No to Drugs” products
bought by victims of the Whatleys’ scheme were going to schools
and churches. The script also uses the term “donation” to describe
the transfer of funds from the victims to the Whatleys’ operation.
An enhancement of their sentence for misrepresenting that they
were acting on behalf of a charity, in accordance with U.S.S.G.
§ 2F1.1(b)(3)(A), was therefore proper.
United States v. Whatley, 133 F.3d at 607.
Nor do we see any reason to reverse the district court's
imposition of a sentencing enhancement on the basis that the
victims in this case were unusually vulnerable. See U.S.S.G. §
3A1.1(b). This sentencing enhancement applies when a defendant
chooses to target a particular victim or group of victims on the
basis of age or of physical or mental condition. . . . A reasonable
person could conclude on the basis of the evidence presented at
trial and at the sentencing hearing that the defendants targeted the
elderly and those who were known to be susceptible to the sort of
operation that the Whatleys ran. Indeed, one piece of evidence
introduced at sentencing indicates that MMC purchased so-called
“response leads” that listed customers who would “buy from
anyone and everyone that has sales ability,” and there was also
evidence that Mr. Whatley described these customers as “dupes.”
We believe, therefore, that this record provided a sufficient basis
for the district court’s application of the vulnerable-victim
10. At some point before Whatley was convicted, Modern Business Systems employed
her to sell copiers to its major accounts. One of the accounts that Whatley serviced was that of
Martin Bauman, a businessman and lawyer in the Kansas City, Missouri, area. Bauman has
substantial experience in practicing law and in business.
11. After the November 1994 FBI raid, Whatley contacted Bauman for help in seeking
other employment. Her husband had left, and she had two children to support.
12. At the same time, Bauman and Delton Davis were setting up a branch office in
Phoenix for a telecommunications company, Delton Corporation. Bauman referred Whatley to
Davis. Davis hired Whatley to be the branch manager for the new branch. Whatley was
responsible for setting up all aspects of the Phoenix branch office. Whatley located office space,
bought and leased furniture and office equipment, and hired and managed the employees.
13. Whatley was also signatory to a company checking account, handled payroll, and
was responsible for generating the monthly financial statements. Davis considered Whatley a
good employee. Both Davis and Bauman regularly reviewed Whatley's financial statements,
reviewed them with the company accountant, and found them to be in proper order. Davis never
found any reason to question Whatley’s integrity.
14. Whatley served her term of imprisonment at the federal prison camp in Bryan,
Texas. While there:
a. Whatley taught another inmate how to read.
b. Whatley earned a certificate as a Horticultural Technician from the Texas
Agricultural Extension Service.
c. Whatley was one of ten inmates out of a population of 1,200 to be allowed
to leave the prison camp on work release. She worked as a volunteer for
over 4,400 hours at the Mental Health Mental Retardation Authority of
Brazos Valley in a variety of functions, including accounting, financial, and
public relations projects.
d. Whatley received the Daily Point of Light Award in September 2000 for her
volunteer work in an area of serious social need.
15. Whatley was discharged after serving 50 months, instead of 63 months, because of
16. Whatley was discharged to a halfway house for a six-month period. After three
months, Whatley was released to home confinement with permission to leave for and return
directly from work, but without a monitoring device. She had to telephone the parole office
when going to work and returning home.
17. When released on parole, Whatley contacted Bauman for assistance in seeking
employment. Bauman referred her to a law firm in Kansas City, Missouri, which he knew
wanted to hire a paralegal. From July 2001 to August 2002, Whatley worked as a paralegal for
that law firm. She left when she decided that she did not like the work.
18. Richard Rintamaa, Ph.D., is the senior minister of Raymore Christian Church
(Disciples of Christ) in Raymore, Missouri. In October 2002, Rintamaa hired Whatley as the
church secretary. Whatley was not a member of the church’s congregation.
19. Whatley’s tasks included “reception duties, keeping the computer system operating,
managing the network and keeping the programs operating, managing data bases, mailings,
publications, telephone system and voice mail.”6 She showed an attitude that facilitated working
with others. The duties of her position did not involve access to money. Rintamaa considered
Whatley’s level of performance to be excellent.
20. In August 2004, Whatley left her church employment by mutual agreement.
Whatley had conflicts with another minister over her frequent absences relating to emergencies
involving her children and extended family.
21. In the fall of 2004, Whatley asked Bauman if he knew of employment in the
St. Joseph area where her children lived. Bauman had recently founded and become the
president of Missouri Doctors Mutual Insurance Company (“Doctors Mutual”). Doctors Mutual
offered medical malpractice insurance.
Letter dated August 21, 2004. Ex. D.
22. Bauman wanted to offer Whatley the position of sales manager at Doctors Mutual,
but he learned that a federal law7 prohibited her from being an employee at the business because
of her convictions. Instead, Bauman paid Whatley as an independent contractor to organize a
charitable golf tournament to build good public relations between Doctors Mutual and the
doctors at Children’s Mercy Hospital.
23. At the time of our hearing, Whatley was still working in that capacity with Doctors
24. On January 10, 2005, Whatley was fully discharged from parole supervision and
from her sentence, except for completing restitution payments. Whatley has been paying
installments on the restitution.
25. On March 23, 2005, Whatley applied for an individual insurance producer license.
She had passed her examination for a producer in the property and casualty lines of insurance.
She paid her application fee. She was at least 18 years old.
26. On June 8, 2006, the Director refused to issue an insurance producer license to
Title 18 USC § 1033 provides:
(e)(1)(A) Any individual who has been convicted of any criminal felony
involving dishonesty or a breach of trust, or who has been convicted of an
offense under this section, and who willfully engages in the business of
insurance whose activities affect interstate commerce or participates in such
business, shall be fined as provided in this title or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.
(B) Any individual who is engaged in the business of insurance whose activities
affect interstate commerce and who willfully permits the participation described
in subparagraph (A) shall be fined as provided in this title or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
(2) A person described in paragraph (1)(A) may engage in the business of
insurance or participate in such business if such person has the written consent
of any insurance regulatory official authorized to regulate the insurer, which
consent specifically refers to this subsection.
Conclusions of Law
We have jurisdiction to hear Whatley’s complaint.8 Whatley has the burden of
demonstrating that she qualifies for the insurance producer license (“the license”).9
We decide anew whether there is legal cause to deny the license and whether the license
application should be granted.10 We exercise the same discretion that the law grants to the
Director to grant or deny a license.11
Section 375.015, RSMo Supp. 2005, sets forth the qualifications for an individual
insurance producer license:
1. An individual applying for a resident insurance producer
license shall make application to the director on the uniform
application and declare under penalty of refusal, suspension or
revocation of the license that the statements made in the
application are true, correct and complete to the best of the
knowledge and belief of the applicant. Before approving the
application, the director shall find that the individual:
(1) Is at least eighteen years of age;
(2) Has not committed any act that is a ground for denial,
suspension or revocation set forth in section 375.141;
(3) Has paid a license fee in the sum of one hundred
(4) Has successfully passed the examinations for the lines
of authority for which the person has applied.
The Director filed an answer setting forth the reasons for denying Whatley’s application.12
The Director contends, in effect, that Whatley is disqualified for licensure under § 375.015.1(2),
Section 621.045, RSMo Supp. 2005. Statutory references are to the 2000 Revised Statutes of Missouri,
unless otherwise noted.
Section 621.120; Francois v. State Bd. of Regis’n for the Healing Arts, 880 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Mo. App.,
State Bd. of Regis’n for the Healing Arts v. Finch, 514 S.W.2d 608, 614 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
J. C. Nichols Co. v. Director of Revenue, 796 S.W.2d 16, 20 (Mo. banc 1990).
See Ballew v. Ainsworth, 670 S.W.2d 94, 103 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984).
RSMo Supp. 2005, because she has convictions that are grounds for denial, as provided in
§ 375.141.1(6), RSMo Supp. 2005. Although the Director’s refusal notice cites grounds for denial
under subdivisions (6) and (8) of § 375.141.1, RSMo Supp. 2005, the Director’s answer asserts
only subdivision (6) as the “provision of law that allows the respondent to base the action on such
facts[.]”13 The Director’s answer constitutes the due process notice of what law he is relying upon,
so subdivision (6) is the only statutory cause for denial that we address.14
Section 375.141, RSMo Supp. 2005, provides:
1. The director may . . . refuse to issue . . . an insurance
producer license for any one or more of the following causes:
* * *
(6) Having been convicted of a felony or crime involving
This provision allows us to refuse licensure for conviction of (1) any felony, whether or not it
involves moral turpitude, or (2) any crime of moral turpitude, whether or not it is a felony.15
Title 18 USC § 3559 defines felony:
(a) Classification.--An offense that is not specifically classified
by a letter grade in the section defining it, is classified if the
maximum term of imprisonment authorized is—
* * *
(3) less than twenty-five years but ten or more years, as a Class C
(4) less than ten years but five or more years, as a Class D
Regulation 1 CSR 15-3.380(2)(E)2.
Ballew v. Ainsworth, 670 S.W.2d at 103.
Director of Insurance v. Labarge, No. 04-0565 DI, at 2 (Admin. Hrg. Comm’n Dec. 9, 2004).
Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 provides imprisonment for not more than five years for Whatley’s
conspiracy conviction. Title 18 USC § 3559(a)(4) classifies this as a felony.
Title 18 USC § 1957(b)(1) provides imprisonment for not more than ten years for each
count of money laundering for which Whatley was convicted. Title 18 USC § 3559(a)(3)
classifies this as a felony.
Section 375.141.1(6), RSMo Supp. 2005, provides cause for us to refuse licensure for
each of Whatley's felony convictions independently.
b. Crime of Moral Turpitude
Moral turpitude is:
an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellowman or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man; everything “done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, and good morals.”
In re Frick, 694 S.W.2d 473, 479 (Mo. banc 1985) (quoting In re Wallace, 19 S.W.2d 625
(Mo. banc 1929)).
Title 18 USC §§ 371 and 1343 set out the elements of conspiracy and wire fraud
18 USC § 371
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of
the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such
conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for
18 USC § 1343
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or
television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation affects
a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Fraud is an intentional perversion of truth to induce another to act in reliance upon it.16
Crimes involving fraud are crimes of moral turpitude.17 Further, a conviction for conspiracy to
commit a crime requires that the person act “willfully.”18 Crimes requiring willful conduct
involve moral turpitude because they involve the voluntary and intentional violation of a legal
duty.19 We conclude that Whatley’s conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud is a crime
involving moral turpitude and is cause to refuse licensure. Title 18 USC § 1957 sets out the
elements of money laundering:
(a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection
(d), knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary
transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than
$10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an
offense under this section is a fine under title 18, United States
Code, or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both.
* * *
(c) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the
Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that the
Hernandez v. State Bd. of Regis’n for Healing Arts, 936 S.W.2d 894, 899 n.2 (Mo. App., W.D. 1997).
Neibling v. Terry, 177 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Mo. banc 1944) (mail fraud); and In re Frick, 694 S.W.2d at 479.
United States v. Overholt, 307 F.2d 1231, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2002).
In re Duncan, 844 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Mo. banc 1992).
offense from which the criminally derived property was derived
was specified unlawful activity.
Whatley’s convictions for money laundering were for using the money obtained from
fraudulent activity when she knew how the money was obtained. These are crimes involving
moral turpitude. Each conviction is an independent cause to refuse licensure.20
Whatley contends that we cannot refuse licensure without considering whether she has
rehabilitated herself to become a person of good moral character. Whatley relies upon §§
314.200 and 620.135.
Section 314.200 provides:
No board or other agency created pursuant to laws of the state of
Missouri . . . for the purpose of licensing applicants for
occupations and professions may deny a license to an applicant
primarily upon the basis that a felony or misdemeanor conviction
of the applicant precludes the applicant from demonstrating good
moral character, where the conviction resulted in the applicant’s
incarceration and the applicant has been released by pardon, parole
or otherwise from such incarceration, or resulted in the applicant
being placed on probation and there is no evidence the applicant
has violated the conditions of his probation. The board or other
agency may consider the conviction as some evidence of an
absence of good moral character, but shall also consider the nature
of the crime committed in relation to the license which the
applicant seeks, the date of the conviction, the conduct of the
applicant since the date of the conviction and other evidence as to
the applicant's character.
Section 314.200 applies only when “good moral character” is an expressed licensure
qualification. When the General Assembly wants to include “good moral character” as a
qualification for a particular license, it does so expressly. A few of many examples are at
State Bd. of Nursing v. Heck, No. 05-0900 BN, at 4 (Admin. Hrg. Comm’n Dec. 6, 2005); Missouri Real Estate
Comm’n v. Jones, No. 98-001640 RE, at 2 (Admin. Hrg. Comm’n March 16, 1999).
§§ 301.559.3 (licenses relating to the selling of motor vehicles); 311.060.1 (liquor license); and
326.280.1(3), RSMo Supp. 2005 (certified public accountants). The General Assembly has not
specified “good moral character” as a qualification for an insurance producer license in §
375.015, RSMo Supp. 2005. Therefore, § 314.200 does not apply to an applicant for an
insurance producer license.
Section 620.135 provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, no license for
any occupation or profession shall be denied solely on the grounds
that an applicant has been previously convicted of a felony.
The plain language of this statute applies to all licensed occupations and professions. That
would necessarily include an insurance producer license. That this statute is in a chapter other
than Chapter 375 does not control. The words of the statute control.
Section 375.141.1, RSMo Supp. 2005, does not mandate that the Director or we deny an
application solely on the basis of a conviction for a felony or for a crime of moral turpitude
because the word “may” in § 375.141, RSMo Supp. 2005, requires the use of discretion. “The
use of the term ‘may’ necessarily implies that the denial is not mandatory, and that the conferee
of the power has the discretion in exercising it.”21
To guide our exercise of discretion, we adopt the standards set forth at § 314.200,
because § 314.200 codifies the considerations that appellate court decisions22 set forth to
determine rehabilitation for professional licensure applicants.23 Accordingly, while we consider
criminal history, we also consider: (1) the nature of the crime committed in relation to the
State Bd. of Regis’n for the Healing Arts v. Finch, 514 S.W.2d at 614.
State Bd. of Regis'n for the Healing Arts v. DeVore and State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v.
We have used § 314.200 as our guide in cases in which “good moral character” is not an express licensure
qualification but where we have the discretion to refuse the application because of a conviction. See Crider v.
Missouri Bd. of Therapeutic Massage, No. 04-1191 TM, at 4 (Admin. Hrg. Comm’n April 20, 2005).
license that the applicant seeks, (2) the date of the conviction, (3) the conduct of the applicant
since the date of the conviction and (4) other evidence as to the applicant’s character.
Nature of the Crime as Related to License Sought
The nature of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and the laundering of the money gained
from the fraud relates directly to the honesty and trustworthiness required of an insurance
producer. Although “good moral character” is not set forth as an express qualification for an
insurance producer license, many of the causes set forth in §375.141.1 for the denial of licensure
involve the making of misrepresentations,24 showing “untrustworthiness” in business,25 and the
misuse of others’ money.26 The license authorizes its holder to sell insurance to people, an
activity that requires honest and forthright representations about the benefits and obligations of
insurance policies. The insurance producer receives money, such as for premiums, and is
required to apply that money to the purpose intended by the insured and the insurer. An
insurance producer license enables the licensee to engage in business alone, without any
immediate supervision in regard to the handling of money or to the other aspects of the
Whatley’s convictions were for her use of a sophisticated scheme of lies designed
specifically to prey on those chosen because of their particular vulnerabilities to the sales pitch
about money going to a charitable use. The character traits shown by her participation in the
calculated and sustained dishonesty of this criminal enterprise are directly related to the
functions and duties of an insurance producer.
Section 375.141.1(1), (3), (5), (7), (8), (10), and (12), RSMo Supp. 2005.
Section 375.141.1(8), RSMo Supp. 2005; Stith v. Lakin, 129 S.W.3d 912, 918 (Mo. App., S.D. 2004).
Section 375.141.1(4), RSMo Supp. 2005.
Date of Conviction
Whatley contends that the date of the criminal conduct and of the conviction show a
significant lapse of time – 12 years from the end of the scheme and nine years from sentencing.
Of course the passage of 50 months of that time was because Whatley had to spend that much
time in prison. Whatley's supervised parole ended on January 10, 2005, only two months before
she filed her application with the Director. It is now only a year and a half since Whatley has
lived without supervision. This is not a sufficient period of time to assure us and the public that
Whatley has changed her character enough to maintain honesty and integrity without
Whatley’s Conduct Since Date of Conviction
She contends that her conduct since conviction has shown the required change in moral
code.27 Whatley has acknowledged her responsibility for her crimes and has conducted herself
since the date of her conviction as someone trying to live her life within the law and to accrue
and demonstrate those values associated with someone people can trust. Nevertheless, the
majority of this time Whatley was involved with the criminal justice system in some capacity,
being either under indictment, incarcerated, or on supervised on parole. In fact, barely two
months had passed from her discharge from supervised parole until the time she filed this
application with the Director. It is impossible to predict the durability of this apparent change of
heart unless the person maintains good conduct over a significant period of time without the
supervision of prison and parole authorities.
Other Evidence of Character
As for other evidence indicating whether Whatley would conduct herself honestly and in
a trustworthy fashion, we observe that Whatley was a mature adult when she engaged in the
Francois v. State Bd. of Regis'n for the Healing Arts, 880 S.W.2d at 603.
conduct of targeting the vulnerable through the guise of obtaining donations for a charitable
cause. This was a sophisticated and well organized scheme that came to an end only because the
FBI intervened. As the money laundering convictions show, Whatley enjoyed the monetary
benefits of the scheme until the FBI put an end to it. We are aware that both the General
Assembly, through its enactment of §§ 314.200 and 620.135, and the courts, through their
appellate decisions, have established a public policy allowing felons the opportunity to show
sufficient rehabilitation for occupational and professional licensing. Yet we also realize that the
General Assembly and courts have established a public policy that emphasizes government
licensing of occupations and professions as the best way to protect and assure the public that the
people licensed are qualified and honest.28 Licensing laws are “remedial statutes enacted in the
interest of the public health and welfare and must be construed with a view to suppression of
wrongs and mischiefs undertaken to be remedied.”29 Members of the public simply do not have
the resources or time to determine the qualifications and character of all of the licensed
professions and occupations they must deal with in their everyday lives. The public depends on
those entrusted with the discretion to issue licenses to take a careful and thoughtful approach
before issuing a license. We think that protection of the public is paramount and requires an
extensive period of good conduct for a felon, unsupervised by prison or parole authorities, when
the convictions from which the applicant claims rehabilitation involve the type of cynical
fleecing of the particularly vulnerable that Whatley’s convictions show.
State ex rel. Lentine v. State Bd. of Health, 65 S.W.2d 943, 950 (Mo. 1933).
Bhuket v. Missouri Bd. of Regis'n for the Healing Arts, 787 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Mo. App., W.D. 1990).
Whatley asks us to consider mandating that the Director issue a probationary license with
conditions to protect the public.30 For the same reasons as just stated, we refuse to grant Whatley
even a probated license.
We deny Whatley’s application for licensure and request for a probated license.
SO ORDERED on January 3, 2007.
JOHN J. KOPP