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Sharon Anderson CitySt.Paul,MN Ward 2 Candidate www.sharon4council.blogspot.com to expose the Ponzi Taxing_Commerce_Schemes to Condemn,Demolish and "take" your Homesteads BIZZARE City is out of …

Sharon Anderson CitySt.Paul,MN Ward 2 Candidate www.sharon4council.blogspot.com to expose the Ponzi Taxing_Commerce_Schemes to Condemn,Demolish and "take" your Homesteads BIZZARE City is out of Control

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  • 1. Page 1 of 11Subj: Claims of Sharon Scarrella Anderson 1988 to 2011Date: 1/20/2011 12:20:53 P.M. Central Standard TimeFrom: Sharon4Anderson@aol.comTo: Sharon4Anderson@aol.com, jason.johnston@zimmreed.com, charles.zimmerman@zimmreed.comCC: rcbarden@mac.com, jragsdale@pioneerpress.com, jrgraham@oricom.ca Thurs.20Jan2011 To Whom it may concern AFFIDAVIT OF VA WIDOW SHARON SCARRELLA ANDERSON "takings" without Just Compensation 1988 RICO Claims up to and including today 2011_ 23 years unabated by Public officials, triggering Death,Disabilitys,Disparagment of Titles. TAKING HOMESTEAD PROPERTY VIA DENIAL OF HS CREDITS 1058 Summit http://www.slideshare.net/Sharon4Anderson/sasc1988-brief15pdf? from=download_email_for_pro&show_download_info=true#favsGroupsEvents TAKINGS OF HS CREDITS AT 697 SURREY, INFLATING TAXES BASED ON THEFT,TRESPASS,TREASON 697 Surrey St.Paul,MN 55106 tiny cottage with Sharons Car in Drive. Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 2. Page 2 of 11http://cop-corruption-minnesota.blogspot.com/2007/04/notice-insclaim-stolen-91-chrysler-v.html I have posted the below IRS estoppel letter here. I have recrafted the original as a request for admissions without using to-be verbs or passive voice. I encourage everyone who has dealings with the IRS to post the letter to the Commissioner, legislators, and the press. Please send me a scanned copy of any responses you receive. http://groups.google.com/group/lawmen/topics The author will send an expanded memorandum of law, and a response to the response in due course. The author intends that the letter will help you cause the IRS employees estop themselves from making THEIR frivolous arguments in the future. Sharon will research via Google the rest of the Cases Please forward this message to all mailing lists and all people interested in causing the IRS to obey the Constitution and laws pursuant thereto. -- ************************************************* Bob Hurt - Home Page - +1 (727) 669-5511 2460 Persian Drive #70 - Clearwater, FL 33763 Donate to my Law Studies Learn to litigate: Buy and Study JURISDICTIONARY Stay up to date: Subscribe to Lawmen E-Letter Now ************************************************* John Doe 123 Anywhere Street Anytown, CA 12345-6789 January 18, 2011 Certified Mail No. 7007 0220 0003 9592 xxxx Douglas H. Shulman Commissioner of Internal Revenue 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 3. Page 3 of 11 Washington, DC 20224 Re: Statutory construction and the meaning of legislative enactments Dear Commissioner Shulman: I intend to gather all information necessary for me to determine how much income tax I owe the United States Treasury, and to complete my self-assessment. I hereby request a legal opinion from you for that purpose regarding the statutory construction of certain laws and regulations. I have presented my opinion of those laws and regulations below as factual assertions. I ask that you either admit them or deny them. I ask that you provide me with a written, detailed rebuttal, with supporting case law, of each assertion that you deny. I have providedareas for you to check Admit or Deny as your answer. You may return tome a copy of this letter, showing the appropriate areas checked Admit or Deny, and attach rebuttals for those you deny.I shall assume that you admit any numbered items below which you do not deny and rebut particularly and specifically with supporting case law within 90 days after receiving this letter. I shall treat your failure to answer any item as acquience and admission to the truth of its assertion. In this document the following meanings apply, * CUSA means “the Constitution for the United States of America;” * U.S.C. means “United States Code;” * IRC means “the Internal Revenue Code” at U.S.C. Title 26; * APA means “Administrative Procedures Act;” * 16A means “the Sixteenth Amendment” to the CUSA; * SCOTUS means “the Supreme Court of the United States;” * Lettered items (a, b, etc) provide case law in support of the assertions. You have a legal duty to respond meaningfully, truthfully, and timely. Let the APA guide you in providing a timely answer. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/26/3121.html 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 26 U.S.C. § 3121(e)(1) defines (for the Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 4. Page 4 of 11 purposes of Chapter 21, Federal Insurance Contributions Act) “State” as the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 26 U.S.C. § 3121(e)(2) defines (for the purposes of Chapter 21, Federal Insurance Contributions Act) “United States” when used in a geographical sense as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(A)(i) defines “employment” “(i) within the United States” to mean performing service by an employee for the employer within the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa, in the context of the complementary definitions for “State, United States and citizen” at § 3121(e). 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(A)(ii) defines “employment” “(ii) on or in connection with an American vessel or American aircraft under a contract of service which is entered into within the United States or during the performance of which and while the employee is employed on the vessel or aircraft it touches at a port in the United States, if the employee is employed on and in connection with such vessel or aircraft when outside the United States” to mean performing service by an employee for the employer on or in connection with an American vessel or American aircraft under a contract of service entered into within the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa, or touching at a port in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa, in the context of the complementary definitions for “State, United States and citizen” at § 3121(e), and “American vessel and aircraft” at § 3121(f). 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(B) , definse “employment” “(B) outside the United States by a citizen or resident of the United States as an employee for an American employer (as defined in subsection (h))” to mean performing service for the United States or any instrumentality thereof, including for any individual or entity subject to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, or American Samoa, in the context of the complementary definitions for “State, United States and citizen” at § 3121(e), and “American employer” at § 3121(h). 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(C)3 defines “employment” “(C) if it is service, regardless of where or bywhom performed, which is designated as employment or recognized Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 5. Page 5 of 11 as equivalent to employment under an agreement entered into under section 233 of the Social Security Act;” to mean working under an international social security old-age, survivors, disability, or derivative benefits agreement, in the context of the complementary definition for “International agreements” at 42 U.S.C.s43 Did you mean: 42 USC 43 Search Results 1. Race, law and public policy: cases and materials on law and public ... - Google Books Result Robert Johnson, Robert Johnson (Jr., J.D.) - 1998 - Law - 446 pagesUnited States, 323 US 214 (1944) Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, s!42, 86 Stat. 1367(codified at 42 USC s43 1); Act of Sept. ... books.google.com/books?isbn=1580730191... Did you mean to search for: 42 USC 43 Preview image 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: the regulation in the Federal Register at 8 FR 12267, § 404.104 supporting 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) defines “employee” as “officers and employees whether elected or appointed, of the United States, a State, Territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing,” for the purposes of Chapter 24, Collection of income tax at source on wages Consider the following assertions about rules of statutory construction in light of the foregoing legislative enactments: 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: Congress provides a statutory definition to supersede, not enlarge, the common or ordinary dictionary definition of a word. 1. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 2615 (2000) (“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that terms ordinary meaning.Court opinions for Stenberg v. Carhart,530 U.S.914 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 US 914 - 2000 - Supreme Court - Cited by 1879 Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 6. Page 6 of 11 2. Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 484-485 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term"); Court opinions for Meese v. Keene 481 US 465 Meese v. Keene, 481 US 465 - 1987 - Supreme Court - Cited by 507 3. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. at 392-393, n. 10 ("As a rule, `a definition which declares what a term "means" ... excludes any meaning that is not stated Court opinions for Colautti v. Franklin 439 US Colautti v. Franklin, 439 US 379 - 1979 - Supreme Court - Cited by 1799 4. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490, 502 (1945) ("Of course, statutory definitions of terms used therein prevail over colloquial meanings.”);Court opinions for Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 US 490 - … - Supreme Court - Cited by 267 Lenroot v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 141 F. 2d 400 … - Circuit Court of Appeals, … - Cited by 24 Lenroot v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 52 F. Supp. … - Dist. Court, SD New York - Cited by 19 5. Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 95-96, 55 S.Ct. 333, 336 (1935) (“[A] definition by the average man or even by the ordinary dictionary with its studied enumeration of subtle shades of meaning is not a substitute for the definition set before us by the lawmakers with instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all others.”); see also 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases).”); 6. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S. Ct. 755, 760 (1999) (“This Courts review -- begins with the statutes language.”); 7. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992) (“In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statutes meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished. 8. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 190 (1991).”); Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 7. Page 7 of 11 9. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2172 (1989) (“The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language.”); 10. BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) (“The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to "presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." 11. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992). Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous. -- Connecticut Nat. Bank, supra, at 254.”).1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: the courts must strictly construe the taxing statutes. 1. United States v. Stone & Downer, 47 S. Ct. 616, 274 U.S. 225 (1927) (“The rule against enlarging the subject-matter of a statute by judicial interpretation has been applied with great particularity in the case of statutes levying taxes”); 2. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 78 L Ed 2d 17, 104 S Ct. 296 (1983) (“"[Where] Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." 3. United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972).”); 4. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153, 38 S.Ct. 53 (1917) ("In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen."); 5. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.07, p. 152, and n. 10 (5th ed. 1992) (collecting cases).1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: The IRC use of the verb “means” in a Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 8. Page 8 of 11 definition makes the term and its definition into interchangeable equivalents; the IRC use of the verb “includes” in a definition imports a general class into the definition, and the definition specifies some particular instances of the class. 1. Helvering v. Morgan’s, 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1, 55 S. Ct. 60, 61 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 232 (1934), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court explained the meaning of the verbs “means” and “includes” in the context of the Revenue Act of 1926, as follows:*fn1 The terms means and includes are not necessarily synonymous. The distinction in their use is aptly pointed by sections 2, 200 of the act itself (26 USCA 1262, 931). Section 2(a) of the act (see 26 USCA 1262(a) and note) gives general definitions of ten terms; of these, three are stated to include designated particular instances, the other seven are stated to mean the definitions subsequently given. Section 200, in addition to the definitions contained in subsection (a), givesfour of which two use the verb include and two the verb means. That the draftsman used these words in a different sense seems clear. The natural distinction would be that where means is employed, the term and its definition are to be interchangeable equivalents, and that the verb includes imports a general class, some of whose particularinstances are those specified in the definition. This view finds support in section 2(b) of the act (26 USCA 1262(b), which reads: The terms includes and including when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined. Note: Congress codified word-for-word into 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c) the definition the Helvering v. Morgan’s Court cited for “includes” fromSection 2(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926. Congress had formerly codified the definition in the footnote at 26 USCA 1262(b). 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: Helvering v. Morgan’s established the principle that “includes” imports a general class into the definition. That principle governs, notwithstanding the “not limiting” nature of “includes” in the context of an IRC definition. 1. Brigham v. United States, 160 F.3d 759 (1st Cir. 1998) (“but "includes" is not limiting. Rather, "[t]he terms includes and including . . . shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined." 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c). In light of this we apply the principle that a list of terms should be construed to include by implication those additional terms of like kind and class as the expressly included terms. *fn2 This follows from the canon noscitur a Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 9. Page 9 of 11 sociis, "a word is known by the company it keeps." Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708-09 (1878)”). The principle that “includes” is “not limiting”, the principle that “includes” imports a general class, and the interpretive canon noscitur a sociis are all complementary and harmonious. 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 16A does not contradict, reverse, repeal, weaken, create an exception for, or modify, in any respect, CUSA’s Article I Section 2 Clause 3, or its Article I Section 9 Clause 4, which states, “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken” 1. Wright v. United States, 58 S. Ct. 395, 302 U.S. 583, 607 (1938) (“The Court has hitherto consistently held that a literal reading of a provision of the Constitution which defeats a purpose evident when the instrument is read as a whole, is not to be favored. -- "From whatever source derived," as it is written in the Sixteenth Amendment, does not mean from whatever source derived. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245.”). 2. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12-19, 36 S. Ct. 236 (1916) (“[T]he contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax -- thus destroying the two great classifications [of direct and indirect taxation under the Constitution] is -- wholly without foundation.”); 3. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1916), (“[B]y the previous ruling [Brushaber] it was settled that the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged.”)1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 16A contains no enactment clause, implementing regulations, or implementation budget for implementation. 1. See citations for item immediately above. 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 16A constitutes a philosophical statement which Congress intended to maintain the CUSA’s limitations and harmonize their operation. Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 10. Page 10 of 11 1. See citations for item immediately above. 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: 16A does not attempt to do that which, under the CUSA, Congress cannot do. 1. See citations for item immediately above. 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: SCOTUS has, through its rulings, mandated that the Government and People construe 16A in the context of CUSA Article I, including Section 2 Clause 3, and Section 9 Clause 4. 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: the Government and People should construe the “gross income” definition at 26 U.S.C. § 61 in the context of CUSA Article I Section 9 Clause 4 because the definition contains language substantially similar to that in 16A. 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: CUSA confines ALL IRC tax impositions to the class of “indirect taxes in the nature of an excise,” including taxes on “employment” measured by “self-employment income” or “net earnings from self-employment” or “wages.” 1. ___ Admit or ___ Deny: in order to comply with CUSA, the Government must construe definitions associated with IRC-imposed taxes in conformity with the principle of indirect taxation on the earnings of the individual, including all of those definitions corresponding to the legal requirements for listing “gross income” on the face of an IRS Form 1040. The APA provides that your failure to deny and rebut the foregoing assertions within 90 days after you receive this document shallconstitute your acquiescence and passive admission to the truth in law of each assertion you fail to deny. Your active or passive admissions estops you from inferring any statutory meanings contrary to thecorresponding assertions. SCOTUS rulings constitute their mandate for you to heed their interpretation of law and therefore the statutory construction which this document assertsI shall release this document and all responses into the public domain; people might use it in situations they deem lawful. Respectfully submitted, John Doe Copy to: John A. DiCicco Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson
  • 11. Page 11 of 11 Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 NOTE: Get your zip plus four U.S. postal mailing code because you will need it to obtain the name and mailing address for your State Representative in Congress for the purpose of sending a copy of this letter to him or her. To look up your zip plus four code go to: http://zip4.usps.com/zip4/zcl_0_landing_error.jsp Then find your Representative’s name and mailing address at: http://www.house.gov/ Also send a copy to your State Senators in Congress. Find their names and mailing addresses at:http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfmUnited After 90 days lapses, or sooner if the Commissioner responds to your inquiry, and depending on how he responds, if he responds, I shall provide an appropriate follow-up letter template for your next step in establishing estoppel against IRS frivolous arguments. BOB HURT sunglasses.jpg 6K Download Sharon4Anderson@aol.com AttorneyProSe_Private AG, ECF:165913 Pacer:sa1299Tel: 651-776-5835 http://sharon-mn-ecf.blogspot.com/2007/03/foia-06cv-permission-to.html http://forums.e-democracy.org/groups/stpaul-issues/files/f/1202-2007-03- 02T233420Z/SASC1988Brief15pdf.pdf http://forums.e-democracy.org/groups/stpaul-issues/files/f/748-2007-02- 27T034303Z/JR&SHomeless1988_17.pdf http://www.justice.gov/crt/crim/3631fin.php Thursday, January 20, 2011 AOL: Sharon4Anderson