Creating a Reliable andSecure Advanced DistributionManagement SystemFor Smart Grid Efficiency and EfficacyMake the most of...
SummaryExecutive Summary . ................................................................................... p	 1Introdu...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemExecutive summaryAs public utilities strive to build...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemIntroductionToday, public utilities are looking to o...
Creating a Reliable andSecure Advanced DistributionManagement System
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemThe need for cyber securityIn the past, SCADA/DMS/OM...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemSecurity standards and regulatoryconcernsLeading ind...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management Systema set of mandatory cyber security standards as wella...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management System• SO/IEC 27001: “Information technology – Security  ...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemAn ADMS security strategyThe modern ADMS must provid...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemNERC CIPThe NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection ...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemCIP-007 Systems Security Management deals           ...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemElectronic Security Perimeter. CIP-003, CIP-005     ...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemSolution characteristicsThe utility looking to estab...
+                                                        Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management S...
Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemConclusionThe ‘security through obscurity’ argument ...
©2012 Schneider Electric. All rights reserved.Schneider Electric USA, Inc.   4701 Royal Vista Circle   Fort Collins, CO 80...
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Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management System

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As public utilities strive to build an efficient distribution network, they are looking to automated solutions. One such solution is the advanced Distribution Management System (ADMS) that integrates SCADA, DMS and OMS technology, for optimum performance efficiency. Instead of operating with proprietary protocols on isolated networks, this approach applies open-system design – and makes security of the SCADA system paramount.
In the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is leading the efforts toward establishment of security standards for SCADA networks that process unclassified information. The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), with oversight by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and governmental authorities in Canada, enforces mandatory cyber security standards for the bulk power system in North America. Beyond North America, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) maintain the ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management System standard.
It is these standards that make possible the performance efficiency of an interoperable ADMS open system while actually improving the security of older, proprietary SCADA/DMS/OMS systems.
The NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) guidelines establish best practices for the minimal level of security required for safe and secure operations of a modern ADMS solution. They fully describe the system’s security objectives but leave to the user the choice of technology that best achieves these objectives for the user’s network. These guidelines describe access control and event logging, personnel training, maintenance of the electronic security perimeter, incident reporting and response planning, and security auditing. The utility that implements an ADMS solution that complies with these guidelines is positioned not only for operational effectiveness and enterprise-wide efficiency but also security of operations. It is recommended that the ADMS solution vendor be actively involved in industry working groups, to support compliance with the latest developments.
An open-architecture, fully configurable ADMS system meeting NERC CIP guidelines will offer security at all operational levels, even as the network grows and software upgrades are applied.

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Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management System

  1. 1. Creating a Reliable andSecure Advanced DistributionManagement SystemFor Smart Grid Efficiency and EfficacyMake the most of your energy SM
  2. 2. SummaryExecutive Summary . ................................................................................... p 1Introduction ................................................................................................. p 4The need for cyber security ......................................................................... p 6Security standards and regulatory concerns ................................................ p 7An ADMS security strategy .......................................................................... p 10NERC CIP ................................................................................................... p 11Solution characteristics . .............................................................................. p 14Conclusion................................................................................................... p 16
  3. 3. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemExecutive summaryAs public utilities strive to build an efficient distribution network, they are looking toautomated solutions. One such solution is the advanced Distribution ManagementSystem (ADMS) that integrates SCADA, DMS and OMS technology, for optimumperformance efficiency. Instead of operating with proprietary protocols on isolatednetworks, this approach applies open-system design – and makes security of theSCADA system paramount.In the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is leadingthe efforts toward establishment of security standards for SCADA networks thatprocess unclassified information. The North American Electric Reliability Council(NERC), with oversight by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)and governmental authorities in Canada, enforces mandatory cyber securitystandards for the bulk power system in North America. Beyond North America,the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the InternationalElectrotechnical Commission (IEC) maintain the ISO/IEC 27001 InformationSecurity Management System standard.It is these standards that make possible the performance efficiency of aninteroperable ADMS open system while actually improving the security of older,proprietary SCADA/DMS/OMS systems.The NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) guidelines establish bestpractices for the minimal level of security required for safe and secure operationsof a modern ADMS solution. They fully describe the system’s security objectivesbut leave to the user the choice of technology that best achieves these objectivesfor the user’s network. These guidelines describe access control and eventlogging, personnel training, maintenance of the electronic security perimeter,incident reporting and response planning, and security auditing. The utility thatimplements an ADMS solution that complies with these guidelines is positionednot only for operational effectiveness and enterprise-wide efficiency but alsosecurity of operations. It is recommended that the ADMS solution vendor beactively involved in industry working groups, to support compliance with the latestdevelopments.An open-architecture, fully configurable ADMS system meeting NERC CIPguidelines will offer security at all operational levels, even as the network growsand software upgrades are applied. White paper | 01
  4. 4. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemIntroductionToday, public utilities are looking to optimize distribution performance throughsophisticated Advanced Distribution Management System (ADMS) solutions thatinherently integrate an advanced-technology SCADA with a DMS and OutageManagement System (OMS) — a solution that enables a high-performancenetwork model and automated control of a very large number of critical resourcefunctions for efficient distribution. As such, SCADA/DMS/OMS technologycan be an attractive lure for hackers, cyber-criminals and cyber-terrorists; thesame supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system functionalityused to control and manage an information network could be used to blind anorganization to attack, create confusion, provide false information, and preventrequired actions — and wreak havoc on the electric grid, water pumping plant oroil pipeline.The security of the SCADA employed in such a broad solution is paramount;a proprietary, non-adaptable monitoring and control system not designed forsecure operation as part of a comprehensive technology solution is no longer anunacceptable option.In this paper, we discuss the security criteria that make a SCADA system —and any network management solution incorporating the SCADA as a keycomponent — a secure and reliable control system. Compliance with thesesecurity attributes also facilitates audit, system monitoring, certification and useraccreditation of the control system. White paper | 02
  5. 5. Creating a Reliable andSecure Advanced DistributionManagement System
  6. 6. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemThe need for cyber securityIn the past, SCADA/DMS/OMS systems ranproprietary protocols on isolated networks. Whilethis eliminated a number of potential threats, it alsolimited the utility’s access to its own informationand increased the total cost of ownership of datamanagement. New SCADA/DMS/OMS solutionsembrace industry standards and open-systemdesign, allowing connection to corporate networksthat are, in turn, connected to the Internet. Accessand information is shared with applications andauthorized users across the entire enterprise —significantly increasing the threat and vulnerabilitiesthat must be addressed through security controls. White paper | 04
  7. 7. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemSecurity standards and regulatoryconcernsLeading industry groups and standards organizations have taken up the cyber security challenge and arecreating guidelines, standards and certifications for the protection of critical IT systems. In many industries,compliance will be mandatory and will require a signed certification of compliance by a corporate officer.United States certified by an independent third party. The firstThe terrorist attacks of September 11th dramatically Protection Profiles will apply to the entire SCADAincreased the level of effort, funding and pace of community, but industry specific Protection Profilesdeveloping and implementing certified security are likely to follow.for U.S. industries relying on IT networks for corefunctionality. The critical infrastructure industries also • n October 2002, NIST issued Special Publication Ihave developed Information Sharing and Analysis 800-37, Guidelines for Security Certification andCenters (ISACs) on the Internet, where industry Accreditation of IT Systems. This documentmembers can securely share information dealing with specifically mentions utility networks in Sectionthreats and vulnerabilities. 2.2.3, referring to “… utility distribution systems (for example, water and electric distribution systems)”.The National Institute of Standards and The Guidelines define three security certificationTechnology (NIST) is the U.S. government agency levels and the appropriate management, technicalresponsible for setting security standards for the and operational security controls required to beprotection of unclassified information and networks. certified at each level.NIST, in association with the National Security Agency(NSA), has formed a Process Control Security • n the spring of 2003, NIST issued Special IRequirements Forum to create security standards for Publication 800-53, Minimum Security ControlsSCADA networks. The Forum includes government for Federal Information Technology Systems andsecurity experts, SCADA vendors and significant Special Publication 800-53A, Techniques andparticipants from the industries that use SCADA Procedures for the Verification of Security Controlssystems. in Federal Information Technology Systems.• he Forum is following the ISO/IEC 15408 T These three NIST endeavors will result in standard methodology and is writing Protection Profiles processes that allow companies to certify and specific to SCADA networks. This methodology accredit their SCADA systems to the appropriate provides a security target that can be tested and security level.Electric providers in North AmericaBecause of the highly inter-dependent nature of The North American Electric Reliability Councilthe electric grid, a vulnerability at one utility has (NERC) is the regulatory authority established tothe potential of cascading throughout the grid and evaluate reliability of the bulk power system incausing a massive failure. Therefore, the security North America, subject to oversight by the U.S.of the electric grid requires the cooperation and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)vigilance of all participants. and governmental authorities in Canada. Among its several functions, NERC has developed and enforces White paper | 05
  8. 8. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management Systema set of mandatory cyber security standards as wellas Security Guidelines for the Electricity Sector and aVulnerability Assessment Methodology. It participatesin education and training of industry personnel andprovides the compliance checklist allowing each utilityto complete self-certification.InternationalAlthough the international security standardsorganizations have developed a number of standardsthat can be applied to IT systems, none relatespecifically to SCADA. The Common Criteria, ISO/IEC 15408, is a very detailed standard that definesa methodology for actually testing and certifyingsystem security at one of seven different securitylevels. This methodology, rigorous and expensive, has implement the standardization work requested byinfluenced many of the recent IT-specific standards. the European Commission mandate M/490 forIn 2003, the international Instrumentation, Systems, standardization of Smart Grid implementation. Theand Automation Society (ISA) developed a SCADA- following documents and international standards arespecific security standard, the SP-99. being analyzed for this group:Published in October 2005 by the International • G2 Report: Report of the Task Force Smart EOrganization for Standardization (ISO) and the Grid Expert Group 2 on “Essential RegulatoryInternational Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), ISO/ Requirements and Recommendations for DataIEC 27001 is an Information Security Management Handling, Data Safety, and Consumer Protection.”System (ISMS) standard that is part of the growingISO/IEC 27000 family of standards. It is officially • SO Joint Working Group Report: CEN/CENELEC/ Enamed ISO/IEC 27001:2005 Information technology ETSI Joint Working Group on standards for Smart- Security techniques - Information security Grid Report (chapter 5.1.5 Smart Grid Informationmanagement systems - Requirements. As a formal Security).specification, the ISO/IEC 27001 standard mandatesspecific requirements for achieving information • ISTIR-7628: US non-prescriptive Nsecurity under explicit management control. recommendations for Smart Grid Cyber Security.Organizations that claim to have adopted ISO/IEC 27001 can, therefore, be formally audited and • ERC/CIP: mandatory standards issued by NERC Ncertified compliant with the standard. (North-American Electrical Reliability Corporation) to protect critical infrastructures.More recently, the Working group for Smart GridInformation Security (WG SGIS), part of the Smart • EC 62351: IEC 62351 defines explicit security IGrid coordination group, was established up by measures in the context of energy automation, suchthe European Standards Organizations (ESOs) to as for IP-based and serial protocols. White paper | 06
  9. 9. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management System• SO/IEC 27001: “Information technology – Security I techniques – Information security management systems – Requirements.”• SO/IEC 27002: ISO/IEC 27002: “Information I technology – Security techniques – Code of practice for information security management,” which identifies best practices recommendations for information security management. White paper | 07
  10. 10. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemAn ADMS security strategyThe modern ADMS must provide the cost, operating system, and the resulting knowledge,performance and interoperability advantages of an experience and security components can beopen system, while actually improving the security extended to secure the SCADA/DMS/OMS networkoffered by older, proprietary SCADA/DMS/OMS and lower the total cost of ownership; see Figure 1.systems. System administrators can implement This security framework includes:security standards that have passed a rigorous peerreview, such as IPSec, SSL, Kerberos, and X.509 • ingle sign-on to improve user experience Sdigital certificates. Not only does this standardizationsecure the system, eliminating the need to review a • trong authentication (Kerberos, RSA keys) to Scomplex, proprietary security protocol makes security eliminate most of the scope of security passwordaudit, certification and accreditation much easier, problemsand, consequently, more practical and effective. • ole-based access control for user authorization RBuilt on open standards and component flexibility, theADMS solution takes full advantage of the e-business • ighly granular Active Directory policy configuration, Hera, elevates the integrated SCADA/DMS/OMS secured at installationsystem to new levels of enterprise integration, andreadies the utility for tomorrow’s upgrades. • uthentication-everywhere model AA key part of the architecture of such a flexible and • ncrypted communications (IPSec, SSL) for data Eextendable solution is the use of Windows Server™ confidentialityintegrated server software. This architecture providesnumerous tools and security options that security • ublic key infrastructure (PKI) to automate security Padministrators are deploying for their internal network management (X.509 digital certificates) Browser hosted Standalone applications applications Browser and IIS Security DMS Common Security Application Pool Integrated DMS Authentication Manager, DMS Principal Authorization Policy, DMS Identity, Authentication DMS Post Authentication and Post Authorization Request events ASP .NET Security Windows Communication Foundation Security Windows Authentication, Access Control Windows Authentication, Access Control, Auditing Common Language Runtime Security Code Access Security Core Operating System Security /GS Compilation, Windows API (Logon User, SSPI)Figure 1 . ADMS security framework. White paper | 08
  11. 11. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemNERC CIPThe NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) • hat CIP does not do. CIP does not prescribe or Wguidelines, generally accepted by electric energy specify the technologies to be deployed to meetproviders worldwide, describe how a modern ADMS secure operational goals. It defines objectives,solution must respond for safe and secure operation. not how the user must achieve them. With theFirst, let’s clarify the main objectives of these responsibility of meeting secure operationsguidelines — objectives, the user also has the choice of which technology will best serve its needs in meeting• hat CIP does. CIP provides general security W those objectives. guidance toward achieving the minimal level of security required for safe and secure operations.Brief description of CIP guidelinesThe NERC CIP document addresses a broad range • ecurity of dial-up access Sof Critical Cyber Asset (CCA) and Cyber Securityissues; here, we very briefly review six of the CIP • ccess denied by default Aguidelines that apply to operation of control roomsand electric network field devices. The full text of the • Enabling and disabling ports or functions deemedNERC CIP standard can be found at not neededhttp://www.nerc.com. • ppropriate-use banner ACIP-003 Security Management Controls describesthe development of a cyber-security policy and • onitoring, logging and warnings for user access or Mdocumentation of that policy in a way that it can be attempted accessupdated and that all staff is aware of the policy. Italso discusses management of personnel who have CIP-006 Physical Security discusses physicalaccess to the CCAs and identification of users with accessibility to equipment, including:different privileges, roles and responsibilities. • Mounting equipment in lockable enclosuresCIP-004 Personnel and Training identifies thepersonnel training and awareness recommended • emote control of locks Rfor supporting security-related operations andprocedures. It cites CCA user identification lists that • ccess alarms indicating a door or gate is open Aare reviewed periodically and can be modified to • ard keys, video cameras, etc. Cchange both users and user privileges. • ser logged in and failed login attempts UCIP-005 Electronic Security Perimeter(s) dealswith identification and protection of ESP accesspoints and communications. While encryption is notidentified specifically as a guideline for ESP access,CIP-005 does speak to: White paper | 09
  12. 12. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemCIP-007 Systems Security Management deals • nti-virus and malware protection — driven by the Awith operating issues such as security patches, operating systemvirus protection, vendor releases and event logging.References to device security reinforce CIP-005 CIP-008 Incident Reporting and Responseconcepts: Planning relates to the managing and handling of reports and logs. While collecting and storing logs for• bility to enable or disable unused or unneeded A historical reference is necessary, how that retention ports and services — or compensating factor that is done is determined by the hardware and the will mitigate risk, such as physical security organization’s capabilities.• ecurity patches and firmware upgrades SNERC CIP alignmentTogether, the CIP guidelines address eight different • dministrative access not required for typical Acriteria related to a secure ADMS framework: operations — only for maintenance andUser Controls, Access Control, Electronic Security modificationPerimeter, System Logging, Personnel Termination/Privilege Changes, Security Software Management, • Passwords managed from a central locationAlerts and Notifications, and Training. The followingidentifies the framework features that, working closely Access Control. CIP-003, CIP-004 and CIP-with the SCADA/DMS/OMS infrastructure, help meet 005 describe these characteristics related to userthese criteria and contribute to the ADMS security authentication and account setup:strategy described earlier. • ecure authentication (one or multi-factor) SUser Controls. CIP-003, CIP-004 and CIP-007identify characteristics of the permissions assigned • eparation of duties-based user model Sto each user to perform certain functions within thesystem: • ighly configurable permissions structure H• nique passwords for each user U • No ‘back doors’ or maintenance channels• ole-based Access Controls R • All default user accounts documented and provided on request• Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) architecture • ser access may be controlled based on time of U• ranular audit capabilities G shift or isolated to only specific workstations• entralized user store C • trong passwords enforced by the operating S system• pplication restrictions available on a per-user basis A and/or by console basis • Password change policies enforced • ser-configurable banners available U White paper | 10
  13. 13. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemElectronic Security Perimeter. CIP-003, CIP-005 Personnel Termination/Privilege Changes. CIP-and CIP-007 relate the issues to be considered for a 004 and CIP-007 speak to capabilities necessaryvalid security perimeter around the CCA: regarding user accounts: • onitoring and logging of all access M • User accounts can be revoked by administrator• apable of integrating with off-the-shelf access C • ser accounts can be “downgraded” to lower U control devices or VPNs to extend single-sign-on authority• ncryption of communications with remote clients E Security Software Management. CIP-007 cites the or sites features needed for operating system patches and antivirus updates:• ingle-port communications through perimeter with S external systems • Security patch management program in place• oftware restrictions available for non- S • S multiple patch management technologies O administrative users supported• ommunications inside the perimeter can be C • Anti-virus/anti-malware applications supported on secured through signing end pervasive encryption all platforms and hosts• onfigurable port usage C • endor security testing performed on realistic V environments and system which accurately reflectSystem Logging. CIP-003, CIP-004, CIP-007 and real-world conditionsCIP-008 all refer to this function as it relates to theaudit requirements of the system: Alerts and Notifications. CIP-005, CIP-007 and CIP-008 all refer to the detection of failed attempts to • All access attempts securely logged through the access the system: operating system • Unauthorized logon attempts logged• ndividual privilege uses logged I Training. CIP-004 describes specific training tasks• ser account management and change control in U during implementation and subsequent maintenance place and logged of the system:• Modifications to SCADA databases logged • ecurity concepts are covered in standard training S courses• bility to send logs to central server backup for A aggregation purposes • Security controls are highlighted and their use is covered in standard training courses• onfigurable log lifetimes and log export C capabilities • CADA security-specific training is available for S additional depth of knowledge White paper | 11
  14. 14. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemSolution characteristicsThe utility looking to establish a robust, secure and reliable ADMS solution that will meet both current andfuture needs should target a system that —Complies with NERC CIP and NISTIR 7628 guidelines• ccess control and event logging — A system A an operator’s access to only those devices that fall based on the Windows® operating system or other under his or her jurisdiction. platform with inherent access control capabilities prevents accidental or malicious acts from affecting • Electronic Security Perimeter — Network Model the system. Only authorized personnel can access Promotion in an established ESP environment services; and all file access, permission usage allows secure update without threatening the and alterations to security policies are logged and system’s operational capacity. The process includes can be tracked for auditing purposes. Host-based thoroughly identifying access points, monitoring firewalls on every machine minimize the threat transferred data and enforcing approval from surface. an authorized entity located in the operational environment. This approach eliminates the Look for a system that locks down operator possibility of automatic updates with respect to the accounts to prevent any user access beyond established ESP. the control room user interface, as well as the installation of unauthorized software. VPN • ecurity Auditing — Each system should be S connections allow users to securely access audited before deployment to assure every change the system network from the insecure public in databases and network model is logged with and corporate infrastructure for management, user, timestamp and console annotations. maintenance and operations. Reflects ongoing vendor engagement with industry Also, highly granular asset-based access control working groups like the Cyber Security Coordination supports all operational requirements while limiting Task Group (SGIP) and Gridwise Alliance, to support compliance with the latest industry developments.Represents commitment to product security• usiness requirements and control system B The solution should remove all applications not requirements — IPSec encryption capability required for the successful operation of the SCADA preserves data integrity and confidentiality for system. communications between servers and workstations without the need for altering operational • esign and architect with future requirements D procedures. in mind — The solution must reflect a dedication to scalability and extensibility. Required ports open on servers should be screened from external access through the use of properly configured routers and network firewalls. White paper | 12
  15. 15. + Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemOffers out-of-the-box Schneider Electric’s design for securityadaptable, secure systems and reliability • No back doors — The system should easily accept any major authentication technology, such as biometrics, persistent smartcards and access The distributed architecture of Schneider Electric’s ADMS solution and network model allows both tokens, and allow central access control at a user/ primary and redundant backup control centers with machine policy level so that an administrator can full access to the assets, along with regional control make use of available tools. centers with access to the assets in their respective regions.• hard-coded passwords — A system with No full configurability allows strong, default password This DistribuSys design enables flexible control complexity, a configurable ‘Failed Login’ threshold strategies with deployment at zone levels: • ecure Zone or Production — used for real-time S and enforcement of password history. A feature operations, with access only by dispatchers, such as Single-Sign-On authentication technology supervisors and administrators allows a user to access the system through a single • Decision Support Zone — used for monitoring, complex password at the system platform level, reporting and exhaustive “what if” analysis, with allowing administrators to make use of greater no impact on the real-time system. password complexity. • Test and Staging Zone — used for software update testing, network model staging and QA before deployment.• ecurity lifecycle management — A support S • isaster Recovery — closely follows real time and D program that rapidly reviews, tests and approves ready to take over in case of serious failure. This security updates will maximize system security while zone is typically at a separate building. minimizing the risk of upgrade-induced issues. The solution should be configurable for industry-leading DistribuSys architecture can limit access and anti-virus software packages. control of the most critical assets to the primary and backup control center, which often reflect more robust physical access control, more staffing and enhanced security monitoring. An administrator can be prevented from configuring aspects of the database at a regional control center, but allowed to perform this action at the primary control center. An operator at the primary control center can be allowed to view the entire system, but allowed to view only localized assets at a regional control center. White paper | 13
  16. 16. Creating a Reliable and Secure Advanced Distribution Management SystemConclusionThe ‘security through obscurity’ argument supporting proprietary SCADA systemsnever was the option of choice of security professionals. In today’s Smart Gridenvironment requiring effective integration of SCADA with other informationmanagement systems, open-architecture technology designed with appropriatefeatures is necessary not only for proper performance and enterprise efficiency,but also for the security necessary at all levels to assure the safety of criticalinfrastructure assets. White paper | 07
  17. 17. ©2012 Schneider Electric. All rights reserved.Schneider Electric USA, Inc. 4701 Royal Vista Circle Fort Collins, CO 80528 Phone: -866-537-1091 1 + (34) 9-17-14-70-02 Fax: 1-970-223-5577 www.schneider-electric.com/us June 2012

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