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INDONESIA: INDONESIA: Document Transcript

  • INDONESIA: The Causes, Effects and Lessons of the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis by Zara Ahmed Julia Dreier Frank Ro April 9, 2007 FSPP 556: Macroeconomics Professor Kathryn Dominguez 1
  • Indonesia’s Economy at a glance: Introduction GDP (adjusted for PPP): $935 billion Following its independence in 1945, the Indonesia (2006 est.) economy deteriorated drastically as a result of political instability, GDP (real growth rate): 5.4% a young inexperienced government, and ill-disciplined economic GDP (per capita): $3,800 Unemployment: 12.5% nationalism. However, the New Order administration in the Population below poverty line: 17.8% 1960s, brought about a new degree of discipline to economic policy that quickly brought inflation down, managed foreign debt, Source: CIA Factbook but more importantly, attracted foreign investment through financial liberalization. As massive inflows of foreign investment poured into the country, problems soon arose with regulation and oversight. These structural weaknesses created instability and ultimately multiplied the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. With strong encouragement of the IMF, Indonesia adopted a set of policies to protect currency values and penalize insolvent companies, in order to restore investor and creditor confidence in the country. Despite assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the Crisis devastated the Indonesian economy and brought on massive social unrest. This paper consists of six parts. We intend to analyze pre, during, and post-crisis trends utilizing such macroeconomic models as the Mundell-Fleming model, the IS-LM model, and the open economy model for calculating exchange rates. First we provide a brief overview of the Asian Financial Crisis. The second part of the paper analyzes why the crisis happened; moreover, what policies lead to the crisis. Third, we provide an in depth examination of Indonesia’s response to the crisis. Forth, we evaluate what went wrong with Indonesia’s macroeconomic response to the crisis through the models. Fifth, we examine what occurred in the aftermath of the crisis. The final part of this paper analyzes the future steps and outlook for Indonesia. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, international investors became enamored by the potential of emerging markets in Asia, particularly in Indonesia. As a result investment flowed into Indonesia during this period, particularly into a rapidly developing export-oriented manufacturing sector, and the Indonesian economy grew over 7% annually. (Appendix A) Moreover, with low US interest rates and slowed economic growth in Japan, foreign investors increasingly poured capital into East Asia. Other East Asian countries like Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, and the Philippines also experienced substantial inflows of foreign capital. However, the attractiveness of these investment opportunities began to weaken around the mid- nineties, when the US Federal Reserve began raising interest rates; thus, the rising value of the dollar made investing within the US more attractive. Furthermore, since the rupiah, Indonesia national currency, was pegged to the dollar, its value decrease, as did the competitiveness of their exports. In early 1997, increased skepticism regarding Thailand’s economy led to speculation of a potential devaluation of the Thai currency (the baht). Investors such as George Soros began to attack the currency, buying baht with the goal of “selling short.” Moreover, as capital began to flee the country, Thai citizens increasingly began to fear the devaluation as well, which further depreciated foreign reserves. Upon exhausting its reserves, the Thai government was forced to float the baht on July 2, 1997, leading to an immediate devaluation of 15-20%.i Thailand’s devaluation induced a panic among investors. As a result of this growing speculation, foreign investors began calling in for their short-term loans and selling their investments. Domestic residents, who had also feared the devaluation, also began to send their capital abroad. This situation continued to perpetuate until it finally reached Indonesia. 2
  • Under the IS-LM Model we can observe how the crisis developed. Interest Rate LM0 6 Real *Note: The slope (steepness) of the IS (and LM) curve depends on how sensitive output Equilibrium (money demand) is to changes in the interest Nominal rate. 3 Expected Deflation 5 1 2 IS1 IS0 Y= Output Y1 Y0 4 (1) Investors expect devaluation of the rupiah, due the increasing value of the US dollar and what occurred in Thailand. (2) Reluctance to borrow: because loans will have to be repaid in more valuable dollars the IS curve shifts inwards. (3) Fall in invest: depresses planned expenditure, which in turn depresses income from Y1 to Y2 (4) The fall in income, which decreases money demanded (5) The reduced demand in money reduces the nominal interest rate (6) The nominal interest rate falls below the expected deflation, thus the real interest rate raises. Causes of the East Asian Financial Crisis In the aftermath of the crisis, economists and politicians alike struggled to identify its causes. According to an IMF report published the year following the crisis, several factors, both country-specific and international, were to blame. At the domestic level, large external deficits, inflated property and stock market values, a build-up of overheating pressures, and unreasonable expectations on returns, stemming from a lack of transparency and availability of credible data, all contributed to the crisis. In addition, poor corporate governance and inadequate oversight of financial systems led to corruption, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few politically- connected banks, and an increase in political and high-risk lending.ii By July 1997, nonperforming loans (i.e. those which are never repaid) accounted for over 15% of all domestic loans. (In contrast, the U.S. had a 1% rate of nonperformance.)iii Furthermore, both Indonesian banks and private firms were dependent on loans rather than equity as their primary form of finance, and by 1998 they had accrued over $82 billion in debt, 88% of which was in the form of loans. By comparison, the U.S. holds 22% of its debt in the form of loans. Compounding the problem of high-risk lending was the short-term nature of the borrowing. The optimism of investors in the early 1990s led to a steady increase in the number of “roll over” loans issued, loans which were taken out to cover old loans, ad infinitum. At the end of 1996, 62% of all loans taken out by Indonesian firms or banks had a maturity of one year or less.iv Because 3
  • those loans could be called in at any time, debtors were highly vulnerable to shifts in lender sentiment and investment preferences. One factor altering these preferences was the exchange rate. Banks and firms borrowed in dollars and repaid in rupiah, a system which worked well unless the rupiah were to devalue, in which case lenders would face an increase in their debt burden. The high levels of external borrowing created great exposure to foreign exchange risk for both private firms and the government.v This risk was underestimated in the 1980s and early 1990s, when investment poured into the emerging economies of Southeast Asia. However, by the mid-1990s, after the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, lenders were wary of developing countries and started to pay more attention to the riskiness of investing in the Asian Tigers. Perhaps the greatest factor leading to the crisis was the devaluation of the rupiah, which exacerbated the issues related to uncertainty in investment. The depreciation was a result of rising U.S. interest rates, and dealt a crushing blow to the economy of Indonesia by decreasing investment in the region, lowering the purchasing power of Indonesia on world markets and driving up debt. One final international factor that may have contributed to the crisis was increasing competition from China in regards to the exporting of goods to the West and the attracting of capital and manufacturing contracts, sectors which were at the heart of the Indonesian economy.vi Response to the crisis As the Thai baht came under attack in the summer of 1997, the Indonesian government took a number of steps to prevent the devaluation of its currency, maintain a relatively stable exchange rate and stop investment from fleeing the country by keeping interest rates high. On July 11, 1997 the monetary authority, the Bank Indonesia (BI), took its first step towards these goals by widened the pegged exchange trading band from 8% to 12%. However, the strategy failed to maintain the value of the money and the rupiah began a steep depreciation ten days later. In response BI raised interest rates from 12% to 13.5% on July 23rd to support the rupiah, but that policy also failed.vii As a last-ditch effort, BI decided on August 14th to float the currency and simultaneously raise short-term rupiah interest rates in order to attract rupiah deposits and stabilize the currency, while the fiscal authority cut non-essential spending. This plan backfired due to the severe tightening of liquidity, which caused interest rates to overshoot their goal and jump to 44.5%, and the value of the rupiah to decline by more than 33%.viii A week later the government adopted a five-point plan to deal with the crisis, a policy that tried to i) stabilize the rupiah at a new equilibrium level, ii) strengthen fiscal policies and fiscal consolidation, iii) reduce the current account deficit, iv) support the banking sector and finally, v) reassure the private sector about the stability of the economy. For a few weeks the program appeared to work, but the currency crisis intensified in November of 1997, when the floating exchange rate dropped an additional 42% to 18000 rupiah/dollar as more investors fled the country after seeing corporate earnings reports, which reflected the devaluations from the summer. At this point the IMF intervened.ix The IMF and the government of Indonesia signed an emergency lending agreement in November of 1997, the goal of which was to “restore investor and creditor confidence in the country’s fiscal solvency by protecting currency values and penalizing insolvent companies.”x The Reform and Stabilization Program, as it was known, was comprised of four prongs: i) a package of loans from the IMF to BI, ii) an agreement to maintain a balanced budget or surplus, maintain high nominal interest rates and restrict domestic credit to keep exchange rates stable, iii) a promise to undertake drastic restructuring of the financial markets and iv) a pledge to adopt “good governance” reforms and improve oversight of corporations.xi Unfortunately, rather than restore confidence, these reforms only created uncertainty about the fate of the banking system, the effectiveness of the government at reforming itself, and the solvency of remaining investments.xii These fears were realized in early 1998, when the Indonesian government presented its budge for the upcoming fiscal year. Not only did it fail to include the 1% surplus requested by the IMF, it proposed an expansion in government spending, drawing the country into deficit instead. 4
  • This plan was publicly denounced by the IMF, which called it a sign that Indonesia was not serious about reforming, a statement which in turn further erode investor confidence.xiii However, due to the currency depreciation, the increase in government expenditure was nominal and in real terms, the proposal was a contraction in fiscal policy, a fact ignored by the IMF. A few months later, in an attempt to appease the IMF, the Suharto government agreed to a plan to reform the banking sector by instating a government guarantee of all debts in domestic banks, creating a regulatory body (the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency) to oversee all banking transactions, and establishing a currency board to help regulate inflation. In exchange, the IMF modified the policies it recommended for Indonesia’s recovery and made them more reasonable. Trying to minimize the budget deficit was the new goal, rather than aiming for a budget surplus. Other changes included international forgiveness on certain debts, a greater focus on long term structural changes in the banking system and a government guarantee on all domestic bank liabilities.xiv When in April 1998 the IMF decided not to provide the second round of assistance it had promised, the banking reform plan was dropped, and the new guidelines ignored.xv By March 1998 the exchange rate had somewhat stabilized at a rate of about 10,000 rupiah/dollar. (Prior to the crisis the rate was closer to 2,000 rupiah/dollar.) Slowly investment began to flow back into the country and firms reopened, but over the first year of the crisis real GDP dropped by 17.4%, inflation rates reached 78%, the value of the stock market dropped by 83% and more than 20 million people lost their jobs, leading to 13.2% unemployment.xvi,xvii Although the other victims of the 1997 crisis suffered major blows to their economies as well, none fared as badly as Indonesia. After using the Mundell-Fleming model to interpret the actions taken in response to the crisis, we will look at the errors in judgment made by both the IMF and Indonesian government, the reasons their policies failed, and what they could have done differently to avoid such dramatic setbacks to the country. Interpreting the Response Through the IS-LM Model Indonesia remained steadfast about maintaining a fixed exchange rate. However, in July 1997, Indonesia had no choice but to float the exchange rate. As a result, they continuously attempted to raise the interest rate in order to restore and establish foreign investor confidence. How does this work economically? According to the Mundell-Fleming model (IS-LM-BP) model we would expect that: As described up above, the speculation of the devaluation of the rupiah would lead to decreased investment. Furthermore, during a time of crisis we would expect consumption to decrease and a reduction in government expenditure. Looking at our open economy IS curve: (1) If Y= C(Y-T)+ I(r)+ G+NX(e) While holding NX(e) constant, a decrease in C, I(r), and G would lead to a inward shift in the IS curve, from IS0 to IS1. Due to the decreased investment, the Indonesian government artificially attempts to keep the interest rates high in order to restore confidence in foreign investment. Moreover, now they are underneath the original balance of payments (BP0) and current in deficit. Thus, in order to increase the interest rates and get out of deficit, we would expect the government to contract the money supply (moving to R1 and BP1) (2) The government succeeds in raising the interest rate. However, two major problems arise: a)The GDP decreases substantially b)While the interest rates increases, foreign investors still are cautious about investing in the country. (3) The crisis worsens, investment deteriorates, consumption and government expenditure would continue to decrease; thus, the IS curve once again shifts inward towards IS2. (4) The Indonesian government continues to artificially increase the interest rates. Thus, 5
  • they contract the money supply once again (moving to R2 and BP2) (5) Investors are still not enticed to invest with the even higher interest rates. Again, GDP falls and this process continues until the government realized that maintaining a fixed exchange rate was not going to work. Interest Rate LM2 *Note: There was free LM1 flow of capital within 5 Indonesia, thus, the LM0 flat BP curves. 2 6 R2 BP2 5 R1 BP1 3 R0 BP0 2 IS0 IS2 IS1 1 4 Y3 Y2 Y0 Y= GDP 6 3 VI. Why the IMF Programs Failed In 1998, less than nine months after the IMF pulled its support out of Indonesia, Jeffrey Sachs and Steven Radelet published a paper arguing that while bureaucratic issues within the country may have contributed to the failure of the IMF programs, the international authority’s policies and attitudes were really to blame for the sluggishness of Indonesia’s recovery. They cited seven reasons for the IMF’s ineffectiveness, which are listed below. • The IMF can not rally market confidence, because its mere presence in a country is a symbol of domestic economic failure and instability. • Instead of reassuring investors that the problems of Indonesia were only temporarily, the IMF announced to the world that there were “deep fundamental weaknesses” in the financial structures of the country, which were unlikely to be reformed quickly. • The IMF believed, incorrectly, that crackdowns on inefficient markets and corrupt banks would reassure creditors of the solvency of remaining markets and banks and encourage them to roll-over short-term loans. • The IMF advocated a contraction in fiscal policy, a plan which runs counter to both the Keynesian theory that a government must expand during crisis, and empirical evidence from the experience of the U.S. during the Great Depression. • The loan packages offered by the IMF were not large enough to ease Indonesia’s considerable debt burden and “provided only a weak shadow of a lender of last resort.” • The agreements signed between the IMF and Indonesia stipulated reforms in a wide range of policies, including demonopolization, trade liberalization and privatization. While some reforms were germane to the crisis, most were not and instead ate up valuable government time, money and resource, which could have been spent solving the problems around the exchange rate, interest rate and inflation. • The initial loan programs and agreements were not made public, as per IMF protocol. This 6
  • secrecy and uncertainty further eroded investor confidence and deterred investment to the countries signing the agreements.xviii Apart from these misjudgments in policy, the IMF also failed to deliver on its promises of financial assistance. By March 1998 only $3 billion of $40 billion promised by the IMF to Indonesia had been disbursed.xix Compounding the problems associated with the IMF were the obstacles to reform and recovery within the country. Wide-spread corruption and cronyism prevented important issues related to banking regulation, trade policy and fiscal policy from being discussed publicly. For example, political pressures prevented BI from carrying out IMF recommendations and closing insolvent banks, many of which were connected to the Suharto family.xx Although Suharto was eventually forced to step down in May 1998 and many of his family members also resigned from government positions, fraud and bribery remain problems in Indonesia and continue to impair economic growth and political progress. IV. What went wrong? Even after floating the exchange rate, Indonesia was still unable to stabilize the exchange rates. Utilizing the of principles of macroeconomics we would expect that: Exchange S – I (r0) S – I (r1) Rate 1 E0 2 E1 Nx (E) Nx0 Nx1 NX 3 (1) As we know, the supply of net capital outflow is: S-I(r). In order to keep this model simple, let us assume that savings remains constant. It was Indonesia intent to raise interest rates (r) to entice investment. (2) As discussed up, skepticism was strong and investment continued to decline. The Indonesian government continues to increase the interest rate even higher. As a result, there is a reduction in the exchange rate. (3) Due to the lower exchange the currency depreciated. On one hand this made Indonesian goods cheap, thus, increasing net exports of goods. However, on the other hand, it did not increase investment, nor government expenditure or consumption. What policies should have Indonesian implemented? Had Indonesia followed the Keynesian Model, they would have likely observed better outcomes. 7
  • Interest Rates LM0 R1 R0 2 IS1 IS0 1 Y0 Y1 Y= Output 3 (1) Looking at the model, if the IS curve is: Y= C(Y-T)+ I(r)+ G+NX(e), had the Indonesia government increased the government expenditure than it would have shifted the IS curve outward. (2) As a result, the interest rate would have increased. (3) Furthermore, this would have also increased GDP, instead of lowering it. Potential Next Steps Although Indonesia has made substantial progress in the past ten years, the country still faces a high level of poverty, precarious inflation levels, and a robust infrastructure needed to support significant development.xxi As a result, several policies Indonesia might consider to help bolster their economy include: 1. Continue to improve the Bank of Indonesia’s transparency, independence, accountability, and credibilityxxii 2. In order to maintain market confidence and attract additional foreign investment, continue to invest in local programs that create a more stable infrastructure and aid in the development of human capital 3. Increase tax revenuexxiii 4. Continue to reduce the debt to GDP ratioxxiv Where is Indonesia Today Almost ten years post-crisis, Indonesia has made two key changes that aid in the country’s economic growth and stability. First, following the resignation of Suharto, Indonesia has developed an effective, democratic government under the rule of current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.xxv This change has reduced the high levels of corruption that were present under Suharto’s regime and have re-focused government priorities to work towards providing basic necessities such as water and education for Indonesian residents.xxvi Second, these changes have fostered a climate that supports sound macroeconomic policies that have helped to create a growing economy. These include reducing the government’s debt ratio, 8
  • creating a more accountable banking system and improved fiscal management, and creating a favorable climate for investors. Currently, the country is enjoying 5-6 percent annual economic growth, an increase in the country’s reserves up to US$30 billion, and a decrease in the public debt to GDP ratio to below 40%.xxvii Overall Indonesia has made a strong recovery since the crisis, especially given the lack of help it received from the IMF in 1997/1998. However vulnerabilities still exist in the government and financial sectors, vulnerabilities which much be monitored by both domestic and international agencies to ensure that the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 remains a solitary incident of the past, and not the first in a series of reoccurring currency emergencies. 9
  • Endnotes 10
  • i Shelandra Sharma, “The Indonesian Financial Crisis: From Banking Crisis to Financial sector Reforms 1997-2000,” April 2001. ii Mari Pangestu and Mangi Habir, “The Boom, Bust, Restructuring of Indonesian Banks,” (2002). iii Nicholas Kristof and David E. Sanger, “How US Wooed Asia to Let the Cash Flow In,” New York Times, 16 February 1999. iv Bank for International Settlements, www.bis.org v “The Asian Crisis: Causes and Cures,” Finance and Development, June 1998, Volume 35, No 2. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/06/imfstaff.htm vi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_East_Asian_financial_crisis vii Shelandra Sharma, “The Indonesian Financial Crisis: From Banking Crisis to Financial sector Reforms 1997-2000,” April 2001. viii International Financial Statistics, http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/ImfBrowser.aspx ix Ibid. x Sharma (April 2001). xi Mohammad Yasin, “Economic Crisis and Financial Reform in Indonesia,” Asia Forum (1999). xii Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects,” Brookings paper on economic activity (1998). xiii Sharma (April 2001). xiv Radelet and Sachs (1998). xv Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, “Pathways through Financial Crisis: Indonesia,” Global Governance 12 (2006). xvi Islamic Development Bank, “1997 Economic Highlights” http://www.idb-uif.org/Economic.htm xvii Zmag.org, “The Latest Bust,” http://www.zmag.org/Instructionals/GlobalEcon/id4_m.htm xviii Radelet and Sachs (1998). xix Radelet and Sachs (1998). xx Martinez-Diaz (2006). xxi ibid. xxii “Indonesia: Monetary Transparency.” Oxford Analytica. November 2006, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip- docs/investments/assets/equities/international/permissible-2007/indonesia-monetary-report-2006.pdf xxiii “Indonesia: Recovery at a Crossroads,” Embassy of the United States: Jakarta, Indonesia. 6 March 2001, http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/econ/crossroad.html#9 xxiv “Progress With a Backdrop of Volcanoes,” The Economist, 25 May 2006. xxv Timothy Harcourt, “Indonesia’s Recovery: From Suharto to SBY,” Austrade.gov, 14 December 2006, http://www.austrade.gov.au/Suharto-to-SBY/default.aspx xxvi “Global Corruption Report 2004,” Transparency International, www.trasparency.org xxvii Timothy Harcourt, “Indonesia’s Recovery: From Suharto to SBY,” Austrade.gov, 14 December 2006, http://www.austrade.gov.au/Suharto-to-SBY/default.aspx
  • Exchange Rate (Rupiah per U.S. Dollar) AppendixB Q 3 0.000 2000.000 4000.000 6000.000 8000.000 10000.000 12000.000 14000.000 16000.000 19 AppendixA 96 Q 4 19 96 Q 1 19 97 Q 2 19 97 Q 3 19 97 Q 4 19 97 Q 1 19 98 Q 2 19 Exchange Rate 98 Q 3 19 98 Fiscal Quarter Q 4 19 98 Q 1 19 99 Q 2 19 99 Q 3 19 99 Q 4 19 99
  • Money Supply (in Millions of Money Supply 140000000.000 120000000.000 100000000.000 Rupiah) 80000000.000 60000000.000 40000000.000 20000000.000 0.000 97 98 98 99 96 96 97 97 97 98 98 99 99 99 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 2 1 4 4 3 4 1 3 4 2 3 1 2 3 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Fiscal Quarter Interest Rates 80.000 70.000 Interest Rate 60.000 DISCOUNT RATE 50.000 MONEY MARKET RATE 40.000 30.000 DEPOSIT RATE 20.000 LENDING RATE 10.000 0.000 96 97 97 98 98 99 96 99 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 3 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Fiscal Quarter Trade Balance Trade Balance in Dollars 7000.000 6000.000 5000.000 4000.000 3000.000 2000.000 1000.000 0.000 96 96 97 97 98 98 99 99 97 98 98 99 99 97 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 3 2 3 4 4 1 2 4 1 1 2 4 3 3 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Fiscal Quarter
  • Financial Account (Foreign Liabilities in Rupiah Value in Millions of US Investment in Domestic Dollars Assests) in Millions of US Dollars Q 0.000 2000.000 4000.000 6000.000 8000.000 10000.000 12000.000 14000.000 16000.000 3 0.000 50000000.000 100000000.000 150000000.000 200000000.000 19 Q 96 Q3 1996 Q 4 3 19 Q4 1996 -10000.000 -8000.000 -6000.000 -4000.000 -2000.000 0.000 2000.000 4000.000 6000.000 19 96 Q 96 Q 4 1 Q1 1997 19 19 97 Q 96 Q Q2 1997 1 2 19 19 97 Q3 1997 Q 97 Q 2 3 19 19 Q4 1997 Q 97 Q 97 3 4 Q1 1998 19 19 Q 97 97 Q2 1998 4 Q 19 1 19 Q3 1998 Fiscal Quarter Q 97 98 1 Q 19 2 Q4 1998 Q 98 19 Exports & Imports Foreign Liabilities 2 Financial Account Q 98 Q1 1999 19 3 Q 98 19 Q2 1999 3 98 Fiscal Quarter 19 Q 4 Q3 1999 Q 98 19 4 Fiscal Quarter 98 19 Q Q4 1999 Q 98 1 1 19 19 99 Q Q 99 2 2 19 19 99 Q 99 Q 3 3 19 19 99 Q 99 Q 4 4 19 19 99 99 IMPORTS,C.I.F. EXPORTS,F.O.B.
  • Deposit Money in Banks IMF Lending Position (in Foreign Reserves (in Millions (U.S. Dollars) Millions of Dollars) of US Dollars) Q 3 0.000 100.000 200.000 300.000 400.000 500.000 19 Q 3 0.000 5000.000 10000.000 15000.000 20000.000 25000.000 30000.000 Q Q 96 19 3 4 0.000 2000.000 4000.000 6000.000 8000.000 10000.000 12000.000 14000.000 16000.000 18000.000 96 19 19 Q 96 4 Q 96 19 4 Q 19 1 Q 96 96 19 1 Q 97 19 1 Q 19 2 Q 97 Q 97 19 2 2 97 19 Q 97 19 3 Q Q 97 19 3 3 97 19 19 Q 97 4 Q Q 97 19 4 4 97 19 19 Q 97 97 1 Q Q 19 1 1 98 19 19 Q 98 98 2 Q Q 19 2 2 19 Deposit Assests 19 98 Q Q 98 Q 98 3 3 3 19 19 Fiscal Quarter 19 98 Q 98 Fiscal Quarter 98 4 Q Foreign Exchange Reserves Q Fiscal Quarter 4 19 4 19 98 19 Q 98 Indonesia Lending Position in the IMF Q 98 1 Q 1 19 1 19 19 99 99 Q 99 Q Q 2 2 2 19 19 19 99 99 Q 99 Q Q 3 3 3 19 19 19 99 99 99 Q Q Q 4 4 4 19 19 19 99 99 99
  • Total Reserves Minus Gold Total Reserves Minus Gold 30000.000 25000.000 20000.000 15000.000 10000.000 5000.000 0.000 96 97 97 97 98 98 98 99 99 96 97 98 99 99 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Fiscal Quarter Capital Accounts 200000000.000 Millions of Rupiah 150000000.000 100000000.000 50000000.000 0.000 96 97 97 98 98 98 99 99 99 96 97 97 98 99 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 1 2 2 1 2 3 4 3 4 1 3 4 3 4 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Fiscal Quarter xxv Timothy Harcourt, “Indonesia’s Recovery: From Suharto to SBY,” Austrade.gov, 14 December 2006, http://www.austrade.gov.au/Suharto-to-SBY/default.aspx xxvi “Global Corruption Report 2004,” Transparency International, www.trasparency.org xxvii Timothy Harcourt, “Indonesia’s Recovery: From Suharto to SBY,” Austrade.gov, 14 December 2006, http://www.austrade.gov.au/Suharto-to-SBY/default.aspx