3. c
UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
Peace-promoting
Education Reform
in Southeast Asia
and the South Pacific
4.
Acknowledgements
Peace-promoting Education Reform in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific was commissioned as
part of UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office’s (EAPRO) contributions towards the 4 year
global ‘Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) Programme’ (2012–2015), funded by the
Government of the Netherlands. The report contributes to the PBEA programme Global Outcome
5: that is, the generation and use of evidence and knowledge in policies and programming related
to education, conflict and peacebuilding.
Our sincere gratitude goes to the principal author of this report, Amanda Seel, and all those
in UNICEF Country Offices for their support during the research phase. Our appreciation goes
particularly to Clifford Meyers, who initiated and guided the process, and also to Teija Vallandingham
for their expert advice and guidance.
We sincerely thank Tani Ruiz for editing this report and Vilasa Phongsathorn for her overall support
and assistance in reviewing and lay-out of this document.
The views expressed in this report represent those of the author and not necessarily those of
UNICEF.
5.
Contents
Acronyms and abbreviations . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. Regional analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1 Introduction . 6
1.2 Peace, conflict and natural disaster in
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Peace and conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Natural disasters . 9
1.3 Dynamics of peace and conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Inter-related processes . 10
1.3.2 Economic growth, poverty and inequality . 10
1.3.3 Social, cultural and demographic change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.4 Environmental degradation and climate change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
1.3.5 Governance and capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.6 The geopolitical and regional contexts . 18
1.4 Conclusion . 20
2. Concepts and themes in the literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1 Introduction . 23
2.2 Statistical relationships between the development of
education systems and levels of conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Three sets of processes that link education to peace,
conflict and natural disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.1 Exclusion ó inclusion . 25
2.3.2 Fragmentation ó cohesion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.3 Vulnerability ó resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 The opportunity of education sector reform . 38
2.5 Summary: Possible roles of education in peace, conflict and
natural disaster in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific . 39
3. Working model and outline methodology for exploring
‘peace-promoting’ education sector reform at the country level . 43
3.1 A working model of a ‘peace-promoting’ education system . 43
3.2 A framework for unpacking education sector reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Outline methodology and stages of research . 45
6.
Annexes
Annex A: Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Annex B: References for chapter 1 – Regional analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Annex C: References for chapter 2 – Concepts and themes in the literature . . . . . 54
List of Figures
Figure 1: Dynamics of peace, conflict and natural disaster in
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific . 10
Figure 2: Potential positive influences of general education
expansion/universalization on processes that link to peace,
conflict and natural disaster . 24
Figure 3. Education’s roles in the dynamics of peace, conflict and natural disaster . 41
Figure 4: A working model of ‘peace-promoting education’ for
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific . 44
Figure 5: Applying the ‘peace-promoting’ model to education sector reform . 45
7. 1
Acronyms and abbreviations
ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AEC ASEAN Economic Community
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
CREATE Consortium for Research on Education Access, Transitions and Equity
CSO Civil Society Organization
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
EAPRO East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
ECD/E Early Childhood Development/Education
EFA Education For All
EiE Education in Emergencies
ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for East Asia and the Pacific
EU European Union
FBO Faith-Based Organization
GCPEA Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack
GMR Global Monitoring Report (on Education For All)
GPE Global Partnership for Education (formerly the Fast Track Initiative on EFA)
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IIEP International Institute for Educational Planning
INEE Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO International Non-governmental Organization
LESC Language, Education and Social Cohesion
LTLT Learning to Live Together
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MoE Ministry of Education
MIC Middle-Income Country
MTB-MLE Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education
NAT National Achievement Test
NFE Non-formal Education
NGO Non-governmental Organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PBEA Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme
PDR People’s Democratic Republic
PNG Papua New Guinea
RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
SEAMEO Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization
SEL Social and Emotional Learning
SWAp Sector-Wide Approach
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGEI United Nations Girls’ Education Initiative
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VAC Violence Against Children
9. Introduction 3
Introduction
This three-part Concept Paper has been written by independent consultant Amanda Seel to
inform the research project ‘Peace-Promoting Education Sector Reform in Southeast Asia and
the South Pacific’, commissioned by UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office (EAPRO).1 The
research project forms part of EAPRO’s participation in UNICEF’s global Peacebuilding, Education
and Advocacy (PBEA) Programme, funded by the Netherlands Government. Under EAPRO, a
range of regional studies will contribute mainly to Objectives Two and Five of the global PBEA
initiative, which are:
• Objective Two: increase institutional capacities to supply conflict sensitive education.
• Objective Five: contribute to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge in policies
and programming related to education, conflict and peacebuilding.
Other regional studies are exploring varying aspects of peace and conflict in relation to early
childhood development, child protection and youth development. This study has particular
synergies with a cross-country study of ‘Language, Education and Social Cohesion’ (LESC).2
This study explores issues, policies and plans in selected countries3 that are undergoing major
education reform, while at the same time facing significant challenges of peace building, reducing
conflict and/or addressing natural hazards and the effects of climate change. It aims to directly
support what countries (primarily governments but also the wider range of education stakeholders
and partners) are already doing in education, while assisting in deeper analysis to make more
explicit the relationship between education and a range of wider processes linked to conflict and
peace. The research is also intended to help inform the work and approaches of UNICEF in the
participating countries, contribute to UNICEF EAPRO’s strategies for country support and regional
engagement and fulfil the objectives of the UNICEF Global Education Strategy, 2010.4 Additionally,
the research supports wider knowledge development in the fields of education in emergencies
(EiE), disaster risk reduction (DRR) in education and the role of education in peacebuilding.
The study focuses on two regions: Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Each of these constitutes
a political and geographic region that is sufficiently well defined to make a degree of regional
analysis and comparison feasible and meaningful. Under UNICEF’s organizational structure,
EAPRO covers the larger – and less coherent – area referred to as East Asia and the Pacific.
The label ‘peace-promoting’ has been adopted as an umbrella term, to allow for a flexible response
to the different expectations and priorities of the participating countries and UNICEF Country
Offices. It covers notions of building peaceful, cohesive and inclusive societies and communities,
maintaining and consolidating peace, reducing risk, responding to conflict or environment-related
crisis and mitigating the impacts of the same. Attention is drawn here to the fact that this study,
unusually, integrates considerations of conflict and natural disaster within a single analysis. This
approach was elected for a number of reasons. Firstly, natural disasters (which always have a
human-made element) are significant and increasing concerns across the two regions. Secondly,
1 Southeast Asia and the South Pacific sit within the larger geographical area covered by UNICEF EAPRO.
2 The LESC study is led by Professor Joseph Lo Bianco of the University of Melbourne.
3 At the time of preparing this background paper, the Philippines and Vanuatu were confirmed case study countries for
the regional study. Myanmar was originally to join the regional study but has now assumed a country-level participation
in the PBEA, under which a similar study might be undertaken. Others might join in the future.
4 UNICEF’s Global Education Strategy objectives are: (1) To help countries achieve the goal of universal primary
education by 2015, making their education systems inclusive and focused on quality; (2) To help countries achieve
the target of eliminating gender disparity at all educational levels, address other disparities in education and promote
gender equality in society through education; and (3) To help countries restore normalcy to children and adolescents
affected by conflict and natural disasters (emergencies) as part of the process of rebuilding communities, institutions
and systems.
10. 4 Introduction
there is often an overlap of conflict with natural disaster, in that each can exacerbate the other and
both impact most strongly upon the poorest and most vulnerable people. Thirdly, while educational
approaches to reducing the risks of conflict and the impacts of natural disasters are quite distinct,
responses to these events have many features in common. It is, however, noted that integrating
the two has presented some conceptual challenges in achieving a coherent analysis.
The term ‘education sector reform’ is used to denote a focus on comprehensive policy reform
and programmes of educational development, which are taking place over a number of years, as
opposed to discrete projects or single policies. Developing countries that have not yet attained
universal completion of quality basic education (on which UNICEF and hence the research is
most focused), are often supported through harmonized development assistance in the form
of ‘sector-wide approaches’ (SWAps).5 These various terms are defined and further explored at
relevant points in this paper and fuller definitions are given in Annex A.
The 2011 Education For All Global Monitoring Report, dedicated to the theme of education and
armed conflict, states that “during the post-conflict period, there is a window of opportunity
to address education sector reform in areas related to the conflict, including root causes, and
post conflict needs.” The report also suggests that “SWAps provide donors and government
with an opportunity to initiate a conflict sensitive planning process to address areas such as
policy reforms, new legislation, information systems to monitor equity, educational budgeting
and financing.”
At the same time, the report identifies a “gap in the literature about education sector reform in
post conflict societies from a peace-building perspective.” This study intends to assist in filling
that gap and supporting countries to recognize their ‘windows of opportunity’. The research might
also deepen understanding of what kind of ‘peace-promoting education’ is relevant to countries
that are currently free of violent conflict, but face significant threats, tensions or insecurities in the
context of rapid socio-cultural, economic, geopolitical, environmental and demographic change.
The initial identification of the topic of this study has rested on a number of assumptions, which
are:
• Countries of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific face particular challenges in relation to
preventing or mitigating conflict or emergencies and/or building and sustaining peace;
• Education processes, institutions and systems are part of the dynamics of peace and conflict
and can also play an important role in promoting peace and preventing, reducing or mitigating
conflict; and
• Better understanding of these challenges, linkages and processes is required to inform
education sector reform and planning, in order to maximize the potential contribution to peace
promotion of ‘education’ in its various meanings (a basic service, a process of development of
various human intelligences and abilities and an asset linked to economic, social and political
opportunity).
5 The term ‘SWAp’ is now generally used in a broad sense to describe an approach based on national leadership of a
comprehensive sector or sub-sector development programme, supported by harmonized – but not necessarily pooled
– development partner assistance.
12. 6 Regional analysis
Regional analysis
1.1 Introduction
This analysis seeks to examine the main dynamics of peace and conflict at play in the
countries of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific regions, looking in particular at what
the key regional and national challenges are in preventing and mitigating conflict and
emergencies and in building and sustaining peace. Because the issues are very complex,
there has been no attempt to give an exhaustive description but rather to highlight the
main trends and issues that seem most salient to the subsequent exploration of the roles
of education. Sources include two books fully dedicated to exploring conflict in the East
Asia, Southeast Asia and Pacific regions;6 a range of academic treatises on the causes
and dynamics of conflict in general; United Nations documents concerned with conflict
resolution and peacebuilding; studies of specific conflicts and natural disasters affecting
countries within the two focus regions; and reports documenting ‘lessons learned’ from
programming in Education in Emergencies and Disaster Risk Reduction in the context of
peacebuilding through education. The full list of references is given in Annex B.
1.2 Peace, conflict and natural disaster in Southeast Asia
and the South Pacific
1.2.1 Peace and conflict
At first glance, neither Southeast Asia nor the South Pacific seems to be an obvious
candidate for a study on conflict mitigation or peacebuilding through education.
For three decades, both regions have had no significant inter-state conflict and,
according to Wainwright (2010), are enjoying their “most peaceful period in modern
history”. This period of relative peace and stability has supported considerable
economic growth and human development, including substantial expansion of
education systems.
Closer examination, however, reveals that a majority of countries in the two regions
are currently experiencing – or are recovering from – some form of intra-state
conflict or serious inter-communal violence. It is not necessary for the purposes
of the study to present a detailed typology of these conflicts; however, it is useful
to make a distinction between three general categories that, although overlapping,
are different in character and hence probably have different linkages with – and
implications for – education.
Insurgencies: These are conflicts in which distinct regions seek to assert, through
violent means, their own identity and greater autonomy within, or independence
from, the nation state. The main conflicts of this type have occurred (or are still
occurring) in:
• Indonesia: A 29-year, religious-based separatist conflict in Aceh came to an end
in 2007 in a settlement that grants the region greater autonomy. Since 1965 a war
of secession has been underway in the ethnic Melanesian region of Papua, with
attacks sometimes launched from militants based within refugee communities
on the border with Papua New Guinea.
6 (1) ‘Heijmans, A., N. Simmonds and H. Van de Veen, Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict
Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2004; and (2) Wainwright, E., Conflict
Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, New York University, April 2010.
1.
13. Regional analysis 7
• Myanmar: The country is slowly emerging from four decades of ethnic
insurgencies that have generated the largest number of international refugees
(within the two regions) in the recent past. Peace agreements – or key
understandings – have recently been achieved with nine insurgency armies.7
The settlements are nevertheless fragile, and violence continues in Kachin State.
The agreement with the Karen National Union marks the end of one of the
world’s longest-running civil conflicts and the start of a process of repatriation of
thousands of refugees from camps in Thailand.
• Papua New Guinea (PNG): A separatist conflict waged for nine years on the
island of Bougainville claimed at least 15,000 lives8 – a significant percentage
of the total population – and displaced many more. The island has had an
autonomous government within the State of PNG since 2005.
• Philippines: Starting in the late 1960s, two complex insurgencies have killed
more than 190,000 people and displaced many thousands more. The first conflict
revolves around the degree of autonomy and self-government for the Muslim
Moro areas of the southern Island of Mindanao. An agreement between the
government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1989 paved the
way for the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). A Peace Framework Agreement (PFA) between the current government
of President Benigno Aquino and the now-dominant Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) was signed in 2012 and will support the development of an expanded
autonomous area, ‘Bangsamoro’, to come into being by 2016. The second,
equally protracted, conflict has been the class-based guerrilla warfare waged by
the communist New People’s Army (NPA). Since a peace agreement in 2011,
ongoing skirmishes are largely confined to a few core strongholds.
• Thailand: A separatist insurgency, begun four decades ago, continues in four
predominantly ethnic Malay Muslim provinces of the ‘Patani’ region in the deep
south. After easing in the 1980s and 1990s, the conflict re-ignited in 2004 and has
since claimed over 5,000 lives. The past year has seen progress in peace talks,
but a lasting solution is yet to be found.
• Timor-Leste: Over 100,000 people died during Indonesia’s 25-year occupation,
mostly during the brutal years preceding independence in 2002.
Inter-communal conflict: There are many examples of conflict and violence that
are more locally focused, which occur either between groups (defined by geography
or one or more identity factors such as religion, ethnicity or social class), or where
one particular group is singled out for persecution and attack. Major examples of
this type of conflict in the two regions are:
• Fiji: Ongoing tensions between indigenous and ethnic Indian Fijians erupted into
violent attacks on the ethnic Indian population during political coups in 1987 and
2000.
• Indonesia: In the early 2000s, inter-communal violence (generally between
Muslim migrants relocated under the transmigration policy of successive
governments and local Christian or indigenous communities) broke out in a range
of locations, including Maluku, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. There have also been
attacks on large Chinese communities in major cities.
• Myanmar: Exacerbating already complex political tensions, Myanmar has
recently experienced an upsurge of violence against Rohinga Muslims in Rakhine
State and other Muslim communities across the country.
7 These are the New Mon State Party, the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Shan State Army-South, Shan State
Army-North, the Karen National Liberation Front, the Chin, the Mongla, the United Wa State Army and the Karen
National Union (KNU).
8 Estimates vary considerably. The Australian DFAT website reports 15,000–20,000 deaths while the Australian Army
website suggests 10,000–15,000.
14. 8 Regional analysis
• South Pacific Island States: Civil conflict erupted in Solomon Islands in 1998,
when the Istabu Freedom Movement sought to drive out Guadalcanal migrants
from the neighbouring island of Malatia, which eventually led to a Malatian-led
military coup. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has
been in place over the past decade and is only now in the process of withdrawal.
Papua New Guinea is affected by frequent inter-community conflicts in multiple
locations. Other Pacific islands, including Vanuatu, have also experienced similar
conflict to a greater or lesser extent.
Other Forms of Political Violence: This can be defined as the “unlawful use, or
threatened use, of force or violence by a person or an organized group against
people or property, with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or
governments, often for ideological or political reasons.”9 This kind of violence is
often closely associated with the other two forms, and includes:
• Radical Islamist terrorist attacks: Bombings and terror attacks have been
perpetrated in Indonesia (Bali, Jakarta and Aceh) by Jemaah Islamia and other
Jihadist groups. In the southern Philippines the continued actions of Abu Sayyaf
and other terrorist groups with links to Al Qaeda have been responsible for
numerous kidnappings and bombings, deliberately targeting foreigners, aid
workers, journalists, teachers and government officials. A number of attacks in
Thailand’s deep south have also been identified as externally agitated (Melvin,
2007).
• Violence associated with political coups, mass demonstrations and
elections: Politically motivated violence has affected Thailand, most recently in
2010 and again in late 2013 and early 2014. Election-related violence has occurred
in Solomon Islands (2006), Indonesia (Aceh and Maluku) and in Timor-Leste.
Hensengerth (2012) notes that in Cambodia “the end of the civil war in 1991 did
not end the political conflict. Instead, the major civil war parties struggled for
predominance in the post-war political system. Assassinations became a routine
means of dealing with political opponents, including opposition parties, trade
unions, journalists, and social activists.”
• Clan feuding for political advantage: In Mindanao, Philippines, entrenched
practices of inter-clan conflicts known locally as ‘Rido’10 often trigger incidents
that are played out as a part of insurgent group confrontations.
• Political repression: Hensengerth (2012) notes that many countries in Southeast
Asia “have been governed by authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes that
applied political violence for the purpose of staying in power.” He identifies
Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Cambodia as all having
aspects of ‘predatory politics’. Other examples concern government repression
of specific population groups, often those with precarious residency status. The
Hmong have faced persecution in Lao PDR since the end of the ‘hidden war’ of
the 1970s and since 2011 have been forcibly repatriated from Thailand, despite
international expressions of concern at the human rights implications.
As these attempts at classification show, different kinds of conflict overlap and
interact. Indeed the nature of inter-state and identity-related conflicts that now
dominate in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, as they do globally, make it harder
than ever to classify a conflict. Each situation is complex and context-specific. It
is often difficult to define where ‘community violence’ ends and ‘conflict’ begins,
or identify clear phases of ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’. Modern conflicts tend to
stop and start and what begins as ‘resolution’ can turn out to be only ‘mitigation’.
Conflicts mutate and change in nature as a result of local factors, a natural disaster
(see below), or changes in the wider national or international context.
9 Farlex Free Legal Dictionary Online.
10 The Asia Foundation (2007) defines Rido as “a state of recurring hostilities between families and kinship groups,
characterised by a series of retaliatory acts of violence, carried out to avenge a perceived affront or injustice.”
16. 10 Regional analysis
1.3 Dynamics of peace and conflict
1.3.1 Inter-related processes
The conflicts and natural disasters explored above do not, of course, take place in
a vacuum. Rather, they need to be seen as a part of a complex and dynamic inter-relationship
of processes, which have come together to create the conditions in which
conflict becomes more likely, or natural hazards less easy to manage. These processes
are summarized diagrammatically (see Figure 1 below). In the following sections, each
of these processes is unpacked further.
Figure 1: Dynamics of peace, conflict and natural disaster in Southeast Asia and the
South Pacific11
1.3.2 Economic growth, poverty and inequality
As noted above, the two regions, and in particular Southeast Asia, are generally
associated with economic success. Many countries are endowed with rich and
diverse natural and human resources, which have been effectively tapped to support
economic development. Globalization has benefited many and supported the
rapid spread of ideas and technology (Wainwright, 2010). The UNDP 2013 Human
Development Report states that East Asia and the Pacific now account for over half
of the world’s middle-class population.
While not equalling the pace of growth of the Asian Tigers12 in the preceding decades,
many Southeast Asian countries have seen considerable economic development,
with some graduating from low to middle-income status. The ASEAN13 Southeast
Asian Economic Outlook 2012 notes that while not immune from global economic
uncertainty, in contrast to most OECD14 economies the region will enjoy solid growth
11 The classification developed for the purposes of this study shares similarities both with the model employed in the
INEE ‘Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education’ (2012), which identifies the five contextual domains in which
education takes place as ‘Governance’, ‘Social’, ‘Security’, ‘Economic’ and ‘Environmental’; and with the framework
used in the IIEP ‘Guidance Notes for Integrating Conflict and Disaster Risk Reduction into Education Sector Planning’,
which explores the ‘environmental, economic, social and political vulnerabilities’ that impact upon and interact with
education.
12 Hong Kong (SAR, China), Singapore, Taiwan and Republic of Korea.
13 Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
14 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Governance
and Economic growth,
poverty and inequality
Environmental
degradation and
climate change
Social, cultural and
demographic change
Governance
and capacity
$
PEACE, STABILITY,
MANAGEMENT OF
NATURAL HAZARD
CONFLICT,
FRAGILITY AND
“NATURAL DISASTER”
Geopolitical and
regional influences
17. Regional analysis 11
until 2016. The UN ESCAP15 Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific
2012 cites examples of growth in many (although not all) South Pacific countries
and identifies East Asia and the Pacific as a “bedrock of global economic stability”.
Human development has accompanied economic growth. The UNDP Human
Development Report 2013 lists Thailand, Indonesia, Lao PDR16 and Viet Nam as
countries that have experienced significantly greater human development gains
since 1990 than might have been predicted on the basis of previous performance.
Many (though not all) countries have invested heavily in their educational systems
as a foundation for national socio-economic development. Almost all of the low
and middle-income countries of the two regions have committed themselves to
reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as the broader set
of the Education For All (EFA) goals. To achieve these, many governments have
embarked on ambitious reform programmes, often supported with substantial
international assistance programmes.
Despite notable progress and great benefits for many, it is well documented that
the impacts of economic development – in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific as
elsewhere – have been uneven both across and within countries (Wainwright, 2010).
With the number of rural-to-urban migrants far exceeding the growth of sustainable
employment and livelihood opportunities, peri-urban areas have joined stagnating
rural communities as major loci of poverty and exclusion. In some cases, disparities
have grown not only because of the rapid rise in prosperity for some, but in actual
reversals in progress for others, as livelihood insecurity has increased. Wainwright
(2010) cites evidence of increased poverty in Lao PDR, Cambodia, Thailand, Timor-
Leste and Malaysia.
Very often, poverty impacts differently on women and men, and on different social
or geographically located groups. Poverty in terms of income and assets is closely
related to indicators of human development, including health and education. A
number of recent studies suggest that poverty remains the most important variable
determining educational participation.17 This is the case even where it is free of
direct fees because of poverty-associated factors including lack of cash for indirect
costs (e.g. transport, stationery), demands for youth labour contributions to the
household economy, health challenges and the inter-generational effects of illiteracy.
In Cambodia, for example, 28 per cent of 23–27 year olds from the wealthiest 20
per cent of households have completed secondary school. Whereas among the
poorest households only 0.2 per cent have (Chronic Poverty Report 2010).
Poverty itself has a link with fragility and conflict. The World Bank (2011) explores the
ways in which poverty both creates fragility and is a result of it, noting that almost
40 per cent of the world’s poorest live in fragile states. Duffield (2001, quoted in
Smith and Vaux, 2003) is one of many who argue that the prevalence of conflict
today is related more to the rate of change than to the persistence of poverty. The
juxtaposition of wealth and poverty, especially stark in the urban areas of countries
with rapid but uneven growth, not only heightens the sense of grievance and
exclusion on the part of the poor, but also the adoption of exclusionary and self-protective
measures on the part of the newly monied, for whom former poverty
remains vivid in the collective memory. Kanbur and Sumners (2010) shed light
on a “new geography of global poverty”, pointing out that because of the rapid
but very uneven growth of a number of large-population countries (including the
15 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for East Asia and the Pacific.
16 While growth and human development in Lao PDR have exceeded expectations, the country remains poor and donor-dependent.
17 Socio-economic status appears to remain the most important variable in access to basic education in many developing
countries, even when it is free of direct fees (Lewin et al.). However, that is not to say that how education is delivered
has no effect, as is discussed further in section 1.3.5.
18. 12 Regional analysis
Philippines and Indonesia),18 72 per cent of the world’s poor now live in middle-income
countries, a reality which is not yet reflected in aid allocation mechanisms
and assistance modalities. If theories about the risks of sharp inequality being a
driver of conflict are correct, then the risks of grievance-related conflicts in these
countries would seem to be high.
The economically excluded, residing in areas where grievances tend to ferment, are
most likely to live in sub-standard housing, depend on precarious livelihoods and
lack skills and resources for self-protection and adaptation. They are also often the
most vulnerable to the impacts of both conflict and natural disaster. When these
occur, exclusion and vulnerability are often further intensified.
1.3.3 Social, cultural and demographic change
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific are regions of extraordinary human diversity:
ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious, reflecting long and complex histories of
migration, settlement and inter-group cooperation and conflict. Ethnic and linguistic
diversity is particularly rich in the ‘indigenous belt’19 of the Mekong Basin area,
spanning northern and eastern Myanmar, northern Thailand, most of Lao PDR,
northern and western Viet Nam and northeast Cambodia; as well as across the
Philippines, Indonesia, insular Malaysia and Melanesia.20 Southeast Asia was home
to a number of ancient civilizations: the Khmer, Vietnamese, Thai and Burmese, the
achievements (both cultural and on the battle fields) of which continue to inspire
patriotic nationalism and territorial claims to this day. Within these civilizations, and
more recently in the South Pacific, various forms of the world’s major religions
of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Islam have displaced, overlaid or merged
with traditional cultures in complex ways. Many societies have also developed
complicated and intricate social hierarchies and structures, for example Cambodia
(see Ngarm, 2004), and Java and Bali in Indonesia. From historic times, therefore,
relationships within and across ethnic, linguistic, social and religious groupings and
communities have been complex and in flux, including elements of reciprocity and
cooperation as well as of prejudice, discrimination and conflict.
Colonialism brought further – and more rapid – social and cultural change. ‘Eastern’,
‘Western’, ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ cultures came into closer contact, but often
on a far from equal footing. In many instances, colonial ‘divide and rule’ policies
exploited existing tensions between groups. In colonial Burma, for example, military
personnel from the peripheral ethnic regions were used to control the predominantly
Burman heartlands. Practices of indentured labour in the Pacific resulted in large-scale
migrations of Melanesians to Queensland, eventually returning with new
languages and adapted cultures. Similar imperial production policies resulted in the
migration of large numbers of Indian workers to Malaysia and Fiji. In Indonesia, the
Dutch colonists introduced a system of ‘transmigrasi’, the movement of Muslim
residents of densely populated islands (mainly Java) to the indigenous outer islands,
a policy that was continued long into the post-colonial period. While such processes
facilitated some beneficial cultural exchange and transfer, they undoubtedly also
brought profound disruption and fermented resentments to which many present-day
conflicts can be traced.
18 Indonesia is identified as one of five ‘PICNIC’ middle-income countries (the others are Pakistan, India, Nigeria and
China), which together are home to 854 million poor people.
19 See Nettle, D. and S. Romaine, Vanishing Voices: the Extinction of the World’s Languages, Oxford University Press,
2000.
20 To give some examples, Myanmar has around 135 officially recognized groups speaking approximately 111 languages.
Viet Nam has 106 languages and Lao PDR (at a fraction of the population) at least 84. Indonesia is thought to have as
many as 711 languages, while Papua New Guinea has 830 (Muturzikin.com). Tiny Vanuatu has around the same number
of languages as Myanmar amongst a population of 250,000, making it the most language-dense nation on earth.
19. Regional analysis 13
Wars of independence and post-independence conflicts resulted in delineation
of nation states that did not necessarily reflect culturally homogenous –
or even
cohesive – units. Reilly and Graham in Heijmans et al. (2004) emphasize the historic
evolution of conflicts in East Asia and the Pacific, suggesting that “the bloodiest and
most persistent conflicts in the region over the past decade have all been internal,
intrastate wars that stem, in many cases, from the heterogeneous nature of the
post colonial state.”
More recent globalization, economic migration, the expansion of education and the
creation of the ‘middle class’ and the spread of ideas through modern communications
technology has continued the process of change. While bringing benefits to many,
these changes have also sparked further tensions and contradictions around issues
of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ culture and identity. ‘Becoming more alike’ has in many
ways catalyzed the reassertion of difference. As Hesengerth (2012) points out, such
assertion might not only centre on real differences of belief, or even resentments
around economic disparities between groups, but also more symbolic associations,
for example the myth of ‘the Angkor period’ for the modern Cambodian.
Changes in gender constructions and relations have often been a particularly
difficult part of the processes of socio-cultural change. On the one hand, these
have brought greater freedoms and rights for women. On the other, paradoxically,
there is a reassertion of traditional restrictions and even an escalation of gender-based
violence in many countries as traditional male ‘breadwinner’ roles become
increasingly obsolete. Young people often face a particularly difficult challenge of
reconciling a traditional and modern identity, especially where there has been an
erosion of supportive family and community structures.
Most analyses of conflict agree that – rather than diversity itself – it is the factors
described above (memory of historic discrimination, population and boundary
movements, rapid social change and insecurity around established beliefs and
traditional identities), which underpin the conflicts in the two regions that manifest
as ‘inter-ethnic’ or ‘inter-religious’. As Lake and Rothchild (1999) summarize: “Where
ethnicity is linked to acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict and fear of what
the future might bring, it emerges as one of the major fault lines along which
societies fracture.”
1.3.4 Environmental degradation and climate change
Human-influenced environmental change in Southeast Asia has taken place over
millennia, with the development of wet rice agriculture supporting large and settled
populations – including towns of significant size and sophistication – from early
times. As an inevitable accompaniment to economic development and population
growth, however, the past 50 years have seen much intensified use of land, water,
forests and other natural resources. In the islands of the South Pacific, smaller and
sparser populations have for centuries lived in harmony with the natural environment
and significant changes wrought by human activity have occurred only relatively
recently. These countries too, however, have experienced very rapid population
growth, urbanization and exploitation, threatening their fragile ecosystems,
biodiversity and habitats; as well as traditional practices of land and natural resource
stewardship. UNICEF (2011) identified for both regions serious problems resulting
from the decreased availability of fresh water and the reduction of crop yields,
with evidence of associated increases in diarrhoeal and nutrition-related illnesses
in children.
Added to these pressing problems, human-induced climate change has now taken
centre stage on the global environmental agenda. The ‘Germanwatch’ Climate Risk
Index (2012) identifies Myanmar, Viet Nam and Thailand as being amongst the top
10 countries globally to be affected by climate change between 1992 and 2011.
21. Regional analysis 15
1.3.5 Governance and capacity
While all countries within the two regions are affected by the transnational and
global trends described above, the extent to which they are impacted is determined
by their natural endowment, level of development and history (indigenous, colonial
and more recent). It nevertheless seems clear that political and governance factors
have also been key determinants of the degree to which negative processes of
social exclusion, fragmentation, conflict and natural disaster have been able to
take hold. There are differences in the ability and willingness of states to perform
a number of functions that are critical to the maintenance of stability, security and
prosperity. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Transparency, participation, accountability and the rule of law: States that are
perceived as broadly even-handed, accountable, responsive to citizens’ concerns
and able to protect them through effective maintenance of law and order are in a
stronger position to maintain peace and cohesion than those where these factors
are absent. As Lukham et al. (2004) observe: “Violent conflict arises when its costs
are reduced and benefits are increased in relation to other forms of collective action,
especially where there are no legitimate channels for peaceful mobilisation or
redress.” Lake and Rothchild (1999) similarly note that “the context for conflict is set
when the state has been unable to maintain the trust and confidence of all of the
major groups of the society” and/or “lost control of significant parts of its territory”.
Some countries have made progress in throwing off extreme forms of oppressive and
authoritarian rule and embracing various forms of democracy and decentralization,
supported by increased media and press freedoms and the development of civic
institutions. Indonesia, whose former practices of central control, neglect of the
periphery and forced transmigration were key triggers of ethnic conflict, has
undergone dramatic changes in governance, with a rapid decentralization process
aiming to bring decision-making closer to the people. This has been accompanied
by a significant decrease in inter-community conflicts. The Philippines, under the
current administration of President Benigno Aquino, has also made progress in
transparency and devolution of powers. Myanmar, up until the present probably the
most oppressive regime of the two regions, is in the early stages of reforms that
have the potential to bring transformative changes.
Nevertheless, there continue to be significant challenges in promoting participation
and transparency and tackling the corruption and crime that encourage violent
conflict. The 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Papua New Guinea,
Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar 150 or higher in a lowest-to-highest ranking
of 176 countries based on citizens’ perceptions of the level of common forms of
corruption. Corruption, nepotism and non-transparency in government are directly
related to the recent political violence in Thailand. Clan violence known as ‘Rido’
in Mindanao, Philippines, significantly exacerbates conflict and complicates the
current peace process. Cambodia’s protracted decentralization process has to
date achieved neither a notable shift in its rigid, hierarchical and corrupt power
dynamics, nor genuine grassroots participation, as has recently been underscored
by the shooting and violent dispersal of demonstrators in Phnom Penh. Myanmar’s
nebulous and precarious reform process has been considerably challenged by new
outbreaks of criminal violence against Muslim communities, which has its roots in
years of neglect and repression of all communities.
Le Billon (2003) notes that in Southeast Asia a prolific small arms trade has opened
the way for large-scale criminality in which “the rewards of immediate corrupt
gains become more certain than long term benefits of rule of law.” As discussed
by Wainwright (2010), Myanmar, Lao PDR and Cambodia all face challenges in
controlling their border areas, which have become major locations of trafficking,
22. 16 Regional analysis
including human trafficking.21 The South Pacific countries have traditionally been
relatively free of organized and transnational crime. However, the region’s traditional
systems of patronage and client relations have proved difficult to replace with more
open, democratic ones and continue to heavily influence political decision-making,
while at the same time greater exposure to the political systems of other countries
has tended to increase corruption (Heijmans et al., 2004). Vanuatu has had recent
warnings from the OECD regarding the criminal exploitation of its lax taxation
regimes for money laundering purposes.
State responses to diversity and indigenous rights: Fearful of social fragmentation
and the emergence of groups that might be hostile to the state, many Southeast
Asian governments, including those of Thailand, Myanmar, Lao PDR and the
Philippines, have over a long time period taken the view that national unity requires
homogeneity. All aspects of national life, including education, have promoted a
single ideal of what it means to be a good and loyal citizen; an ideal that links very
closely to the culture, language and religion of the dominant population group. This
focus on repression of differences and forced assimilation has proved both risky
and costly, directly contributing to insurgencies around the region. Recognizing this
problem, some countries (e.g. the Philippines) are now reassessing their approach,
responding better to diversity and supporting local divergence from national norms.
This is not without its challenges, however, particularly where cultural practices
within a particular community clash with human rights, for example the increased
restrictions placed on Muslim women as a result of the extension of Sharia law in
Aceh (Hensengerth, 2011).
It has been discussed that many countries across Southeast Asia are home to
large numbers of indigenous and tribal groups. UNDP (2012) identifies factors that
often exclude indigenous and tribal groups as: discriminatory legislation, lack of
participation in decision-making, the weakening of traditional forms of dispute
resolution, violations of indigenous rights (especially in extractive industries), denial
of self-determination and the inferior status of minority languages. In Myanmar,
Viet Nam, Cambodia, Lao PDR,22 Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia,
there are large populations of tribal and indigenous groups that are not only distinct
from each other, but are also collectively marginalized in relation to the majority
group or groups in many of the ways identified by UNDP. In the South Pacific
countries, by contrast, the majority of the population consists of numerous distinct
tribal and indigenous groups that have tended both to alternatively compete and
cooperate with each other on more equal terms. The challenge that this creates for
governments in developing a sense of national citizenship is somewhat facilitated
by the existence of considerable commonalities across cultures and, in some cases,
the existence of a lingua franca.
Just and sustainable management of the economy, urbanization and the
environment: Countries differ not only in their natural resource endowment but
also in their success in just and sustainable management of, access to, use of,
and benefit from those resources. Ensuring that there is at least reasonable parity
across population groups and that the natural resource base is sustained, often
implies a complex range of measures, including taxation control, land reform,
assiduous environmental management, infrastructure investment and housing and
facilities to respond to urban influx. Some countries, perhaps most notably Viet
Nam, have implemented policies and actions to lift people out of extreme poverty
21 Wainwright (2010) further observes that the Wa-controlled areas of Shan and Kachin States in Myanmar are major world
centres of heroin production. Piracy in the Straits of Malacca and South China and Sulu Seas has been successfully
reduced over the past decade, but remains a threat. Cyber crime and the illegal production and trafficking of counterfeit
synthetic drugs are emerging as major problems across Southeast Asia.
22 In Lao PDR, it is not strictly accurate to refer to all non-Lao (Tai Kadai) groups as ‘minorities’ as these in fact
collectively constitute more than half the total population.
24. 18 Regional analysis
Management of conflict and hazard risk: Countries differ in their capacity
(military, logistical and managerial) to prepare for, mitigate and respond effectively
to outbreaks of conflict or natural disaster. Indonesia provides an example of a
country that has made considerable progress in putting response systems in place.
The World Risk Index ranks eight Southeast Asian and Pacific countries (Vanuatu,
Tonga, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea and Brunei
Darussalam) in its top 15 countries for ‘risk of natural disaster’. These are ranked
not solely on the basis of the absolute numbers, intensity or frequency of natural
hazards but also by the gap between these risks and the level of capacity to deal with
them. Political will is also a factor; Myanmar’s response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008
is a stark example of an unnecessarily high loss of life and level of destruction given
the military regime’s fair level of logistical capacity. The seemingly slow response to
Typhoon Haiyan has raised questions regarding whether political factors, not only
questions of gaps in systems and capacity, might have played a role.
Prohibition and containment of violence: Domestic violence (including gender-based
violence23 and violence against children) is common in the countries of
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, However, the nature and frequency of such
violence varies across and within countries and changes over time. The reasons for
these variations are many and include, for example, traditional cultural and religious
attitudes towards women and perspectives on child rearing and the status of
youth and adolescents. However, there are also governance-related influences on
whether violence is ignored, condoned, or actively disapproved of and discouraged.
These include, for example, the adoption and use of rights frameworks, public
awareness raising and debate around violence issues, systems of identification and
punishment of perpetrators and protection of the vulnerable.
While the promotion of non-violent behaviours in domestic life might not, of itself,
prevent conflicts from arising (when there are other provocative factors), there does
appear to be evidence that it can reduce the propensity of tensions or protests to
spill over into violence. Even more importantly, the acceptability of violence during
peacetime is an important determinant of the degree of violence that is meted
out to vulnerable people (women, children, persons with disabilities) in the event
of a breakdown in the rule of law. The Human Security Report (Vancouver, 2012)
presents evidence to suggest that high levels of abuse by the military in times of
conflict almost always reflects existing high levels of domestic violence, tolerance
of which has created an enabling environment for both combatants and civilians
to take advantage of chaotic situations to act with impunity. Luckham et al. (2006)
explore how masculine identities are often framed in terms that “facilitate the use
of violence in spaces of power”, thus creating highly dangerous situations when
large numbers of teenage and young adult urban males lack education, employment
or opportunity and become alienated from the wider society.
1.3.6 The geopolitical and regional contexts
Finally, there are a number of dynamics in the global and regional contexts that either
support or frustrate countries in the exercise of good governance and maintenance
of security.
New and old powers: Growing wealth and state power in the larger countries of
East Asia have in recent years seen a parallel growth in their ability to project force
and influence further afield. As these new powers (most significantly China but
23 A recent United Nations study on the prevalence of non-partner rape in East Asia and the Pacific, which included
case studies in Cambodia, Indonesia and Bougainville (PNG), found a high incidence of three forms of rape in all
countries, in particular in Bougainville, with associated factors including poverty, personal history of victimization
(especially in childhood), low empathy, alcohol misuse, masculinity emphasizing dominance over women, and
participation in gangs and related activities.
25. Regional analysis 19
also India) emerge, the former ‘great power’ influences in the region have been in
decline. As Jones (2013) states:
“In August 2013 India launched her first home-built aircraft carrier, China flew
aircraft off the carrier she had fitted-out in 2012 and other countries in the
region began to feel the absence of the former European colonial powers, as
they send fewer military missions to the region and reduce their assistance
budgets. Even the United States, about to base troops in Australia for the first
time, is no longer seen as able or willing to act alone, causing every state in the
region to think of partnerships and alliances in more complex forms. The old
truism that ‘wealth brings warships’ has been underlined by tension between
China, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and many other countries in the region
over small island groups claimed by several parties. While not affecting the
daily lives of many, the sparring raises expectations that inter-state violence
might again occur and normalises the idea of conflict by its constant repetition
in patriotic news media, sometimes reiterated in classrooms even where not
in the official curriculum. In many Southeast Asian countries from Thailand to
the Philippines, defence budgets are on the rise and the complexity of the
defence equipment they acquire increases even more. In front of everyone
is the example of North Korea, a paranoid dictatorship convinced of the
imminence of attack, both heavily-armed and politically unstable.”
Further developments at the time of finalizing this report (late 2013) include the
United States of America’s ‘pivot to Asia’ entailing a shift towards India in a counter-balancing
of China, and an acceleration to potentially dangerous levels of Chinese
rhetoric against Japan.
Radical Islamism: More insidiously, extremist versions of radical Islamism
encouraging violence and ‘martyrdom’ have spread through Southeast Asia
(including Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines). As well as bringing murder and
bombings in their wake, these have considerably exacerbated and complicated
existing insurgencies. Modern communications and social media have been
revealed as quite neutral in their political effect, just as able to amplify such extremist
propaganda as to promote progressive and peaceful ideas. States have been slow
to encourage traditional, non-radicalized Muslim clergy and institutions to counter
this new and growing influence through encouragement of debate, discussion and
toleration. At the same time, some analysts have criticized authoritarian governments
of the region for using the United States-led ‘War on Terror’ as a justification to
delay progress on democratic reform and clamp down on legitimate activities and
peaceful protest in ways that can increase the grievances felt by minority Muslim
populations (Wright-Neville, 2004).
Frameworks for transnational and regional cooperation: To some extent
countering trends towards instability and conflict, frameworks for cross-country
cooperation and elements of regional governance have emerged in recent years.
For the South Pacific Island States, the Pacific Islands Forum has long supported
inter-state dialogue and cooperation and some have predicted that communications
technologies will support greater economic integration. Putzel and Di John (2012)
suggest that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is important
as a “significant expression of the collective desire for the stability required for
economic growth.” Lo Bianco (2013)24 postulates that the interdependence of
ASEAN Member States will increase with the formation of the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) from 2015, through the setting of shared benchmarks and
standards of performance in education, economic affairs and human rights. Lo
Bianco also identifies the ‘Statement of Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities
24 Lo Bianco, J., ‘Language, Education and Social Cohesion: Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand’, Final Desk Review,
Conceptual Framework and Workplan, January 2013.
26. 20 Regional analysis
of ASEAN’ as a hopeful indication that the risk of increased homogenization (as a
result of greater integration) can be countered by the opening-up of democratic
spaces for bottom-up and transnational participation.
Transnational initiatives also take the form of diplomacy and development assistance.
Competing for votes at the United Nations, and an improvement in their image
regionally, many powerful states within Asia and the Pacific (especially China and
India) and beyond (including the United States and Australia) have increased their
engagement in both in recent years. This brings the potential for additional resources
and capacity development that can support development and stabilization. However,
international assistance can also be a factor in instability. Jones (2013) suggests
that, when conceived of as ‘charm offensives’, “the competitive nature of these
activities may increase rather than decrease unease for the national governments
that are at the centre of these attentions.”
Cooperation over conflict and national hazard management: Early warning
systems in the Pacific for tsunamis and cyclones have been in existence for some
time. However, inaccurate forecasts over Typhoon Haiyan’s timing have served as
a reminder that there can be no complacency on seeking to further improve these
systems, while avoiding over-reliance on them as a substitute for local responsibility.
For the Indian Ocean, early warning alerts have been much improved since the
devastating December 2004 tsunami, but the same caution applies. Meanwhile,
Wainwright (2010) notes that mechanisms for conflict management in East Asia and
the Pacific are less well developed than in other regions, opining that this is due in
part to the fragmented and localized nature of many of the conflicts, to which the
existing international architecture is not well suited. Wainwright also suggests that
ASEAN’s limited regional coherence and default position of ‘non-interference’ have
also thus far limited its role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Southeast Asia.
1.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific face a range of critical challenges that
justify their inclusion in a study of ‘peace-promoting’ education reform. Many countries are
currently (or recently) affected by significant intra-state violent conflict, inter-community
violence or environment-related disasters. These not only seriously impact on the lives
and livelihoods of those directly affected and have grave implications for children, they
also create considerable challenges in sustaining and consolidating development gains,
including making further progress in education.
These conflicts and natural disasters have been shown to have complex causes and
dynamics, being influenced by historical factors, natural resource endowment and the
current interplay of geopolitical, economic, environmental, cultural and social change that
will also bring new threats and challenges in the future. It can be postulated that ‘education’
(as both a human right, a service and a scarce and rationed resource at higher levels) is
very likely to be integral to at least some of these dynamics. At the same time, examples
from across both regions of success in managing and responding to these changes while
continuing to make human development gains, suggests that states and citizens are in the
position to make a positive contribution to the promotion of peace and the reduction and
mitigation of conflict. Again, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that both the institutions
and the process of education might have a positive role to play in these peace-promoting
processes. This leads to the topic of the next chapter, which presents, discusses and
critiques the findings of the growing body of literature that sheds more light on the ways in
which education can be integral to the dynamics of conflict and what its potential roles in
peace promotion might be.
29. Concepts and themes in the literature 23
Concepts and themes in the literature
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified a range of complex and inter-related social, political,
environmental and economic dynamics at work in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific
that seem to be drivers of violence and conflict. It has been observed that education would
seem to be integral to a number of these processes and over the past decade, there has
been increasing interest in this relationship. The founding of the Inter-Agency Network for
Education in Emergencies (INEE) and the subsequent dedication of the 2011 Education For
All Global Monitoring Report to issues of education and armed conflict25 have sharpened
international attention, in particular, to the provision of education in emergencies and conflict-affected
contexts. More recently, there have also been mounting calls from the INEE,
NGOs and United Nations agencies for stronger inclusion of education in the architecture
of peacebuilding, conflict sensitive approaches to programming, and the mainstreaming of
DRR and climate change adaptation into education sector planning.
As a part of this trend, a body of literature has developed – and continues to expand – that
explores the ways in which education might mediate the relationship between peace and
conflict. This literature includes a few attempts at identifying quantitative relationships or
correlations between education indicators and measures of conflict or fragility, treatises
exploring the process linkages of education to peace and conflict, documentation of ‘lessons
learned’ from programmes on the ground and, increasingly, a range of advocacy or practical
‘guidance’ documents containing more generalized exhortations of what ‘needs to be done’.
This chapter seeks to review, summarize and critique the findings and perspectives from
these various writings. The literature review is undertaken both as a useful exercise in its
own right (few critical reviews of this body of literature have been undertaken to date) and
in order to inform a research methodology for unpacking ‘peace-promoting sector reform’
at the country level. The full list of references is given in Annex C.
2.2 Statistical relationships between the development of
education systems and levels of conflict
In the previous chapter it was noted that many countries in Southeast Asia and the South
Pacific are making strong headway to achieve universal primary or basic education, but that
these goals are not yet fully attained. Some studies have sought to identify correlations and
relationships between macro education indicators and quantitative measures of conflict
or fragility. The most comprehensive was probably that of Thyne (2006), who undertook
a statistical regression analysis of 160 countries from 1980 to 1999. He found significant
negative correlation between the incidence of civil war and high levels of intra-state and
anti-government violence and the four factors of investment in education, secondary
enrolment rates, male secondary enrolment rates, and adult literacy rates. Thyne takes
care, however, not to claim any direct causal effect of education upon the levels of conflict
in a society.26 He hypothesizes that the correlations might imply that the educational
process directly reduces motivations for conflict (through a range of mechanisms that are
discussed further in the subsequent sections of this report). However, the correlations
probably reflect the important, but indirect role of education in a complex dynamic of
25 The Education For All Global Monitoring Report 2011: The Hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education, UNESCO, 2011.
26 Thyne’s findings are quoted in some advocacy documents in a way that suggests a clear preventative effect of
education has been established.
2.
30. 24 Concepts and themes in the literature
socio-economic development processes27 (i.e. successfully developing countries can
invest more in education, which in turn promotes further – and more equitable – growth,
which supports further educational expansion in a ‘virtuous cycle’ which reduces the risks
of conflict and fragility). Both of these mechanisms assume that ‘education’ implies more
than just enrolment; that, for example, skills and a certain knowledge are acquired and that
education is of a minimum quality.
Alternatively, the correlations might indicate that conflict negatively impacts on national
educational development rather than the reverse. However, the Human Security Report
Project (Vancouver, 2012) presents evidence to dispute this second assumption, while
somewhat reinforcing the first. Although not denying the devastating impacts of violent
conflict on the regions, the communities and individuals directly affected,28 the Human
Security Report questions the assumption that modern types of conflict have generally
reversed national trends in education indicators. It presents data illustrating that over the
past decade most conflict-affected countries have continued to experience an increase in
their national education indicators, albeit at a somewhat slowed rate of progress. In just
a few of the countries with very severe and widespread conflict did national education
indicators further decline during the conflict period. However, in these cases the indicators
were already low or declining before the conflict occurred. The report therefore cautions
against necessarily viewing conflict as ‘development in reverse’.
Figure 2 (below) summarizes what might be the positive influences of expanding education
systems (that at least deliver basic literacy, numeracy and thinking skills) on processes that
were identified in chapter one as mediators of the relationship between peace and stability,
and conflict, fragility and natural disaster in the Southeast Asia and Pacific regions.
Figure 2: Potential positive influences of general education expansion/universalization on
processes that link to peace, conflict and natural disaster
Processes Possible long-term effects of development of national education systems
Environmental
degradation and
climate change
Economic growth,
poverty and inequality
Governance, capacity
and geopolitical
influences
Social, cultural and
demographic change
• Education and literacy support empowerment, political participation and
development of ‘civil society’, increasing confidence in the state and reducing
motivations for conflict.
• Basic education might make young people less vulnerable to the influence of
violent and irrational ideologies.
• Expansion of education increases, at least in theory, the available pool of talent
for effective national leadership.
• Achieving universal basic education tends to support social capital and social
mobility, thus reducing social exclusion that can create conflict.
• Attainment of basic skills through formal education might increase capacities to
mitigate or respond to environmental change, protect assets and reduce risk.
• The education of girls through to at least lower secondary education is shown to
have an impact on family size and thus population growth, potentially reducing
conflicts related to local pressures on natural habitats and resources.
• Early childhood development, primary education, lower secondary education and
girls’ education are widely demonstrated to support socio-economic development
and poverty reduction, which in turn might reduce motivations for conflict.
Poor education
governance
Effective education
governance
Education services
delivered efficiently and
Governance
processes
Significant
weaknesses in
Governance processes
Governance to maintain
rule of law, protect
vulnerable citizens,
Fragility, Conflict and Natural Disaster Peace, Security and Hazard Management
Society Education Education Society
27 These are well documented (e.g. see The World Bank website) and include impacts on economic growth, health,
family size, the status of women, democratic participation and social capital.
28 These local impacts of conflict are discussed in more detail in 2.3.3.
31. Concepts and themes in the literature 25
It can be seen that there are many ways in which the provision of education in itself
(irrespective of any attempts to be ‘conflict sensitive’) might have important effects on
reducing the level of conflict in a society. It should be noted, however, that many of
these impacts of improving and expanding education on national indicators of peace
and security are likely to be realized only over the long term and are part of a network
of complex, interacting processes. No direct, linear causation can be claimed. As Davies
(2013) expressed it: “input-output models do not work in social terms, as too many messy
contextual factors and power interests intervene. The attribution gap is too huge. Even
if conflict were to decrease, it is almost impossible to trace this back to something that
happened in education.”
2.3 Three sets of processes that link education to peace,
conflict and natural disaster
Recognizing the limitations of identifying statistical relationships, a range of studies have
sought to understand in more detail the various processes and mechanisms through which
education might mediate the relationship between peace and stability on the one hand,
and conflict and natural disaster on the other. Despite their diversity, these studies would
seem to a great extent to repeat, expand on and elaborate three main sets of associated
concepts. For the purposes of this study these have been given the abbreviated labels of
‘exclusionóinclusion’, ‘fragmentationócohesion’ and ‘vulnerabilityóresilience’. While all
three have relevance to both conflict and natural disaster, the first two in particular are
emphasized in discussions on ‘human-made’ conflict, while discussions on resilience focus
on mitigation, risk-reduction, preparedness and response to all kinds of crises, including
natural disasters. Each of these is further explained and explored below.
2.3.1 Exclusion ó inclusion
The Regional analysis explored how stark economic disparities and social exclusion29
can be drivers of fragility and conflict. There has been considerable exploration of
the idea that education can be an integral part of these processes of exclusion, yet
on the other hand can reduce overt conflict and support peaceful relations through
attention to inclusion, equity and participation. In education, ‘equity’ is understood
to mean that all children, regardless of gender, ethnicity, language, geographic
location, residency status or other identity factor have an equal chance to fulfil their
individual potential through equity of access to education of comparable quality
and duration, resulting in equity of opportunity to avail oneself of the outcomes and
benefits of education. ‘Inclusion’ is a similar concept, but focuses on ensuring that
mainstream educational provision supports full participation in education by being
responsive to those at risk of exclusion, for example working children, migrants or
children with disabilities. In the literature that links exclusion-inclusion in education
to ‘peace promotion’, two main mechanisms are identified:
Inclusion and participation in education reduces the opportunity and
motivation for engagement in conflict on the part of the learners themselves:
Thyne (2006), in the study introduced above, hypothesizes that education might
have a ‘stability’ effect. He postulates that formal education, by constructively
engaging children and young people and giving hope for the future, might reduce
the motivation for armed conflict. In so doing, Thyne is implying an assumption
29 The Australian Government publication ‘The Origins, Meaning, Definition and Economic Implications of the Concept
of Social Inclusion/Exclusion’ (2009) gives a useful definition of social exclusion (from Pierson, 2001) as “a process
that deprives individuals and families, groups and neighbourhoods of the resources required for the participation in
the social, economic and political activities of the society as a whole. It is primarily a consequence of poverty and
low income, but other factors such as discrimination, low educational attainment and depleted living environments
underpin it.” In this definition, access to education is one of the ‘resources required for participation’ while education
outcomes (literacy levels) are seen as underpinning the poverty that lies at the heart of exclusion.
32. 26 Concepts and themes in the literature
that formal education is of sufficient quality and relevance to be able to offer
some kind of reward for perseverance. Thyne, however, cautions against simplistic
interpretations, recognizing that the leaders, agitators and manipulators in most
conflicts are themselves often highly educated.30 Dupuy (2008) cites evidence
that expanding access to secondary education in post-conflict situations is directly
linked to reducing motivations for armed conflict by raising both the social cost and
psychological constraints. The stability link would seem to be strongest for post-primary
education (whether formal secondary schooling or non-formal or alternative
learning programmes) in current conflict-affected countries, where it presents a
tangible and immediate alternative to violence for vulnerable youth and adolescents
(especially males). A number of advocacy documents (e.g. INEE, 2010 and Save the
Children, 2011) therefore encourage a greater priority on these programmes, with
some calling for a particular targeting of boys and young men.
Some studies have extended the argument ‘backwards’, emphasizing attention to
targeted early childhood interventions to support more equitable progress through
to post-primary levels of education. This, it has been suggested, will reduce the
probability of conflict by keeping the most vulnerable children in school for longer
(Vargos Baron, 2006). While this adds to the already strong arguments31 for reaching
the most disadvantaged children with ECD support, it should be emphasized that
the causal chain here is very long. In other words, the impact of ECD can be more
easily linked to the achievement of gradual systemic expansion with equity and a
minimum quality of education than to any direct impact on conflict reduction.
Equitable inclusion, transparent and fair resource distribution and structures
for participation in decision-making about education prevent, or reduce,
tensions and grievances over unequal access to resources, opportunities and
power (that education provides), which are common drivers of ethnic and
inter-community conflict: Many studies suggest that inequitable provision of
education at different levels, for instance in teacher distribution and resourcing that
result in inequality of opportunity and/or outcomes of education, might all contribute
to grievances that fuel tensions or actual conflict. This is particularly the case where
these issues are not merely logistical (e.g. difficulties in encouraging good teachers
to work in remote areas), but relate to a lack of commitment to equal opportunities,
weak structures to enable a fair ‘voice’ in educational decision-making, and even
active corruption, for example in school admissions policies or assessment practices.
The grievance argument is essentially about ‘good governance’ in education, based
on the understanding that it is the stark inequalities and injustices (or perceptions
of these) – rather than the size of the ‘overall pot’– that create resentments which
fuel tensions across groups.
Novelli and Smith (for UNICEF, 2011) found that inequitable education systems were
key drivers of conflict in Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone. In a subsequent UNICEF
Conflict Analysis32 undertaken in Sierra Leone it was found that “resentment on
the part of those who can only access sub-standard state education when others
can afford better opportunities in the private sector” is a major grievance. Similar
linkages have been found in Guatemala and Liberia (Save the Children, 2008) and
in Sri Lanka (Lo Bianco, 2011). A 2005 report on Nepal by Human Rights for Global
Justice cited denial of education as integral to caste discrimination in Nepal, which
has made Dalits33 a “ready support base for the insurgency”. Dalit children have
30 The Paris-educated progenitors of the Cambodia genocide provide a particularly stark example of how educational
privilege is not always used for the social good.
31 Walker in The Lancet (2011) describes in detail how inadequate support in early childhood sets the stage for inequality,
noting that ‘with cumulative exposure to developmental risks, disparities widen and trajectories become more firmly
established’.
32 For PBEA.
33 Dalits: the group at the bottom of the Hindu caste system, historically known as ‘untouchables’.
34. 28 Concepts and themes in the literature
criteria for resource allocation, collection and use of data on enrolment and transition
disaggregated by geographic area and ethnicity and “measures to prevent local
discrimination” in matters of access, scholarship provision or fee waivers.
Addressing linguistic diversity through provision of education in children’s mother
tongues (e.g. through mother tongue-based bilingual education) is also promoted as
an important means by which education can reduce inequality, by attracting children
of minority language groups to school and supporting their improved learning. For
example, IIEP guidance on integrating conflict and DRR into education sector
planning (2012) recommends ‘inclusive language policies’, while Save the Children
(2011) argues for “good practice in multilingual education to support more equitable
inclusion in fragile or conflict affected situations.” Issues of language, education and
peacebuilding are discussed further in the next section on fragmentation-cohesion.
Other studies focus on the role of participatory education governance. Smith, A.
(2010) emphasizes the importance of “governance structures for representation and
participation at national or local levels” to ensure inclusion and support the resolution
of grievances, and identifies transparency in funding and the balance of central and
local authority as being of critical importance in post-conflict situations. Some writers
point out that resolution often requires more than ensuring ‘objective’ fairness since
(as was discussed in Chapter 1) many conflicts are also linked to more subjective
identity and symbolic associations. West (2013), for example, advises that measures
to reduce conflict through education should take account of “perceptions, beliefs and
community stories about education and its delivery”.
It is noted that the arguments for attention to inclusion and equity in education as
a means of ‘peace promotion’ focus in particular on equity across groups (ethnic,
linguistic, social), since it is the divisions (psychological, social and geographical)
between these identity-based groupings that often form the fissures along which
societies fracture. These understandings serve as a useful reinforcement of the
recent broadening of concern beyond the individual and household disparities
related to gender and poverty,35 to embrace other forms of social exclusion.
Unfortunately, however, some of the ‘guidance’ on what needs to be done to achieve
equitable inclusion appears simplistic. For example, it is often advocated to focus on
categorization and disaggregation in order to get a better measure of how different
groups are faring in educational terms and to target those that are disadvantaged,
but without reflection on the problems associated with categorization based on
social or ethnic grouping (compared, for example, with socio-economic status,
gender or geographic location). Such groupings often have a subjective element and
in situations of conflict are often politically manipulated and in rapid flux.36 In such
situations, an over-emphasis on achieving an exact and measurable parity between
social groups might serve to inflame tensions rather than to calm them, as well as
lead to an escalation of new identities and claims.37
35 See Faul, 2013.
36 In Nepal, the identity of ‘Madhesi’ has assumed greater significance in recent decades. In the conflicts in Mindanao
and South Thailand, religion (as opposed to culture and ethnicity) has become more strongly emphasized as a factor of
difference. During the break up of former Yugoslavia, many people of mixed descent were forced to align with selected
identities according to what seemed to promise the greatest chance of survival and protection. In the last two decades
of segregation, Serbs and Croats have sought to move their respective dialects of what was formerly ‘Serbo-Croat’
down divergent paths.
37 In Nepal, for example, while some of the resentment against the introduction of a policy of stipends for all children
of Dalit or marginalized indigenous backgrounds might be dismissed as simply an expression of caste discrimination,
there are also genuine grievances on the part of those that are ineligible but face similar levels of poverty. The search
for an acceptable allocation formula continues. Rwanda’s experience provides a stark reminder that ethnic identities
can be both overwhelmingly negative and to a large extent spurious. In these cases, to be inclusive, education needs
to be ‘blind’ to these identities rather than to reinforce them (Rwanda has banned the use of the former Hutu/ Tutsi
classification).