Antonio de Santiago Laporte, Industrial Technical Engineer, Madrid Metro & Conor O’Neill Rail, Vehicles Group Manager, NewRail – SecureMetro Project

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  • 1. Preparing For The Worst – The SecureMetro Project: Outcomes and Recommendations Antonio de Santiago Laporte Industrial Technical Engineer Madrid Metro & Conor O’Neill Rail Vehicles Group Manager NewRail – SecureMetro Project
  • 2. Mitigating the Effects of Firebomb and Blast Attacks on Metro Systems. Conor O’Neill (NewRail) & Antonio De Santiago (Metro de Madrid) Rail & Public Transport Safety & Security Mar 2014 - London 2
  • 3. Preparing For The Worst – The SecureMetro Project: Outcomes and Recommendations Antonio de Santiago Laporte Industrial Technical Engineer Madrid Metro & Conor O’Neill Rail Vehicles Group Manager NewRail – SecureMetro Project 3
  • 4. PROJECT DETAILS  3½ year EU project – Jan 2010 to Jun 2013  11 partners in 4 countries 4
  • 5. PROJECT PARTNERS 5
  • 6. PROJECT AIMS  To increase metro vehicle resilience to terrorist bomb blast through selection of vehicle materials and structural design.  To increase security against a firebomb attack through design of fire barriers and fire suppression technology.  To increase the resilience of vehicles to blasts in order to speed up recovery following attack to return to normal operation.  To reduce the attractiveness of metro systems as a target for attack by reducing deaths and injuries and increased resilience. 6
  • 7. THREATS  Review of previous blast and incendiary attacks on metro systems.  833 terrorist attacks identified. 1960 -2010 1960-2010 Bombing 57% Hijacking Kidnapping 0% 0% Other 5% Logistic Activity 0% Sabotage 20% Barricade 0% Arson 5% Threat 5% Armed AttackUnconventional 7% 1% 7
  • 8. THREATS 2000 - 2010 Bombing 58% Hijacking 0% Kidnapping 0% Other 4% Logistic Activity 0% Barricade 0% Arson 6% Armed Attack 6% Unconventional 0% Threat 3% Sabotage 23% 8
  • 9. THREAT SUMMARY  Primary Threat: Bombing – 70% of all fatalities – 77% of all injuries  Fire Attacks – Low frequency. – High impact.  Attacks on vehicles more lethal than infrastructure. – 73% of fatalities were onboard the vehicle. – 90% of metro vehicle fatalities were onboard the vehicle. 9
  • 10. THREATS – UNDERGROUND SYSTEMS  Subway systems. Total Attacks Attacks on Vehicles % of Total Fatalities on Vehicles Injuries on Vehicles Subway 82 29 35% 90% 67% Subway EU 35 11 31% 100% 92%  Future Threats. Question posed Highest ranking response Most severe threat Explosive device Most probable threat Explosive device Most vulnerable target Multi-modal terminals Primary aim of attack Loss of life Device type Improvised explosive device Attack type Multiple targets  Analysis of potential future threats, risks and potential trends.  Threat and attack scenarios to provide design approach. 10
  • 11. SCENARIO DEFINITION 11
  • 12. SCENARIO DEFINITION  Finite element modelling and simulation of blast conditions.  Study of blast mechanics related to rail metro vehicles and systems.  Small/large scale blast testing (correlation) components and vehicle.  Evaluation of range of potential vehicle design improvements. 12
  • 13. BLAST TESTING  Panel tests June 2012: – – – – – Driver cabin panels. Carriage wall panels. Floor and ceiling panels. Windows (glazing). Material assessment tests (32 individual materials tested). 13
  • 14. BLAST TESTING  Full-scale test Aug 2012:  Decommissioned Metro de Madrid vehicle.  Tested at HSL (UK) for NewRail.  Evaluation of structural and equipment response. 14
  • 15.  Delivery of metro! 15
  • 16. AREAS OF INTEREST – Reduce Damage and Injury      Glass fragmentation Door retention Structural deformation Equipment retention Vehicle derailment      Interior components (floor/roof) Critical system protection Driver Protection Evacuation & egress Recovery (injured & system) 16
  • 17. 17
  • 18. BLAST TESTING 18
  • 19. KEY SYSTEMS  Lighting: – Assess situation. Seek egress. Communication. Guidance.  Driver: – Knowledgeable person. Relay updates & commands. Focal point.  Radio communications: – Co-ordinate evacuation. Link to outside world.  Door systems: – Operational post incident. Escape means. Useable if unpowered. Access for emergency response crew.  Surveillance data backup: – Forensic data. Understanding of events leading up to blast. 19
  • 20. DEMONSTRATOR VEHICLE  A blast resilient demonstrator: – – – – 14m vehicle. Driver’s bulkhead. Open-ended design. Passengers doors incorporated. 20
  • 21.     Modified glazing (jointing and glazing films). Tethering technology. Evaluation of seat orientation. Bulkhead reinforcement 21
  • 22. 22
  • 23. DEMONSTRATOR VEHICLE  Reduction in glazing debris.  Reduction in debris in gangway.  Tethering held dislodged panels. 23
  • 24. RESEARCH OUTPUT  Appraisal of State-of-Art design practices (techniques).  Specification of the desired vehicle performance.  Design specification for blast and firebomb mitigation.  Recommendations for future international standards. 24
  • 25. THANK YOU! SecureMetro is a European Commission funded FP7 project GA# 234148 25