Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
  • Like
Flexible Access to Video Streaming
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.


Now you can save presentations on your phone or tablet

Available for both IPhone and Android

Text the download link to your phone

Standard text messaging rates apply

Flexible Access to Video Streaming



  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Be the first to comment
    Be the first to like this
No Downloads


Total Views
On SlideShare
From Embeds
Number of Embeds



Embeds 0

No embeds

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

    No notes for slide


  • 1. Flexible Access to Video Streaming Yongdong Wu and Feng Bao Institute for Infocomm Research 21, Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore, 119613 {wydong, baofeng} Abstract— This paper presents a flexible access method for Hartung et al. [10] provided an approach to watermark the secure multicast streaming. In this scheme, a server segments a compressed/raw video and encrypt them. Any user can decrypt video into clips, and prepares the protected video by selectively the content directed to him. The watermarking is performed encrypting the video clips off line. Proxies store the protected videos and distribute them as Cable-TV programs. To decrypt in different portion of an image so as to trace the owner a protected video or clip, a client sends to the server a request efficiently. In their experiments, to watermark MPEG-2 bit- for the decryption keys. The server then generates an enabling stream, 15-30% of the DCT coefficients should be altered block which enables the client to access video or clips in a period. typically. However, Hartung et al. disabled multiple access to Therefore, the present scheme enables the client to access a clip the content without storing the content at the consumer side. or video for a restricted number of dissemination times, but the server selectively encrypts the video only once, and distributor Perkins et al. [8] proposed a scheme which enabled to ac- performs no encryption at all. cess the content for predefined times. In the scheme, a trusted player should be installed such that the number of licenses can I. I NTRODUCTION be decreased gradually. To defeat against license backup, an Media streaming is becoming more and more popular due on-line license authority or registrar should be deployed. The to the explosive growth of Internet and multimedia processing scheme also suffers from both additional computational cost technologies and applications [1] - [3]. One hot topic in and storage. multimedia dissemination is how to prevent data theft. For The present streaming scheme partitions a video into clips example, in pay-per-view business which assumes that the based on the video’s utilization characteristics [11]-[13], and subscriber can not save the decrypted content, the service each clip is further divided into fragments. One fraction provider broadcasts/multicasts the video in encrypted form, of each fragment is encrypted twice with two independent and any recipient can not decrypt the video without a valid keys and each cipher-text is merged with the unprotected decryption key. A n¨ ive solution [4] is that the server/proxy a fragment to produce two protected fragments. All the protected unicasts the encrypted media to the user. However, due to fragments are sent to the proxies and cached in the proxies. the limitation of network bandwidth and servers’ resource, At the transmission stage, one of two protected fragments is neither can networks support many unicast connections simul- selected and multicast to the clients. In order to play a video, a taneously, nor can servers/proxies encrypt an arbitrary number client must send a request to the server. The server prepares an of videos in real-time. enabling block with the client’s public key according to the To reduce the computational overhead, Shi et al. [5] [6] client’s request. After recovering the keys for the requested designed a fast MPEG video encryption algorithm by encrypt- clip(s) from the enabling block, the client receives the pro- ing the sign bits of a fraction of DCT coefficients to produce tected video. If the received video data is encrypted, the client encrypted DCT coefficients. This scheme decreases the com- decrypts the data and assembles the decrypted data with other pression performance and thus increases the network traffic. original data to form a decodable video stream. The present Zeng et al. [7] presented a joint encryption and compression scheme provides the following properties: short response time, framework in which video data are scrambled efficiently in efficient network usage, light weight computation, and flexible the frequency domain by employing selective encryption of access mechanism. the transform coefficients and motion vectors. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II Griwodz et al. [9] proposed to protect a fraction of the com- elaborates the present secure streaming. Section III discusses pressed video data directly rather than the DCT coefficients the performance in terms of the computational cost, storage so as to remain the compression rate. The protected video is consumption, etc. A conclusion is drawn in Section IV. stored in the proxies and multicast periodically. After receiving a request from a client, the server encrypts a selected fraction II. FLEXIBLE ACCESS TO VIDEO STREAMING of codes using a personal key of the client, and unicasts In the application of video distribution, the providers wish the encrypted codes to the client. However, the server has to to provide flexible access mechanism for business profit. In encrypt the selected portion of the video on the fly and involve pay-per-view business, there are at least two factors related in the streaming all the time. In addition, the server should to the charge rate: number of clips and access time. Clips synchronize with the client till the end of the transmission control manages which clip a client is allowed to render, while session. time control manages when a client is allowed to render a 0-7803-8521-7/04/$20.00 (C) 2004 IEEE
  • 2. Segmenting Generating Generating Server B. Producing Protected Videos at the Server video protected video enabling block In order to protect a video from illegally playing, the video should be encrypted with secret keys. To this end, a server Disseminating Forwarding selects a random number r as a master key and generates clip protected video Proxy keys to encrypt clips. Specifically, the process for producing enabling block protected videos is as follows. (a) Divide clip i into fragments as Fij = Vij ||Sij (j = Rendering Recovering Recovering 0, 1, · · · ) based on some rules (e.g, Vij is the frame video video video keys Client header and Sij is media data), where x y is the concatenation of strings x and y. (b) For each clip i, create the first key K1i = H(r 1 i), Fig. 1. Fundamental building blocks. In the Content Distribution Network, where H(·) is a one-way function. a proxy may be an edge server. (c) Encrypt Vij with key K1i as V 1ij = E(K1i , Vij ), where E(·) is an encryption function. The protected ˜ fragment Fij = V 1ij Sij . clip/video. To cater to these requirements, the present scheme ˜ (d) All the protected fragments Fij generated in steps (a)- enables each client to render either one clip or video within (c) constitute the protected clip i, then all the protected a restricted time period according to a key hash chain. Figure clips form a protected video V 1. 1 illustrates the building blocks: Segmenting video, generat- (e) For each clip i, create a second key K2i = H(r 2 i). ing protected video, distributing protected video, generating (f) Encrypts Vij with key K2i as V 2ij = E(K2i , Vij ). The enabling block, forward enabling block, recovering video key, ˆ protected fragment Fij = V 2ij Sij . recovering video and rendering video. ˆ (g) All the protected fragments Fij generated in steps (e)- (f) constitute a second protected clip i, and then all the A. Segmenting Videos at the Server protected clips form a protected video V 2. (h) V 1ij , V 2ij and Sij (i, j = 0, 1, · · · ) are sent to the Generally speaking, a video can be segmented into clips proxies. randomly. However, it is effective to segment a video based on the its utilization characteristics [12] [13]. With respect to In fact, videos V1 and V2 do not physically exist in the Figure 2, the experiment [12] demonstrates that only 55% of proxies because they share the un-encrypted data Sij . Figure all the requestors play the entire video, and most stoppages 3 illustrates the data structure of protected videos stored in a occur during the first 5% of the movie playback period. The proxy. short starting pattern suggests to distribute the first several Clip 0 Clip 1 minutes frequently. Thus, a video is segmented into three fragment clips: the beginning data, the middle body and the end data. _______ This segmentation method enables the proxy to distribute the V1 clips at different rates so as to provide short response time on average. V1 00 S 00 V2 00 95 V2 Members percentage 85 Clip 0 Clip 1 75 Fig. 3. Static structure of protected videos. The dark block (e.g., V 100 , V 200 ) indicates the encrypted fraction of a fragment, and the gray block (e.g., 65 S00 ) is the unencrypted fraction of a fragment shared by two fragments. 55 C. Distributing Protected Videos at the Proxy 0 20 40 60 80 One objective of the present scheme is to provide flexible Duration access method based on the dissemination time. Hereinafter, Fig. 2. Partial playback [12]. only 55% of all the requestors play the entire time is measured with the video dissemination counter which video, and most stoppages occur during the first 5% of the movie playback represents how many times the video has been broadcast. To period. this end, the server and the proxies share a key v used to generate chain Kt = H T −t (v) = H T −t−1 (H(v)), where t is 0-7803-8521-7/04/$20.00 (C) 2004 IEEE
  • 3. the counter to represent the dissemination time, and T is the his private key. Subsequently, he calculates the keys as maximum distribution time. In practice, if t > T , the video is follows. Firstly, he calculates the keys K1i = H(r 1 free. Given the current dissemination time t, the random seed i) and K2i = H(r 2 i) for ith clip of the protected Kt is used to produce a random bit sequence. If a random bit videos, (i = 0, 1, · · · ). Meanwhile, the client computes is 0, a fragment in video V1 is delivered, otherwise, a fragment Kt = H t0 −t (vt0 ). in V2 is sent out. F. Recovering and Rendering Videos at the Client Figure 4 summarizes the whole process of generating trans- mitted fragments at the server and proxy. In the process, the After recovering the keys K1i and K2i for clip i, the client clip keys (K1i and K2i ) are derived from the master key r, starts to receive the protected fragments. He calculates the then the keys are used to encrypt a portion of a fragment (i.e., sequence with key Kt so as to determine which clip key Vij ) to produce two cipher-texts. Sequentially, one out of two is used to decrypt the fragments. For each fragment of clip cipher-texts is selected by a multiplier controlled by another i, if the sequence bit is 0, select key K1i to decrypt the key v and dissemination counter t. This selected cipher-text fragment, otherwise, K2i is used. After the encrypted fraction is assembled with the un-encrypted Sij to form a protected of a fragment is decrypted correctly, the clear-text will be fragment to be multicast. assembled with un-encrypted fragment data together to form a complete original fragment. The recovered video fragment S ij can be decoded with the dedicated player. K1 i=H (r|| 1 || i) V1 ij III. E XPERIMENTS AND P ERFORMANCE A NALYSIS Corrupted r V ij fragment A. Experiments v,t In the simulation, Figure 6 is generated by encrypting Figure K2 i=H (r|| 2 || i) V2 ij 5, while Figure 7 is generated when only picture 2 is granted. Clearly, the video is protected properly. Fig. 4. Distribute different video without real-time encryption by selecting one from two encrypted clips. D. Generating Enabling Blocks at the Server Because the video stream is encrypted, no one can correctly render the video without the decryption key. If client j sends to Fig. 5. Original video including 3 clips. Each clip has only one picture (or server a video request including the interested clip/video and fragment). dissemination period, the server generates an enabling block with the client’s public key e and sends the block to the client. Table I lists the enabling blocks corresponding to the requests, vt0 = H T −t0 (v), t0 is a counter which represents the access expiry granted to the client. TABLE I Fig. 6. The protected video whose clips are encrypted. Thus, the pictures T HE REQUEST AND CORRESPONDING RESPONSE , WHERE E(e, x) IS AN are noise-like. ENCRYPTION OF x. Request Enabling block Clip i E(e, K1i ), E(e, K2i ), E(e, vt0 ) Video E(e, r), E(e, vt0 ) E. Recovering Video Keys at the Client Fig. 7. The picture 1 remains unchanged, picture 2 and picture 3 are decrypted with the key for picture 2. Accordingly, only picture 2 is recovered Upon receiving the enabling block, client j recovers the correctly. video key K1i , K2i and Kt with one of the following ways according to the received enabling block. • For the enabling block including E(e, K1i ), E(e, K2i ) B. Security and E(e, vt0 ), the client decrypts the enabling block to According to one-wayness of hash chain, users have no way K1i , K2i and vt0 with his private key. Subsequently, the to generate a valid sequence with their outdate keys. At the client computes Kt = H t0 −t (vt0 ). mean time, no matter how many traitors collude, they can • For the enabling block including E(e, r) and E(e, vt0 ), not generate a new sequence with their keys. However, if a the client decrypts the enabling block to r and vt0 with client requests for the whole video once and then requests for 0-7803-8521-7/04/$20.00 (C) 2004 IEEE
  • 4. one clip at the last dissemination time, he can always access further. Next, each fragment is partially encrypted with two the whole video because he knows r and vT . In pay-per-view keys to produce two protected fragments. All of the protected business, this weakness may be not serious. fragments are cached in the un-trusted proxies for multicasting Another threat comes from that the random assemble the to the clients. Our solution also provides flexible access control fragments. Averagely, if we assume that the time-key sequence based on the request for video clip and time. Because the proxy is random, an old legal user can always decrypt 50% fragments does not encrypt the video on the fly, but selects one from two with one old time-key. Given t time-keys, the attacker can encrypted clips (equivalently select one key from K1i or K2i decrypt the video at the probability 1 − 2−t . In reality, people based on access time key Kt ), the computational cost is small will not content with a degraded quality of movie if he had R EFERENCES viewed it before. Furthermore, the attacker has to find a way to tell the correct frame from the decrypted frames. Of course, [1] Z. Morley Mao, David Johnson, Oliver Spatscheck, Jacobus E. van der Merwe, and Jia Wang, “Efficient and Robust Streaming Provisioning in a human can do it easily by checking the frames one by VPNs,” WWW2003, pp.118-127 4. one, but this brute force method may not meet the real time [2] Dimitris Thanos, “COiN-Video: A Model for the Dissemination of requirement in streaming. On the other hand, some frames Copyrighted Video Streams Over Open Networks,” 4th Information Hiding Workshop, 2001 which are decrypted wrongly may propagate the error due to [3] Y. Chae, K. Guo, M. Buddhikot, S. Suri, and E. Zegura, “Silo, the correlation between the frames. For example, a mistake Rainbow, and Caching Token: Schemes for Scalable Fault Tolerant in an I-frame may propagate to all the related P-frames and Stream Caching,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 20(7):1238-1344, 2002 B-frames in MPEG-2 streaming. Thus, the proposed scheme [4] Siu F. Yeung, John C. S. Lui, and David K. Y. Yau, “A Case for a can meet the requirement of content distribution with a low Multi-Key Secure Video Proxy: Theory, Design, and Implementation,” price. 10th ACM Multimedia’02, pp. 392-401, 2002. [5] Changgui Shi, and Bharat Bhargava, “A Fast MPEG Video Encryption C. Comparison Algorithm,” 6th ACM Multimedia, pp.81-88, 1998 [6] Changgui Shi, Sheng Yih Wang, and Bharat Bhargava, “MPEG Video Table II lists the performance of video streaming schemes in Encryption in Real-time Using Secret Key Cryptography,” http:// terms of access control dimension, security, storage efficiency, [7] Wenjun Zeng, and Shawmin Lei,“Efficient Frequency Domain Selec- and computational overhead. Only the present solution pro- tive Scrambling of Digital Video,” IEEE Transactions on Multimedia, vides 2-dimension access control. That is to say, all the other 5(1):118-129, 2003 [8] G. Perkins, and P. Bhattacharya, “An Encryption Scheme for Limited solutions provide the function of enabling/disabling access to K-time Access to Digital Media ”, IEEE Transactions on Consumer a video, but our solution refines the user’s requirements into Electronics, 49(1):171-176, 2003 clips and access time. The scheme in [4] requires unicast [9] C. Griwodz, O. Merkel, J. Dittmann, and R. Steinmetz, “Protecting VoD the Easier Way,” ACM Multimedia ’98, pp. 21-28, 1998. channels which provide fast response with a price of inefficient [10] Frank Hartung, and Bernd Girod, “Watermarking of Uncompressed and network usage, while others reduce the network burden by Compressed Video,” Signal Processing, 66(3):283-301, 1998 multicast channels. Considering the storage efficiency, our [11] K. Almeroth, and M. Ammar, “Multicast group behavior in the Inter- nets multicast backbone (MBone),” IEEE Communications Magazine, solution requires additional storage (appro. 1% of the video), 35(6):124-129, 1997. and Shi’s solution [5] increases the storage space because the [12] S. Acharya, and B. Smith, “An Experiment to Characterize Videos compression rate is decreased. In view of the computational Stored on the Web,” ACM/SPIE Multimedia Computing and Networking 1998 cost, only our solution requires little real time computation, [13] M. Chesire, A. Wolman, G. Voelker, and H. Levy, “Measurement and but the solution [4] requires intensive computational resource. Analysis of a Streaming Media Workload,” USENIX Symposium on Additionally, the video proxy scheme given in paper [4] is Internet Technologies and Systems (USITS), 2001 vulnerable to collusion attack. TABLE II P ERFORMANCE COMPARISON Griwodz[9] Shi[5] Yeung[4] Present Dimension 1D 1D 1D 2D Secure Yes Yes No Yes Network partially multicast unicast multicast multicast Data No Yes No Yes Expansion Real-time Fast Fast Slow Fastest Computation IV. C ONCLUSION In the present secure streaming scheme, a video is par- titioned into clips. Each clip is partitioned into fragments 0-7803-8521-7/04/$20.00 (C) 2004 IEEE