Governance and Accountability Issues in the 2011 Thai Floods

The Great Flood of 2011:
Accountability and Governance Issues
1
Angthong Province
Source: http://blogs.voanews.com/photos/2011/09/16/september-16-2011/
Bangkok
Source: The Nation, Rangsit and Nonthaburi residents rally for help,
November 16, 2011
Minburi Market
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show-new.php?id=1&pid=12012
Ramon C. Sevilla, PhD.
APTU Thammasat University
March 18, 2012

2
“The primary cause of flooding was very
high rainfall. The following graphs compare the
2011 monthly totals (January to September) with the 30-
year averages for those months.
In Chiang Mai the nine-month total was
140 percent of the average; in Lamphun
196%; in Lampang 177%; in Uttaradit
153% and in Phitsanulok 146%.
These are only a few locations (and all of them from
lowland sites – rainfall is heavier at higher elevations) but
they give a clear indication that 2011 was an
exceptionally wet year and that
this has been widely spread across
the Chao Phaya catchment.”
1. High rainfall (from tropical storms)
What were the causes of the floods?

3
Source: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2011/10/19/thai-flood-
cause-revealed-rain/
* Source: The Nation, “Lethargy over water woes will hurt govt”, October
11, 2011
Bangkok had 3 metres of rain in 2011 -
triple the usual amount according to
Deputy BMA Governor Pornthep
Techapaiboon.
Source: Khanittha Theppajon, Olarn Lertrattanadamrongkul, “48 hours:
Deadline Bangkok”, The Nation, October 18, 2011
From 2008, the country recorded plentiful rain above the 30-year average compiled by the
Meteorological Department. *

4
Two Tropical Storms:
Nok-Ten late July 2011
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nock-
ten.A2011207.0230.250m.jpg
Haima June 24-26, 2011
Source:http://typhoonwatch2011.blogspot.com/2011/06/cyclo
nic-activity-in-west-central_15.html

5
"Our agency told the Royal Irrigation Department [RID] in July, before tropical storm
Nok-Ten hit the country, there would be abnormal weather this year, and the RID
should treat this year's flood with crisis measures not just normal measures,"
according to Deputy director of the Thai Meteorological Department (TMD), Somchai
Baimuang.
LIMITATIONS OF TMD FORECASTING:
TMD can now forecast weather only for 24 hours and with an accuracy of only 79 per
cent. It relies on a super computer that was installed 10 years ago for these
predictions.
Source: The Nation, “Govt should have tacled flood crisis earlier: experts”, October 3, 2011
Warned the Royal Irrigation Department in July 2011.
What happened after that?

6
“The Royal Irrigation Department was damned for its
dam water mismanagement, and for keeping the water
level close to the brim despite the prospect of heavy rain
that comes with the La Nina phenomenon.”
Source: Sanitsuda Ekachai, “Drowning in prejudice”, Bangkok Post, Nov 4, 2011
2. Dam Water Mismanagement
But according to says Sutat
Patmasiriwan, the Governor of the
Electricity Generating Authority of
Thailand (EGAT), unusually heavy
rains, not dam mismanagement, was
the main factor behind the severity of
this year's floods.
Source: Bangkok Post, Egat chief says dams 'not to blame'
Cause was 'heavy rain, not mismanagement‘, November 3, 2011.

7
2a. Ministry of Agriculture takes responsibility for
delaying the release of dam water
On November 10th, 2011, Agriculture
Minister Theera Wongsamut
acknowledged that the government
made the controversial decision to
delay the release of water from the
country's major dams “so that farmers
could harvest their crops first”.
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/I-ordered-a-delay-in-the-
release-of-water-from-dam-30169695.html

8
- as for the 3rd crop: in a Facebook statement by Finance Minister Thirachai
Phuvanatnaranubala, the flood crisis would have been less severe if the number of rice
harvests had been reduced from three to two this year, and the water released after the
second.
2c. Minister of Agriculture Theera blamed weather forecasting as
“problematic” because the Meteorological Department can only
forecast one week in advance.
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/I-ordered-a-delay-in-the-release-of-water-from-dam-30169695.html
2b. Minister of Agriculture miscalculated on the 3rd crop use of
water.
2d. The water gushing from the dams was blocked from being
diverted to the Tha Chin River in the west.
- As a result, the Chao Phraya River was the only way that the water could flow down.
-The water was also prevented from flowing to Prachin Buri in the east, leaving it to
overflow into the central region and then Bangkok.
- The water could not be diverted to Min Buri either.
Source: The Nation, “Day by Day, Waiting on Judgement Day”, November 4, 2011

9
3a. The irrigation authorities, blamed flood control failure on
local communities who built self-protection dykes and destroyed
flood walls at the cost of other communities.
3b. Irrigation authorities also complained about the lack of water
pumps to do their work.
Source: Sanitsuda Ekachai, “Drowning in prejudice”, Bangkok Post, Nov 4, 2011

10
Source: The Nation, “Govt should have tacled flood crisis earlier: experts”,
October 3, 2011
Sam Khok, Pathum Thani
water up to doorknob !
Source:
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show.php?id=1&pi
d=11474
Result: Heavy Flooding in many areas

11
By September 29, 2011 this
picture captioned “Front
row seats in the wet”
appeared in Bangkok Post.
Tourists get wet feet as they watch a
royal barge procession rehearsal at the
flooded Nagaraphirom public park by
the Chao Phraya River in Phra
Nakhon district of Bangkok, with the
main pagoda of the Temple of Dawn
in the background yesterday (Sept 28,
2011). PAWAT LAOPAISARNTAKSIN
Source:
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/258767/landslid
e-kills-family-of-5

12
As the flood moved downstream, it brought on a new
polarization, the conflict between ‘wet and dry partition’* as
people began to stand up against evidence of unfair sharing of
burdens. (civil disobedience)
More than 400 people from Nakhon
Nayok tore down a sandbag
embankment because they said it was to
blame for their homes, roadside stalls
and farms being under water for more
than a month.
The embankment, they alleged, was
constructed to protect the Pathum Thani
economic zone at their
expense.
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/Suffering-Nakhon-Nayok-locals-tear-down-sandbag-em-30166319.html
* Source: Bangkok Post Opinion, Lost in Flood, Information, November 15, 2011.

13
More than 500 flood victims in Chai Nat yesterday demolished sandbag walls that officials had
erected to limit the amount of water flowing into neighbouring Suphan Buri province.
"We have lived with floodwater for a month now. We can't put up with this any longer," said a flood
victim who identified herself only as Kung.
She and her comrades at first closed the Wat Sing - Uthai Thani Road in Mueang Chai Nat district to
force officials at the Phon Thep Irrigation Project to come out and negotiate with them. However,
after the officials refused to come out, the local flood victims simply demolished the sandbag walls.
"The first floor of local houses are flooded. Have you thought about people whose houses have just
one floor? Three locals have drowned. Our children are suffering from athlete's foot," Kung said.
WET SEASON WOES - Chainat
Source:http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/Angry-Chai-Nat-flood-victims-destroy-sandbag-barri-30166084.html

14
The success of any urban area in
keeping the flood waters at bay would
appear to depend on its level of
infrastructure and its downright
refusal to flood it as a “kaem ling” (a
retention pond) so that water from
upstream can drain faster. This is the
case of Suphanburi, where the
political strongman of Suphanburi
(Mr. Banharn) is reported “to have
kept the keys of all watergates in
Suphan Buri and does not allow
anyone to open a single one to allow
run-offs from the upper North”.
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/politics/The-
suffering-continues-as-politicians-play-game-30166957.html
“Maybe if Banharn Silapa-archa was the
prime minister, the flooding situation might
not be as bad as it has been this year.”
Source: The Nation, The suffering continues as politicians play game, October
6, 2011
Can Mr. Banharn keep Bangkok dry?

15
Flood 2010 &
Flood 2011
PM Abhisit Vejjajiva in Korat,
October 18, 2010
Source:
http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9530000147315
PM Yingluck Shinawatra in
Sukhothai, August 13, 2011
Source: http://www.prachachon.org/board/index.php?topic=24651.0
Lopburi Muang District (BP 27/9/2011)

16
An aerial view shows flood-ravaged areas in Bang Rakam district of
Phitsanulok province. How can flood waters drain away if the water
level in the Nan River remains high?
Source: http://www.posttoday.com/

“The problem is the lack of an integrated effort. As authorities in one province seek to prevent their province
from floods, other provinces are affected,” the PM said.
She lamented that her government did not know how to drain all the flood water, given that it was now
literally almost everywhere.
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/Bt40-bn-needed-for-longterm-solution-PM-says-as-mo-30166223.html
PM Yingluck requests money for integrated water management (?)
no details given!!! (see next page) panic mode! panic, panic!
Bt40 Bn needed for long term solution, PM says, as more rain looms
The Nation, September 27, 2011
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra yesterday
said the government would likely need to
spend more than Bt40 billion on integrated
water management, which should prevent
extensive flooding in the future.
“It will be a long-term solution,” she said.
Yingluck blamed the lack of integrated efforts for
the current widespread flooding, which had
already caused 158 deaths and left 3 people
missing.
The floods continue to rage on in 23 provinces,
affecting the lives of 1.92 million people.
17

18
"Make the checklist and see if you've followed them," she said, referring to preparation and
prevention, and response and recovery.
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/PM-calls-for-more-early-warning-systems-30166405.html
PM calls for more early-warning systems
THE NATION September 29, 2011 10:30 am
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra on Sept. 28th instructed all
governors to implement the "2Ps 2Rs" in fighting off disasters in
their provinces
Too Late!!

19
ACCUSATION:
Democrat MP Apirak Kosayodhin accused the Yingluck government that while
it set up the Flood Relief Operations Command (FROC) in October 2011, it had
done nothing else since the flooding began in August.
Source: “MPs clash over crisis response”, Bangkok Post, November 25, 2011
RESPONSE:
Natural Resources and Environment Minister Preecha Rengsomboonsuk said
Bangkok was flooded because the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
(BMA) was not prepared to handle run-off from the North as its drainage
system was for rainwater only.
Source: “MPs clash over crisis response”, Bangkok Post, November 25, 2011
After the flood, in a parliamentary session
discussing the government’s performance:

20
According to Smith Dharmasarojana, former director-general of the
Meteorological Department, and Pramote Maiklad, former director-general of
the Royal Irrigation Department:
• last year's flood crisis was not an accident but the
result of mismanagement by up to 20 state agencies
. "Do not say the flood was an accident," Mr Smith said. "It was not an
accident. Do not say that nature punished us. It is clear that what caused the
flooding were mistakes by state authorities.“
Mr Pramote:
"Thailand today does not have a system to drain floodwater or water run-off
into the sea," he warned. "We do not have a feasible plan either. What we
have done in the past was drain run-off into natural waterways and canals dug
in the reign of King Rama V.“
Source: Bangkok Post, Yingluck sets up new flood committees, February 29, 2012
Two experts say: Flood was not an accident

21
• Thirachon also alleged that some politicians
ordered RID officials not to open sluice gates in
certain provinces so that farmers could finish
harvesting their paddy. The rice fields should have
served as water catchment areas in order to protect
the industrial estates.
• Mr Theerachon insisted that BMAl worked to its
utmost capacity to open sluice gates and water pumps
to protect the capital.
Source: Bangkok Post, 'Amateurs' blamed for flood damage, January 17, 2012.
Thirachon Manomaipiboon
Bangkok Deputy Governor
Photo Source: Pattaya Today, All districts in Bangkok still ‘at
risk’, November 2, 2011
BMA blames the flood on “amateurs”
• BMA Deputy Governor Thirachon Manomaipiboon blamed the government for
appointing inexperienced amateurs in the FROC to manage last year's floods for
ignoring the advice of experts and causing damage far greater than there should
have been.
• Khlongs 1-13 were originally designed upon engineering principles used for over a
hundred year to drain water from the North into Bang Pakong river in Chachoengsao
province.
• But the FROC ordered Khlong Rapeepat, Khlong Rangsit Prayoonsak and Khlong Hok
Wa to be closed which prevented water from flowing into BMA’s downstream floodway,
Mr Theerachon said.

22
Thirachon’s
accusations are
serious.
Why is there no move
to conduct a serious
investigation?

23
1. Bangkok is located in the flood plain near the mouth of the
main river.
• Bangkok (BMA) therefore blocks the runoff from the north
2. Flat Terrain (slope gradient small)
• In Western Bangkok, Seri Suparathit of the Rangsit University Centre on
Climate Change and Disaster, explained that opening the gates at at Khlong
Mahasawat (east-west) and Thawee Watthana (north-south) at 1 metre could
worsen floods in Thon Buri unless more pumps are deployed.
Source: Opening sluice gates higher 'problematic‘, Bangkok Post, November 21, 2011
• In the Western part of Bangkok, it is difficult to push water to the sea as most
canals ran parallel to the coast, according to PM Yingluck.
• Drainage system in the West not as good as in Eastern Bangkok
Source: The Nation, “PM hopeful but governor fears a second wave”, November 1, 2011
Let us try to understand the hydrological characteristics of
Chao Phraya River flood plain. Drainage Problems: Runoff must
be drained fast, but……..

24
Source: Flood Mitigation and Management in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Power Point Presentation by Vichai Somboon and
Surat Jaroenchaisakul, Department of Drainage and Sewerage, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, no date.
“A river basin is an area of land drained by a river and its tributaries. “
Source: http://www.geography.learnontheinternet.co.uk/topics/rivertheory.html
Bangkok is part of the Chao Phraya River Basin

25
Source:
http://sammyboy.com/showthread.php?10
3116-Latest-flood-map-at-Bangkok-its-
serious.....
Chao Phraya River
Basin Flood Plain
A flood plain is an area near a
river or a stream which floods
easily.
Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Floodplain
How do we know this is a flood
plain?
• by looking at the pattern of
flooded areas, Oct 18 2011
flood
• Bangkok is part of the flood
plain.

26

27
Coverage of 2.5 to 3 meter dike along river and canal. Protection up to +2.5 MSL

28
General Principle in draining Bangkok – low water level in canal

29
General Principle in draining Bangkok – high water level in canal

30
In the 2011 flood, Chao Phraya River water peaked October 15th at 2.29 metres
against the 2.5-metre flood barrier height. Source: The Nation, The worst apparently over: Agriculture Minister,
October 16, 2011
Note: the elevation
of some areas and
roads in Bangkok.
Flood wall, 2.5 to 3
meters high (MSL).
Protection against
100 year flood.

31
Source: https://www.facebook.com/bkk.best#!/photo.php?fbid=293601957324105&set=o.186357484732609&type=3&theater

32
Cross-section of Bangkok showing elevations
Source: http://2bangkok.com/forum/showthread.php?4014-Flood-of-2011-wrecking-havoc/page4

33
3. Long drainage canals that also narrow in width, make
drainage more difficult.
• Khlong Thawee Watthana, north-south canal, is about 36 kms., making it
hard to drain floodwater flow due to its length, and further down to Phetkaseam
Rd, the canal width is reduced from 30 to 20 metres, restricting the waterflow even
further. Shrinks further to 5 meters wide at its “tail”.
• drainage is slow and dependent on pumps
Source: The Nation, “Town planning law to be amended”, November 16, 2011
• Khlong Mahasawat is also very long about 36km. It is even harder to
expedite floodwater to Tha Chin and Chao Phraya river as it is a horizontal
canal.
Source: Opening sluice gates higher 'problematic‘, Bangkok Post, November 21, 2011
Therefore upstream areas may benefit from opening the
sluice gates higher but lower stream areas will flood
depending on RID and BMA pumping capacity.

34
4. Blocked khlongs: On the eastern side of the capital, three major canals
had been dredged, and work was underway on four more. On the western side,
where floodwater is flowing through the Tha Chin River, the river's winding
character made it necessary to dig shortcuts to speed up the drainage.
• Canals blocked by water hyacinths, shortage of pumps, bottlenecks (e.g.north
of Hok Wa Lang Canal)
Source: The Nation, “Weeds, lack of pumps hinder flow from city”, October 25, 2011
Emergency nature of
preparations for flood
drainage!!! Many
khlongs lack regular
maintenance.
Source:
http://antoniuni.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/img_0185-
fs.jpg
Photo copyright Antoni P. Uni
antoniuni.wordpress.com

35Source: https://www.facebook.com/bkk.best#!/photo.php?fbid=182368461848261&set=o.186357484732609&type=3&theater
Khlongs filled with rubbish

36
5. Slums built on banks of canal further block water flow in
khlongs.
- Close inspection has uncovered that many structures have been built illegally on
26 waterways in eastern Bangkok, leading to estuaries being redirected or blocked
altogether .
- thus it takes a long time to drain the floods
- the Chuad Ta Thim canal in Bang Na
district seems to have disappeared
altogether and has been replaced by a
luxury housing complex.
- many golf courses and apartments have
allegedly been illegally built on canals,
not to mention several slums along the
riverside
- Suvarnabhumi Airport and several roads
are also allegedly blocking waterways
and water catchment areas.
Source: The Nation, “Many city canals 'illegally blocked‘”,
November 4, 2011
The Nation (2011), “Blocking water not the answer, says AIT
expert”, October 18.

37
Ban Klong Sala Daeng, Samut Prakarn
Source: http://www.bangkok-daytrips.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/saladaeng_1a.jpg
Where’s the khlong?

38
• "Housing estates have gone up and
blocked floodways”. "There's
encroachment on canals, too." (Senator
Decha Boomkhum, deputy chairman of the
committee on settlements and town
planning.)
• Even Suvarnabhumi Airport in Lat
Krabang could be regarded as blocking
eastern Bangkok's natural waterways,
(Suphot Tovichakchaikul, deputy
permanent secretary of the Natural
Resources and Environment Ministry )
Source: The Nation, Town-planning law to be amended, November 16,
2011
Source: The Nation, Suvarnabhumi 'will be safe', November 2, 2011

39
6. Water pushing boats – does it help speed the flow in Chao Phraya, Tha
Chin and Ban Pakong Rivers. Launched by PM Yingluck on Oct 15th, 2011.
Saturday. (Smith Dharmasaroja thinks this is impractical)
Source: The Nation (2011), “PM offers assurances on 'worst floods in history”, October 16.
Source: The Nation, “Experts play down risk to Bangkok”, October 13, 2011
Source: The Nation, “PM enlists more Army help”, October 17, 2011
Source: The Nation, Chao Phraya armada planned to rush river water out to sea,
October 9, 2011

40
Water Management Strategy
sketch by HM the King
Source: Bangkok Post, “Heeding His Majesty’s Advice”,
December 1, 2011
Source: The Nation, Bangkok kept on edge, October 12, 2011
Compare the two:. HM’s strategy will
work only if the floodways are free,
not blocked with “development”.
Land Use Controls as well as proper
planning of city growth expansion
need to be strictly implemented and
followed.
7. Flood Prevention Plan for Bangkok

41
Flood Prevention Strategies in Bangkok
The BMA has employed structural and non-structural measures.
Structural measures include the Polder System that prevents inflow from outside the
polder through the construction of flood barriers such as dykes, earth embankments,
roads and railways. Other structural measures to discharge water out of the polder –
such as pumping stations, water gates, tunnels and sewers, improvement of drainage
canals and the construction and/or improvement of ponds and wells for temporary
retention basins – have been employed primarily in the densely populated areas of the
BMA. Bangkok invested heavily in its water drainage infrastructure after 1983 when
major flooding hit the city. (Source: Bangkok Post, Canals built to take localised floods, October 30,2011)

42
The unit directly responsible for flood management in Bangkok is the Department of
Drainage and Sewerage (DDS) of the BMA. The DDS initiated the construction of a dike
in the eastern part of the BMA. The dike is about 72 kilometers in length and
constructed in cooperation with the BMA, the RID, the Department of Highways and
State Railway of Thailand. Another project is the nearly completed 77kilometer flood
barrier along the Chao Phraya River. The RID also currently manages 20 retention ponds.
Source: IDS (2007), Governance Screening for Urban Climate Change Resilience-building and Adaptation strategies in Asia: Assessment
of Bangkok City, Thailand , August, p. 11
Non-structural measures are mostly utilised in suburban or agricultural areas and
include urban land use control, establishment of forecasting and warning systems and
emergency service teams
• Land Use Control has largely been ineffective in Bangkok
Besides the RID, the BMA cooperates with a number of other concerned agencies to
gather information for decision-making. Table 1 displays the activities of concerned
agencies in cooperation with the BMA for flood prevention and control especially during
the flood events.

43
See land use plan of BMA 2011
Source: http://cpd.bangkok.go.th/db/doc/khetmap/comprehensive-city-plan.zip (downloaded February 15, 2012)
BMA Comprehensive Plan 2011
Where are the floodways?
Rural and Agricultural
Conservation Zone
Hey,
that’s
where I
live!!!

44
Source: Bangkok Post, Floodways key to keeping capital safe NEXT CITY PLAN
CREATES DRAINAGE ZONES IN EAST, WEST , November 20, 2011
Hey,
that’s
where I
live!!!

45
Source: (IDS (2007), Governance Screening for Urban Climate Change Resilience-building and Adaptation strategies in Asia: Assessment of
Bangkok City, Thailand

46
8. In order to drain the flood from upstream there must be close
coordination between RID and BMA. This is a complex system
that due to fragmentation
of control, no agency
understands completely.
No single authority to
control the entire system
of flood gates and pumps
for the system to work
efficiently. For example,
Source: Bangkok Post, Popular blue whales battle a sea of misinformation about crisis, October 30, 2011
• according to RID the BMA
has the capacity to dispose of
10 million cubic metres per
day (in eastern floodways) to
detour runoff from the north
via the Bang Pakong River in
Chachoengsao) depending
on the two sluice gates under
the RID's control at Nong
Chok and Prawet Burirom
canals.
Source: The Nation, Irrigation dept defends
closure of sluice gates, October 27, 2011

47
Evidence of BMA blocking water from Pathumthani
1. Overflowing canal in Pathumthani . "The Hok Wa canal has risen one metre
above its banks," Suchat Janchang complained yesterday. Lam Luk Ka
district chief Panuwat Jenprasert said if Bangkok authorities continued
blocking flood waters, then more than 18,000 rai of the local farmland would
be submerged sustaining huge damages. "Some of them have been flooded
for nearly a month now," he said.
Source: The Nation, “Bangkok escapes wrath of floods”, September 22, 2011
2. In the heavy rains of 2010, Pathumthani residents Klong 6 to 14 were
inundated. They blamed the BMA for closing the floodgates of Klong
Luang Phaeng and Klong Phra Ongchao Chaiyanuchit, so that BMA areas
downstream will not get flooded.
Source: The Nation, “Homes flooded in Angthong as river rises”, Sept. 19, 2010.)

48
The importance of water basin
management capacity.
“Experience has shown that piecemeal or ad hoc approaches
are at risk of causing significant adverse impacts elsewhere.
For example, flood embankments protect one area by
aggravating the flood in another area. Water uses and hazards
need to be addressed holistically for the water basin to
maximize benefits.”
Source: ADB,JICA, WB (2010), Climate Risks and Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities, Synthesis Report, September. P.95

49
“the various state
agencies in charge of
flood control are at odds
on how to proceed. Each
of these many agencies
has its own regulations
and mandates and each
is eager to protect its
own turf, so getting
information about flood
control in Thailand
entails a lot of ''shopping
around''.”
Source: Bangkok Post (2010), Flood Control
planning awash in bureaucracy, November
14.
Flood Control Organizational Structure

50
The Plan to drain the floodwater: FROC’s strategy
Background: Before we discuss the FROC’s strategy, let us study
the following maps to understand water flow.

กรุงเทพฯ
อ่าวไทย
สภาพน้าหลากและการระบายน้า
สนามบิน
สุวรรณภูมิ
+6.5+6.0
+4.0
+3.0
+5.0
+3.0
+2.0
+1.0
+1.5
+1.0
+0.5
+0.75
+0.4
พื้นที่น้าท่วมซ้าซาก
อ่างทอง
สระบุรี
กรุงเทพฯ
ปทุมธานี
สมุทรสาคร
ปราจีนบุรี
ฉะเชิงเทรา
ชลบุรี
อยุธยา
นนทบุรี
นครนายก
สมุทรปราการ
+0.8

52
Source: http://la-cour.eu/filer/flodding_thailand_2011/maps/322706.jpg
Spreading Disaster
of massive runoffs
from the north,
threaten North
Bangkok and West
Bangkok

53
Source: http://www.student-weekly.com/101011/72.jpg
It was difficult to
control the runoff
because Pathum
Thani villagers
forced authorities to
open sluice gates to
release flood water.
The overflow then
flooded the upper
Rangsit area and
then moved closer
to Bangkok’s
northern boundaries.
Source: Bangkok Post, More areas at
risk due to lack of organization,
November 6, 2011

54
Source: http://poleshift.ning.com/profiles/blogs/thailand-bangkok-
627-bangkok-communities-under-water
The Last Barriers
to protect Bangkok

55
Source: The Nation, City fate rests on
barriers, October 19, 2011.
Another view of
emergency barriers
(sandbags) put in
place.

56Source: Bangkok Post, BMA tries to protect city's heart, November 9, 2011
Last hope to prevent
water from reaching
Victory Monument.

57
Source: http://www.bangkokpost.com/media/content/20111103/326025.jpg

58
Source: http://www.thaitravelblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/floodareabangkok_2.jpg
Flood Prevention
Walls and drainage
tunnels of
Bangkok

59
Bangkok’s
Flood-Prone
Areas
Source: Bangkok Post, Evacuation plan readied
City close to losing last line of defence , October 13, 2011.

52
Final Path of
Water in the West
to the sea.
Source: http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/264872/

61
The Plan to drain the floodwater: FROC’s strategy
• There are three outlets for the northern run-off. East, through Bang Pakong
River. West, through Tha Chin River, and through the Centre, via Bangkok's
canal system into the Chao Phraya.
• The east and west of Bangkok is the responsibility of the central government
(RID). The Pheu Thai-led government said they have been letting the water
through, but there was too much of it. However, the Democrat-led opposition
claimed that the government hadn't been letting the water through.
• Bangkok is the responsibility of the BMA, controlled by the Democrat Party.
• Governor Suhumbhand reports (Oct 7) that BMA “has already opened 90%
of its water sluice gate”. The city can drain 1 million cubic meters per day to
the sea but at this time it was difficult to speed up draining as the water levels
in all waterways in the city are very high. Comment: why? From rain?
Source: Bangkok Post, Flood waters bear down on capital, October 8, 2011.

62
Source: Bangkok Post, More areas at risk due to lack of organization, November
6, 2011
Source: The Nation, Bangkok kept on edge, October 12, 2011

63
Source: The Nation, Can Bangkok make it?, October 14, 2011.
The huge
amount of
flood water
that needs to
be drained: 16
Billion cubic
meters and the
capacity of
floodways.
How much can
BMA canal system
add to this if utilized
properly?
16,000 m M3

64
Source: The Nation, Experts play down risk to Bangkok, October 13, 2011.
Low Tide
High Tide

65
• On Wednesday, Oct 19, PM Yingluck asked BMA Governor Sukhumbhand to
open the flood gates of all Bangkok canals. Two days before, Monday, Oct 17,
the water level in Bangkok's canals was very low. There was also low tide in the
Chao Phraya. Boat operators at Saen Saeb canal had to cancel operations
because of low water level.
• The governor replied (Oct 19) that they had to remain closed in anticipation
of rainfall. Why? Were the BMA pumps not working? Why not pump all the water out of
the khlongs?
• The BMA's strategy was to construct flood walls to divert the northern run-
off from Bangkok.
Did BMA’s failure to open the gates as instructed cause unnecessary
damage?
• On Thursday, Oct 20, Governor Sukhumbhand appointed Dr Pramote
Maiklad as the BMA's adviser on the flood situation. Pramote advised
that all water gates should be opened and the floodwater allowed to flow
through the canals of Bangkok into the Chao Phraya and out to sea but it
should be carried out carefully and the situation closely monitored
afterward.
• by doing so, Bangkok would help provide an outlet for the huge mass
of floodwater in the north of the capital

66
• On Thursday October 20, Sukhumbhand succeeded in convincing all that
Bangkok flood gates were opened to help ease floods in the north of Bangkok. It
was hours later that they found out they were closed. Perhaps Sukhumbhand may
have given an order but the officers failed to comply?
Source: The Nation, “Reflection on floods: The mirror has two faces”, October 24, 2011
• On Friday, Oct 21, PM Yingluck invoked the provisions of the Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation Act (2007). This Act gave the prime minister full
authority over the crisis. Those who refuse to follow orders can be prosecuted for
negligence of duty.
• On Oct 21, MR Sukhumbhand said the flood gates had been open all the time,
but added they they could not be fully opened as he had to protect Bangkok from
flooding . On Oct 24, it was reported that its sluice gates were only about halfway
open because the city wants to manage the flow of floodwaters. ????
Source: The Nation, “Expect to be flooded for a month, MP tells Bangkok”, October 24, 2011
• The decision meant that that floodwater from the inundated provinces north of
the capital did not have a major outlet. The governor said his responsibility was
Bangkok, not the provinces. He continued with the strategy to divert the northern
run-off to the east and west.
Source: Bangkok Post, Mismanagement political intrigue? Cruel fate?, October 30, 2011.

67
• But on Oct 26 high tides pushed up the water level in the Chao Phraya.
• The window of opportunity was closed.
Source: The Nation, Curbs on water in Thon Buri, Nonthaburi, Samut Prakan, October 30, 2011
• On Friday, Oct 28, water being released into Bangkok's canals coupled
with high tides caused the Chao Phraya to overflow its embankments.
Source: Bangkok Post, Mismanagement political intrigue? Cruel fate?, October 30, 2011.
Overflowing Chao
Phraya River due to
high tide at Sanghee
Bridge

68
Government Response to Floods:
1. Thailand does not have a long operating disaster management
organizational infrastructure. In 2002, the Department of Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) (Ministry of Interior - MOI) was
established as the principal agency for disaster management coordination
among all agencies concerned at all levels (see next page diagram*).
Source: Panya Consultants (2009), Climate Change Impact and Adaptation Study for Bangkok Metropolitan Region, Final Report, Main
Report, March, pp. 5-8 to 5-11.
Comments:
• does the DDPM have any power? The organizational structure looks
extremely complicated.
• what experience has been gained since 2002 to streamline (improve the
efficiency and effectiveness) of DDPM?
• the lines of authority and chain of command are not clear. (see next page).
• where is the Emergency Operation Centre for Flood, Storm, and
Landslide? Where is the FROC?
• The issue of clear authority and chain of command as well as its legal
force is an important planning issue when designing organizational
structures!! (Someday, some of you will be helping design organizations.)

69
Procedurally, there is a tradition of
• overlapping water management authority,
• no coordination in planning and implementation
among the different water related agencies.
• “In a crisis, the result shifts from inefficiency to utter
chaos.”
Source: Bangkok Post, What Water Management?, October 21, 2011

71
2. PM Yingluck sworn in August 10th, 2011 as the newly elected Prime Minister.
• Toured flooded provinces beginning August 12, assigned cabinet members and
members of parliament to visit affected people, pledged support to local administration
organisations.
• The 24/7 Emergency Operation Center for Flood, Storm and Landslide was set up on
August 20 under the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Department of the Ministry of
Interior to coordinate warning and relief efforts. Interior Minister Yongyuth Wichaidit
was appointed as the head of the Emergency Operation Center.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Thailand_floods
• The RID issued a warning of disaster as storms came in September and October.
• 28 out of 33 big dams showed more than 80 percent capacity.
• RID alerted farmers and authorities in Central Region and lower North to organise an
early rice harvest to save crops.
• Hydrology and Water Management Office declared a red alert – a highest critical level 3
– on water management on September 5th, 2011 but the government did not
acknowledge the crisis at hand.
• First week of October, Bhumibol Dam opened its emergency spillway for five
consecutive days. Source: The Nation, “Lethargy over water woes will hurt govt”, October 11, 2011

72
• Early morning Thursday October 6th, run-off was approaching Ayutthaya .
Between saving the Asian Highway or the Rojana Industrial Estate, Transport
Minister Sukumpol Suwanatat took swift action to save the country's electronics
hub.
• If the Rojana industrial estate is flooded, others such as the Map Ta Phut
Industrial Estate would suffer a downstream effect because it is a key
supplier of industrial parts to the other industrial estates, according to
Science and Technology Minister Plodprasop Suraswadi.
Source: Bangkok Post, Highway sacrificed to protect industry, October 8, 2011.
• On Friday, October 7th 2011, PM Yingluck appeared on national TV to inform
the public of the flood situation and formed the National Flood Relief Centre
(FROC) led by Justice Minister Pracha Promnok. The centre, activated on
Saturday October 8th, took over Yongyuth's 24/7 Emergency Operation Centre
for Flood, Storm and Landslide.
Source: The Nation, “Lethargy over water woes will hurt govt”, October 11, 2011

73
Asia Highway
Source: The Nation, October 7, 2011.

74
3.0. The implementation of The Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007
on October 21, 2011 gave the Prime Minister the full authority over state
officials around the country, including the BMA (Article 31) . However, it
did not render the FROC any more effective because its provisions were not
fully utilized by the Prime Minister.
• Those who refuse to follow orders can be prosecuted for negligence of
duty. The prime minister becomes director of the relief operation.
Source: Bangkok Post, “PM invokes natural disaster law”, October 21, 2011
• The central government via FROC by issuing a disaster warning for the
capital could have taken control (but did not) over the BMA’s sluice gates
to coordinate flood control and drain run-off into the sea in the most
timely and efficient manner.
• In past cases of disaster, provincial governors were the main enforcers
of the law.
Source: The Nation, Powers and limitations of Disaster Act, October 22, 2011

75
• as mandated by the disaster law, all relevant agencies must comply with
uniformity to the FROC, such as the issue of opening sluice gates to regulate
the water flow.
Source: The Nation, PM steps up control, October 22, 2011
• The act has a more limited mandate than the emergency decree. The
disaster provisions apply mainly to civilian officials and the prime minister is
obligated to issue a separate order to involve the military in flood control.
Source: The Nation, Powers and limitations of Disaster Act, October 22, 2011
• under Section 31 of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act, any person
is prohibited from disrupting the authorities' disaster management works and
gives powers to local administrative officials to remove or destroy any
structures that obstruct disaster control operations. Did FROC use these
powers effectively to remove obstructions like slum housing along khlongs,
and arrest anyone destroying sandbags? Is there legal backing to FROC’s
powers?
Source: Source: Bangkok Post, “Gov’t makes barriers off limits, Public prohibited from interfering in relief work”, October 24, 2011

76
4. Establishment of the FROC (Flood- Relief Operation Command)
4.1. main purpose was to enable representatives of numerous government
agencies to work in an “integrative approach” to the flood problem.
• It is an ad hoc (a reaction to the flood crisis), not proactive organization. A
Task Force (temporary arrangement). The disaster caught the government
completely by surprise and “showed it lacked sufficiently constructive
forethought involved, long before any suggestion of an impending flood
scenario.”
Source: Bangkok Post, Crisis management versus political expedience, November 9, 2011
4.2. By this time floods have ravaged 28 provinces and affected the lives of more
than 2.69 million people. The death toll from the disaster has reached 252. PM
Yingluck supervised overall flood-relief operations, Justice Minister Pracha
Promnok has been named director of the Flood-Relief Operation Command and
Science and Technology Minister Poldprasop Suraswadi, the Chief of Operations.
• IS THIS THE JOB OF THE PRIME MINISTER?
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Flood-war-room-set-to-swing-into-action-30167143.html

77
4.3. Lack of suitability and lack of experience of FROC officials in disaster
management. Everybody was new to the job.
• When PM Yingluck Shinawatra informed the country in a national televised
address on Oct. 7, 2011, she admitted her government was almost at its wits'
end dealing with the disaster.
Source: Bangkok Post, Flood waters bear down on capital, October 8, 2011.
• Pracha Promnok is a Police General and Minister of Justice and Party Chief
Advisor of Peau Paendin, while Plodprasop Suraswadi was former director-
general of the Department of Fisheries, former director-general of
Department of Forestry, former director of Chiang Mai Night Safari and
former director of the National Disaster Warning Center.
Source: http://www.antithaksin.com/BlankForm.php?Aid=0802027
• Tirachai Wuthitham, secretary to Justice Minister Pracha Promnok, who heads
FROC reported that the FROC never had a systematic plan to battle the crisis
and has simply tackled problems as they have arisen on a day-to-day basis.
Source: The Nation, Aide to Pracha admits lack of planning at FROC, November 20, 2011
• PM Yingluck and other officials did not heed recommendations from advisers
or was late to implement them, which aggravated the intensity of the flood
crisis.
Source: Bangkok Post, “Crisis response exposes leadership failure”, November 3, 2011

78
4.4 “Panic mode” disaster management
• on Sunday October 9, PM Yingluck demanded the governors of ten
provinces under severe flooding to come up with comprehensive measures
for dealing with the situation by 6 pm Monday, October 10th.
• comment: how can they possibly do this when this is the first time a
flood of this magnitude occurred in recent years? Do these provinces
have disaster management planning capacity?
Source: The Nation, “PM demands 10 provinces to submit comprehensive flood measures by 6 pm”, October 9, 2011
• Former Pathum Thani
Governor Pheerasak
Hinmuangkao fainted under
the weight of stress a few
days after he was transferred
to the post of Interior
Ministry's inspector general.
Source: The Nation, Pathum Thani's ex-governor faints
from stress. October 26, 2011

79
• But: according to the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act, B.E. 2550
(2007), Section 56: all Provincial Governors and BMA Governor "shall
finish the formulating of the Disaster and Mitigation Plan in accordance to
this Act within two years after this Act is enforced" (i.e., by 2009).
• Comment: Did these plans exist? From the way the crisis has
unfolded it seemed: there were no plans, there were no provisions for
coordination (especially with BMA).
Source: Bangkok Post, “ Canals Built to take Localised Floods”, October 30, 2011.

80
4.5 FROC internal organization was chaotic
4.5.1 Politics over expert knowledge: flip-flopping between optimistic and
pessimistic forecasts on scope of Bangkok flooding and lack of advanced
information about areas at imminent risk of flooding.
Source: Takeshi Fujitani (2011),” Experts, officials disagree on scope of Bangkok flooding”. November 2,
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/south_east_asia/AJ2011110216346
4.5.2 Lack of clear information: “Since the start of the flood crisis in July,
the authorities: FROC, City Hall and bureaucrats did not give the public a
clear picture of what was going on, the possible courses of action, which
ones they would choose to implement and why.”
• it created a widespread sense of anxiety, confusion and uncertainty
Source: Bangkok Post Opinion, Lost in Flood, Information, November 15, 2011.
• there was no warning from the government or local authorities that
floodwater in Bang Bua Thong district would rise to more than 1 metre,
leaving no time for many residents to prepare for the flooding.
Source: Bangkok Post, Govt slammed for lack of boats, relief , Furious residents claim response was too slow, October 21, 2011

81
• examples of conflicting information: When the Nava Nakorn Industrial
Estate was flooded on Monday, October 17th, FROC spokesman Wim
Rungwattanajinda told people to evacuate in seven hours, but Pol Gen Pracha
said that moving belongings to high ground should suffice. This left the
public confused.
• Bangkok residents were relieved to hear that the capital was declared safe,
with massive floodwaters moving past on Sunday, October 16th. On Monday,
they were told Bangkok was actually still at risk.
Source: Bangkok Post, Govt wrestles with telling truth or lies about floods, October 19, 2011
• a senior official spoke of "secret" plans relating to the handling of flood
that cannot be revealed. As a result, people lose faith in the pronouncements
of politicians, regardless of their political affiliation.
Source: Bangkok Post Editorial, Bangkok Not Waterproof, October 22, 2011
• BMA Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra backtracked from his vow that the
capital could escape massive flooding, saying he never promised the capital
would not be inundated.
Source: The Nation, “Evacuation centres ready: city officials”, October 10, 2011

82
• When Ban Prao floodgate in Pathum Thani's Sam Kok district was not going
to be finished on time, Minister Plodprasob, FROC’s chief of flood relief
operations announcement on TV on Thursday evening October 13th, that people
in those northern Bangkok districts should start moving their belongings as
flood water as high as one metre could be heading towards these districts caused
widespread panic. Justice Minister Pracha Promnok, FROC Director had to
come out to allay fears, telling the media that no evacuation order had been
issued, or even suggested.
• PM Yingluck defended Plodprasob's "good intention", but FROC stated
that public announcements concerning the flooding were to come from
Pracha alone.
• BMA Governor Sukhumbhand then told Bangkokians to listen to flood
updates concerning the capital from him only.
Source: The Nation, Conflicting updates cause flood of confusion, October 15, 2011.
• in the place of unified command, you end up with a contest of power which
creates more uncertainty.
Asked by reporters whether the people should listen to the FROC or the BMA,
the Minister Plodprasop said, "I am 176cm tall, but the governor's not as tall as
me. "I am taller so people have to listen to me. What do you expect my response
to be?"
Source: Bangkok Post, “All districts in Bangkok still 'at risk'”, November 2, 2011

83
• Bangkok businesses say unclear and inadequate flood information is
making it harder for them to make preparations. Both the FROC and the
BMA have failed to provide clear forecasts about how much water could
arrive in the capital and when, said Chai Srivikorn, president of
Ratchaprasong Square Trade Association.
Source:Bangkok Post, “City firms decry information gap”, October 28, 2011

84Source: The Nation, Conflicting flood info frustrates private sector, October 28, 2011
Source: The Nation, October 16, 2011
Did Big Business know
something that the rest
of the public didn’t
know? Note the
height of sandbag wall
around office buildings
at Silom Road!!!!

85
• “infantalizing” the public by keeping them in the dark because the
government fears that telling the truth might cause panic.
• An ABAC poll showed that the FROC had failed in credibility. On a scale of
0 to 10, FROC scored only 3.6, reflecting growing public impatience with the
government's approach to the crisis.
• Sources at the flood relief operation centre at Don Mueang airport said that
concerned ministers and authorities were at loggerheads about how to deal with
the floods.
• Some wanted to tell the truth to the public, while others thought playing it
close to the chest was the best policy. The conflict between Science and
Technology Minister Plodprasop Suraswadi and Justice Minister Pracha
Promnok is a case in point. Mr Plodprasop's recent flood alert was retracted by
Pol Gen Pracha, head of the flood relief centre, who thought that telling the
truth would hurt the government's image.
Source: Bangkok Post (2011), “Govt wrestles with telling truth or lies about floods”, October 19.

86
4.5.3 Lack of systematic opeational procedures caused more chaos and
frustration.
Protesting residents at Don Muang claimed they were told by their local MP,
Karun Hosakul, that the government's Flood Relief Operations Command
(Froc) had consented to their demand to make a hole in the big bag flood
barrier and release some of the water occupying their homes – but FROC
denied it gave permission.
People gather at the big bag barrier in Don
Mueang on Nov 13, 2011
Source: Bangkok Post, Messy handling of big bag floodwall protest,
November 14, 2011

87
4.6. Failure of FROC to secure cooperation of BMA
4.6.1 BMA was uncooperative from the very beginning. BMA officials started to
join the team at FROC only in the second week.
Source: Bangkok Post, “Drainage system not up to task”, October 30, 2011
• Before issuing the disaster warning for Bangkok (Disaster Mitigation Act of
2007), Yingluck chaired a high level meeting to assess the situation, particularly the
runoff heading toward the capital. BMA Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra was
absent. Source: The Nation, PM steps up control, October 22, 2011
• In the early part, Bangkok Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra insisted that his
administration was capable of managing the situation in the capital and told the
Pheu Thai-led government to focus its attention elsewhere.
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Flood-war-room-set-to-swing-into-action-30167143.html
4.6.2 BMA’s reluctance to open water gates in the eastern part of the city to drain
floodwater out to the sea, caused the flood crisis in the Central Plains to ease only
slowly.
Source: Bangkok Post, “Yingluck says city ill prepared for floods”, October 12, 2011

88
• Asked if the refusal to open the inner canals (BMA) would affect the water
level in Khlong Rangsit, MR Sukhumbhand said Khlong Rangsit was not his
responsibility but the government's. !!!!!
Source: Bangkok Post, “Latest plan to save Bangkok Published”, October 20, 2011
• Acknowledgement by FROC Chief of Operations, Plodprasop that FROC and
BMA were not cooperating well enough in terms of watergate management so
that drainage from flooded upstream provinces can be speeded up into the Gulf
of Thailand.
Source: Bangkok Post, “Scared City Folk Prepare for the Worst in Bangkok”, October 9, 2011
4.6.3 BMA contradicting FROC. Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra,,said he
did not believe information from the government-run Flood Relief Operations
Command (FROC) indicating that the flow of water from the North was
slowing.
Source: The Nation, “PM hopeful but governor fears a second wave”, November 1, 2011

89
4.6.4 Lack of unified command. Yingluck seemed not to want to exercise
control or have a direct confrontation with BMA over water management.
In response to Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra's move to use the Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation Act 2007 and order for the BMA to open watergates so
that flood water can be let through to the sea, Sukhumbhand said the government
had not notified the BMA to open watergates 100 per cent but had let the agency
exercise its own judgement.
Source: The Nation, “Bangkok water gates not fully opened: Governor”, October 23, 2011.
4.6.5 Continued bureaucratic approach in doing things. For example to secure
more pumps from RID, BMA sent a letter to the wrong ministry therefore taking a
long time to arrive plus causing interagency misunderstandings.
Source: Bangkok Post, “Dispute over pumps for Thon Buri”, November 4, 2011
• Chart Thai Pattana advisory chairman and former prime minister Banharn Silapa-
archa in a press conference advised BMA governor to phone the RID chief directly
if the BMA urgently wanted more water pumps.
Source: Bangkok Post, Sukhumbhan advised to phone RID, November 5, 2011.

90
The conflict between the central government and the Bangkok
authority heightened yesterday when the governor and the chief of
the irrigation department engaged in a war of words during a
meeting on flood control.
Source: The Nation, Irrigation dept chief slams governor over accusation, November 5, 2011.

91
The Nation cartoon making fun of Yingluck’s
indecisiveness
Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show.php?pageid=6&id=30&pid=11884

92
4.7 Failure to understand hydraulic properties of entire system of canals.
• City Hall’s reluctance to open water gates in the eastern part of the city to
drain floodwater out to the sea caused the flood crisis in the Central Plains to
ease only slowly. BMA Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra, explained that
he decided not to fully open the water gates for fear that it would cause
severe flooding in Samut Prakan province, not just to safeguard the capital.
Comment:
• was he overly cautious because of poor operational procedures and
coordination with non-BMA agencies?
• In fact: canals in Samut Prakan have been ready to receive flood water
drainage from Bangkok for almost three weeks but little volume of water
was discharged from Bangkok's watergates. Samut Prakan, the last area
before flood water flows to the sea, has 9 pump stations and could drain
about 40 million cubic metres per day of water into the Gulf of Thailand.
Source: The Nation, “Samut Prakan ready to take Bangkok overflow : experts”, October 22, 2011

93
• Pramote Maiklad, a former director general of the RID, said the BMA might
be confused about how water flows and urged the Bangkok administration to
work closely with RID, which knows which gates should be opened or closed.
(comment: BMA may not understand hydraulics of entire Chao Phraya basin since it takes care only
of BMA drainage.)
Source: The Nation, “Irrigation dept defends closure of sluice gates”, October 27, 2011
Source: http://www.thailandqa.com/images_03/IMG_4206.jpg
Source:
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/admin/specials/nationphoto/photo/r
kZ7Ouw.JPG
Pumping Station in Samut Prakarn

94
พ.ต.ต.เสงี่ยม สำรำญรัตน์
Source:
http://akecity.blogspot.com/2011_11_01_ar
chive.html
• In Min Buri district, Pol MajGeneral Sangiam
Samranrat, an official from the PM's
SecretaryGeneral Office, said they would not lift
the sluice gate by two metres as demanded by
Bueng Kum residents, because he needed three or
four days to inspect downstream Saen Saeb Canal.
Comment: 4 DAYS!!!!! DOES NOT UNDERSTAND
HYDRAULICS SYSTEM OF CANALS
Source: The Nation, Evacuations ordered in Bueng Kum as floods approach BKK's inner
areas, November 8, 2011
Source:
http://thaiwhoiswho.blogspot.com/2011/12/blog-
post.html

95
4.8 FROC did not fully enforce the law on violators.
• Expressways became parking lots as are thousands of cars illegally double parked or even
triple parked on the expressway to escape the flood in Bangkok.
Source: Bangkok Post, When Bangkokians Panic, October 20, 2011.
• The warning: “Any car parked on the expressways will be detected by the CCTVs and
will be moved away consequently” was not implemented because the announcement came too
late when thousands of cars were already parked on the expressways.
Source: http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255410230018&tb=NEWS&return=ok
Source: http://xba.xanga.com/7dfe0421c5c35279368166/b222546455.jpg
Source:
http://www.demotiximages.com/sites/default/files/imagecac
he/large_610x456_scaled/photos/894553.jpg
Source: http://asiancorrespondent.com/67712/thailand-floodwaters-reach-outer-bangkok/
"The motorists are breaking law," Pol Maj Gen Panu.

96
4.8 FROC did not fully enforce the law on violators (continued).
• FROC did not penalize Pheu Thai MP Keng Karun who was
accused by Pak Kret district chief Wisit Phuangphet for demolition of a 1
kilometre section of clay wall near an intersection where Prapa Canal
meets Chaeng Wattana Road, letting in flood water. Karun denied this.
Source: The Nation, “Boundary guarded as canal secured further”, October 22, 2011
• no strict monitoring of prices of essential goods during
floods. Although the Commerce Ministry yesterday had
announced 16 additional price-controlled goods,
including flashlights, life vests, water pump, drinking
water, toothpaste, sand and sandbags, and small boats.
Source: The Nation, Bt325-bn rehab budget approved by Cabinet, October 26, 2011.
• Commerce Minister Kittiratt suggested people
should refuse to buy eggs which are sold at inflated
prices.(8 baht each) and buy other food
items instead. !!!!!
Source: Bangkok Post, Kittiratt: No shortage of essentials, October 28, 2011.
Hoarding and panic buying in Bangkok.
Empty shelves at Tesco Lotus
Source: http://digitaljournal.com/img/2/7/7/2/0/3/i/9/7/0/o/tesco.jpg

97
The basis for enforcing the law disappeared when the
government could not relieve people’s sufferings.

98
4.8 FROC did not fully enforce the law on violators. (continued)
• The law stipulates 7 years in prison and a 10,000-baht fine for anyone caught
ripping off their fellow flood victims! The Department of Internal Trade had arrested
34 shop owners for failing to display price tags on their products. Despite such a high
number of arrests for the heinous crime of not having labels, profiteering went on.
Source: Bangkok Post, How to lose a flood in ten days, November 12, 2011.
• Khlong Phraya Suren sluice gate
dispute. Who broke the law? Sangiam
or Sukhumbhand? Residents reportedly
heard the governor agreeing to open the sluice
gate at one meter wide, but BMA didn't do
anything. Pol MajGeneral Sangiam Samranrat of
the PM's Secretary General Office thus got the
letter in which Pracha asked for BMA
cooperation and filed a complaint at the Sai Mai
police station before joining others to open the
sluice gate. Sukhumbhand said he will sue
Sangiam. Sukhumbhand denied the Froc request
because it will flood Sai Mai and Bang Khen
districts.
Source: The Nation, Governor and protesters lock horns, November 30,
2011
Bangkok Post, Sukhumbhand denies Froc request to raise sluice gate,
November 29, 2011
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Tension-over-sluice-gates-ease-
30171015.html

99
4.9 Politicization of relief distribution
• Accusations over red shirt areas being favored in relief supplies and MPs
attaching their names/pictures to relief goods even if these were from public
contributions.
Source: The Nation, “Spat over flood relief supplies”, October 26, 2011
• Froc allowed red shirt partisans, apparently directed by Don Muang MP
Karun Hosakul, to subvert the aid. A truckload went out with the banner,
"With Love From Pol Lt Col Dr Thaksin Shinawatra."
Source: Bangkok Post, At the mercy of our politicians, November 1, 2011
• Within FROC, politicians of various shades clash over priorities and areas
that should get aid first.
Source: The Nation, Children's games continue despite emergency, November 10, 2011

100
Source:
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/nationphoto/show-
new.php?pageid=0&id=1&pid=11879#.Tq6luGxVRvw.facebook
Natthawut denies red shirts being favoured, says
MPs not claiming credit for supplies
Source: The Nation, Spat over flood relief supplies, October 26, 2011
SUPPLY DEMAND
Flood victims reach out for relief supplies
handed out by authorities in Saphan Mai market,
Bang Khen district.
Source: Bangkok Post, Residents threaten BMA staff, October 31, 2011

101
LOTS OF DEMAND FOR RELIEF GOODS
Officials try to keep order among
residents of Saphan Mai, Bang
Khen district, as they emerge
from flooded side sois after
hearing relief trucks were arriving
with supplies of food and water.
Source: Bangkok Post, Angry residents complicating
flood control, October 31, 2011
The residents of Saphan Mai, Bang
Khen district, have been stranded in
their homes for more than a week.
Source: Bangkok Post, Residents threaten BMA staff, October
31, 2011.

102
By contrast - Japanese victims of March 2011
earthquake/tsunami lining up for relief assistance.

103
4.10 The government FROC was hampered by lack of sandbags and pumps.
• all government agencies were running out of sandbags for floodwalls. PM
Yingluck announced that the government would buy all the sandbags
available in the market.
• FROC could not provide
more pumps to BMA since
most water pumps were
already in use. FROC
orders more pumps from
other provinces but these
were not enough to cover 60
requested pumps. It takes
about 4-5 days to buy from
abroad. Why not order more
pumps?
• FROC asks if private sector
can sell/rent to FROC.
Source: Bangkok Post, Please don't destroy Big Bag,
November 5, 2011
Source: Bangkok Post cartoon, October 13, 2011

104
• As a result, the government was criticized for slow response during
emergencies, as shown in the lack of boats for evacuation and relief, no
warning given in the case of Bang Bua Thong.
Source: Bangkok Post, “Govt moves to protect inner city, Govt slammed for lack of boats, relief, Furious residents claim response was too slow”,
October 21, 2011
Source: Bangkok Post, “Govt moves to protect inner city, Govt slammed
for lack of boats, relief, Furious residents claim response was too slow”,
October 21, 2011
The situation in Nonthaburi's Bang Bua Thong and Pak Kret districts was critical October 20th,
as a massive volume of water suddenly flowed into the municipality area and markets, inundating
hundreds of vehicles and causing residents to flee their homes.
Source: The Nation, Flooding in Bang Bua thong, Pak Kret hits critical levels,
October 20, 2011

105
Source: Deluge surprises
Bang Bua Thong, October
21, 2011
Source: Bangkok Post, PM takes
charge of flood crisis, October 22,
2011
Source: Bangkok
Post, Outside the
flood walls, October
19, 2011
Bang Bua
Thong
flood
chaos
2011

106
Source:
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/admin/specials/nationphoto/photo/
tzE6Ycs.jpg
http://www.bangkokpost.com/multimedia/photo/262376/bang-
bua-thong-flooded

107
5.0 FROC capitulates to BMA? Flood Relief Operations Command announced
on October 23 that all parties in the government sector agreed that floodwater
from Bangkok's northern outskirts had to be drained through canals in the eastern
districts of the capital and Samut Prakan province into the sea.
Source: Source: Bangkok Post, “Gov’t makes barriers off limits, Public prohibited from interfering in relief work”, October 24, 2011
• was this due to BMA’s reluctance to share the flood burden?
• “If Bangkok is crippled, the economy will be crippled. If the economy is
crippled, who will suffer most? Certainly not big businesses, but the
ordinary people, the workers, the people who send their money home to the
provinces.” BMA Governor Sukhumbhand rejected criticism that flooding
north of the city was made worse because city officials waited too long to
open Bangkok’s canal system. Bangkok and its vicinity account for about
half of Thailand’s industrial output, according to government statistics.
Source: Daniel Ten Kate and Suttinee Yuvejwattana, ‘Mob Rule’ Threatens Bangkok’s Business Areas With Floods, Governor Says, Nov
1, 2011 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/-mob-rule-threatens-bangkok-s-business-areas-with-floods-governor-says.html)
• Information and Communication Technology Minister Anudith Nakornthap
yesterday said the government has to save the heart of Bangkok which is densely
populated and housed important economic areas. Its protection would speed up
rehabilitation of other parts of the country. Do you agree?
Source: Bangkok Post, “Latest plan to save Bangkok Published”, October 20, 2011

108
• Why did PM Yingluck not exercise her power based on the Disaster
Mitigation Act? Why does she sound subservient to BMA Governor
Sukhumbhand?
•Asked about a criticism that the BMA was too selfish for designating
Nonthaburi as a water retention zone to spare Bangkok from floods, PM
Yingluck said she did not want to say so.
• “I would like to ask for mercy (kwaam songsan?) and cooperation
from the BMA to consider which sluice gates could be wider open to
help ease hardships of the people affected by the flooding. The nature of
water is that it must have a way to go. But if its way is blocked, the
water draining would not be possible”, she said.
Source: The Nation, Yingluck denies she is shedding tears, October 28, 2011
Source:
https://www.facebook.com/
bkk.best#!/photo.php?fbid=
10150423415466118&set=
o.186357484732609&type
=3&theater
versus

109
• or was it because FROC believed that BMA was the only one that knew
how to operate its internal canal drainage system?
When asked why Bangkokians remained dry at the expense of Nonthaburi,
Yingluck said she wanted people in Bangkok to cooperate and let the flood
water to be directed through their areas. She said she had told FROC to
discuss this issue with both sides and find solutions. She also urged the
BMA to look at the overall picture and find ways to drain the water, adding
that the government had no information about the BMA's drainage
system and capacity.
Source: The Nation, Yingluck wants everyone to cooperate, November 24, 2011
Comment : But what does cooperate mean???? That others are willing to
suffer and not complain when not adequately compensated?

110
The Nation cartoon making fun of the conflict between
Yingluck and Sukhumbhand.

111
Source: The Nation cartoon, October 18, 2011
Source: The Nation cartoon, October 11, 2011
Some are
more dry
than others.
• as a result of the government's plan
to sacrifice outlying areas to save the
inner city, communities clashed
increasingly with central authorities,
both from the Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration and the Royal
Irrigation Department.
Source: Sanitsuda Ekachai, Development that leads to
destruction, Bangkok Post, November 3, 2011

112
Source: Bangkok Post cartoon, November 4, 2011
And whose interests was the government protecting?
"I pay the same tax as the people in Bangkok, why didn't they think of me too?" said a teary-eyed
Wanpen Rittisarn, in Bang Pahan, about 100 kilometres north of Bangkok. The 41-year-old had
to abandon her home after it was inundated by two metres (six feet) of water, seeking the relative
safety of the nearby town, which has now also been overrun by floodwaters.
Source: Amelie Bottollier-Depois, Bangkok's neighbours shoulder flood burden
Oct 8, 2011 http://www.mysinchew.com/node/64817?tid=10
Where is EQUITY?

113
The floods have:
“underlined Thailand's urban-rural divide which has underpinned a broader
national polarisation and conflict since Thaksin's departure. Downstream
provinces were awash in order to divert waters away from central Bangkok. The
Thai capital was kept mostly dry at the expense of its surrounding areas. If
Bangkok shares some of the flooding, economic damage will mount but a sense of
equality and justice will prevail. When the floods go through the capital, they will
find faster release into the Gulf of Thailand.”
Source: Thitinan Pongsudhirak(2011), The politics behind Thailand's floods. The Guardian, October 21, 2011
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/21/thailand-floods-bangkok )

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