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Mr Jaganath Sankaran - Evaluating the EPAA Missile Defense System: Does it Threaten Russian ICBMs? What Measures of Cooperation with Russia are Viable?
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Mr Jaganath Sankaran - Evaluating the EPAA Missile Defense System: Does it Threaten Russian ICBMs? What Measures of Cooperation with Russia are Viable?

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This is a presentation delivered by Mr Jaganath Sankaran, at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference 2014.

This is a presentation delivered by Mr Jaganath Sankaran, at the RUSI Missile Defence Conference 2014.

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  • 1. Evaluating the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Missile Defense System: Does EPAA Threaten Russian ICBMs? What Measures Of Cooperation With Russia Are Viable? RUSI Missile Defense Conference Session II - March 18, 2014 Jaganath Sankaran Post-Doctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Managing the Atom Project Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University This research was performed as a Stanton Nuclear Security Post-Doctoral Fellow from August, 2012 to August, 2013 at the RAND Corporation. The views expressed are the author’s.
  • 2. The Policy Problem – A Seeming Disagreement over EPAA Capability • The United States and NATO have endorsed EPAA for defense against Iranian ballistic missiles • Russia has raised concerns about the effect of EPAA on its deterrent forcesEPAA on its deterrent forces • Russia has pegged further nuclear arms reductions to a resolution of these concerns Analysis of EPAA performance can inform discussions on these issues. 2
  • 3. Architecture of the EPAA Missile Defense System Russian ICBM trajectories Iranian missile trajectories EPAA Sites
  • 4. Estimating the Performance of EPAA without the SM-3 Block IIB Interceptor • EPAA Phase IV (SM-3 Block IIB with Vbo of 5.5 km/s) has been cancelled, leaving only slower interceptors in planned deployment – Does this change the perceived threat to Russian– Does this change the perceived threat to Russian ICBMs? – Does it render all Russian concerns invalid; i.e. will this action make both Aegis-Ashore and ship-based Aegis ineffective against Russia? – Is the system still capable of effectively defending against Iranian threats? (Not discussed here, but yes) 4
  • 5. Bottom Line: Results From the Analytic Evaluation of EPAA • The currently planned interceptors do not allow EPAA to reach Russian ICBMs aiming for the U.S., even given optimistic assumptions for defensedefense • Analytic result dependent only upon final velocity of interceptors, which is realtively easier for Russia to verify by monitoring EPAA inteceptor flight tests
  • 6. Does EPAA as Currently Conceived Threaten Russia?Threaten Russia? 6
  • 7. Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack (no time delay) Vbo < 3.5 km/s Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s Vbo > 5.5 km/s Offense: Russian ICBM Missile Attack from Vypolzovo, Russia to Washington D.C. Defense: From Aegis Ashore SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in Redzikowo, Poland 7 ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and (3) No Countermeasures Vypolzovo, Russia Washington D.C., U.S.A Redzikowo, Poland
  • 8. Defense Against Russian ICBM Attacks – EPAA Phase II Aegis-Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania with SM3-IB with a Vbo of 3.5 km/s does not have a capacity to intercept this particular (or any other) Russian missile trajectory. – Neither does Phase III Aegis-Ashore site in– Neither does Phase III Aegis-Ashore site in Redzikowo, Poland with SM3-IIA with a Vbo of 4.5 km/s. – In fact, even the canceled SM3-IIB with a Vbo of 5.5 km/s has no capability against this particular Russian trajectory. – What about other Russian launch locations? Are they vulnerable? 8
  • 9. Defense Against Russian ICBM Attacks on U.S. East Coast– All Launch Locations 120 seconds is a very favorable estimate of the time needed by the Globus II radar in Norway to start tracking Russian ICBMs. The real-world conditions will be more demanding.
  • 10. Are there other deployments of EPAA (outside current U.S. plans) that might interceptcurrent U.S. plans) that might intercept Russian ICBMs? 10
  • 11. Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack (no time delay) Vbo < 3.5 km/s Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s Vbo > 5.5 km/sVypolzovo, Russia North Sea 11 ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and (3) No Countermeasures Russia Washington D.C., U.S.A Offense: Russian ICBM Missile Attack from Vypolzovo, Russia to Washington D.C. Defense: From Ship-based SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in the North Sea Area
  • 12. Defending Against Russian ICBM Attack (no time delay) Vbo < 3.5 km/s Vbo > 3.5 & ≤ 4.0 km/s Vbo > 4.0 & ≤ 4.5 km/s Vbo > 4.5 & ≤ 5.0 km/s Vbo > 5.0 & ≤ 5.5 km/s Vbo > 5.5 km/s Bershet, Russia Barents Sea 12 ASSUMPTIONS: (1) Perfect Tracking Information, (2) Minimum energy trajectory, and (3) No Countermeasures San Francisco, U.S.A Offense: Russian ICBM Missile Attack from Bershet, Russia to San Francisco Defense: From Ship-based SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) located in the Barents Sea Area
  • 13. Joint (North and Barents Sea) Defense Against Russian ICBM Attacks
  • 14. Cancelation of SM3-IIB Should Resolve All Plausible Russian Concerns • The baseline EPAA deployment after the cancelation of the SM3-IIB allows a strong analytic result: – The baseline EPAA deployment can not kinematically reach Russian ICBMs, even with implausibly short time delays • Realistic time delays eliminates the theoretical capability to engage Russian ICBMs with EPAA Aegis Ships with the SM3-engage Russian ICBMs with EPAA Aegis Ships with the SM3- IIA in the North Sea and the Barents Sea The cancelation of the SM3-IIB has in effect removed any threat from EPAA to the Russian deterrent potential against the United States. 14
  • 15. What measures of cooperation between NATO and Russia arebetween NATO and Russia are viable?
  • 16. Russian Position on Cooperation • Medvedev: “We do not want next generations of politicians in 2019 or 2020 to take decisions which would open a new page in arms race. But such a threat exists and everyone in Russia and the U.S. should understand this.” • Russia wants legally binding “military-technical” guaranteesguarantees – Certain changes to the algorithms of the missile defense radars – Refraining from bringing Aegis ships into areas that are in proximity to trajectories of Russian ICBMs – Stationing Russian observers at U.S. and NATO missile defense installations – Formulating a mechanism to monitor the implementation of these measures
  • 17. U.S./NATO Position on Cooperation • The U.S. Senate resolution supporting ratification of New START specifically states that it would not accept any limitations on missile defense • U.S. will not accept limits on capabilities and numbers of missile defense systems or on where Aegis ships deploymissile defense systems or on where Aegis ships deploy • Non-binding political agreement affirming U.S. missile defenses are not aimed at Russia • Prominent scholarly suggestion rest on data sharing about interceptors. However, it is not clear what data can be provided that they are not capable of independently obtaining.
  • 18. Possible Measures of Cooperation • Cooperation might instead be achieved via a range of disparate interactions. • Missile Defense isn’t always about Missile Defense – Not irreducible to technical arguments? Deployments close to Russia’s border regions – Russia wants to retain a say in (future) U.S. missile defense– Russia wants to retain a say in (future) U.S. missile defense plans? Reflection of broader U.S.-Russia relations? • Dialogue on Threat Assessment (Iran, North Korea) • Joint Data Exchange Center – Some form of monitoring U.S. missile defense operations – Demonstrating limitations of current U.S. space-based and ground-based early warning/missile tracking systems
  • 19. Thank you. Questions.
  • 20. EPAA Defense Against Present Iranian Threats 20
  • 21. EPAA Would Reach Present Iranian Threats Interceptor Interceptor Location Target Missile Targeted Location Distance to targeted location (km) Intercept Possible? SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Eastern Mediterranean Sea Iranian Shahab-3/3A Incirlik Air Base, Turkey 964 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Eastern Mediterranean Sea Iranian Shahab-3/3A (depressed trajectory) Incirlik Air Base, Turkey 964 YES trajectory) SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Shahab-3/3A Incirlik Air Base, Turkey 964 NO SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Eastern Mediterranean Sea Iranian Shahab-3/3A Izmir Air Base, Turkey 1670 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Shahab-3/3A Izmir Air Base, Turkey 1670 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Shahab-3/3A (depressed trajectory) Izmir Air Base, Turkey 1670 YES
  • 22. EPAA Would Reach Future Iranian Threats Interceptor Interceptor Location Target Missile Targeted Location Distance to targeted location (km) Intercept Possible? SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir Camp Darby, Italy 3064 YES SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) Redzikowo, Poland Iranian Safir Camp Darby, Italy 3064 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir Ramstein Air Base, 3309 YES km/s) Base, Germany SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) Redzikowo, Poland Iranian Safir Ramstein Air Base, Germany 3309 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Deveselu, Romania Iranian Safir London, U.K. 3876 NO SM-3 IIA (Vbo=4.5 km/s) Rezikowo, Poland Iranian Safir London, U.K. 3876 YES SM-3 IB (Vbo=3.5 km/s) Western Mediterranean Sea Iranian Safir Rota, Spain 4529 YES

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