Etude PwC sur les émissions de carbone et le rechauffement climatique (2012)


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Selon l’étude Low Carbon Economy Index de PwC, aux taux de croissance actuels des émissions de carbone, le réchauffement climatique pourrait atteindre au moins 6°C d’ici la fin du siècle. En effet, le taux annuel de réduction des émissions de carbone par unité de PIB nécessaire pour limiter à 2oC le réchauffement climatique a franchi un seuil critique. Le taux de réduction désormais requis n’a jamais été aussi significatif : il faudrait désormais réduire l’intensité carbone mondiale à 5,1 % par an en moyenne, un niveau jamais atteint depuis 1950.
L’étude de PwC mesure la progression des économies développées et émergentes dans le domaine de la réduction des émissions de carbone liées à la production économique. D’après cette étude, si l’augmentation de l’intensité des émissions observée en 2010 s’est inversée, la réduction mondiale de seulement 0,7 % en 2011 ne représente qu’une fraction de ce qui est prévu par les engagements internationaux visant à limiter à 2°C le réchauffement climatique mondial.

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Etude PwC sur les émissions de carbone et le rechauffement climatique (2012)

  1. 1. Too late for two degrees? Low carbon economy index 2012November 2012
  2. 2. 2 Too late for two degrees? | PwC
  3. 3. Foreword It’s time to plan for a warmer world. In the emerging markets, where the E7 The annual Low Carbon Economy Index are now emitting more than the G7, centres on one core statistic: the rate of improvements in carbon intensity have change of global carbon intensity. largely stalled, with strong GDP growth This year we estimated that the required closely coupled with rapid emissions improvement in global carbon intensity growth. Meanwhile the policy context for to meet a 2°C warming target has risen carbon capture and storage (CCS) and to 5.1% a year, from now to 2050. We nuclear, critical technologies for low have passed a critical threshold – not carbon energy generation, remains once since World War 2 has the world uncertain. Government support for achieved that rate of decarbonisation, renewable energy technologies is also but the task now confronting us is to being scaled back. As negotiators achieve it for 39 consecutive years. convene every year to attempt to agree a global deal, carbon emissions continue to The 2011 rate of improvement in carbon rise in most parts of the world. intensity was 0.7%, giving an average rate of decarbonisation of 0.8% a year Business leaders have been asking for since 2000. If the world continues to clarity in political ambition on climate decarbonise at the rate since the turn of change. Now one thing is clear: the millenium, there will be an emissions businesses, governments and gap of approximately 12 GtCO2 by 2020, communities across the world need 30GtCO2 by 2030 and nearly 70GtCO2 to plan for a warming world – not just by 2050, as compared to our 2-degree 2°C, but 4°C, or even 6°C. scenario. Even doubling our current rate of decarbonisation, would still lead to emissions consistent with 6 degrees of warming by the end of the century. Leo Johnson To give ourselves a more than 50% chance of avoiding 2 degrees will Partner, Sustainability and require a six-fold improvement in our Climate Change, PwC rate of decarbonisation. PwC refers to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (a limited liability partnership in the United Kingdom), which is a member firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited, each member firm of which is a separate legal entity. PwC | Too late for two degrees?  1
  4. 4. Too late for two degrees? Stabilising atmospheric carbon dioxide Since 2000, the rate of decarbonisationThe PwC Low Carbon Economy concentrations at 450 ppm, according to has averaged 0.8% globally, a fraction ofIndex evaluates the rate of broad scientific consensus, will give the the required reduction. From 2010 todecarbonisation of the global world a 50% probability of limiting 2011, global carbon intensity continuedeconomy that is needed to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial this trend, falling by just 0.7%. Becausewarming to 2°C. This is based on a levels. The 2°C target was formally of this slow start, global carbon intensitycarbon budget that would stabilise agreed at COP-15 at Copenhagen 2009. now needs to be cut by an average ofatmospheric carbon dioxide Governments have since agreed to 5.1% a year from now to 2050.concentrations at 450 ppm and launch a review in 2013 to considergive a 50% probability of limiting strengthening the long-term goal to 1.5°C.warming to 2°C. We published the first Low CarbonThis report shows that global Economy Index (LCEI) ahead of COP-15,carbon intensity decreased between2000 and 2011 by around 0.8% to look at the progress of the G20a year. In 2011, carbon intensity economies against a global carbon budget1decreased by just 0.7%. necessary to stabilise atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations at 450The global economy now needs to ppm. We estimated a low carboncut carbon intensity by 5.1% every pathway for the 21st century for theyear from now to 2050 to achieve global economy, which required thethis carbon budget. This required world to decarbonise at 3.7% a yearrate of decarbonisation has not to 2050.been seen even in a single yearsince the mid-20th century when This is the fourth edition of our Lowthese records began. Keeping to Carbon Economy Index, and a stock-takethe 2°C carbon budget will require of progress since the Copenhagenunprecedented and sustained summit. The failure of the globalreductions over four decades. economy to reduce carbon intensityGovernments’ ambitions to limit beyond business-as-usual levels haswarming to 2°C appear highly magnified the low carbon challenge.unrealistic. See appendix for an explanation of how the 1 carbon budget is derived.2 Too late for two degrees? | PwC
  5. 5. This rate of reduction has not been Figure 1: PwC’s Low Carbon Economy Index* – Globalachieved in any of the past 50 years.Even if it might be achievable in the 500longer term, it is unrealistic to expect 1. PwC low carbon pathway for the 21st century: the world needed to decarbonise at 3.7%, on average,that decarbonisation could be stepped each year to 2050.up immediately – which means that 400the reduction required in future years Carbon intensity (tCO2/$m (2011) GDP 2. Progress 2000-2011: the global rate ofis likely to be far greater than 5.1%. decarbonisation averaged 0.8%.Governments’ ambitions to limit 300warning to 2°C now appear highlyunrealistic. This new reality meansthat we must contemplate a much 200more challenging future. Whilst the 3. Challenge to 2050: Global carbonnegotiators continue to focus on 2°C, intensity now needs to fall by 5.1%a growing number of scientists and on average from now to 2050.other expert organisations are now 100projecting much more pessimisticscenarios for global temperatures.The International Energy Agency, 0 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050for example, now considers 4°C and Pathway to a low-carbon economy (Actual f or 2000-2011) Pathway to a low-carbon economy6°C scenarios as well as 2°C in theirlatest analysis. * We use the carbon intensity for countries as a measure of progress towards a low carbon economy. The carbon intensity of an economy is the emissions per unit of GDP and is affected by a country’s fuel mix, its energy efficiency and the composition of the economy (i.e. extent of activity in carbon-intensive sectors). Source: PwC’s analysis, data from World Bank (2012) and BP Statistical Review (2012) PwC | Too late for two degrees? 3
  6. 6. Progress in 2011The pace of reducing global carbon Developed countries Emerging economiesintensity has been slow, despite thegrowing international focus on climate In the last year, major EU economies top In China and India, the reduction inchange. The financial crisis, which our league table of countries with the carbon intensity seen in the last decadestarted in 2008, has dampened progress highest rate of decarbonisation, with the appears to have stalled. In both countrieseven further – carbon intensity has UK, Germany and France all strong GDP growth was closely coupledfallen less than 1% in these four years. reducing carbon intensity by over 6% with rapid emissions growth, despiteContinued slow progress in 2011 means in 2010-2011. The irony is that a key commitments at Durban to significantlythat our estimate of the required annual reason for lower energy use was the reduce carbon intensity by 2020rate of decarbonisation to 2050 has milder winter in the region. Both UK (40-45% for China and 20-25% for Indiaincreased to 5.1%, from 4.8% in last and France also witnessed increased respectively, relative to 2005 levels).year’s LCEI. generation in low emissions nuclear Meanwhile Indonesia has managed to power, whereas Germany’s exit from hold energy emissions broadly stable asTotal emissions from the E7 countries nuclear is reflected in its relatively its economy grew, with the resultinggrew by 7.4% while those of the G7 lesser decline in emissions. energy-related carbon intensity fallingeconomies fell by 2.0% in 20111. The E7 by 5.2% in 2011. Emissions fromnow emits more than the G7 countries, Emissions in the United States fell by deforestation and land use change,and further projected economic growth 1.9% in 2011. A mild winter helped, but which account for a large proportion ofimplies that emissions will continue the the shift from coal towards shale gas in Indonesia’s emissions, grew significantlyupward trend. its fuel mix and more efficient vehicles in the last few years (see Box 1). on the road signalled that decarbonisation may continue. Production vs. At the bottom of the league table for 2011 is Australia, a region where consumption data climate change is projected to cause In line with the approach adopted by the more frequent and severe extreme UNFCCC3, the LCEI measures the source weather. The result reflects an anomalous of carbon emissions, i.e. where 2010 rather than a structural shift; since emissions are produced, rather than 2000, Australia averaged 1.7% reduction ‘consumed’. But it is important to in carbon intensity, on a par with other remember that it is consumption that developed countries. Carbon intensity drives emissions and, indeed, many of grew significantly in 2011 (6.7%), the other sustainability challenges the reversing the decarbonisation seen in world faces. 2010 (of 10.9%). Heavy rainfall in Many developed countries are Australia boosted hydro generation and increasingly outsourcing their also disrupted mining operations in manufacturing needs abroad, so on a Queensland and impacted on the level of consumption basis would report higher coal stocks at power stations. A return to emissions. The emission levels of those normality in 2011 saw Australia’s carbon emerging economies that provide a intensity increase correspondingly, a manufacturing base for the rest of the large part of this due to the timing of world would be adjusted downwards, the re-stocking of coal2. if exports were fully accounted for.1 Countries in the E7 group of emerging economics 2 Stocking and de-stocking of fossil fuels impacts 3 United Nations Framework Convention on are: Brazil Russia, India, China, Turkey, Indonesia the reported emissions data for some countries Climate Change and Mexico4 Too late for two degrees? | PwC
  7. 7. Figure 2: PwC’s Low Carbon Economy Index – G20 Country Change in Real GDP Carbon Change in Annual Required energy- growth intensity carbon intensity average annual related (PPP) (tC02/ 2010-2011 change decarbonisation emissions 2010-2011 2011$m) in carbon rate 2010-2011 2010-2011 intensity 2012-2050 2000-2011 World 3.0% 3.7% 395 -0.7%  -0.8% -5.1% France -6.1% 1.7% 153 -7.7%  -2.4% -4.4% UK -6.4% 0.7% 209 -7.0%  -2.8% -5.2% Germany -3.6% 3.0% 235 -6.4%  -2.2% -5.2% Indonesia 0.9% 6.5% 377 -5.2%  -1.0% -4.9% EU -3.6% 1.5% 213 -5.1%  -2.3% -5.2% USA -1.9% 1.7% 374 -3.5%  -2.1% -5.2% Italy -2.5% 0.4% 203 -2.9%  -1.2% -4.3% Mexico 1.7% 3.9% 244 -2.1%  -0.2% -4.6% South Africa 1.5% 3.1% 781 -1.6%  -1.4% -5.6% Russia 2.9% 4.3% 510 -1.4%  -3.9% -6.0% Brazil 1.7% 2.7% 197 -1.0%  -0.7% -4.1% Argentina 7.9% 8.9% 242 -0.9%  -1.6% -5.0% South Korea 2.9% 3.6% 464 -0.7%  -1.0% -6.5% Canada 2.0% 2.5% 416 -0.4%  -1.4% -5.3% Saudi Arabia 6.7% 6.8% 817 0.0%  1.9% -7.0% India 6.9% 6.9% 377 0.0%  -1.4% -4.4% Turkey 8.6% 8.5% 244 0.1%  -0.5% -5.0% China 9.4% 9.1% 754 0.2%  -1.4% -6.1% Japan 0.1% -0.7% 281 0.8%  -0.8% -4.8% Spain 2.2% 0.7% 211 1.5%  -1.9% -3.6% Australia 8.7% 1.8% 415 6.7%  -1.7% -5.3%Source: PwC’s analysis, data from World Bank (2012) and BP Statistical Review (2012) PwC | Too late for two degrees? 5
  8. 8. The low carbon challengeToo much carbon, too little time In the period leading up to the Our calculations show the scale of the Copenhagen UN summit on climate challenge, from now to 2020, for some change in 2009, major economies came of the largest developed economies. In forward and pledged carbon reduction some respects the economic downturn targets for 2020. Analyses of those may make these absolute pledges less pledges suggest that they are collectively challenging1; but at the same time insufficient to meet a 2°C target. Even economic pressures may make it much more worryingly, with eight years to go, harder to finance the necessary it is questionable whether several of transition towards a low carbon these pledges can be met. economy.Figure 3: Major developed countries – pledges and the scale of challenge Country Pledge for 2020 Progress at 2011 Outstanding commitment Pledge Required Progress Actual Fall in Emissions reduction is fossil fuel against fossil fuel emissions equivalent to ... emissions in pledge emissions in required 2020 (MtCO2) 2011 from 2011 (MtCO2e) (MtCO2e) US 17% below 5,390 7% below 6,017 627 100% of coal power 2005 levels 2005 levels generation replaced by gas EU-15 20% below 2,774 5.5% below 3,277 503 Removing all of UKs current 1990 levels 1990 levels emissions Japan 25% below 873 12% below 1,307 435 Removing all industrial 1990 levels 1990 levels sector emissions UK 34% below 391 18% below 511 101 All coal-fired power plants 1990 levels 1990 levels to shut down or use 100% biomass or be fitted with CCS.Source: PwC analysis, pledges based on countries’ announcement, data from BP Statistical Review 1 This is in contrast to the intensity pledges that some emerging economies have made.6 Too late for two degrees? | PwC
  9. 9. The challenge isn’t necessarily easier for or nuclear and not fossil fuel generationemerging economies – pledges to reduce (unless this can be fitted with CCS).carbon intensity mean curbing emissions Russia and Brazil expect slowerat the same time as promoting rapid economic growth, but their emissionseconomic growth (see Figure 4). China pledges imply a more drastic cut inand India are expected to nearly double carbon intensity than either Chinathe size of their economies by the end of or India.the decade, but emissions must level offsoon for them to meet their targets. Themajority of any new energy demand willhave to be met from renewable energyFigure 4: BRIC countries – pledges and the scale of challenge Country Pledge for Progress at 2011 Outstanding commitment 2020 Progress 2011 total GDP change Emissions Annual against fossil fuel projected change decarbonisation pledge emissions 2011-2020 required rate required (%) (MtCO2e) (%) 2011-2020 (%) China 40-45% 17% below 8,979 92% +12% -4.5% below 2005 2005 carbon carbon intensity intensity India 20-25% 3% below 1,798 86% +31% -2.8% below 2005 2005 carbon carbon intensity intensity Russia 15-25% 5% below 1,675 38% -19% -5.8% below 1990 1990 absolute absolute emissions emissions Brazil* 36-39% n/a 482 41% -25% -6.8% below BAU emissions* Brazil’s emissions reported here are fossil fuel emissions only and do not include emissions from deforestation, which is the biggest source of emissions for the country – business-as-usual emissions are not estimated. See also Box 1.Source: PwC analysis and projection are of GDP growth, pledges based on countries’ announcement PwC | Too late for two degrees? 7
  10. 10. The shale gas dilemma The boom of shale gas in the United States Our analysis suggests that at current that has helped pushed down emissions rates of consumption, replacing 10% of there has sparked a debate on the use of global oil and coal consumption with gas gas as a transition fuel to a low carbon could deliver a savings of around 1 economy. The development and GtCO2e per year, or 3% of global energy widespread deployment of fracking emissions. A shift to gas away from oil technology in the US has lowered the and coal can provide temporary respite, price of natural gas and resulted in a a necessary but not sufficient move to the fall in greenhouse gas emissions as it low carbon challenge. displaces coal in power generation At the same time, an over-reliance on gas, (although some analysts have raised particularly in emerging economies questions around the lifecycle emissions expecting high energy demand growth, of shale gas). Despite concerns about the could lock in the dependence on fossil possible environmental impacts of fuel. Avoiding lock-in will require fracking, a world-wide hunt for discipline in governments that encourage unconventional gas reserves had already gas generation, to ensure that incentives begun – China, India, Canada, Mexico, are not diverted away from renewable Australia, Russia and Saudi Arabia are energy. To avoid stranding new gas all known to have significant reserves. generation assets, new investments Gas may buy some time much needed by should be CCS-ready, with at least space the global climate system and help limit to retrofit CO2 separation equipment and emissions growth – displacing coal with an agreed CO2 transport solution and gas in power generation roughly halves storage site. carbon emissions. But low gas prices may also reduce the incentive for investment in lower-carbon nuclear power and renewable energy. Large scale renewables and low carbon technology such as CCS and nuclear will require significant amounts of political will, finance and time.8 Too late for two degrees? | PwC
  11. 11. Increasing degrees of riskWe estimate that the world economy now Regardless of the outcomes at the UN The only way to avoid the pessimisticneeds to reduce its carbon intensity by climate change summit in Doha this scenarios will be radical transformations5.1% every year to 2050 to have a fair year, one thing is clear. Governments in the ways the global economychance of limiting warming to 2°C above and businesses can no longer assume currently functions: rapid uptake ofpre-industrial levels. Even to have a that a 2°C warming world is the default renewable energy, sharp falls in fossilreasonable prospect of getting to a 4°C scenario. Any investment in long-term fuel use or massive deployment of CCS,scenario would imply nearly quadrupling assets or infrastructure, particularly in removal of industrial emissions andthe current rate of decarbonisation. coastal or low-lying regions, needs to halting deforestation. This suggests a address more pessimistic scenarios. need for much more ambition andThe decarbonisation rate required for a Sectors dependent on food, water, urgency on climate policy, at both the2°C world has not been achieved in a energy or ecosystem services need to national and international level.single year since World War 2. The scrutinise the resilience and viability ofclosest the world came to that rate of Either way, business-as-usual is not their supply chains. More carbondecarbonisation was during the severe an option. intensive sectors need to anticipate morerecessions of the late 1970s/early 1980s invasive regulation and the possibility of(4.9% in 1981) and the late 1990s (4.2% stranded assets. And governments’in 1999). The expected reduction in support for vulnerable communitiesemissions resulting from the current needs to consider more drastic actions.economic slowdown has notmaterialised, partly because ofsustained growth in emerging markets.The observed relationship betweeneconomic growth and CO2 emissions isalso asymmetric – emissions tend togrow proportionally with economicgrowth, but fall by less than the rate ofeconomic decline.Figure 5: Implied concentration levels at different rates of decarbonisation Average annual rate of global Implied concentration levels, IPCC ‘best guess’ of average decarbonisation to 2050 approximate* global temperature increase (%) above pre-industrial levels, ppm CO2e rounded to nearest oC 1.6% 1,200 ppm 6°C 3.0% 750 ppm 4°C 4.5% 550 ppm 3°C 5.1% 450 ppm 2°CSource: PwC analysis, IPCC AR4 WG1, Chapter 10, Table 10.8* Note: This high-level analysis has rounded figures and made several simplifying assumptions, for example on carbonsinks, and ignored complex interactions in the carbon cycle (such as any feedback effects), consistent with the LCEI modeldescribed in Appendix 1. In table 10.8, the IPCC also provides the likely range of temperature outcomes at different CO2equivalent concentrations. The likely range of temperature increase is greater at higher concentrations. PwC | Too late for two degrees? 9
  12. 12. Box 1Decoupling economic growth anddeforestation emissions Deforestation and land use change A low carbon economy will therefore accounts for about 17% of global need to decouple economic growth from greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, more emissions from forestry. Figure 6 below than the entire global transportation provides an overview of the link between sector and second only to the energy GDP per capita and net annual carbon sector. The majority of these emissions emissions from forests1 for tropical and stem from deforestation and forest non tropical countries with the largest degradation in tropical areas. Economic forest carbon stocks in the G20. growth in tropical countries typically involves growth in primary sectors, such as agriculture, which are one of the main direct drivers of deforestation in the tropics. Figure 6: The link between GDP per capita and net forest carbon emissions 350 (2000 - 2005) 300 (1990 - 2000) 250 (2005 - 2010) Approximate annual net forest carbon (2005 - 2010) 200 (2000 - 2005) Brazil emuissions (MtCO2) 150 China (1990 - 2000) 100 India Indonesia 50 Mexico (1990 - 2000) (1990 - 2000) (1990 - 2000) (2005 - 2010) Russia 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 (2005 - 2010) (2000 - 2005) -50 (2005 - 2010) (2000 - 2005) (2005 - 2010) -100 (1990 - 2000) (2000 - 2005) -150 GDP per capita ($PPP, constant 2005) Source: PwC analysis, FAO (2011), and World Bank (2012) 1 Annual forest carbon emissions have been estimated using the annual net change in carbon stock in above-ground forest biomass. The lines are constructed by connecting three annual averages that represent three time intervals: 1990 – 2000, 2000 – 2005, and 2005 – 2010. The corresponding GDP per capita is calculated using the mean value for each of these periods.10 Too late for two degrees? | PwC
  13. 13. Figure 6 reveals a number of interesting 2. Agricultural  intensification leading Indonesia, however, has drasticallyrelationships between economic activity to increased productivity without the increased its forest emissions betweenand forest emissions over time. Brazil has need for agricultural expansion on to 1990 and 2010, whilst GDP per capita hasreduced its annual emissions from forest land. increased only slightly. This has largelydeforestation while increasing GDP. been due to the expansion of plantation 3. Agricultural expansion occurring onRussia also appears to have started to crops (such as palm oil) and pulpwood land that has been previouslydecouple economic growth from forest production. The government will likely degraded or non forested landemissions. Whilst we need to be aware of need to strengthen policies to reverse this rather than on primary forest land.the potential for emissions ‘leakage’, trend if it is to meet its ambitious target ofthese appear to be positive trends. 4. Reforestation  activities that lead to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) increased forest plantations and emissions in 2020 by 26% from business-This decoupling may be the reflection of offset the emissions generated as-usual levels.several different factors, including: elsewhere through deforestation,1. Improvements in forest governance, whilst also increasing economic improved law enforcement, and activity through job creation and stronger environmental regulation revenue from timber sales. and policies. For example in Brazil the legal protection of forests has recently been enhanced and law enforcement improved, which have lead to better regulation of the informal agriculture sector and improvements in forest management.ReferencesBoucher, D., Elias, P.,Lininger, K.,May Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Verchot, L.V., Petkova, E., Obidzinski,Tobin, C.,Rouquemore,S, and Saxon, Change (2007) Fourth Assessment Report. K., Atmadja, S., Yuliani, E.L.,E. (2012) The root of the problem: What’s Available from: Dermawan, A., Murdiyarso, D. anddriving tropical deforestation today, Union of publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/ Amira, S. (2010) Reducing forestryConcerned Scientists. Available from: contents.html emissions in Indonesia. CIFOR, Bogor, (We note that estimates vary; for example Indonesia. Available from: http://www.cifor.global_warming/UCS_RootoftheProblem_ Van der Werf et al. (2009) CO2 emissions org/online-library/browse/view-publication/DriversofDeforestation_FullReport.pdf from forest loss estimated that they account publication/3142.html for 12% of global emissions). Kissinger, G., Herold, M., Desy, V. (2012) Driver of deforestation and forest degradation: A synthesis report for REDD+ policy makers. Available from: display&type=Document&id=62628 PwC | Too late for two degrees?  11
  14. 14. AppendixPwC LCEI Model GDP (at PPP) Unit carbonThis section offers a summary of our GDP model projections from emissions by fossil assumptionsmodel. More details are available in PwC model to 2050 fuel typeour first LCEI report, available here.The study contains energy andmacroeconomic data from individual Carbon emission Primary energy to Primary energyG20 economies, as well as world totals. projections to 2050 GDP intensity consumption (by country and atThe G20 is portioned into three blocks: assumptions projections global level)• G7 economies (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada). Oil, gas, coal, other• E7 economies which covers the Average CO2 levels Fuel mix share primary energy BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and in atmosphere assumptions consumption China), and Indonesia, Mexico (ppm) projections and Turkey.• Other G20 (Australia, Korea, EU, The study considers energy-related We have also made assumptions on non South Africa, Saudi Arabia, carbon emissions, driven by a series energy-related emissions and carbon sinks: Argentina). of assumptions including the primary • Net annual CO2 emissions from landThe study draws on long-term GDP energy intensity and fuel mix share. use changes and forestry (LUCF)projections from an updated version In 2012, we have made two key around 5.8GtCO2 in 2008 decliningof PwC’s ‘World in 2050’ model, which changes to the assumptions in to around 1.4GtCO2 by 2020, andis based on a long-term GDP growth previous model versions: then at a slower rate to around justmodel structure. • Delaying the start of commercial CCS over – 4GtCO2 by 2050. CurrentEach country is modelled individually at scale from 2016 to 2021. estimates on reducing emissionsbut connected with linkages via US • Updating country-specific rates of from deforestation and forestproductivity growth (known as the global decline in energy intensity of GDP in degradation (REDD) expect it totechnological frontier). Each country is 2001 – 2025 to better reflect relative deliver around 5GtCO2 emissionsdriven by a Cobb-Douglas production historical progress between countries, reduction by 2020.function with growth driven by: and explicit policy targets in this area. • Global absorption capacity of the planet (oceans, forests etc.) is around• Investment in physical capital. Summary 15 GtCO2 per year and broadly• Working age population growth (UN stable over time. In differentiating countries in the way projections). described above, we aim to generate This scenario therefore has some• Investment in human capital (rising energy-related carbon emission pathways common features across countries but average education levels). that are challenging but fair in terms of also some variations to reflect differing• Catch-up with US productivity levels recognising the different starting points starting points, stages of economic (at varying rates). of each country in terms of energy development and energy resource• Real exchange rates will also vary intensity and fuel mix and their differing endowments. We have compared this with relative productivity growth. stages of economic development and, in with the IEA’s 450 scenario for 2030 particular, industrial structure. CCS is emissions, giving broadly similarThe results are not forecasts, but rather then factored in using a consistent results. This gives some reassurance thatindicate growth potential assuming proportional formula as described above. our GG + CCS scenario, while clearlybroadly growth-friendly policies arefollowed and no major disasters challenging, is reasonable both at global(e.g. nuclear war, radical climate level and, broadly speaking, in terms ofchange before 2050). allocations to major countries/regions.12 Too late for two degrees? | PwC
  15. 15. PwC Advisory services Climate change has emerged as one of the most important political and business issues of our time. We have been working Contacts with companies and policy makers for Leo Johnson the past 17 years, helping to set the agenda, analyse the issues and develop practical solutions for clients. Richard Gledhill We can help you understand which issues will have the greatest impact in your organisation, form a coherent strategy to address them, and then Jonathan Grant support you through the often complex organisational changes needed to put your strategy in place. Lit Ping Low For more detail, please visit Solar. Why Does It Take So Long to Build a Inter-governmental Panel of Climate Change,Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) Plant?. Available from: Assessment Report 4, Working Group 1, Chapter 10: Global Climate Projections, Table 10.8 Department of Climate Change and Energy chapter10.pdfEfficiency (2010) Australia’s emissions projections 2010.Available from: International Renewable Energy Agency (2012) Renewable Energy Technologies: Cost Analysis Series: Concentrating Solar Power.australias-emissions-projections/emissions-projection-2010.aspx Avalable from:Eckert, V. (2012) German greenhouse gas emissions off 2.1 pct 2011. Available from: Technologies_Cost_ Analysis-CSP.pdf Kiko Network (2008) Japan’s GHG emissions. Available from:idUSL6E8FC53420120412 Environment Agency (2012) Annual European japansGHGemission_E.pdfUnion greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2010 and inventory report2012. Point Carbon (2012) French power sector CO2 emissions fallAvailable from: 20 pct in 2011. Available from: Vaughan, A. (2012) UK greenhouse gas emissions down 7% inGreenhouse Gas Inventory Office of Japan (2012) Japan’s 2011. Guardian. Available from:GHG emissions data (FY1990-2010). Available from: greenhouse-gas-emissions-2011International Energy Agency (2011) World Energy Outlook York, R (2012) Asymmetric effects of economic growth and2011. Available from: decline on CO2 Emissions. Nature. Available from: nclimate1699.html PwC | Too late for two degrees? 13
  16. 16. This publication has been prepared for general guidance on matters of interest only, and does not constitute professional advice. You should not act upon theinformation contained in this publication without obtaining specific professional advice. No representation or warranty (express or implied) is given as to the accuracy orcompleteness of the information contained in this publication, and, to the extent permitted by law, PwC does do not accept or assume any liability, responsibility or dutyof care for any consequences of you or anyone else acting, or refraining to act, in reliance on the information contained in this publication or for any decision based on it.© 2012 PwC. All rights reserved. PwC refers to the PwC network and/or one or more of its member firms, each of which is a separate legal entity.Please see for further details.121029-101935-NS-OS