A Progressive Approach to Improving Regulation - PPI

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The regulatory system needs a mechanism to address the need for periodic review of outdated or burdensome existing regulations. We propose a Regulatory Improvement Commission (RIC), an independent body analogous to the BRAC Commissions for evaluating military base closures. This is designed to build on the president’s executive order, and in the process improve its effectiveness. The RIC will take a principled approach to evaluating and pruning existing regulations, gather input from all stakeholders (not just business or just agencies),and do so in a manner that ensures we protect public health, safety, and the environment.

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A Progressive Approach to Improving Regulation - PPI

  1. 1. POLICY MEMOreviving Jobs and Innovation:a Progressive approach to improving RegulationBy Michael Mandel, Phd FEbruarY 2011Today, the U.S. is suffering from a regulatory come up with a plan for reviewing their existingparadox: Too few and too many regulations at significant regulations.the same time. On the one hand, financialservices were clearly under-regulated during However, the president’s executive order did notthe 2000s, making financial reform essential. go far enough. A regulatory ‘self-review’ processSimilarly, President Obama’s healthcare has been tried repeatedly in the past, and it’sreform bill was a key first step to reining in always fallen far short of expectations. Regulatorsmedical costs. have a tough time trimming their own regulations, given internal bureaucratic pressures. But don’tBut in other areas we see an accumulation of blame the agencies—neither Congress nor therules and regulations over the past decade. The executive branch has a good way of reviewing andtrend started with the vast expansion of homeland reforming existing regulations, even when theysecurity regulation under the Bush administration have become outdated or burdensome.and continued through the first two years of theObama administration.1 The regulatory system needs a mechanism to address this need for periodic review. WeThat’s why President Obama should be applauded propose a Regulatory Improvement Commissionfor issuing his executive order “Improving (RIC), an independent body analogous to theRegulation and Regulatory Review” on January BRAC Commissions for evaluating military18. The order asked agencies to pay more attention base closures. 2 This is designed to build on theto promoting innovation as part of the regulatory president’s executive order, and in the processprocess. In addition, agencies were directed to improve its effectiveness. The RIC will take aabout the authorMichael Mandel is founder of Visible Economy LLC, a New York-based news and education company. He is also president of SouthMountain Economics, a consulting company focused on innovation, growth and regulation, and a senior fellow at Wharton’s MackCenter for Technological Innovation.
  2. 2. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy instituteprincipled approach to evaluating and pruning regulations and examine the cumulative impact ofexisting regulations, gather input from all them across agencies, not just within the silo of astakeholders (not just business or just agencies), single department or agency’s jurisdiction.and do so in a manner that ensures we protectpublic health, safety, and the environment. The intent behind the RIC is not to create a mechanism to sidestep Congress and dismantleThe Goal of RefoRm major substantive regulations that are politicallyOur goal is to create a positive environment for controversial, like EPA pollution rules. Instead,innovation in the U.S., which is essential for we are trying to get beyond business as usual tomaintaining competitiveness and creating jobs. identify the regulations that are not critical toThis pro-innovation goal requires us to take a protecting things we value highly but are stillhard look at the excess accumulation of regulation, burdensome, inefficient, outdated, or duplicative.which may be slowing down innovation andpreventing the U.S. economy from reaching Taken individually, most of these rules andits full potential. regulations were probably reasonable when they were adopted, and they may still be individually defensible now. But the accumulation of the intent behind the regulations has the potential to hamper innovative and growing sectors, in the same way that a big Ric is not to create a enough pile of small stones can dam up a stream. mechanism to sidestep Indeed, regulatory drag may be one reason why congress and dismantle the past decade has seen few breakthrough products, outside of information technology and major substantive communications. 3 regulations...[but] to identify regulations that are not The regulation issue is often wrapped up in ideological debates—big government versus small critical to protecting things government, or rapacious private sector versus we value highly but are still corrupt public sector. However, to a large degree burdensome, inefficient, the problem is a procedural one: Washington has a well-defined process for passing new regulations, outdated, or duplicative. but the tools are lacking to address the obvious duplications, inefficiencies, and conflicts of the current system. The result is that businesses andThat’s why we are proposing the creation of individuals lose faith in the direction that thea periodic review process centered around economy is taking.appointing experts and stakeholders in aRegulatory Improvement Commission (RIC), Thus, the Regulatory Improvement Commission iswhich will be charged with identifying a limited designed to address two questions:number of regulations that can be eliminated,consolidated, or simplified. As such, it’s designed • How do we identify existing regulations thatas a politically feasible alternative to ideological are impeding growth and innovation?and indiscriminant deregulation that takes a • Can we come up with a politically feasibleheavy-handed axe to essential federal agencies, and process for implementing targeted regulatoryends up exposing too many Americans to harm. improvements (including consolidation,This process is also a more effective alternative simplification, or elimination of existingto the president’s procedures ordering agencies regulations), while ensuring that we do notto evaluate their own regulations, because it will compromise essential protections for publicinclude broader stakeholder input to identify target health, safety, and the environment? 2
  3. 3. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy instituteThis proposal for improving and rolling back which are discussed on the website, whichsome regulations is part of a broader, progressive, will prevent backroom dealing and promoteforward-looking approach to the economy. Our transparencyapproach focuses on building knowledge capital,physical capital, and human capital; encouraging 3. appoint an independent, politically balancedinnovation and growth; and protecting public Regulatory improvement commission. Thegoods. Commission’s credibility and success will depend on having a group of appointedWithin this context, we want to make a pragmatic members who are highly qualified and beyondpush for regulatory improvements and (where reproach, as well as expert staff secondedappropriate) reductions, particularly when it from the various agencies, Congress, andcomes to industries that are innovative, growing, independent organizations. The Commissionand generating jobs. In today’s global supply- will hear testimony bearing on both positivechain economy, companies increasingly have the and negative impacts. All deliberations of theoption of rearranging operations so that more and commission must be public. The Commissionmore production and supervision is done in other will vote on a package of 15-20 regulatorycountries. That’s why it is so important to get the changes that meet the original specified goals.regulatory structure right. The Commission will have a specified time and budget to complete its work, and it willa summaRy of The Review pRocess terminate after submitting its recommendationOur proposal for a Regulatory Improvement package.Commission (RIC) process is based loosely on thesuccessful process set up for the Base Realignment 4. send the package to congress for an up-or-downand Closure (BRAC) Commission, but adjusted vote, no amendments allowed. 5for today’s very different political and economicenvironment. To summarize the key components 5. following congressional approval, the packageof the proposal: must receive the president’s signature. This ensures that any changes will carry the full1. lay out specific goals for regulatory improvement force of law, avoiding constitutional objections in the enacting legislation. This step is absolutely and potential litigation. essential, since the RIC is not a policy- making body. We would focus on encouraging The rest of the paper will consider the RIC innovation, improving competitiveness, proposal in more detail. But it’s important to reducing compliance costs, fostering growth, note here that the RIC needs the combined protecting public health and safety, and efforts of both the legislative and executive promoting responsible environmental branches, because regulation lives in that gray stewardship.4 Whatever objectives we chose, area between legislation and executive action. the important thing is that they are chosen Neither branch by itself can get a grip on the at the front end, so the criteria for decision problem. However, if Congress fails to act in this making are fixed and transparent throughout area, it would also possible in the meantime for the process. agencies to incorporate elements of this process in the “retrospective analysis” plans they are2. invite suggestions from the public for which required to submit to OMB under Section 6 of regulations to cut, consolidate or simplify. the new executive order. Think of an open and transparent website, where individuals and businesses can Note that the RIC proposal is more flexible than identify problematic regulations, along cost-benefit analysis, which is often criticized for with specific examples. The RIC would be undervaluing certain benefits (like innovation) encouraged to focus on the regulations which can be hard to quantify.6 3
  4. 4. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy instituteI also note that the RIC proposal is following the stock options, an essential tool of start-up techground opened up by Senator Mark Warner (D- companies.10VA) with his regulatory “pay-as-you-go” proposal.7In addition, the RIC has some similarities to • The terrible events of September 11, 2001the Commission on the Accountability and understandably led to a wave of homelandReview of Federal Agencies (CARFA), which has security regulation, including: tighterbeen introduced several times by Senator Sam restrictions on monetary transfers in and outBrownback (R-KS). But compared to CARFA, the of the U.S., tighter restrictions on foreignersRIC would have a sharper focus on regulation and entering the U.S., additional securityinnovation rather than spending, and would be measures on travel and freight, and additionalmore sensitive to protecting public health, safety, surveillance both domestically and abroad.and the environment. (More recently, the Obama Administration proposed that telecom providers configureThe RecenT hisToRy of ReGulaTion their most advanced systems to allowBefore discussing the RIC in more detail, wiretapping for law enforcement and anti-we must understand the regulatory history of terrorism purposes.11) While homeland securitythe United States over the past fifteen years. is not directed towards traditional regulatoryDuring the second half of the 1990s—the New ends, security-related rules have much theEconomy period—it seemed like the U.S. had same effect as economic regulations.managed to escape the “hardening of the arteries”that afflicted Japan and Western Europe. The • The broad economic crisis that started in 2007combination of venture capital funding and an showed the need for increased regulation ofopenness to innovation and new technology financial services.generated a wave of start-ups, jobs, and income.With information technology roaring ahead and • A 30-year upward trend in new drug approvalsthe biotech revolution on the horizon, it seemed suddenly and unexpectedly paused in the earlylike nothing could stop the innovation-driven 2000s. Despite rapid advances on the scientificU.S. economy. 8 research front, including the sequencing of the human genome, much fewer new drugs wereDuring those years, the state of regulation in the approved in the 2000s than in the 1990s. ThisU.S. economy didn’t seem like much of a concern. turned into a vicious circle: fewer ‘wow’ drugsThe Internet was mostly protected from regulatory led regulators to become more skeptical, whichactivity, while President Bill Clinton steered in turn led them to tighten up the approvala middle ground between active deregulation process, which in turn has made it more andand greatly increased regulation. From fiscal more costly for drug makers to develop newyears 1993 to 2001, employment in the federal treatments. 12 Medical devices, too, have runregulatory agencies actually fell from 174,000 to into the same wall of regulatory skepticism.13173,000. 9 All four of these trends translated intoBut in the first decade of the 21st century, what dramatically increased regulatory activity fromhad seemed like an economic and regulatory 2000 to 2010, a period including Presidentsuccess story came to an end, as four perhaps George W. Bush’s entire administration throughunrelated events rocked the U.S.: the first two years of President Obama’s term. However, the increase in regulatory activity was• The tech bust and the accompanying scandals highly uneven. Some key agencies—notably at Enron, Worldcom, and Global Crossing the FDA, the SEC, and the Homeland Security led Congress to enact a new wave of business Department—got big bumps in employment and regulation. This included the Sarbanes-Oxley budgets that far exceeded the growth rate of Act of 2002 and tighter controls on the use of private sector employment. (In the chart above, 4
  5. 5. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy institute figuRe 1: fedeRal RegulatoRy eMPloyMent, PeRcentage change, fy2000-10 (not including hoMeland secuRity) 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% bs n lth ce t g gy ss c en io ifi jo in la ne ea er at nm ec nk kp or En rt si /h sp Ba ct po Bu ro or ty se ry W vi fe ns d al st En e an sa a er at du Tr en iv er e In nc Pr um G na ns Fi CoData: Dudley WarrenChart: Progressive Policy Institutethe FDA is in the consumer safety health category, expanding again once the crisis started. Thiswhile the SEC is found in the general business shrinkage of financial regulators was in retrospectcategory). The gain in energy regulatory jobs a great mistake.mostly represents the expansion of the NuclearRegulatory Commission in preparation for the impacT of ReGulaTionapproval of a new wave of nuclear reactors. The impact of regulation on the economy, pro and con, has been studied extensively since the 1970s.Other areas of regulation—notably environment These include microeconomic studies looking atand workplace—have lagged far behind over this the costs and benefits of individual regulations,ten year stretch. In addition, though it doesn’t and macroeconomic studies that sum up costsshow up on this chart, the number of financial and benefits for the entire economy. I’m notregulators shrunk between 2000 and 2007 before going to summarize the literature here, except to 5
  6. 6. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy institutenote that it’s highly controversial and covers thegamut from intensely anti-regulatory to devoutlypro-regulatory. To just pick one, the 2010 reportfrom the Office of Information and RegulatoryAffairs (OIRA) sums up the costs and benefitsof individual regulations, and estimates that thebenefits of federal regulations far exceed the costs: The estimated annual benefits of major federal regulations reviewed by OMB from October 1, 1999 to September 30, 2009, for which agencies estimated and monetized both benefits and costs, are in the aggregate between $128 billion and $616 billion, while the estimated annual costs are in the aggregate between $43 billion and $55 billion.14OIRA’s analysis, based on summing up thecosts and benefits of individual regulations, the task of improving, The bad news is that regulatory drag can sneak eliminating or simplifying up on us. Even if Washington passes only reasonable and well-intended regulations, we old regulations is similar could find ourselves in a situation where economic to scraping barnacles off growth and innovation is being slowed by the the bottom of a boat. accumulation of rules. it’s a thankless chore However, if this analysis is correct, the good that must be done, or news is that we don’t need wholesale deregulation, else the boat gradually or a complete overhaul of existing regulations. What we need is to scrape away some of the slows down. excess accumulation of rules, while leaving the most effective ones alone.unfortunately misses the point. The big issue If Washington can demonstrate that it can takein the U.S. is the accumulation of regulations. a meaningful step toward getting the regulatoryBusinesses can adjust fairly easily to any single process under control, that will have importantrule, but they have a much harder time with symbolic and economic value. That was themultiple and overlapping regulations in the same importance of getting the deficit under control inarea. the 1990s. In his 2003 book In an Uncertain World, Robert Rubin explained:An accumulation of regulations can sometimescreate problems, even if every regulation, In important ways, the deficit had becometaken individually, is defensible. Waves of new a symbol of the government’s inabilityregulations, without elimination or rationalization to manage its own affairs—and of ourof old ones, end up closing off options and society’s inability to cope with economicraising costs.15 challenges more generally, such as our global competitiveness, then much in question.16 6
  7. 7. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy instituteThat’s why adopting institutional procedures for While these were mostly military inimproving and pruning existing regulations is so nature, they also included economic andimportant today: it would restore confidence in environmental considerations. A cleargovernment and send a clear signal that we are up mission (identify bases to be cut) along withto the challenge of managing regulations over the guiding criteria (military need) positioned thelong term. commission to make empirically defensible choices.19DefininG oBJecTives foR ReviewIn some ways, the task of improving, eliminating The lesson from BRAC is clear: building clearor simplifying old regulations is similar to criteria and guidelines into the enabling legislationscraping barnacles off the bottom of a boat. It’s for the RIC is essential. Without clear criteria,a thankless chore that must be done, or else the the RIC would become a policy-making body,boat gradually slows down. which would not and should not be acceptable to Congress.The big difference, of course, is that regulatory‘barnacles’ get to do a lot of complaining. Almost Ideally these goals or criteria should come from everyone agrees that the regulatory structure is Congress, because ultimately the RIC process too complicated, but they can’t agree on which requires cooperation from both the legislative and ones need to go. executive branches. One set of clear goals might be:The question is how to set up a process which is 1. Reducing compliance costs.effective, fair, and offers enough political cover 2. encouraging innovation.to allow legislators to approve it. In recent years, 3. fostering growth.there have been a variety of political mechanismsdesigned to deal with complicated questions where 4. protecting public health and safety.most agree with the final goal, but the individual 5. improving competitiveness.pieces get nitpicked to death. For example, ‘fast-track trade authority’ allows the President to 6. ensuring responsible environmental stewardship.negotiate a trade treaty, which Congress can onlyvote up or down without amendments. The newMedicare Independent Payment Advisory Board is Other goals are possible, of course, but theyan example of a commission-type structure which should be specified up front.is designed to allow difficult decisions to make itthrough Congress.17 The memBeRship, scope, anD DuR aTion of The commissionBut it’s still true that the BRAC process offers the The RIC will be going into uncharted territory,best model for making difficult decisions. Today, with broad powers. For the Commission topeople usually associate BRAC with the idea of succeed, it must be perceived by the public andan independent commission that comes up with policy makers as competent and credible. It shoulda unified package of proposals, followed by a therefore be comprised of a bipartisan collectionstraight up and down vote. In fact, however, the of stakeholders who have strong qualifications andactual BRAC process was more complicated and reputations that are beyond reproach: businessinteresting. executives, entrepreneurs, consumers, economists, politicians, labor leaders, and others. StaffStarting with the 1991 round of base closings, would be seconded from the various regulatoryBRAC began with the Secretary of Defense agencies, as well as Congress and independentpublicly specifying the criteria for deciding which research organizations, to provide expertise andbases to eliminate or reduce. 18 As one scholar of competency across a range of different areas.BRAC notes: 7
  8. 8. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy instituteIn terms of scope, the RIC should be empowered regulations that should be improved, consolidated,to consider regulations across all departments or simplified.and agencies, including independent agenciessuch as the Federal Communications Commission. For that reason, we propose opening up the processThat would make it different from the President’s for public suggestions, with one requirement:executive order, which did not cover independent complete transparency. If someone wants toagencies such as the FCC and the SEC. However, suggest a regulation for reduction, they have toit’s worth acknowledging that it may be politically publicly say who they are and offer their evidence.necessary to wall off certain controversial issue This is the equivalent of crowdsourcing: relyingareas or major substantive regulations, such on affected stakeholders and other interestedas Clean Air Act rules, from the initial roundsof review to assure skeptics that the RIC is nota Trojan horse intended to dismantle entire Washington has aregulatory regimes that are frequently targeted by well-defined processindustry groups. for passing newTo counterbalance the broad powers and wide regulations, but the toolsscope of the RIC, we propose that it should only are lacking to addressbe authorized for a limited period, say a year or 18months—long enough to put together one package the obvious duplications,of 15-20 regulatory changes that meet the specified inefficiencies, andgoals, and submit the package to Congress. Thiswould be following the BRAC example, where conflicts of the currenteach round of base-closings had to be separately system.reauthorized. That will also help us avoid creatinganother bureaucratic body. parties to attack or defend specific regulations.Of course, if the RIC does its job well, we would The process for identifying regulations has to behope that it would be re-authorized for additional transparent, so that businesses and individuals canrounds of regulatory improvements. Then we see how the decisions are made.would have a steady flow of improvements andrepeals to regulations that would lift some of the Note that our proposed crowdsourcing processregulatory burden off innovation, while protecting is much more open and transparent thanpublic health, safety, and the environment. the chairman of a congressional committee sending private letters to corporations and tradeinDenTifyinG ReG ulaTions of inTeResT associations asking them to suggest regulationsThe next question is how to get the initial list of to undo.20 Moreover, the RIC process allows uspossible regulations to consider for reduction or to wall off some progressive values that we won’timprovement. In the BRAC process, the initial compromise, and make equal time for other groupsproposed list of base closings was generated and individuals.internally by the Department of Defense. acTinG on The commission’s finDinGsIn the case of the Regulatory Improvement The Commission should sort through theCommission, we’d expect agencies and suggestions, examine the evidence in a seriousdepartments to suggest some regulations way, and hold public hearings, as the BRACthat need to be considered. But more likely commissions did. Then it should vote on a packagethe best and most interesting suggestions of 15-20 regulatory changes that meet the originalwill come from outside—from companies and specific goals. All deliberations of the Commissionindividuals who have direct experience with must be public, to ensure public confidence in 8
  9. 9. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy institutethe specific judgments that the members willultimately make in recommending regulatorychanges.The package of regulatory changes is then subjectto congressional and presidential approval. Ideally,the congressional vote should be a fast-tracked,up-or-down vote, with no room for breaking thepackage apart. As in the case of BRAC, this willguarantee a single vote for or against regulatoryimprovement, rather than individual regulations.why aGency self-ReviewBy iTself is noT enouG hThe RIC, designed to improve or repeal existingexecutive branch regulations which were originallyauthorized by Congress, is a bit of a hybrid itself.Designing the authorizing legislation and gettingit through Congress will not be a simple process.As a result, many people will ask why the process Every president since President Carter hasof regulatory improvement can’t simply be done directed agencies to evaluate or reconsiderwithin the executive branch. existing regulations. For example, President Carter’s Executive Order 12044 requiredIndeed, agency self-review is exactly what agencies to periodically review existing rules;President Obama calls for in his executive order: one charge of President Reagan’s task force on regulatory relief was to recommend changes To facilitate the periodic review of existing to existing regulations; President George significant regulations, agencies shall consider H.W. Bush instructed agencies to identify how best to promote retrospective analysis existing regulations to eliminate unnecessary of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, regulatory burden; and President Clinton, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to under section 5 of Executive Order 12866, modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in required agencies to develop a program accordance with what has been learned. Such to “periodically review” existing significant retrospective analyses, including supporting regulations. In 2001, 2002, and 2004, the data, should be released online whenever administration of President George W. Bush possible. asked the public to suggest reforms of existing regulations.21In theory, this “retrospective analysis” approachmakes sense: the simplest way to identify ‘weak’ Agency self-review has turned out to be veryregulations is to redo the original cost-benefit difficult to do, for a combination of institutionalanalysis, using actual outcomes and costs rather and technical reasons. First, many regulationsthan anticipated ones. In theory (once again), this are directly mandated by Congress, limiting theanalysis should tell us which regulations have executive branch’s ability to change them.outperformed their original expectations andwhich ones have fallen short. Second, doing a cost-benefit analysis with actual outcomes and costs requires a sizable andHowever, agency self-review has been tried expensive data collection effect. In fact, the costrepeatedly for the past 30 years, with limited of a retrospective analysis can be much highersuccess. According to a 2007 GAO report: than the cost of the original cost-benefit study. 9
  10. 10. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy instituteThat limits the number of regulations that can be up with a different conclusion, as the 2007 GAOevaluated in this way. (Ironically, one reason why report found that: [A]gencies’ reviews more often attempted to the Ric will take a assess the effectiveness of their implementation principled approach to of the regulation rather than the effectiveness of the regulation in achieving its goal. evaluating and pruning existing regulations ... and Agency self-review is not a bad idea. But it needs to be combined with an outside review like the RIC do so in a manner that process to be truly effective. ensures we protect public health, safety, and the conclusion The hallmark of a dynamic society is that it is able environment. to take effective action, when necessary. The U.S., through no fault of its own, finds itself headingretrospective analysis is so rare and expensive is down the path of slowing innovation and increasedthat it often requires permission from the OMB to ossification. President Obama’s executive ordercollect the necessary data, under the Paperwork is a good first step—but it’s time to take steps toReduction Act of 1980.) reinvigorate the economy while protecting the values that we hold important.Perhaps most important, it’s very difficult for anagency to evaluate its own regulations and come 10
  11. 11. Policy MeMo PRogRessive Policy instituteenDnoTes1 People don’t usually think of the Department of Homeland Security as a regulatory agency, but as part of its mission it has issued new rules for travel, finance, immigration, education, establishing identity, and other areas of the economy.2 We will discuss later in the paper whether RIC should be temporary or permanent.3 See, for example, my policy memo “Why the Jobs Crisis Is Actually an Innovation Crisis,” Progressive Policy Institute, March 2010.4 A similar set of criteria (with the notable absence of encouraging innovation) is set forth is the first sentence of President Obama’s January 18, 2011 executive order: “Our regulatory system must protect public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation.”5 This provision differs from the ‘silent approval’ process of the BRAC recommendations. “Running For Cover: The Brac Commission as a Model for Federal Spending Reform,” Jerry Brito, Mercatus Center, May 20106 When agencies analyze the costs and benefits of a new regulation, they have historically rarely accounted the regulation’s impact on innovation. The problem starts at the top: President Obama’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs barely mentions ‘innovation’ in its latest report on the benefits and costs of federal regulations. This might change with President Obama’s latest executive order.7 “To revive the economy, pull back the red tape,” Mark Warner, Washington Post, December 13, 2010.8 See, for example, my 2004 book Rational Exuberance.9 “A Decade of Growth in the Regulators’ Budget,” Susan Dudley & Melinda Warren, May 2010.10 In 2004, I wrote in Rational Exuberance: “A broad-brush action against stock options seems distinctly counterproductive, at a time when the U.S. is concerned about competing against China and India. The phrase ‘cutting off your nose to spite your face’ comes to mind.”11 “U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet,” New York Times, September 27, 201012 See my forthcoming piece, “Biosciences and the Long-term Economic Recovery.”13 A recent industry-supported survey of medical technology companies found that “it takes significantly longer to navigate U.S. regulatory processes than it does to complete European approvals for the same products.” “FDA Impact on U.S. Medical Technology Innovation,” Josh Makower, Aabed Meer, and Lyn Denend, November 2010.14 “2010 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities,” Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.15 To put it another way, the impact of regulation on the economy may be subject to threshold effects.16 In an Uncertain World, Robert Rubin, 2003.17 See “The Independent Payment Advisory Board”, Congressional Research Service, November 2010, available at http://assets. opencrs.com/rpts/R41511_20101130.pdf18 The first base-closing commission, the 1988 Carlucci Commission, was purely a creation of the Department of Defense.19 “Running For Cover: The Brac Commission as a Model for Federal Spending Reform,” Jerry Brito, Mercatus Center, May 2010.20 “Darrell Issa asks business: Tell me what to change,” Politico, Jan 3, 2011, available at http://www.politico.com/news/ stories/0111/46995.html21 Government Accountability Office. 2007. Reexamining Regulations: Opportunities Exist to Improve Effectiveness and Transparency of Retrospective Reviews Report No. GAO- 07-791. 11
  12. 12. about the Progressive Policy Institute The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is an independent © 2011 research institution that seeks to define and promote a new Progressive Policy institute progressive politics in the 21st century. Through research, all rights reserved. policy analysis and dialogue, PPI challenges the status quo Progressive Policy institute and advocates for radical policy solutions. 1730 Rhode island avenue suite 308 Washington, dc 20036 tel 202.525.3926 fax 202.525.3941 email info@ppionline.org www.progressivefix.com

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