Evan Welbourne University of Washington, CSE C hips Ahoy?  The Legal Issues Associated with RFID in the Workplace May 1, 2...
<ul><li>PART 1: RFID and The RFID Ecosystem </li></ul><ul><li>PART 2: Current and Future Applications </li></ul><ul><li>PA...
Image credit: Tom Reese, The Seattle Times PART ONE Radio Frequency Identification
What is RFID? <ul><li>Wireless ID and tracking </li></ul><ul><li>Captures information on: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Identity <...
Radio Frequency Identification <ul><li>Wireless identification and tracking </li></ul><ul><li>Information on: </li></ul><u...
RFID Tags – A Wide Variety Consumer Item Cases Pallets Trucks Ships / Trains bar codes passive tags active tags GPS-enable...
Elements of an RFID System RFID Reader RFID Tags Reader Antenna Network Infrastructure Data Management System Applications
<ul><li>The RFID Ecosystem </li></ul><ul><li>100s of passive EPC Gen 2 tags </li></ul><ul><li>100s of RFID antennas  </li>...
RFID Ecosystem at UW CSE
PART TWO: Current and Future  RFID Applications
Focus: RFID for Real-Time Location <ul><li>Current trend: RFID in Hospitals </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Track equipment, patient...
Focus: RFID for Real-Time Location <ul><li>Proposed in research: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Infer higher-level events from data...
PART THREE Security & Privacy Issues + Technical Protection Mechanisms Image credit:  Karsten Nohl, from: OV-chipkaart Hac...
<ul><li>Many attacks: </li></ul><ul><li>Encryption can improve security but… </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Increases cost and powe...
<ul><li>Case Study: WA State Enhanced Driver’s License </li></ul><ul><li>DHS claims RFID “removes risk of cloning” </li></...
<ul><li>Our approach in the RFID Ecosystem:   </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1) Store little on tags, secure link between the tag I...
<ul><li>Who owns collected data? </li></ul><ul><li>Who has access to it?  Modes of information disclosure : </li></ul><ul>...
<ul><li>Our approach: “Physical Access Control Policy” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Each user has a personal  view  of the data  ...
<ul><li>1) In practice, RFID tags are often missed by readers </li></ul><ul><li>   Data cleaning  algorithms are commonly...
<ul><li>Our approach:  Directly represent uncertainty with probabilistic data e.g. “Bob could be in his office (p = 0.5), ...
<ul><li>1) Use what security the technology provides </li></ul><ul><ul><li>   Should improve with time </li></ul></ul><ul...
Thanks <ul><li>Thank you! </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Check out our blog: http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/blog/ </li></ul></ul><ul...
Backup Slides Backup Slides…
Privacy & Security Discussion… <ul><li>Just having an RFID tag  could  be a privacy risk </li></ul><ul><li>Pseudonymity no...
Security of Tags and Readers <ul><li>Promise:   Provides a faster, easier payment option </li></ul><ul><li>Problem:  Name,...
Data Privacy and Security RFID and Contactless Smart Card Transit Fare Payment   <ul><li>Promise:   Streamlines transit ex...
Data Privacy and Security <ul><li>From RFID Ecosystem user studies: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>“ How do I know if I have a tag ...
Time:  0  ’ s data store ’ s data store ’ s data store 0 0 0 sightings timestamp sightings timestamp sightings timestamp
Time:  ’ s data store ’ s data store ’ s data store 1 1 1 1  0 0 0 sightings timestamp sightings timestamp sightings times...
Time:  ’ s data store ’ s data store ’ s data store 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 2  sightings timestamp sightings timestamp sightings...
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Studying Next Generation RFID Applications in the Workplace

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  • - Mention uncertainty here
  • NOTE: DHS Privacy Impact Assessment comment “removes risk of cloning” was in regards to Passcard (which uses same RFID technology as EDL)
  • NOTE: See backup slides for detailed example
  • Physical Access Control Example
  • Physical Access Control Example
  • Physical Access Control Example
  • Studying Next Generation RFID Applications in the Workplace

    1. 1. Evan Welbourne University of Washington, CSE C hips Ahoy? The Legal Issues Associated with RFID in the Workplace May 1, 2009 - Seattle, WA The RFID Ecosystem Project Studying Next Generation RFID Applications in the Workplace
    2. 2. <ul><li>PART 1: RFID and The RFID Ecosystem </li></ul><ul><li>PART 2: Current and Future Applications </li></ul><ul><li>PART 3: Security and Privacy Issues </li></ul><ul><li> + </li></ul><ul><li>Technical Protection Mechanisms </li></ul>Outline
    3. 3. Image credit: Tom Reese, The Seattle Times PART ONE Radio Frequency Identification
    4. 4. What is RFID? <ul><li>Wireless ID and tracking </li></ul><ul><li>Captures information on: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Identity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Location </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Time </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Unique identification </li></ul><ul><li>Passive (no batteries) </li></ul>Reader Tag
    5. 5. Radio Frequency Identification <ul><li>Wireless identification and tracking </li></ul><ul><li>Information on: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Identity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Location </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Time </li></ul></ul>A B C tag time location … … … t 1 A t 2 B t 3 C
    6. 6. RFID Tags – A Wide Variety Consumer Item Cases Pallets Trucks Ships / Trains bar codes passive tags active tags GPS-enabled active tags Cost of tag (logarithmic)
    7. 7. Elements of an RFID System RFID Reader RFID Tags Reader Antenna Network Infrastructure Data Management System Applications
    8. 8. <ul><li>The RFID Ecosystem </li></ul><ul><li>100s of passive EPC Gen 2 tags </li></ul><ul><li>100s of RFID antennas </li></ul><ul><li>85,000 sq ft (8,000 sq m) building </li></ul><ul><li>Simulating an RFID-saturated future </li></ul>
    9. 9. RFID Ecosystem at UW CSE
    10. 10. PART TWO: Current and Future RFID Applications
    11. 11. Focus: RFID for Real-Time Location <ul><li>Current trend: RFID in Hospitals </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Track equipment, patients, personnel </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Improve utilization, track workflows </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Rapid progression in 2009: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Feb 19: Awarepoint deploys RFID throughout 4 M sq. ft. Hospital </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Feb 26: Versus Tech. deploys RFID system at Virginia Mason </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mar 4: St. Vincent Hospital deploys RFID workflow tracker </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mar 9: St. John’s Deploys RFID to track child patients </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mar 23: Good Samaritan tracks surgical instruments w/RFID </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mar 24: Western Maryland Health deploys RFID tracking system </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mar 25: RFID system for tracking patient files at Cleveland Clinic </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>April 14: RFID vendor Reva Systems gets $5M in VC funding </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>April 21: Greenville Hospital System tracks OR case carts </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ongoing… </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>[ right middle and right bottom image credit: http://www.pcts.com ] </li></ul></ul>
    12. 12. Focus: RFID for Real-Time Location <ul><li>Proposed in research: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Infer higher-level events from data </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Business Intelligence </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Reminding Systems </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Social Networking </li></ul></ul>
    13. 13. PART THREE Security & Privacy Issues + Technical Protection Mechanisms Image credit: Karsten Nohl, from: OV-chipkaart Hack using polishing paper, a microscope and Matlab
    14. 14. <ul><li>Many attacks: </li></ul><ul><li>Encryption can improve security but… </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Increases cost and power consumption, slows down read rate </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>-- to be useful, RFID tags have to be cheap and fast! </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Physical security </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Foil-lined wallet: works , but you have to remove tag sometime </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Skimming </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Cloning </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Replay attack </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Eavesdropping </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ghost leech </li></ul></ul>Issue: Basic Insecurity of RFID
    15. 15. <ul><li>Case Study: WA State Enhanced Driver’s License </li></ul><ul><li>DHS claims RFID “removes risk of cloning” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Can be cloned easily in less than a second w/cheap device </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Can be read more than 75 ft away </li></ul><ul><li>Sleeve doesn’t always work, worse when crumpled </li></ul>Issue: Basic Insecurity of RFID # EDL Reads, Week of Apr 27th Case study credit: Karl Koscher, Ari Juels, Tadayoshi Kohno, Vjekoslav Brajkovic
    16. 16. <ul><li>Our approach in the RFID Ecosystem: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1) Store little on tags, secure link between the tag ID and PII </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>2) Incorporate cryptographic techniques as they emerge </li></ul></ul>Issue: Basic Insecurity of RFID
    17. 17. <ul><li>Who owns collected data? </li></ul><ul><li>Who has access to it? Modes of information disclosure : </li></ul><ul><li>Institutional </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Organization collects, uses, and potentially shares personal data </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Addressed by contracts, federal law, corporate practice (e.g. FIPs) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Peer-to-Peer or “Mediated” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Peers and superiors access data through some authorized channel </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Mediated by access control policies </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Malicious </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Personal data is compromised by unauthorized parties </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Addressed by secure systems engineering </li></ul></ul>Issue: Data Access & Ownership
    18. 18. <ul><li>Our approach: “Physical Access Control Policy” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Each user has a personal view of the data </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Each user has access to only those historical events that occurred when and where s/he was physically present </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Models line-of-sight, augments memory </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Other “context-aware” policies are possible: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>“ Only reveal my location during business hours” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ Only reveal my activity when I am in a meeting” </li></ul></ul>Issue: Data Access & Ownership
    19. 19. <ul><li>1) In practice, RFID tags are often missed by readers </li></ul><ul><li> Data cleaning algorithms are commonly applied </li></ul><ul><li>2) Further, apps need high-level information from smoothed data </li></ul><ul><li>Event detection and data mining algorithms applied </li></ul><ul><li>But there is always a “ sensory gap” between what actually occurs, what is sensed and what is inferred from the data. </li></ul>Issue: Uncertainty of RFID Data
    20. 20. <ul><li>Our approach: Directly represent uncertainty with probabilistic data e.g. “Bob could be in his office (p = 0.5), the lounge (p = 0.1), or next door (p = 0.4)” </li></ul>Issue: Uncertainty of RFID Data <ul><li>Problem: probabilistic data is huge; and compressed by throwing away less likely possibilities. </li></ul>
    21. 21. <ul><li>1) Use what security the technology provides </li></ul><ul><ul><li> Should improve with time </li></ul></ul><ul><li>2) Verify implementation meets security/privacy claims </li></ul><ul><li>3) Access control can help enforce a policy framework </li></ul><ul><li>  Novel, context-aware access controls are a possibility </li></ul><ul><li>4) RFID data and higher-level info inferred from it probably should not be considered actionable </li></ul>Main Takeaways
    22. 22. Thanks <ul><li>Thank you! </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Check out our blog: http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/blog/ </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Follow us on Twitter! http://twitter.com/rfid_ecosystem </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>See publications for details: http://rfid.cs.washington.edu/publications.html </li></ul></ul>
    23. 23. Backup Slides Backup Slides…
    24. 24. Privacy & Security Discussion… <ul><li>Just having an RFID tag could be a privacy risk </li></ul><ul><li>Pseudonymity not Anonymity </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Each RFID tag you carry has a unique number </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Sequential readings of your tags create a trace </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Over time this trace can be used to identify you </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ The person who: wears this sweater, takes this bus, uses this bus stop, shops at this grocery, …” </li></ul></ul><ul><li>U.S. privacy law doesn’t consider these traces to be PII </li></ul><ul><ul><li>European and Canadian law may handle this better </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Important to discuss these issues </li></ul><ul><ul><li>RFID is increasingly ubiquitous, may be in the REAL ID cards </li></ul></ul>
    25. 25. Security of Tags and Readers <ul><li>Promise: Provides a faster, easier payment option </li></ul><ul><li>Problem: Name, #, expiration sent as plaintext </li></ul><ul><ul><li>$150 homemade device can steal and replay credit cards </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Next generation of cards includes better security </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Promise: Faster border-crossings, improved security </li></ul><ul><li>Problem: Identity, nationality sent in the clear </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Malicious parties can easily identify / target U.S. citizens </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Revised passport includes faraday shielding and BAC </li></ul></ul>First generation RFID credit card vulnerabilities (UMass Amherst, RSA labs) Security and Privacy Risks of the U.S. e-Passport (UC Berkeley)
    26. 26. Data Privacy and Security RFID and Contactless Smart Card Transit Fare Payment <ul><li>Promise: Streamlines transit experience and book keeping </li></ul><ul><li>Problem: Massive databases with transit traces of individuals </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Not entirely clear what data is private and how it can be used </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Oyster card data is the new law enforcement tool in London </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Increasing # of requests for Oyster data: 4 in all of 2004 61 in Jan. 2007 </li></ul></ul></ul>ORCA Card: RFID-Based Transit Card for Seattle Area (August 2008) Promise: Streamlines transit experience and book keeping Integrated with easy pay and institutional partners Problem: The word “privacy” appears twice in 500 pages of docs…
    27. 27. Data Privacy and Security <ul><li>From RFID Ecosystem user studies: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>“ How do I know if I have a tag on me?”, “How do I opt out?” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Users must be carefully educated before consenting </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>There should be equal, available alternatives to the RFID option </li></ul></ul><ul><li>If personal RFID data is stored: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Clearly define how each piece of information can and will be used </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Define and enforce appropriate access control policies </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>May depend on user, application, and context of use (PAC) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Formal data privacy techniques to further ensure privacy (K-anonymity) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Store only the information you need, and add noise! </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Provide users with direct access to and control of their data </li></ul></ul>
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