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Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering

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  • 1. Cryptography and Authentication on RFID Passive Tags for Apparel Products Kirk H.M. Wong, Patrick C.L. Hui, and Allan C.K. Chan The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, PR China Computers in Industry, vol.57, no.4, May 2006, pp. 342-349 Speaker: Chia-Yin Lee
  • 2. Outline
    • Introduction of RFID ( Radio Frequency Identification )
    • The proposed scheme for data protection on passive RFID tags
    • Performance analysis
    • Comments on the proposed scheme
    • Conclusions
  • 3. Introduction (1/3)
    • Passive tags:
      • only function when powered by a nearby reader
    • Semi-passive tags:
      • has an internal power, but is typically dormant until triggered into activity
    • Active tags:
      • self-powered, and interacts with to communicate
  • 4. Introduction (2/3)
    • Standards of RF devices:
      • HF bands: ISO 14443, ISO 15693
      • UHF bands: EPC Class-1 Gen-2
  • 5. Introduction (3/3)
    • Electronic Product Code (EPC):
      • 64-bit or 96-bit length
    • The EPC system defines several classes of products:
  • 6. The proposed scheme (1/4)
    • e.g. 64-bit EPC
  • 7. The proposed scheme (2/4)
    • Preparing phase (for 64-bit EPC):
    (pseudo-EPC) tag’s memory reserved tag’s memory (PIN)
  • 8. The proposed scheme (3/4)
    • Read phase :
    Tag (i) POS (Reader) Back end (Database) “ Request” “ EPC Read”
  • 9. The proposed scheme (4/4)
    • Authentication phase :
    Unlock successfully Tag (i) POS (Reader) Back end (Database) “ Ack”
  • 10. Performance analysis
  • 11. Comments on the proposed scheme (1/4)
    • Use different private keys K pr ( i ) to encrypt each EPC ( i ) may cause collision.
    • For implementation, it might use the same private key K pr to encrypt each EPC ( i ) .
    EPC ( i ) K pr ( i ) key ( i )
  • 12. Comments on the proposed scheme (2/4)
    • Using the same private key K pr and n to encrypt each EPC ( i ) may suffer from known-plaintext attack .
    • If we can collect two ( EPC ( i ) , key ( i ) * ) pairs, then we can easy to find out the private key K pr .
  • 13. Comments on the proposed scheme (3/4)
    • Known-plaintext attack :
  • 14. Comments on the proposed scheme (4/4)
  • 15. Conclusions
    • In this article, the authors proposed a scheme for data protection on passive RFID tags.
    • The proposed scheme adopts the Jigsaw concept to encrypt the EPC on tags.
    • The proposed scheme may suffer from known-plaintext attack.