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  • 1. A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme Divyan M. Konidala, Zeen Kim, Kwangjo Kim {divyan, zeenkim, kkj}@icu.ac.kr International Research Center for Information Security CONFERENCE ON RFID SECURITY-07
  • 2. Introduction - EPCglobal
    • EPCglobal Inc™
      • Industry-driven standards
      • RFID in supply chain management
    • We consider
      • EPCglobal Architecture Framework
      • EPCglobal Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID Protocol
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 3. Contents
    • Introduction
    • RFID-based supply chain management system
      • EPCglobal Architecture Framework
    • Security Threats and Requirements
    • Security Assessment of Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID Protocol
    • Proposed Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
      • Scheme
      • Analysis
    • Conclusion and Future Work
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 4. EPCglobal Architecture Framework A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme EPC-IS
  • 5. Introduction - Tag’s 4 Memory Blocks A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
    • **We Focus on RESERVED memory Block**
    • RESERVED memory Block has….
      • Access Password (APwd)
      • Kill Password (KPwd)
  • 6. Introduction - RESERVED Memory Block
    • Manufacturer of the product stores APwd and KPwd in the Reserved Memory Bank
    • Reserved Memory Bank is R/W LOCKED,
      • Cannot be Read
      • Cannot be Re-Written
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 7. Security Threats and Requirements
    • Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication
      • Malicious RFID Readers
        • Snoop, corrupt, manipulate
      • Cloned Fake RFID Tags
        • Counterfeit products
      • Man-in-the-Middle Attack
        • Eavesdrop and impersonate
    • Tamperproof Tags
      • RFID Tag Snatching
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 8. One-Way Reader to Tag Authentication Proposed by EPCglobal A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
    • Proposed by EPCglobal Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID Protocol
    • Not Secure
    • Un-encrypted openly sent random numbers used as pads to cover-code tag’s APwd
    • Tag’s Access Password easily exposed to disgruntled employee managing hand-held reader
  • 9. Security Weakness – EPCglobal Schheme – Exposed APwd A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme Manufacturer Reader Tag Unauthorized Access Fake Cloned Tags APwd APwd Apwd (Exposed) Only one-way Reader-to-Tag Authentication Malicious, Compromised Reader Disgruntled Employee
  • 10. Goals
    • Tag-Reader mutual authentication
      • simple, light-weight, practically secure (supply chain)
    • A better cover-code or obscure tag APwd
    • Secure distribution of obscured tags' APwd to stakeholder's RFID readers
    • The manufacturer: implicitly keep track on the whereabouts of its products.
    • Our scheme adheres to EPCglobal standards
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 11. Goals
      • NO cryptographic (hash) functions/keys within the tag
      • NO tag - reader synchronization security keys/hash values.
    • We improve scheme proposed by EPCglobal to accommodate tag-reader mutual authentication.
      • Our scheme utilizes tag's already existing,
        • 16-bit random number generator,
        • XOR function,
        • Access & Kill Passwords.
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 12. Proposed Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
    • Emphasis on Tag’s Access & Kill Password
    • Manufacturer of the product is involved in the mutual authentication process
    • Scenario:
      • A pallet has reached the distributor
      • Distributor’s reader query tag on pallet
      • Reader and Tag must authenticate each other
      • Reader does not know tag’s Apwd
      • Reader contact manufacturer and follow this procedure
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 13. A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme Proposed Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication
  • 14. A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 15. A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 16. Pad Generation Function: PadGen(.) [1/3] A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 17. Pad Generation Function: PadGen(.) [2/3] A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme Random Numbers from Tag and Manufacturer
  • 18. Pad Generation Function: PadGen(.) [3/3] A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 19. A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme Tag’s Logical Memory & Access Password Map
  • 20. Security Analysis [1/4]
    • Possible Attacks
      • APwd & KPwd are only 32-bits
      • Brute-force attack or ciphertext-only attack
    • Practically Secure
      • An enclosure (warehouse) that is sealed from external noise and radio signals from malicious readers.
      • RFID supply chain processing environment
        • Extremely fast paced
        • Not feasible to continuously eavesdrop on one particular tag-reader communication channel
        • Several bulks of items pass through several readers with in a very short interval of time.
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 21. Security Analysis [2/4]
    • Reader Impersonation Attack:
      • Reader to authenticate first to tag
      • A malicious reader
        • Does not posses both the APwd and KPwd
        • cannot access manufacturer (EPC-IS) due to lack credentials.
    • Cloned Fake Tags and Tag Impersonation Attack:
      • Tag to authenticate to the manufacturer.
      • A malicious tag or a cloned fake tag
        • Do not posses both the APwd and KPwd,
      • Manufacturer must detect and terminate the communication,
        • if a tag emulator using the same or weak random numbers
        • if tag is not moving through the supply chain processing
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 22. Security Analysis [3/4]
    • Tag's Access Password Never Exposed:
      • Does not use random numbers sent in an un-encrypted form as pads
      • Generated pads are known only to tag and manufacturer
    • Secure against Insider Attacks:
      • Does not deliver the tag's APwd to any of the stakeholder's reader.
      • The reader relays only the cover-coded APwd
      • RFID “system level check",
        • A compromised reader is continuously trying to interrogate only one particular tag
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 23. Security Analysis [4/4]
    • Secure against Replay Attacks:
      • We use two random numbers each, generated by both the tag and the manufacturer.
      • As unique random numbers generate unique pads
    • Password Scalability:
      • We adhered to the 32-bit passwords
      • Our scheme can still be applicable, and more strengthened, when the length of the APwd and KPwd is extended
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 24. Implementation Analysis [1/2]
    • Overhead Analysis
      • Secure channel between tag and manufacturer
        • PKI-based certificate, encryption and signature schemes – may be expensive
      • Reader communicate with manufacturer to authenticate every tag
    • To reduce this overhead,
      • The manufacturer can setup a secure server at every stakeholder's supply chain processing facility
      • Only, the manufacturer can remotely access, monitor, and manage this server and also update the server with tags' Access & Kill passwords
      • We can also assume that the manufacturer's EPC-IS is a highly resource rich entity, which is designed to take heavy computational and storage load.
      • Secure channel with only Keyed-Message Authentication Code (MAC)
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 25. Implementation Analysis [2/2]
    • Light-Weight Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication:
      • Our scheme does not use any special cryptographic functions.
      • Tag already has capability
        • XOR operations,
        • Generate random numbers,
        • Temporarily store random numbers
        • Fetch the APwd and KPwd
    • Our scheme just needs an additional
      • Five 16-bit temporary storage memory slots
      • four random numbers from the manufacturer and one for PadGen(.) function.
      • Class-1 Gen-2 tags can have a 512-bit memory capacity or more (depending on the manufacturer)
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 26. Conclusion
    • Our scheme
      • Not fully secure
      • Simple, cost-effective, light-weight to be implemented on tag
      • Practically secure,
      • Highly suitable to the RFID-based supply chain processing scenario
      • Adhere to EPCglobal standard
    • Our scheme provides considerable challenges to thwart
      • Cloned fake tags
      • Malicious readers
      • Disgruntled employees or compromised readers
      • Tag’s APwd leakage
      • Man-in-the-middle attacks
    A Simple and Cost-effective RFID Tag-Reader Mutual Authentication Scheme
  • 27. Thank you! Q&A International Research Center for Information Security