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Ignalina NPP presentation in Stokholm


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This presentation is designed to show the costs of Ignalina NPP decommissioning

This presentation is designed to show the costs of Ignalina NPP decommissioning

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  • The key INPP function has been changed to „decommissioning organization" after Unit 2 reactor final shutdown. This cardinally effected on whole company's strategy, system of financing, list of actions priorities and company's organizational and management structure. T he in-house project UP01 shall cover and determine the entire D&D exercise, starting from choosing preferred solutions and ending in the physical dismantling of the reactors. Obligatory data collections, mandatory radiological characterization issues should be resolved. I am sure that using in-house project approach INPP will be better prepared for the future to resolve obvious problems. These questions were addressed to key specialists of INPP (key INPP personal from the Technological Service, Waste Management Service, Radiation Protection Service, Project Management Service, Dismantling & Decontamination Service, Design Department and Engineering Department). These selected specialists are very highly motivated and have considerable expertise in respect of RBMK technology: reactor maintenance, operation, assembly and installation.
  • Компетенция, общая — это способность применять знания, умения, успешно действовать на основе практического опыта при решении задач, также, в определенной широкой области;
  • CARBOWASTE is a new European project addressing the 'Treatment and Disposal of Irradiated Graphite and other Carbonaceous Waste' with 28 partners from industry, waste management authorities and research organizations.
  • Transcript

    • 1. IGNALINA NPP: REORGANIZATION FOR DECOMMISSIONING AND NEW FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 2014 - 2020 Osvaldas Čiukšys INPP CORPORATE DIRECTOR 10 May 2011 Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania, Stockholm
    • 2. Plant Overview
      • Largest and most advanced RBMK design (also with later safety upgrading)
      • Intended to serve NW region of Soviet Union
      • Supplied 70-80% of LT national demand
      • Closed at around mid-life
      • Low load factor (lack of consumers in 1990s )
    • 3. I NPP LIFE CYCLE 2010-20 15 Final Decommissioning Plan implementation Decommissioning Fund Accumulated / Used / Accumulation Assumed
      • Post operational period 2010 – 2015/2016: preparation for New Phase of INPP activity - Decommissioning
      Transitional period Design / preparation Construction Operation Decommissioning Site reuse 1970 - 1987 1983 - 2009 2005 - 2029 ?
    • 4. December 31, 20 09: change of INPP core activity
      • INPP was acting as
      • nuclear power plant operator
      • December 31, 2009 Unit 2 reactor was
      • shut down
      • Main INPP activity has been changed
      • to decommissioning organization .
      • Accumulated expertise and know-how of RBMK technology –
      • key prequalification for successful RBMK type plant decommissioning:
      • 1974 Preparations started for construction of INPP
      • 1983 Unit 1, 1987 Unit 2 commissioned
      • It took 11 years to build the worlds most
      • powerful nuclear plant
      • Originally 4 RBMK-1500 reactors planned
      • ~ 6000 staff employed (1989)
      • In 27 years 308 bln kWh of electricity generated
      • INPP specialists were the first to start using the
      • enriched fuel with burnable absorber – erbium
      • Unique project of Unit 1 nuclear fuel reuse in Unit 2 reactor
      • implemented 1st time in operation history of nuclear reactors
      • Other unique technology improvements & modifications
    • 6. INPP STRATEGIC TARGETS IN 2010- 2029
      • To perform safe, timely and effective decommissioning of INPP.
      • To become the services provider in the nuclear energy enterprises decommissioning market. To use existing infrastructure for business and VNPP needs.
      • INPP STRATEGIC TARGET IN 2010- 20 15
      • To reorganize the enterprise's activity in the most effective way redirecting it to the next stage of activity - the decommissioning.
      • To renew the enterprise personnel with properly qualified specialists and leaders, modernize the management.
      • To take measures in order to ensure the transparency and efficiency of the enterprise activity.
      • To achieve the progress during the implementation of the basic decommissioning projects.
    • 7. BUDGET OF INPP: 2010 Fact and 2011 Approved LT Budget 6,42 % NDF 12,37 % INPP own funds 1,73 % IP (C PMA ) 47,59 % IIDSF (EBRD ) 31,89 % LT Budget 3,99 % NDF 4,21 % INPP own funds 3,30 % IP (CP M A) 41,06 % IIDSF (E BRD ) 47,44 % 20,52 % 79,48 % 11,50 % 88,50 % 2010 Factual budget 109.5 mln EUR: Economy of 32.1 mln EUR or 22.7 % from approved 2010 budget 2011 planned budget 190.2 mln EUR : Based on 2010 factual budget implementation and concentrated on key decom projects with allocation of 102 mln EUR EU 79.48 % LT 20.52 % EU 88.50 % LT 11.50 %
    • 9. Decommissioning Strategy
      • Immediate Dismantling: approved by relevant legal acts and procedures
      Advantage Drawback Use of existing workforce: (a) social mitigation (b) staff knowledge Costs incurred earlier Higher radiation levels Use of operational infrastructure Defined regulatory framework Better cost definition No legacy to future generations
    • 10. RBMK plant decommissioning : INPP
      • Technical difficulties :
      • huge primary masses of buildings
      • large proportion of contaminated masses
      • large volumes of operational waste
      • irradiated graphite – no established disposal method
    • 11. Current Status
      • Dismantling outside units since 2009 (e.g. service water pump house)
      • Dismantling unit facilities since late 2010 (e.g. Unit 1 emergency core cooling system, turbine hall etc. )
      • 2 major facilities in construction
        • (a) ISFSF (b) SWMSF
      • 2 major facilities under design
        • Landfill (constructing Buffer Store)
        • Near Surface Repository
    • 12. Dismantling activities (1) Open Nitrogen-and Hydrogen-Receiving Facility 2010-08 2010-08 2010-10-08
    • 13. Dismantling activities (2)
      Chemical Reagent Depot (Room 108 ) 2 009-12-11 20 10 - 04 - 07
    • 14. Dismantling activities (3)
      Service Water Pump Station ( Building 120/1) 2010-01-25 2010-07-30
      • One of the most important stages of
      • Decommissioning started on 1 February, 2011
      • The Fuel Part Unloading Programme was
      • developed by INPP Nuclear Fuel Department
      • The Programme was approved by VATESI
      • 500 Fuel Assemblies to be unloaded and
      • transferred to the pools
      • The completion of the Programme
      • foreseen in February 2012
    • 16. Overall schedule Unit 1 activities Unit 2 activities General site activities Dismantling & Decontamination SWMSF Dismantling & Decontamination Fuel in core Fuel in pools Fuel fully removed Fuel in core Fuel in pools Fuel fully removed Site Operation & Maintenance Demolition D&D Post-operation Operation Operation Post-operation Opening waste management routes (Design & construction ) Global Decommissioning Program / Final Decommissioningg Plan 2001-2010 20 1 1-20 2 0 20 2 1-20 3 0 ISFSF Landfill Facility Near Surface Repository
    • 17. Key decommissioning projects before reactors dismantling Project B1 ISFSF B234 SWMSF B19 Landfill B25 Repository Status : Construction Delay 3 years Construction Delay 3-4 years Design B19/1 Buffer storage facility being released in 2011 Design Price : 193 m ln. Eur 12 3 m ln. Eur 30 m ln. Eur ~ 290 m ln. Eur Total : ~ 6 20 m ln. Eur
    • 18. Breakdown by Generic Activities 550m € 510m € 610m € 200m € 100 m € 210m € 110 m € Total cost: 2290 m Euro (at 2011 prices)
      • Final Site Clearance
      • 5%
      • D&D
      • 24%
      • Preparatory Actions
      • 4%
      • Fuel Removal
      • 9%
      • Post-operation
      • 9%
      • Waste Removal
      • 22%
      • General Site Operation
      • 27%
    • 19. Breakdown by Generic Costs Adjustments 460m € Other Investments & Procurements 38% (2011) 640m € 320m € +160m€ +140m € 870m € Major Facilities 28% (2011) Staffing 20% (2011) Energy 14% (2011) 450m € +150m € Staffing 23% (adjusted) Energy 17% (adjusted) Major Facilities, Investments & Procurements 60% (adjusted) (2012-2029) Total cost: 2290 m Euro (at 2011 prices) +1 6 0m € +1 4 0m € 460 m €
    • 20. Ignalina NPP Staffing 2001-2003 2000 2004-2009 2010-2012 2013-2016 500 1400 2017-2023 1100 500 3900 2800 2024-2026 2027-2029 4600 Staff attributable to the cost of post-operation and dismantling Unit 1 closure 600 End of unit dismantling End of defuelling 2250 Unit 2 closure 2000 New skills End of all D&D 1800 End of demolition INPP applies “in house” project implementation strategy which allows to optimize costs as well as use own staff and gain new know - how
    • 21. Assumptions Field Assumption Justification Overall decommissioning Global Decommissioning Plan (GDP) has identified all possible costs GDP was built-up from estimates developed and refined successively in successive planning documents (PDP, FDP, U1DP0, etc.). GDP accounts for real costs over 2000-2010 and further development of ongoing projects. Reactor dismantling GDP assumes immediate dismantling FDP concluded that dismantling of reactors is possible and foresees long-term interim storage of associated “orphan” waste. Macroeconomic Rises in salaries, energy costs and other prices do not exceed the values presented Macroeconomic study commissioned by Ministry of Energy based on best available data.
    • 22. Risks Other? Field Risk Quantification of impact Design & Build Major Investment Projects (ongoing) Additional works, changes in regulatory requirements 20% (60 m Euro approx.) Excludes indirect impact of any further delays. Build-only Major Investment Projects (planned) Additional works, changes in regulatory requirements 15% (50 m Euro approx.) Reactor dismantling Revisions of scope and unforeseeable variations 50% (20 m Euro approx.) Bitumized waste Upgrading of interim storage into long-term near surface disposal (foreseen in GDP based on preliminary study) is not possible. 50 m Euro (approx.) 14,000 m 3 to be retrieved conditioned and disposed of in NSR Other Investments derived from Final Decommissioning Plan Revisions of scope and unforeseeable variations 10% (10 m Euro approx.)   Total 190 m Euro (approx.)
    • 23. Resources EU & international
      • Legal basis of IIDSF and Ignalina Programme (from Accession Treaty) include decommissioning and consequential measures in the energy sector
      • Relevant to examine use of funds to date:
        • - proportion of funding in each sector
        • - current funding available
      1999 - 2003 210 m€ 320 m€ 837 m€ Bilateral donors: 33 m€ 2004 - 2006 2007 - 2013
      • EU: 1367 m€
      • Total: 1450 m€
      • EU: 995.5 m€
      • Total: 1078.5 m€
      2011 2013
      • IIDSF interest: 50 m€
    • 24. National Decommissioning Fund
      • Limited by:
        • - Soviet period
        • - safety power reduction
        • - low load factor
        • - early closure
      • Former funding
        • - levy on INPP electricity
        • - no present income
      • Future funding
        • - surcharge on electricity sales (also limited)
      45 m Euro 29 m Euro 49 m Euro 32 m Euro Social Mitigation 18% Energy Sector 20% Decommissioning 30% Unallocated 28% Administration 4% (6 m Euro) TOTAL :161 MLN EURO
    • 25. Other national sources
      • Ignalina NPP own resources
        • present cash assets: 100 m Euro
        • future sales of materials: 30 m Euro
      • State Budget
        • taxes and ineligible income costs
        •  460 m Euro to 2029 (at 20% tax)
    • 26. Conclusion
      • Costs well-founded (cf. FDP & Greifswald) but significant funding gap
      • Benefit to EU MS out of Ignalina NPP experience: value added for the whole EU’s nuclear sector through ICCC and other intn’l projects
      • Lithuania is contributing to the expected level: more than 10 % of costs
      • Seeking EU funds to meet funding gap (with inherent risks )
      1290 m Euro 1480 m Euro EU and international donors until 2013 2040m € 650m € 320m € Resources Lithuania Direct Costs Direct costs to 2011 Future direct costs 2012 to 2029 1450 m Euro 2740 m Euro (adjusted) 2290 m Euro (2011 prices) 480m € (max) 700m € 2011 190m € 2930 m Euro (adjusted incl. risk) Risk FUNDING GAP LT realizes the importance of decommissioning activities for the whole EU: - rational approach: effective use of allocated funds - more value added for every EU MS for a funds spent
    • 27. Comparison with Greifswald NPP Operational Solid Waste (to be retrieved and managed) Operational Spent Resins (for cementation) 30,000 m 3 15,000 m 3 5,800 m 3 2,000 m 3 Steel from Equipt. Dismantling contaminated 59% 91% 130,000 tons 116,000 tons Steel Steel Graphite Shielding (serpentine / sand) Required Spent Fuel Casks (for interim storage) 190 (additional) 61 17,100 tons 2,300 t Reactor Core Structures 2,660 tons 3,800 t 11,000 t 6 x 440 MWe VVER Greifswald NP P Ignalina NPP 2 x 1500 MWe RBMK
    • 28. Comparison with Greifswald NPP
      • Smaller reactor size
      • permits integral removal
      • and storage of main vessel
      • Not possible for RBMK
      • International experience exists in dismantling pressurised water reactors
      • Ignalina NPP is pioneering the immediate dismantling of an RBMK
        •  more difficult to define technology and costs
    • 29. Implementation of active communication strategy: INPP is socially responsible employer “if community or your staff don’t know about your activity, opponents will create your full record instead of you anyway... ”
      • Communication strategy developed and working plan for implementation approved by the board in June 2010:
      • National and local communication plans
      • Inside communication:
      • - top and mid level management,
      • - all personnel
      • Corporate communication:
      • - national institutions
      • - international institutions
    • 30. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION! QUESTIONS? [email_address]
    • 31. INPP POTE NTIAL ( 1 )
      • Construction period
      • we acquired the experience of successful use of unique technology and installation of the only RBMK-1500 reactors at the European territory
    • 32. INPP POTENTIAL (2)
      • Operation period :
      • - we obtained the experience of introduction and execution of unique processes and works;
      • - we obtained the experience of execution of appropriate safety analysis, which is required to ensure safety and efficiency of nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management.
      • Carrying out all the projects using internal INPP resources saves decommissioning funds substantially, allows to preserve qualified staff at the enterprise, accumulate unique knowledge and expertise, strengthen capacities of main designed departments of the enterprise and preconditions the opportunity to participate in international decommissioning projects in future.
      • We apply expertise, knowledge and motivation of functional departments, qualified specialists and workers, which has been acquired during the period of construction and operation.
      • In consideration of the current situation at the INPP, it is necessary to establish new job places for the needs of the INPP, develop internal potential of the INPP and strengthen its abilities.
    • 34. UP01
      • UP01
      • Engineering on Dismantling of
      • Units 1 and 2 structures from
      • the Reactor Shafts
      • Strategic project UP01, which had been initiated by the INPP as internal project, was commenced to implement in April 2010
    • 35.
      • Construction volume :
      • ~ 22 m  22 m  25 m
      • Weight of equipment :
      • ~ 13 400 ton s of various materials
      • All the types of radiation contamination: near-surface contamination, activation …
      • According to the estimations at the Chernobyl NPP - 99 percent of activity are bounded in the reactor's constructions, up to 80 percent of this activity are in the technological channels .
      INPUT DATA (1)
    • 36. INPUT DATA ( 2)
      • Zones R1 & R2 :
      • Technical maintenance experience ;
      • Ensuring access to implementation of installation ;
      • Bounded set of materials (mostly metals ) ;
      • Surface radioactive contamination ( excluding channels and some internals );
      • Expected disposal places
      • * channels (stainless steel , zirconium alloy of Э125 type) may be removed .
      • Zone R3 :
      • Minor experience ;
      • No access ;
      • Variety of materials ( sand, serpentinite , graphite , carbon steel , stainless steel) ;
      • Irradiation ( according to estimations ) ;
      • Experimental works are required ;
      • Waste disposal sited are not envisaged
      R1 R2 R3
    • 37. 2011 2014 2017 2020 TOTAL TIMESCALE R1&R2 ( Unit 1) W P 1. Engineering studies for dismantling W P 2. Radiological surveys W P 3 . Development of the design documentation W P 4. Approval of the design documentation by the state authorities W P 5. P reparatory works for dismantling Dismantling for R1 and R2. According to a separate schedule R3 ( Unit 1) W P 6. Engineering studies W P 7. Development of the design documentation W P 8. Approval of the design documentation by the state authorities Dismantling for R3. According to a separate schedule R1&R2&R3 ( Unit 2) W P 9. Recurrence, adaptation of work packages for Unit 2 Dismantling for R3. According to a separate schedule 2013 TIMETABLE
    • 38. RISK FACTORS
      • The loss of knowledge and expertise that are necessary for safe, efficient and transparent implementation of reactors dismantling works :
      • Knowledge is being imparted by humans not by "lifeless" archives or computer systems. Technical specialists rather than general profile specialists are required.
      • Uncertainties, that affect safety occupational and cost:
      • High-quality and efficient analysis of R3 zone is required. In order to carry out sampling and measurement and eliminate uncertainties , the key tasks should envisage the complexity of works, mass of waste, ensuring access to materials.
      • Funding withdrawal - it is necessary to ensure the execution of UP01 project major works.
      • Changes of normative framework and strategies are possible .
    • 39. ESSENTIAL TASK – GRAPHITE MANAGEMENT Anthony Benford National Laboratory in the UK Michael Grave Doosan Babcock owned Doosan Power Systems Ltd part Christian Glorennec (EDF) France Height: 9 m Diameter 15.17 m Weight: 2060 tonnes Bugey- 1 Height: 8 m Diameter ~ 14 m Weight: 1760 t per unit INPP drawing, code РБМ-К15.сб.05СБ
      • Problems :
      • Irradiated graphite is seldom managed, because such operations are expensive .
      • Expenditure depends on input data quality .
      • Input data should be specific for each reactor and optimally fit for decision-making - especially decisions which relate to such waste withdrawal, processing, decontamination or recycling for final disposal as well as seeking to demonstrate the acceptability and safety of technologies .
      • Does Ignalina NPP own all the data on irradiated graphite ?
    • 41. ESSENTIAL TASK – GRAPHITE MANAGEMENT Major Knowledge Centers IAEA CARBOWASTE EPRI/DOE British, French, German, and Russian scientists and industry Lithuanian and Ukrainian scientists
    • 42. “ I gnalina C arbon C ompetence C enter” COMPETENCE STRENGTHENING
    • 43. STRENGTHENING OF GRAPHITE MANAGEMENT COMPETENCE Decommissioning requirements for competence arise Decommissioning requirements for competence SATISFIED Management methods of irradiated materials Any innovations Stakeholders receive “ Know-how” competence Subject 1 Subject N Attracting investment for decommissioning Subject 2 Governing Body Scientific Technical Council Leadership experience section Innovation and Technology section Valdymo organas Mokslinė-techninė taryba Pirmaujančios patirties sekcija Inovacijų ir technologijų sekcija ARBON ENTER OMPETENCE C
    • 44. COMPETENCE STRENGTHENING Task : to organize a conference of interested specialists in autumn 2011 Areas of essential actions Nuclear facilities wherein the works are executed Optimization of verification in real-time (number of samples, samples, methods, etc.) Bugey-1 (France) Windscale AGR (UK) AVR (Germany) RBMK-1000 ( U kraine) Other objects with graphite Explanation of verification in real-time (sampling and measurement) using released publications RBMK-1500 (Lithuania) RBMK-1000 (Russia, Ukraine) Other objects with graphite Integrated methods Bugey-1 (France) Windscale AGR (UK) Magnox (UK), Beloyarsk NPP (AMB), Amplification of designed RBMK term of service Other objects with graphite Special conditioning, treatment and disposal options Different decisions
      • Issues, related to the irradiated graphite, should not be addressed alone. By sharing experience and planning in advance bounded investigative and development works, we have an opportunity to achieve success .
      • The INPP team is convinced that management of waste from reactor should be concerted with dismantling technology. The lack of such integration may affect the whole INPP decommissioning programme .
      • The INPP team has the potential to accomplish the majority of works (for example, to carry out sampling. The INPP has necessary laboratories, the INPP personnel is pro-active, we have 15 tons of pure graphite for establishment of stands). All the missing parts will be developed within the framework of 2011-2029 enterprise's activity strategy.
    • 46. Extensive Emergency Preparedness Training organized at INPP
      • 24 February, 2011 planned Emergency Preparedness training
      • 267 INPP employees from management and various services participated
      • New Emergency Plan reflecting new INPP configuration and organizational structure was validated
      • New Scenario of drop of SFAs to the pond and their interaction was challenged
      • Beyond design emergency procedures were validated
      • Observed by RSC, VATESI, etc. reps
      • Lessons learned – vulnerabilities and further improvement
      • photo
      • photo
      • photo
    • 47. Post Fukushima recommendations
      • WANO Significant Operating Experience Report 2011-2 Review
        • Safety systems, procedures and staff availability and functionality
        • Readiness to mitigate station blackout
        • Readiness to mitigate flooding
        • Readiness to mitigate fire
    • 48. Post Fukushima actions plan
      • INPP Site Specific actions plan has been developed 2011 03 29 and presented to r egulatory body : VATESI
      • Verify through test or inspection that active and passive safety systems are available and functional  
      • Verify that the capability to mitigate station blackout conditions required by station design is valid and that the facility is actually ready for that mode
      • Verify the capability to mitigate internal and external flooding
      • Perform walk downs of safety related equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events and to analyze the potential that equipment ’ s function could be lost.
      • General safety issues
      • Action plan implemented and Final report - 2011 06 30
    • 49.
      INFORMATION ABOUT THE CAUSES OF UNIT 1 MAIN CIRCULATION CIRCUIT SEALING FAILURE OCCURRED DURING ITS DECONTAMINATION On 5 October 2010 during implementation of the scheduled works foreseen in Project B12 “Decontamination of internal surfaces of SE Ignalina NPP Main Circulation Circuit, Blowing, Cooling and Water Purification Systems” – Unit 1 circuit decontamination – seal failure has occurred in one of the components which resulted in the flowing out of the chemical agents (nitrogen acid (1%) and potassium permanganate) used for decontamination outside of the circuit boundaries. Since the strict safety requirements are applied for implementation of this project, the works are performed in the leak-tight rooms, the chemical agents and substances contaminated by radioactive nuclides have drained through the specific drainage systems. In order to ascertain the causes of this technological incident the Commission consisting of representatives of the employer of the project (Ignalina NPP) and the contractor of the project (JSC “Specialus Montažas-NTP”) was formed. “ The Commission has concluded that responsibility for this technological incident falls on Contractor implementing project B12. The project implementation technology proposed by the Contractor had some shortcomings which caused the incident”, - the chairman of the Commission, the head of INPP Technological Service Vigantas Galkauskas stated. In opinion of the Commission Chairman the most essential is that neither INPP employees nor the environment have suffered. Moreover, INPP specialists have ascertained the causes of these malfunctions in the project implementation, so analogical technical problems shall not repeat while implementing a similar project in the future.
    • 50.
      • Commission concluded:
      • MCC sealing failure has occurred during Unit 1 Main Circulation Circuit decontamination due to the shortcomings of the decontamination technology proposed by the Contractor. The technology proposed by the Contractor was in fact not tested in nuclear industry enterprises before. It contradicts the Technical Specification regulations of the Public Procurement Tender for the implementation of this project.
      • It should be added that according to the facts stated the following conclusion can be made: the contract for the project B12 implementation signed with the Contractor – an economic operators group acting on the basis of joint activity agreement – JSC “Specialus Montažas-NTP” (Lithuania), Lithuanian Energy Institute (LEI), JSC “All-Russian Research Institute for NPP Operation” (VNIAES, Russia) on 12 January 2010, was signed without taking into consideration the fact that the Contractor did not comply with the requirements stated in the Technical Specifications of the tender.