Hood (iea) part 2 accounting ccxg gf march2014

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  • reduced mitigation effort globallycould impact mutual trust
  • Hood (iea) part 2 accounting ccxg gf march2014

    1. 1. Climate Change Expert Group www.oecd.org/env/cc/ccxg GHG or not GHG: Accounting for diverse mitigation contributions in the post-2020 climate framework Christina Hood (IEA) Based on the draft discussion paper by C. Hood, G. Briner and M. Rocha CCXG Global Forum 19 March 2014, Breakout Group B
    2. 2. 2 Climate Change Expert Group Session 2 (11.30-13h) Double counting of mitigation Forms of double counting Examples of double claiming Single-year targets and mitigation transfers Options for “opt-in” rules for use of market or non-market mitigation transfers
    3. 3. 3 Climate Change Expert Group Which transfers matter for accounting?  Two conditions under which transfers of mitigation outcomes matter for UNFCCC accounting:  Could include credits (offsets), allowance units from domestic emissions trading systems, or non-market transfers of mitigation outcomes “Used” by a Party as counting directly towards a contribution under UNFCCC Originating outside the boundary of that contribution (geographic, scope or temporal) +
    4. 4. 4 Climate Change Expert Group Double counting of mitigation  “Double issuance” = more than one unit issued for the same emissions reductions.  “Double selling” or “double retirement” = same unit used more than once towards emissions obligations  “Double claiming” against pledges/targets = same mitigation outcome claimed by two jurisdictions
    5. 5. 5 Climate Change Expert Group Examples of double claiming Party A Party B How double claiming could arise Quantified GHG GHG inventory Credit units generated in Party B are sold to Party A. Emissions reductions could be counted by both.
    6. 6. 6 Climate Change Expert Group Examples of double claiming Party A Party B How double claiming could arise Quantified GHG GHG inventory Credit units generated in Party B are sold to Party A. Emissions reductions could be counted by both. Quantified GHG Renewable energy capacity If renewable energy target delivered in part by crediting mechanism (with units sold to Party A), could be double-counting of GHG reductions.
    7. 7. 7 Climate Change Expert Group Examples of double claiming Party A Party B How double claiming could arise Quantified GHG GHG inventory Credit units generated in Party B are sold to Party A. Emissions reductions could be counted by both. Quantified GHG Renewable energy capacity If renewable energy target delivered in part by crediting mechanism (with units sold to Party A), could be double-counting of GHG reductions. Renewable energy (transfers) Renewable energy (capacity) With trade of green certificates between Party A and B, there is potential for double-counting if one Party accounts for the transfers and the other doesn’t.
    8. 8. 8 Climate Change Expert Group Examples of double claiming Party A Party B How double claiming could arise Quantified GHG GHG inventory Credit units generated in Party B are sold to Party A. Emissions reductions could be counted by both. Quantified GHG Renewable energy capacity If renewable energy target delivered in part by crediting mechanism (with units sold to Party A), could be double-counting of GHG reductions. Renewable energy (transfers) Renewable energy (capacity) With trade of green certificates between Party A and B, there is potential for double-counting if one Party accounts for the transfers and the other doesn’t. Quantified GHG Production of clean electricity If electricity is exported from Party B to Party A via grid interconnection, the GHG reductions could be counted by both Parties.
    9. 9. 9 Climate Change Expert Group What do Parties want to “prevent”? 1. Prevent double counting in ex post reconciliation of actual transfers ?  requires tracking of actual unit or non-market transfers 2. Also prevent double counting in ex ante estimates of expected mitigation from national contributions ?  requires restrictions on what types of contributions can use market or non-market transfers
    10. 10. 10 Climate Change Expert Group Contributions defined as single-year or multiple-year targets Multiple Year Target 2020-30  Multi-year target avoids risk that emissions in single target year are unrepresentative of general trend 100Mt 20302020 90Mt 80Mt 2025 2030 target Annual unit purchases 2030 inventory Actual reported inventory emissions
    11. 11. 11 Climate Change Expert Group Contributions defined as single-year or multiple-year targets 100Mt 20302020 90Mt 80Mt 2025 2030 target 2030 inventory Actual reported inventory emissions  Total emissions and abatement less certain ex-ante  Gets complex when we think about “vintages”…
    12. 12. 12 Climate Change Expert Group Ex-ante clarity on expected total abatement and national goals 3. Avoidance •Ex post reporting of flows •Provide ex ante estimate of expected flows •GHG based contributions must account for flows, must be multi-year. •Ex post reporting of flows •Provide ex ante estimate of expected flows •Quantitative limit on units from Parties that do not account for flows. •Units in single-year targets must be reflective of continuous action •Ex post reporting of flows* •Provide ex ante estimate of expected flows Options for “opt in” to use of market or non- market transfers 2. Enhanced clarity 1. Transparency *flows = issuance, retirement, transfers, banking [PLUS: governance of systems, registry and tracking arrangements via FVA]
    13. 13. 13 Climate Change Expert Group Questions for discussion  Should double counting be prevented from occurring ex ante, or only during ex post reconciliation of GHG emission levels and unit transfers?  If only Parties with certain types of contributions can “opt in” to use of market or non-market transfers, how can this be reconciled with existing participation in CDM or other market mechanisms?  To prevent “double claiming” between GHG and a non-GHG contributions, should Parties with non-GHG contributions have to adjust their reported outcomes?

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