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84th Session of the National Education Councilof SerbiaSTRENGTHENING INTEGRITY AND FIGHTINGCORRUPTION IN EDUCATION: SERBIA...
Education: importance and vulnerability• The stakes associated with good education  are high and growing higher• Education...
Education: importance and vulnerability             Share of people in a given world region viewing education in their cou...
What can be done? EDUCATION                                          CORRUPTION                     Preventative:Preventat...
The causes of corruption in educationCORRUPTION                                                     Corruption            ...
The focus of integrity assessment is onthe causes of corruption in education   Incentives +        Opportunity            ...
OECD integrity assessment: the process            • Students                                              •   Access      ...
Sources of information                  Surveys (PISA;                   national and                   international     ...
The vicious circle of failure                                          Analysing                                         t...
Application of the INTES approach:Identifying drivers of corruption demand in Serbia                 Tracing systemic shor...
Findings:integrity and access to education in Serbia                Access to education:                • Strong, mostly f...
Findings:   integrity and access to education in Serbia                                                                   ...
Findings:   integrity and access to education in Serbia                                                                   ...
Findings:       integrity and access to education in Serbia                                                               ...
Main recommendation: access• Leverage for speeding up external school leaving examsto replace entry exams organized by fac...
Findings:             integrity and quality of education in Serbia                               Quality of education:    ...
Findings:             integrity and quality of education in Serbia                                                        ...
Main recommendation: quality• Reform the curriculum• Introduce codes of conduct for teachers
Findings:integrity and education staff policies               Staff policies:               • Loopholes in the legislation...
Findings:     integrity and education staff policies                                   Compaints and requests to MOES by e...
Findings:                                                                   integrity and education staff policies        ...
Main recommendation: staff policies• Legislative strengthening of hiring procedures• Start training of principals• Provide...
Findings:integrity and resource management             Management of resources :             • Heavy reliance of public sc...
Findings:      integrity and resource management        Overview of funding sources, school accounts, and reporting of sch...
Findings:                                                integrity and resource management                                ...
Main recommendation: resources• Strengthen financial accountability of schools on locallevel, while determining what is pe...
Findings:Prevention and detection capacity              Prevention and detection              • Adequate institutional fra...
Main recommendations:  prevention and detection• Strengthen prevention and detection capacities onsector level, by    Imp...
Hvala na pažnji!mihaylo.milovanovitch@oecd.org
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84th Session of the National Education Council of Serbia STRENGTHENING INTEGRITY AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN EDUCATION: SERBIA Mihaylo Milovanovitch, OECD Directorate for Education

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The stakes associated with good education are high and growing higher
Education is typically the second or third biggest domain of public expenditure
Education is a highly complex system, with multitude of actors and vested interests.

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  • The second sequence illustrates corrupt behaviour caused by a criminal intention. The second sequence holds for corruption in any sector.
  • Sources of information:PISA database Education at a Glance database UNESCO and World Bank databases Data and Information Grid – country questionnaire
  • Higher education in Serbia is likely to remain very attractive, and all counterparts met by the OECD assessment team thought of itas a necessary investment for a better personal future. However, the capacity of universities and the state to support expansion islimited and a considerable share of costs is routinely devolved to students and households. In 2010 private sources accounted for34% of the budget of public institutions – more than in any European OECD country except Portugal, where 38% of the resourcesinvested were private (OECD, 2011).Between 2007 and 2009 the state financed around 66% of public university cost, which allowed 42% of the student populationto study for free after passing strict and rigid testing of academic performance. Individual need is sometimes also taken intoconsideration, in addition to performance.The cost of university study in Serbia relative to per capita income is very high, which gives students and their families a seriousincentive to apply for public support. Hence, families and prospective students are willing to invest considerable time and effort to gain access to public support in theform of scholarships, loans and/or dormitory places, and competition is severe – mostly at the point of entry in the system, but alsothroughout the duration of studies because well-performing, but fee-paying students could in theory change their status and begranted a scholarship. Public support is the only existing form of support and is granted according to the principle of “the winnertakes all” – loans and dormitory places are reserved only for students who have been granted a scholarship.Scholarships are tied to study places and are the main channel of state funding for universities. According to data from the MoESfor 2010, 90% of these resources are earmarked for salaries of university staff. Faculties have to rely on student fees to make endsmeet or to improve their study offer, which provides a strong incentive to have as many fee-paying students as possible, or, in otherwords, to be highly restrictive when granting access to public support.Both prospective students and faculties have strong, mostly financial incentives to misuse the admission and assessment mechanisms. Evidence that indications that in these points the system is frequently too weak to resist the pressure. The analysis of complaints submitted via the official channels of the Ministry of Education and Science shows that the most frequent complaints in 2010-11 were about university procedures and administration. This category includes unscheduled examinations, issues related to admission, ranking, changes in student status from fee-paying to budget-supported, course examinations, etc. In an undetermined number of cases, rules and regulations are being bypassed for the sake of access to study places, public financial support and progression during studies.
  • Higher education in Serbia is likely to remain very attractive, and all counterparts met by the OECD assessment team thought of itas a necessary investment for a better personal future. However, the capacity of universities and the state to support expansion islimited and a considerable share of costs is routinely devolved to students and households. In 2010 private sources accounted for34% of the budget of public institutions – more than in any European OECD country except Portugal, where 38% of the resourcesinvested were private (OECD, 2011).Between 2007 and 2009 the state financed around 66% of public university cost, which allowed 42% of the student populationto study for free after passing strict and rigid testing of academic performance. Individual need is sometimes also taken intoconsideration, in addition to performance.The cost of university study in Serbia relative to per capita income is very high, which gives students and their families a seriousincentive to apply for public support. Hence, families and prospective students are willing to invest considerable time and effort to gain access to public support in theform of scholarships, loans and/or dormitory places, and competition is severe – mostly at the point of entry in the system, but alsothroughout the duration of studies because well-performing, but fee-paying students could in theory change their status and begranted a scholarship. Public support is the only existing form of support and is granted according to the principle of “the winnertakes all” – loans and dormitory places are reserved only for students who have been granted a scholarship.Scholarships are tied to study places and are the main channel of state funding for universities. According to data from the MoESfor 2010, 90% of these resources are earmarked for salaries of university staff. Faculties have to rely on student fees to make endsmeet or to improve their study offer, which provides a strong incentive to have as many fee-paying students as possible, or, in otherwords, to be highly restrictive when granting access to public support.Both prospective students and faculties have strong, mostly financial incentives to misuse the admission and assessment mechanisms. Evidence that indications that in these points the system is frequently too weak to resist the pressure. The analysis of complaints submitted via the official channels of the Ministry of Education and Science shows that the most frequent complaints in 2010-11 were about university procedures and administration. This category includes unscheduled examinations, issues related to admission, ranking, changes in student status from fee-paying to budget-supported, course examinations, etc. In an undetermined number of cases, rules and regulations are being bypassed for the sake of access to study places, public financial support and progression during studies.
  • Higher education in Serbia is likely to remain very attractive, and all counterparts met by the OECD assessment team thought of itas a necessary investment for a better personal future. However, the capacity of universities and the state to support expansion islimited and a considerable share of costs is routinely devolved to students and households. In 2010 private sources accounted for34% of the budget of public institutions – more than in any European OECD country except Portugal, where 38% of the resourcesinvested were private (OECD, 2011).Between 2007 and 2009 the state financed around 66% of public university cost, which allowed 42% of the student populationto study for free after passing strict and rigid testing of academic performance. Individual need is sometimes also taken intoconsideration, in addition to performance.The cost of university study in Serbia relative to per capita income is very high, which gives students and their families a seriousincentive to apply for public support. Hence, families and prospective students are willing to invest considerable time and effort to gain access to public support in theform of scholarships, loans and/or dormitory places, and competition is severe – mostly at the point of entry in the system, but alsothroughout the duration of studies because well-performing, but fee-paying students could in theory change their status and begranted a scholarship. Public support is the only existing form of support and is granted according to the principle of “the winnertakes all” – loans and dormitory places are reserved only for students who have been granted a scholarship.Scholarships are tied to study places and are the main channel of state funding for universities. According to data from the MoESfor 2010, 90% of these resources are earmarked for salaries of university staff. Faculties have to rely on student fees to make endsmeet or to improve their study offer, which provides a strong incentive to have as many fee-paying students as possible, or, in otherwords, to be highly restrictive when granting access to public support.Both prospective students and faculties have strong, mostly financial incentives to misuse the admission and assessment mechanisms. Evidence that indications that in these points the system is frequently too weak to resist the pressure. The analysis of complaints submitted via the official channels of the Ministry of Education and Science shows that the most frequent complaints in 2010-11 were about university procedures and administration. This category includes unscheduled examinations, issues related to admission, ranking, changes in student status from fee-paying to budget-supported, course examinations, etc. In an undetermined number of cases, rules and regulations are being bypassed for the sake of access to study places, public financial support and progression during studies.
  • Higher education in Serbia is likely to remain very attractive, and all counterparts met by the OECD assessment team thought of itas a necessary investment for a better personal future. However, the capacity of universities and the state to support expansion islimited and a considerable share of costs is routinely devolved to students and households. In 2010 private sources accounted for34% of the budget of public institutions – more than in any European OECD country except Portugal, where 38% of the resourcesinvested were private (OECD, 2011).Between 2007 and 2009 the state financed around 66% of public university cost, which allowed 42% of the student populationto study for free after passing strict and rigid testing of academic performance. Individual need is sometimes also taken intoconsideration, in addition to performance.The cost of university study in Serbia relative to per capita income is very high, which gives students and their families a seriousincentive to apply for public support. Hence, families and prospective students are willing to invest considerable time and effort to gain access to public support in theform of scholarships, loans and/or dormitory places, and competition is severe – mostly at the point of entry in the system, but alsothroughout the duration of studies because well-performing, but fee-paying students could in theory change their status and begranted a scholarship. Public support is the only existing form of support and is granted according to the principle of “the winnertakes all” – loans and dormitory places are reserved only for students who have been granted a scholarship.Scholarships are tied to study places and are the main channel of state funding for universities. According to data from the MoESfor 2010, 90% of these resources are earmarked for salaries of university staff. Faculties have to rely on student fees to make endsmeet or to improve their study offer, which provides a strong incentive to have as many fee-paying students as possible, or, in otherwords, to be highly restrictive when granting access to public support.Both prospective students and faculties have strong, mostly financial incentives to misuse the admission and assessment mechanisms. Evidence that indications that in these points the system is frequently too weak to resist the pressure. The analysis of complaints submitted via the official channels of the Ministry of Education and Science shows that the most frequent complaints in 2010-11 were about university procedures and administration. This category includes unscheduled examinations, issues related to admission, ranking, changes in student status from fee-paying to budget-supported, course examinations, etc. In an undetermined number of cases, rules and regulations are being bypassed for the sake of access to study places, public financial support and progression during studies.
  • Inefficiencies in learning during regular school hours create a need for remedial lessons and fuel the proliferation of private tutoring as a widespread, commonly accepted solution for difficult subjects, before exam sessions and in preparation of admission exams. Recent household survey data indicate that more than a quarter of Serbian households with children in primary or secondary schooling use the services of at least one private tutor.Learners in Serbia often seem to be trapped in a vicious circle of limited learning during regular schooling hours, which creates need for tutoring and stimulates reliance on out-of-school remedial work; this in turn limits the effectiveness of learning in class. Absence of professional codes of conduct and by weaknesses in the inspection system
  • Inefficiencies in learning during regular school hours create a need for remedial lessons and fuel the proliferation of private tutoring as a widespread, commonly accepted solution for difficult subjects, before exam sessions and in preparation of admission exams. Recent household survey data indicate that more than a quarter of Serbian households with children in primary or secondary schooling use the services of at least one private tutor.Learners in Serbia often seem to be trapped in a vicious circle of limited learning during regular schooling hours, which creates need for tutoring and stimulates reliance on out-of-school remedial work; this in turn limits the effectiveness of learning in class. Absence of professional codes of conduct and by weaknesses in the inspection system
  • Complaints about hiring staff and principals are among the most frequent types made to the Ministry of Education and Science.Loopholes in the legislation allow for bypassing staff redundancy lists through temporary employment, the current rules make staff and school principals depend on each other for their respective (re)appointments, and there are potential problems with the independence of school boards. Absence of transparent guidelines for hiring and firing staff contributes to a perception among stakeholders that appointments and promotion of teachers and school staff are routinely based on political affiliation or favours, and not (only) on competence.
  • Complaints about hiring staff and principals are among the most frequent types made to the Ministry of Education and Science.Loopholes in the legislation allow for bypassing staff redundancy lists through temporary employment, the current rules make staff and school principals depend on each other for their respective (re)appointments, and there are potential problems with the independence of school boards. Absence of transparent guidelines for hiring and firing staff contributes to a perception among stakeholders that appointments and promotion of teachers and school staff are routinely based on political affiliation or favours, and not (only) on competence.
  • Complaints about hiring staff and principals are among the most frequent types made to the Ministry of Education and Science.Loopholes in the legislation allow for bypassing staff redundancy lists through temporary employment, the current rules make staff and school principals depend on each other for their respective (re)appointments, and there are potential problems with the independence of school boards. Absence of transparent guidelines for hiring and firing staff contributes to a perception among stakeholders that appointments and promotion of teachers and school staff are routinely based on political affiliation or favours, and not (only) on competence.
  • Public funding is insufficient and volatile, tradition bound inefficiencies in the network of schools are fairly resistant to change, there is competition between schools for diminishing numbers of youth which is costly, and the school infrastructure is oversized and old. Funding shortages affect mostly items related to school operation, such as expenses for maintenance, classroom equipment and professional development of teaching staff.In coping with the combined challenge of heightened needs and lowered means, the school system in Serbia has developed a high level of dependency on private investment, a fair share of which (18%) stems from revenues generated by the schools themselves through economic activities such as renting out-of-school facilities, mostly without legal permission. Some of the major education expenditure items of households such as textbooks, meals, excursions and transportation can be directly transferred by parents to the school accounts, so that up to 80% of the total private investment in education in Serbia is paid directly to the schools and into their accounts. You can do the maths yourself, but this is a lot of money!At the same time schools in Serbia have incentives to under-report or omit reporting of certain types of revenues, and there is evidence that they in fact do so. As budget users they are expected to return to the budget all income generated by the use of assets in their possession without being reported because under the current legislation they are not considered to be revenue. Municipalities do not have dedicated accounts for the schools under their fiscal responsibility, which leaves all revenue-related bank transfers at the discretion of schools.
  • Public funding is insufficient and volatile, tradition bound inefficiencies in the network of schools are fairly resistant to change, there is competition between schools for diminishing numbers of youth which is costly, and the school infrastructure is oversized and old. Funding shortages affect mostly items related to school operation, such as expenses for maintenance, classroom equipment and professional development of teaching staff.In coping with the combined challenge of heightened needs and lowered means, the school system in Serbia has developed a high level of dependency on private investment, a fair share of which (18%) stems from revenues generated by the schools themselves through economic activities such as renting out-of-school facilities, mostly without legal permission. Some of the major education expenditure items of households such as textbooks, meals, excursions and transportation can be directly transferred by parents to the school accounts, so that up to 80% of the total private investment in education in Serbia is paid directly to the schools and into their accounts. You can do the maths yourself, but this is a lot of money!At the same time schools in Serbia have incentives to under-report or omit reporting of certain types of revenues, and there is evidence that they in fact do so. As budget users they are expected to return to the budget all income generated by the use of assets in their possession without being reported because under the current legislation they are not considered to be revenue. Municipalities do not have dedicated accounts for the schools under their fiscal responsibility, which leaves all revenue-related bank transfers at the discretion of schools.
  • Public funding is insufficient and volatile, tradition bound inefficiencies in the network of schools are fairly resistant to change, there is competition between schools for diminishing numbers of youth which is costly, and the school infrastructure is oversized and old. Funding shortages affect mostly items related to school operation, such as expenses for maintenance, classroom equipment and professional development of teaching staff.In coping with the combined challenge of heightened needs and lowered means, the school system in Serbia has developed a high level of dependency on private investment, a fair share of which (18%) stems from revenues generated by the schools themselves through economic activities such as renting out-of-school facilities, mostly without legal permission. Some of the major education expenditure items of households such as textbooks, meals, excursions and transportation can be directly transferred by parents to the school accounts, so that up to 80% of the total private investment in education in Serbia is paid directly to the schools and into their accounts. You can do the maths yourself, but this is a lot of money!At the same time schools in Serbia have incentives to under-report or omit reporting of certain types of revenues, and there is evidence that they in fact do so. As budget users they are expected to return to the budget all income generated by the use of assets in their possession without being reported because under the current legislation they are not considered to be revenue. Municipalities do not have dedicated accounts for the schools under their fiscal responsibility, which leaves all revenue-related bank transfers at the discretion of schools.
  • The country has a relatively adequate institutional framework for prevention and detection. The National Anti-Corruption Council and in particular the Anti-Corruption Agency with its largely preventative mandate are placed most conspicuously within the anticorruption system. Other institutions such as the Commissariat for the access to information of public importance and personal data protection, and the Ombudsman have been instrumental in increasing transparency in Serbia and play a crucial role in the ongoing anti-corruption effort. On the law enforcement and prosecution side, the capacity to detect and prosecute corruption crime has been on the increase. However, tn relation to the education sector, in the few known prominent corruption cases, respective proceedings have been delayed either at the stage of prosecution or court review.On sector level, there are serious gaps in the quality, availability and use of evidence and data, in particular for budgeting purposes, and lack of administrative transparency. The accountability of faculties vis-à-vis authorities and students is low, and the lack of codes of professional conduct for teachers is a concern, despite a solid but somewhat limited system for licensing of teachers. Procurement and textbooks remain areas where opportunities for corruption exist.
  • The country has a relatively adequate institutional framework for prevention and detection. The National Anti-Corruption Council and in particular the Anti-Corruption Agency with its largely preventative mandate are placed most conspicuously within the anticorruption system. Other institutions such as the Commissariat for the access to information of public importance and personal data protection, and the Ombudsman have been instrumental in increasing transparency in Serbia and play a crucial role in the ongoing anti-corruption effort. On the law enforcement and prosecution side, the capacity to detect and prosecute corruption crime has been on the increase. However, tn relation to the education sector, in the few known prominent corruption cases, respective proceedings have been delayed either at the stage of prosecution or court review.On sector level, there are serious gaps in the quality, availability and use of evidence and data, in particular for budgeting purposes, and lack of administrative transparency. The accountability of faculties vis-à-vis authorities and students is low, and the lack of codes of professional conduct for teachers is a concern, despite a solid but somewhat limited system for licensing of teachers. Procurement and textbooks remain areas where opportunities for corruption exist.
  • Transcript of "84th Session of the National Education Council of Serbia STRENGTHENING INTEGRITY AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN EDUCATION: SERBIA Mihaylo Milovanovitch, OECD Directorate for Education"

    1. 1. 84th Session of the National Education Councilof SerbiaSTRENGTHENING INTEGRITY AND FIGHTINGCORRUPTION IN EDUCATION: SERBIAMihaylo Milovanovitch,OECD Directorate for Education
    2. 2. Education: importance and vulnerability• The stakes associated with good education are high and growing higher• Education is typically the second or third biggest domain of public expenditure• Education is a highly complex system, with multitude of actors and vested interests.
    3. 3. Education: importance and vulnerability Share of people in a given world region viewing education in their country as corrupt or extremely corrupt, 2011 Eastern Europe 59% Africa 56% Western Balkans 50% Caucasus 49% GLOBAL 35% Southeast Asia 34% Latin America 22% OECD 18% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%Source: Transparency International 2011
    4. 4. What can be done? EDUCATION CORRUPTION Preventative:Preventative: Focus on Reactive/punitive:Focus on origin opportunity Focus on cases Assess Teach & Prohibit & enforce Criminalise & integrity mobilise punish Analysis and policy reaction?
    5. 5. The causes of corruption in educationCORRUPTION Corruption Corruption Level 3: incidence incidence Corruption incidenceOPPORTUNITY Level 2: Preventive Regulatory Accountability Budget Civil society framework framework mechanisms monitoring and media Demand for Demand for Staff and Opportunity,DEMAND quality access resources criminal intentions Level 1: Key area 1: Key area 2: Key area 3: System shortcomings teachers assessment xyz
    6. 6. The focus of integrity assessment is onthe causes of corruption in education Incentives + Opportunity Corruption readiness Education system Detection and shortcomings prevention shortcomings
    7. 7. OECD integrity assessment: the process • Students • Access • Parents • Quality • Staff • Staff and resources • PreventionFocus (1) (2) Expectations Deliverables Identification of mismatch between (1) and (2)Outcomes (4) (3) National Recommen- follow-up dations • Focus groups • Policy areas • Further investigation • Target institutions • Reforms • Timeline
    8. 8. Sources of information Surveys (PISA; national and international corruption perception surveys) Data and Stakeholder information interviews; grid; nationalmedia reports data and indicators INTES assessment
    9. 9. The vicious circle of failure Analysing the impact Corruption incidence Failing prevention and detection mechanismsUnderstandingthe reasons Education system
    10. 10. Application of the INTES approach:Identifying drivers of corruption demand in Serbia Tracing systemic shortcomings in: • Access to education • Quality of education outcomes • Management of staff and resources • Prevention and detection of malpractice on sector level
    11. 11. Findings:integrity and access to education in Serbia Access to education: • Strong, mostly financial incentives to misuse the process of admission to universities, by both institutions and prospective students • Low awareness about academic integrity
    12. 12. Findings: integrity and access to education in Serbia Share of adults with higher education, 200960.050.040.0 Access to education: OECD average: 29.5%30.0 • Strong, mostly financial incentives to20.0 misuse the process of admission to 14.3% universities, by both institutions and10.0 prospective students 0.0 • Low awareness about academic integrity France Sweden Chile Korea Australia Spain Serbia Canada Belgium Bulgaria Greece Czech Republic Portugal Estonia Netherlands Albania Luxembourg Poland Israel Finland Ireland Italy Romania Hungary Croatia Slovak Republic Japan United States Slovenia Mexico Austria Turkey New Zealand United Kingdom Switzerland
    13. 13. Findings: integrity and access to education in Serbia Tuition fees of adultsto GDP per capita, Serbia and OECD Share relative with higher education, 200960.0 40%50.0 36% 35%40.0 30% Access to education: 27% OECD average: 29.5%30.0 25% • Strong, mostly financial incentives to20.0 20% misuse the process of admission to 14.3% 15% universities, by both institutions and10.0 prospective students 10% Median OECD: 7.6% 0.0 • Low awareness about academic integrity France Sweden Chile Korea Australia Spain Serbia Canada Belgium Bulgaria Greece Czech Republic Portugal Estonia Netherlands Albania Luxembourg Poland Israel Finland Ireland Italy Romania Hungary Croatia Slovak Republic Japan United States Slovenia Mexico Austria Turkey New Zealand United Kingdom Switzerland 5% 0% Median top 10 areas of study Median all areas
    14. 14. Findings: integrity and access to education in Serbia Complaints of adultsto GDP to MOES by beneficiaries Share relative with higher education, 2009 Tuition fees and requests per capita, Serbia and OECD 60.0 40% University procedures/administration 19.3 50.0 36% 35% procedures/work MoES 14.5 40.0 30% School management Access to education: 27% 13.3 School conditions 10.8 OECD average: 29.5% 30.0 25% School staff/teachers • Strong, mostly financial incentives to 9.6 20.0 20%Hiring /firing of teachers and principals misuse7.2 process of admission to the 14.3% 15% universities, by both institutions and 10.0 University professors 7.2 prospective students 10% Selection of principals Median OECD: 7.6% 4.8 0.0 • Low awareness about academic integrity France Sweden Chile Korea Australia Spain Serbia Canada Belgium Bulgaria Greece Czech Republic Portugal Estonia Netherlands Albania Luxembourg Poland Israel Finland Ireland Italy Romania Hungary Croatia Slovak Republic Japan United States Slovenia Mexico Austria Turkey New Zealand United Kingdom Switzerland Tenders/procurements 5% 1.2 0 5 10 15 20 25 0% Median top 10 areas of study by type of complaint, in %all areas Frequency Median of total
    15. 15. Main recommendation: access• Leverage for speeding up external school leaving examsto replace entry exams organized by faculties• Make financial support more accessible and equitable• Increase financial accountability of faculties vis-a-visstakeholders for public resources
    16. 16. Findings: integrity and quality of education in Serbia Quality of education: • Ineffective classroom learning fuels the proliferation of private tutoring with teachers from the same school • In an undetermined number of cases tutoring is a precondition for obtaining a gradeData source: PISA 2009, OECD
    17. 17. Findings: integrity and quality of education in Serbia % of secondary students who resort to private tutoring Bottom quarter of ESCS Second quarter of ESCS Third quarter of ESCS Top quarter of ESCS 60 50 Quality of education: 40 • Ineffective classroom learning fuels the % 30 proliferation of private tutoring with teachers from the same school 20 10 • In an undetermined number of cases tutoring is a precondition for obtaining a 0 grade Kyrgyzstan Japan Iceland Montenegro Estonia Korea Azerbaijan Croatia Poland Lithuania Australia Canada Switzerland Germany Latvia Bulgaria Serbia Slovak Republic Romania OECD average Hong Kong-China Netherlands Norway Finland Czech Republic SloveniaData source: PISA 2009, OECD
    18. 18. Main recommendation: quality• Reform the curriculum• Introduce codes of conduct for teachers
    19. 19. Findings:integrity and education staff policies Staff policies: • Loopholes in the legislation make principals and teachers mutually dependent for their respective (re-)appointment
    20. 20. Findings: integrity and education staff policies Compaints and requests to MOES by education staffHiring /firing of teachers and principals 35.7 School management 16.7 MoES procedures/work Staff policies: 11.9 School staff/teachers • Loopholes in the legislation make 11.9 principals and teachers mutually dependent Professors at university-teaching for their respective (re-)appointment 7.1 Selection of principals 7.1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Frequency by type of complaint, in % of total
    21. 21. Findings: integrity and education staff policies Teacher salaries and career progression - Serbia (2010) and OECD (2008) 3Ratio increase of salary at the top of the salarz scale, relative to Compaints and requests to MOES by education staff OECD average Korea starting salary, upper secondary school 2009 Hiring /firing of teachers and principals Above average salaries 35.7 Below average salaries Above average career progression 2.5 Above average career progression School management 16.7 Israel Japan Luxembourg MoES procedures/work Staff policies:France 11.9 2 OECD average Austria School staff/teachers Loopholes in the legislation make • Poland 11.9 Ireland Chile Portugal Hungary principals and teachers mutually dependent Finland Above average salaries Switzerland Professors at university-teaching 1.5 Estonia for their respective (re-)appointment 7.1 Czech Republic Greece Netherlands Below average career progression Italy Spain United States Slovak Republic Australia Germany Below average salariesof principals Selection 7.1Sweden Iceland Turkey Below average career progression Slovenia Denmark Norway Serbia 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 Frequency by type of complaint, in % of total Ratio of teachers salaries after 15 years of experience (minimum training) to GDP per capita, upper secondary school
    22. 22. Main recommendation: staff policies• Legislative strengthening of hiring procedures• Start training of principals• Provide opportunities and incentives for careerprogression for teachers
    23. 23. Findings:integrity and resource management Management of resources : • Heavy reliance of public schools on private investment, but without matching financial control
    24. 24. Findings: integrity and resource management Overview of funding sources, school accounts, and reporting of schools (2012)Sources of funding:Donations (I)Parental association (II)Revenues from services and rental of facilities (III)Local budget transfers (IV). Management of resources :School accounts:Donations account (I)Parental association account (II) • Heavy reliance of public schools on privateRegular school account (III, IV) investment, but without matching financialOther (remaining) account controlReporting:Annual reporting of principal for I-IV to the school board, with a possibility for a double check by RED(regional education departments).Revenue tax declarations (III) to local tax authorities.
    25. 25. Findings: integrity and resource management Distribution of public and private expenditure in primary and secondary education in Overview of funding sources, school accounts, (2008) Serbia (2007) and OECD and reporting of schools (2012)Sources of funding: Private per student expenditure Public per student expenditure Share of public and private expenditure (%) 100Donations (I) 90Parental association (II) 80Revenues from services and rental of facilities (III) 70Local budget transfers (IV). 60 Management of resources :School50accounts:Donations account (I) 40Parental association account (II) 30 • Heavy reliance of public schools on privateRegular school account (III, IV) 20 23.1 investment, but without matching financial 22.2Other (remaining) account 10 22.1 control 21.6 9.0 0Reporting:Annual reporting of principal for I-IV to the school board, with a possibility for a double check by RED(regional education departments).Revenue tax declarations (III) to local tax authorities.
    26. 26. Main recommendation: resources• Strengthen financial accountability of schools on locallevel, while determining what is permissible schoolrevenue which can be kept.• Process all lease requests currently with theRepublican Directorate for Property• Revoke the suspension of the Law on Local PublicFinance to rectify inequalities in central funding formunicipalities
    27. 27. Findings:Prevention and detection capacity Prevention and detection • Adequate institutional framework, but… • …weak capacity for malpractice detection and low level of awareness on sector level
    28. 28. Main recommendations: prevention and detection• Strengthen prevention and detection capacities onsector level, by  Improving data reliability and promoting its use  Making universities more accountable for the public funding they obtain  Invest more in training and staffing of school inspectorates  Increase transparency of budget formulation by introduce a per capita funding formula as soon as possible
    29. 29. Hvala na pažnji!mihaylo.milovanovitch@oecd.org
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