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Msf safety-flash-13.29
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Msf safety-flash-13.29

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  • 1. The information available on this Safety Flash and our associated web site is provided in good faith and only for the purposes of enhancing safety and best practice. For the avoidance of doubt no legal liability shall be attached to any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained. - 1 - Marine Safety Forum – Safety Flash 13-29 Issued: 1st July 2013 Subject: Fast rescue craft unplanned descent An FPSO’s fast rescue craft (FRC) was retrieved to a height of 23 metres above sea level following operational duties. When “hoist up” control input was given via the davit controls the FRC commenced an unplanned but gradual descent to the sea. With controls returned to the neutral position the descent continued. Activation of the emergency stop also did not stop the descent. It was concluded that both hoist brakes had functionally failed and that the only brake arresting the descent was the mechanical centrifugal/inertia brake. Four persons were aboard the FRC but no injuries were sustained. Critical Factors 1. Installation of incorrect hydraulic valve causing pressure lock in hydraulic system (valves nearly identical in appearance but part numbers differed by one character). 2. Deficiencies in third party testing/certification procedures. 3. Operator maintenance procedures not fully followed by contractor. Learning’s  Ensure replacement parts are ‘like for like’.  System failure modes must be fully understood and clear mitigative maintenance check implemented to address those failure modes.  Compliance to maintenance procedures, in particular technical integrity maintenance, is critical.  Ensure a full understanding of the maintenance and assurance tasks that are completed by third parties and that these tasks are clearly defined, documented, and in compliance with your company requirements.