Msf safety-flash-13.24
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  • 1. The information available on this Safety Flash and our associated web site is provided in good faith and only for the purposesof enhancing safety and best practice. For the avoidance of doubt no legal liability shall be attached to any guidance and/orrecommendation and/or statement herein contained.- 1 -Marine Safety Forum – Safety Flash 13-24Issued: 18thJune 2013Subject: High Potential Near Miss during Cargo OperationsWhilst engaged in Cargo Operations alongside a Platform within the North Sea, a high potential Near Missoccurred which involved 2 AB’s, who were exposed to a potential crushing injury during back loadingoperations.Prior to entry into the 500metre zone, appropriate checks had been completed, standard communicationsduring the operation were one AB had direct UHF communication with the Bridge, whilst the 2nd AB haddirect VHF communication with the platform and crane driver. The weather was clear with the sea stateapproximately 2.5metres.Nearing the completion of backload operations, the crane driver had been advised by the Bridge Team toland a cargo unit in Bay 4 on the centreline of the vessel. The crane driver made several attempts to land thiscargo unit, the descent and positioning attempts were made in an uncontrolled manner. On third landing, thedeck crew approached the unit to unhook as they observed the bridle over the cargo unit, and the hook andwire landed on deck. To approach the unit at this time is normal practice for the deck crew; video footage ofthis incident clearly shows that this cargo had been on the deck with the bridle over the cargo unit for anadequate time for the deck crew to assume this was landed and safe to approach. The deck crew did not seethe swivel moving outboard or then back inboard but were focused on the deck height length of wire whichwas more or less stationary. As one deck member went for the wire and the other went to unhook, the bridlerapidly ascended and the cargo came off the deck and swung. At this point the deck crew ran forwardbetween back loaded cargo to escape the rising unit and avoid a potentially significant injury. Although Communications had been established, it was noted during investigation that the deck crewhad reported that communications with the crane driver were poor The option to Stop the Job was not identified, nor was the erratic Crane operations reported Deck Crew did not attempt to contact the Crane Driver to confirm cargo was safely landed, after 3rdattempt to land. Crane Driver did not make any attempt to warn the deck crew by radio communications or soundsignalling The vessel’s movement was slight and the location of the cargo was at frame 60 on the centre linewhere pitch and roll have very little effect. The vessel was heaving about 1-1.5m which does notaccount for the rapid ascent of the cargo unit, therefore it is identified that the lift was heaved after thedeck crew had approached it. From Video footage, it is clear that the cargo was landed and had been moved into a suitable position,with adequate time for the deck crew to approach The crane driver stated that he did not see that the deck crew had approached the cargo unit, andrepositioned the cargo unit into Bay 4. Deck crew were attired in high visibility jackets and hat covers and the deck was well illuminated Due to cargo operations continuing, the Deck crew did not raise this as a concern or near miss incidentto the installation at the time. Due to the location on the deck, the Bridge did not witness this incident, however had this beenwitnessed or reported a Time out for Safety would have been called and the Platform informed.Industry guidance states “Adequate communications should be established between the installation, vesseldeck crew and the bridge to stop operations in the event of a dangerous situation”, it was noted throughinvestigation that the level of communications was insufficient, and was a significant contributor to creatingan extremely hazardous occurrence onboard.Clear and sufficient communication should be established and maintained throughout cargo operations.