Perspectivas económicas de américa latina 2010
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  • jeudi 6 mai 2010
  • Origin of Migrants in OECD Countries by Region of Birth After Europeans, Latin Americans and Caribbean (28%) countries lead OECD immigration flows. Latin American and Caribbean immigrants represent 28% of total migrants in OECD countries. Emigration rate to OECD vs. GDP per capita The main motive to migrate is economical. Just considering the case of the individual migrant, he/she will move if he/she expects to earn a higher wage in the new location But economic opportunities alone do not tell the whole story: policies, cultural ties, distance also matter. Nearly half (44%) of OECD migrants were born in OECD countries, where average income levels are far higher than the world average. Within the sizeable Latin American flows to the OECD intra-OECD flows predominate: 11% are Mexican and 1.8% are Puerto Rican (US citizens). jeudi 6 mai 2010
  • South-North migration More than 20 million people from Latin America and the Caribbean are international migrants; equivalent to 4 to 5% of the region ’ s population. Nearly 75% of total migrants are in the United States and as distant second and third place among OECD destinations are Spain (3.3%) and Canada (2.7%). South-South migration Intra-regional migration accounts for 14% of international migration from Latin American countries. But Argentina and Venezuela (from Colombia), have migrant stocks similar in size to those found in Spain and Canada. Costa Rica, too, is a substantial country of destination (Nicaraguans). Ratha and Shaw (2007) show that South-South migration is primarily driven by proximity (a common border) and networks, and only to a lesser extent by income differences Update with 2008 national data. Recent flows to the United States and Spain change the picture – but only slightly: The countries which are the source of the largest inflows to the United States in 2008 are essentially the same countries that had the largest stocks there in 2000. In the case of Spain the largest flows in 2008 came from the countries with the largest stocks in 2000 (Ecuador and Colombia). However: Flows from Brazil and Peru have, however, increased significantly. Given the huge boom of immigration since 2000, Spain may be the second/third most important destination for Latin American migrants (displacing Argentina and Venezuela).
  • (Background) OECD natives are more educated than Latin American migrants – more people have secondary and tertiary education, and fewer have only primary. On the other hand, in the aggregate, educational levels between migrants who go to OECD countries and those who go to other Latin American countries are very similar. These aggregate statistics, however, mask a great deal of variation between different migration corridors. Two-thirds of Mexican migrants in the United States have only a primary education, and less than 10% have tertiary education. The structure of this flow is mirrored in that of Central Americans in Mexico ...
  • ... Caribbean migrants in the United Kingdom and Spain, and, to a lesser degree, South Americans in Spain (also exhibiting low education levels). Some migration corridors, meanwhile, are travelled by relatively higher-skilled migrants . This is notably the case of South American and Caribbean migrants to Mexico . Note 1: South American migrants: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Note 2: Caribbean migrants: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermudas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, St.Kitts and Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos and the US Virgin Islands.
  • The regional average emigration rate among university- educated is 15% (vs. 0.4% for the US; 10.3% for the UK; 4.2% for France). Is Brain Drain robbing Latin America of its most skilled people? We do not think so, in general terms. Few South American countries are truly hard hit, in stark contrast to the Caribbean countries, many of which have brain drain rates in excess of 50%. High rates of brain drain reflect small numbers of highly educated people. The prospect of emigration may raise the incentives to pursue an education.
  • ... Caribbean migrants in the United Kingdom and Spain, and, to a lesser degree, South Americans in Spain (also exhibiting low education levels). Some migration corridors, meanwhile, are travelled by relatively higher-skilled migrants . This is notably the case of South American and Caribbean migrants to Mexico . Note 1: South American migrants: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Note 2: Caribbean migrants: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermudas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, St.Kitts and Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos and the US Virgin Islands.
  • ... Caribbean migrants in the United Kingdom and Spain, and, to a lesser degree, South Americans in Spain (also exhibiting low education levels). Some migration corridors, meanwhile, are travelled by relatively higher-skilled migrants . This is notably the case of South American and Caribbean migrants to Mexico . Note 1: South American migrants: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Note 2: Caribbean migrants: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermudas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, St.Kitts and Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos and the US Virgin Islands.
  • There is an extensive literature for OECD countries showing that the wage (-) and unemployment (+) effect of immigration is minor. Immigrants and native-born workers often do not compete for the same jobs ; migrants are frequently clustered in construction, agriculture, tourism and home care. At the same time, migration spurs labour participation rates directly, and indirectly (educated female labour). Preliminary evidence shows this may also be the case in the main Latin American countries of destination: Argentina, Costa Rica and Venezuela. The complementarity is highest in the case of female immigrants in Costa Rica and Argentina, who are concentrated (between 35 and 40% of all immigrants) in household services. Immigrants in Venezuela (both women and men) seem to strengthen the trade sector. By contrast, male immigrants tend to compete with natives in the manufacturing sector in the three countries, and in the trade sector in Argentina. Technical note Figure compares the occupations in 17 sectors in which immigrants work in the three main Latin American destination countries (Argentina, Costa Rica and Venezuela), to those of the native-born labour force, as percentages, differentiating by sex. Each point in the figure represents the share of the male or female immigrant and native populations working in a given sector. If a point lies on the 45-degree line, it indicates that the relative proportion of immigrants and native populations working in that sector is the same. The further the observation departs from this line, the more probable that immigrant and native workers are complementary; that is, that they do not compete with each other for the same jobs.
  • There is an extensive literature for OECD countries showing that the wage (-) and unemployment (+) effect of immigration is minor. Immigrants and native-born workers often do not compete for the same jobs ; migrants are frequently clustered in construction, agriculture, tourism and home care. At the same time, migration spurs labour participation rates directly, and indirectly (educated female labour). Preliminary evidence shows this may also be the case in the main Latin American countries of destination: Argentina, Costa Rica and Venezuela. The complementarity is highest in the case of female immigrants in Costa Rica and Argentina, who are concentrated (between 35 and 40% of all immigrants) in household services. Immigrants in Venezuela (both women and men) seem to strengthen the trade sector. By contrast, male immigrants tend to compete with natives in the manufacturing sector in the three countries, and in the trade sector in Argentina. Technical note Figure compares the occupations in 17 sectors in which immigrants work in the three main Latin American destination countries (Argentina, Costa Rica and Venezuela), to those of the native-born labour force, as percentages, differentiating by sex. Each point in the figure represents the share of the male or female immigrant and native populations working in a given sector. If a point lies on the 45-degree line, it indicates that the relative proportion of immigrants and native populations working in that sector is the same. The further the observation departs from this line, the more probable that immigrant and native workers are complementary; that is, that they do not compete with each other for the same jobs.
  • Too often when migrants cross a border they lose their accrued pension benefits or have to bear significant (if sometimes hidden) costs. Full portability (the capacity to migrate with your social entitlements) can also generate beneficial effects for the host country, by increasing incentives for job creation in the formal sector. More than half of migrants (nearly 102 million people) have an incomplete access to social security , with portability losses, and another fifth (almost 33 million) are informal sector workers, with very limited access at best. The situation for low and low-middle income countries, and particularly Latin America migrants, is worse . Only 4.1 million Latin American migrants (15%) are covered by social security agreements (which generally assure “ full portability ” ; see Technical Note). By contrast, almost all migrants (98%) moving within high-income OECD countries are covered by bilateral agreements. The broad majority (16.1 million people, almost 60%) are subject to portability losses (covere by national rules). Informal coverage is the highest among all regions of migrant origin in the world, affecting nearly 30% of the migrants (7.9 million people) against a worldwide average of 18% Technical note Full portability, requires four basic rules or adjustments: a totalisation of the periods of contributions (years of contributions in varying jurisdictions are added to determine whether a migrant qualifies for a contributory pension; the aggregation rule ), a totalisation of contributions (accumulated social contributions are considered to set the pension replacement rate, with a pro-rata formula reflecting the time spent in each country; the apportionment rule ), the payments of pensions across borders, specific regulations to avoid double taxation (especially for civil servants and temporary expatriates).
  • This poor situation is driven by the situation of Mexicans . Some 5.1 million Mexican migrants (46% of the total) work in the informal sector of the host country (overwhelmingly the United States). Excluding Mexico the percentage of Latin American migrants covered by social-security agreements increases to 24%, the highest among emerging economies. On pension arrangements Spain (with around one million people arriving from Latin America since 2000) has led the way in good practices. Spain has signed bilateral agreements with 20 countries, including all the major economies of South America other than Bolivia. Chile has also been particularly active and now has 23 bilateral agreements, starting with Argentina in 1972, and most recently with Peru in 2004 and Ecuador in 2008. As a result of this network of agreements more than 70% of Chilean migrants benefit from full portability of pensions , leading the region. Social protection mobility in Latin American and Caribbean is a complex work in progress. Some steps can be taken, though, in the short term: ratification of the Ibero-American Convention and the US-Mexican bilateral agreement .
  • Remittance flows are large in absolute terms and represent an important share of GDP for many countries in Latin America and the Carribean. It is for poorer countries that remittances tend to represent the highest share of GDP. Which families benefit most from remittances varies country by country: it may be the poorest as in Mexico, or the better off as in Peru. Remittances are overwhelmingly used to boost consumption. To criticise this may be to miss the corresponding boost to human capital formation, through increased education or health for example. Notes: a) Remittances are measured using the estimates of Workers' Remittances in the Balance of Payments Current Transfers Account. b) Three different clusters have been identified (high, medium and low) c) The columns correspond to the ten countries having a higher share in total remittances to LAC - Mexico (42.0), Colombia (7.9), Guatemala (7.4), El Salvador (6.5), Ecuador (5.4), Dominican Republic (5.3), Brazil (4.9), Honduras (4.5), Peru (3.7), Jamaica (3.4) jeudi 6 mai 2010
  • Evidence about how remittances correlate with the economic cycle is mixed however. Note: Time spans are determined by the availability of national data. While for Mexico and Ecuador remittances are counter cyclical, for Nicaragua and Peru they are highly pro-cyclical, and for many countries basically acyclical. For 13 out of 23 countries, the correlation is negative. On average, the correlation is slightly negative but not statistically significant, and again it is difficult to draw conclusions about a pattern within the region. On average, remittance flows seem rather insensitive to host-country business cycles, but the situation again varies widely across countries. For example, even within Central America, remittances to Guatemala exhibit a significantly negative correlation with the US business cycle; El Salvador exhibits basically no correlation, while in Nicaragua there is a positive correlation. 06/05/10
  • Why Mobile Payments? Size Matters Remittances represent not only flows of money; they can also be a catalyst for innovation. A potentially important example is the growing use of mobile telephony to undertake banking services, including international transfers of funds. This is a classic case of innovation from multiple perspectives: mobile payments and mobile banking represent the development of new business models, as well as the application of a recent technology – the mobile telephone – to new economic problems. Note: Geographic branch penetration and geographic ATM penetration refer to the number of bank branches and ATMs per 1 000 Km2, respectively. Demographic branch penetration and demographic ATM penetration are defined as the number of bank branches and ATMs per 100 000 people, correspondingly. For mobile phones, coverage refers to the number of mobile lines per 100 inhabitants. Mobile payments represent a new and rapidly developing form of financial service. Operators are active throughout the region. A challenge will be to expand mobile payments to true mobile banking and to use this as a springboard to wider financial integration. One of the competitive advantages of mobile payments is their reach: which is precisely what makes them so interesting for extending coverage. 06/05/10
  • Mobile payments are also very attractive for the sending of small payments given their low marginal cost base. High transaction costs in remittances can justify the use of mobile technology. This slide displays percentage transaction costs when sending USD 200 to Latin American and Caribbean countries using MTOs and banks. Each point represents a particular corridor, for example money being sent from the United Kingdom to Brazil, or from Spain to Colombia. While costs are very similar in the case of MTOs, they can vary substantially between banks23. On the other hand, the extent of competition, measured by the number of firms serving the corridor, appears to reduce costs to the customer more markedly in the MTO market than in the bank market. Note: The x-axis is the number of institutions (MTOs or banks respectively) serving each corridor in the sending country. Transaction costs are the total costs of sending and receiving USD 200 along a given corridor. The trend line is shown. 06/05/10
  • Diaspora Bonds: A financial instrument to Tap Diasporas' Wealth Governments may issue bonds specifically targeted at their own emigrant communities around the world, seeking to tap their connection with the home country. Notes : Universe is migrants resident in OECD countries. Total management and professionals refer s to “legislators, senior officials, managers and professionals” for OECD countries excluding Japan and United States. For Japan it refers to “Managers and officials” and “Professional and technical workers”. For the United States it refers to items 001 to 395 of the Census Occupation Code (COC). Diaspora bonds are most likely to succeed where the overseas community is large, has savings to invest and is well-disposed to the home country (economic stability and control of corruption are good proxies for this). 06/05/10
  • Remittances across the region have grown from less than 0.1% of GDP in 1980 to more than 1.5% in 2007. They now rival FDI and are comfortably greater than ODA. Note: Remittances are measured using the estimates of Workers' Remittances in the Balance of Payments Current Transfers Account. Remittances are less volatile than other international flows, and they act to reduce the overall volatility of external flows . 06/05/10
  • Remittances are part of the assessment of a country’s solvency Remittances are as much part of the assessment of a country’s solvency as are its exports of good and services A common way to pick up the effect of remittances on sovereign risk is to include them in the traditional solvency ratio (that is the ratio of debt to exports of goods and services). Market participants, and in particular rating agencies do take remittance flows into account in rating sovereign debt. However, this variable is significant for a limited set of countries: highly dependent on remittances, typically small in size and generally classified as low or middle income. An upward trend in remittances can improve ratings but the converse also applies. This may explain why in the current economic crisis six out of the seven rated countries with the highest remittance to- GDP ratios in the region have been downgraded or seen a worsening of their rating outlook (from positive to stable, or from stable to negative). Note: The Solvency Ratio With Remittances is defined as the percentage of external debt over exports and remittances Source: Avendaño, Gaillard and Nieto-Parra (2009) 06/05/10
  • 06/05/10
  • jeudi 6 mai 2010

Perspectivas económicas de américa latina 2010 Presentation Transcript

  • 1. Perspectivas Económicas de América Latina 2010 19 de Abril del 2010
  • 2. Abril 19 de 2010 Perspectivas Económicas de América Latina 2010 Migración, Remesas y Desarrollo en América Latina Sebastián Nieto-Parra Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE México DF
  • 3. Fuente : OCDE (2008b), Base de datos de migrantes en los países de la OCDE y Banco Mundial, Indicadores del Desarrollo Mundial. Origen de los migrantes en los países de la OCDE por región de nacimiento A dónde van los migrantes latinoamericanos? Los inmigrantes en los países de la OCDE no proceden predominantemente de los países más pobres.
  • 4. Fuente : Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, con base en Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) (OCDE, 2008b) y en la ronda de censos nacionales de 2000 en América Latina (procesamiento con Redatam+SP de la CEPAL en línea). Migrantes latinoamericanos y caribeños por país de destino Stock de migrantes latinoamericanos y caribeños en los seis principales países de destino de la OCDE y de América Latina A dónde van los migrantes latinoamericanos? Flujos norte-sur pero igualmente sur-sur
  • 5. Fuente: Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) (OCDE, 2008b). Nivel educativo de los migrantes: los nativos de los países de la OCDE tienen un nivel educativo superior al de los migrantes latinoamericanos. Migrantes de América Central Migrantes mexicano s
  • 6. Migrants Caribeños Fuente: Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) (OCDE, 2008b) . Nivel educativo de los migrantes: incluso si algunos corredores se caracterizan por flujos importantes de migrantes altamente calificados Migrantes suramericano s
  • 7. Tasa de emigración de personas con educación universitaria hacia países de la OCDE, 2000 Nota: Universitarios inmigrantes en países de la OCDE como porcentaje del numero total de universitarios nacionales del país de residencia . Fuente : Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, con base en Barro y Lee (2000) y en Database on Inmigrants in OECD countries (DIOC) (OECD,2008b). “ Fuga de cerebros” o fuente de “beneficio intelectual”? La fuga de cerebros se observa únicamente en los países caribeños
  • 8. Alto nivel de calificación en Canadá, Estados Unidos, España y Argentina . Similar o mayor a la de los nativos Fuente: Latin American and Caribbean Immigration Database (LACID) available at http://www.oecd.org/dev/publications/leo . Tasa de sobre-cualificación de los trabajadores latinoamericanos (por nivel de educación y país de destino)
  • 9. Distribución de los trabajadores por categorías profesionales en 2009 Fuente: OCDE Centro de Desarrollo, con base en la US Current Population Survey. Inmigrantes y trabajadores nativos: complementos o sustitutos?
  • 10. Migrantes y trabajadores nativos : los flujos regionales sur-sur muestran complementariedad entre los trabajadores Flujos de migración intra-regional en América Latina Nota: Porcentaje de trabajadores nativos y extranjeros, aprox. año 2000 Fuente : Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, Latin American and Caribbean Immigration Database (LACID) available at http://www.oecd.org/dev/publications/leo .
  • 11. Migrantes y trabajadores nativos : los flujos fuera de la región (sur-norte) tienden a ser menos complementarios Flujos de migración fuera de América Latina Nota: Porcentaje de trabajadores nativos y extranjeros, aprox. año 2000 Fuente : Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, Latin American and Caribbean Immigration Database (LACID) available at http://www.oecd.org/dev/publications/leo .
  • 12. Sistemas de portabilidad de pensiones Nota : Miles de migrantes internacionales por región de origen, 2000 . Fuente: Avato et al. (2009). Los migrantes y la portabilidad de los derechos sociales acumulados: Los migrantes pierden sus derechos a una pensión entre el país anfitrión y de origen.
  • 13. Los migrantes y los convenios de portabilidad de pensiones: La región se caracteriza una vez mas por su heterogeneidad pero también por las buenas prácticas Sistemas de portabilidad de pensiones en América Latina (porcentajes) Nota: Porcentaje del total de migrantes por país de origen, 2000 . Fuente: Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, con base en Avato et al. (2009).
  • 14. Las remesas son importantes y proporcionalmente son más importantes para los países más pobres. Correlación entre nivel de remesas y de ingresos Fuente: Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, según las bases de datos International Financial Statistics y Balance of Payments Statistics del FMI. Remesas de trabajadores a América Latina y al Caribe
  • 15. Correlación cíclica entre las remesas y la brecha del producto del país de origen Correlación cíclica entre las remesas y la brecha del producto del país anfitrión Fuente: Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, según las bases de datos International Financial Statistics y Balance of Payments Statistics del FMI. La correlación con el ciclo económico dista mucho de ser meridiana
  • 16. Redes de distribución financiera– Cobertura demográfica y geográfica Cobertura demográfica Fuente: Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, con base en Recuero Virto (2009).
  • 17. Costos de transacción de compañías remesadoras y bancos: Por qué los pagos móviles? Ventaja de costos. Fuente: Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, con base en Recuero Virto (2009). Número de empresas remesadoras Número de bancos
  • 18. Migrantes con cargos directivos o profesionales, América Latina y el Caribe frente a emisores de bonos diáspora Remesas y mercados de capitales : Bonos diáspora Fuente: Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE a partir de datos de la OCDE (2008).
  • 19. Mercados de capitales y remesas: Las remesas son menos volátiles que otros flujos internacionales … Volatilidad de los flujos externos entrantes con y sin remesas de trabajadores Volatilidad de los flujos de capitales en América Latina ( Variación de la volatilidad en porcentaje, sin remesas, media 1993-2007 ) Fuente: Cálculos del Centro de Desarrollo de la OCDE, según las bases de datos International Financial Statistics y Balance of Payments Statistics del FMI. Fuente: Avendaño, Gaillard and Nieto-Parra (2009) (porcentaje del PIB, 1992-2007 )
  • 20. Mercados de capitales y remesas: Ratio de solvencia (Deuda Externa sobre Exportaciones) con y sin remesas % exportaciones y remesas % exportaciones Importantes discrepancias entre países
  • 21. Cinco decisiones concretas que pueden emprender los actores políticos
    • Crear un acceso legal y flexible al mercado de trabajo a la altura de la demanda laboral.
    • Extender la protección social a más migrantes latinoamericanos
    • Impulsar los beneficios de las remesas.
    • Reducir los costes de envío de las remesas.
    • Recurrir a las diásporas.
  • 22. Abril 19 de 2010 Perspectivas Económicas de América Latina 2010 Migración, Remesas y Desarrollo en América Latina México DF www.oecd.org/dev/americas