SHIPBOARD CRISIS MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY

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  • 1. CONTENT AND CONTEXT: UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEXITIES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IN SHIP OPERATION Claire Pekcan, Warsash Maritime Centre, Southampton Institute, UK David Gatfield, Warsash Maritime Centre, Southampton Institute, UK Professor Michael Barnett, Warsash Maritime Centre, Southampton Institute, UK SUMMARY The maritime training establishment at Warsash Maritime Centre is moving toward the delivery of novel courses that concentrate on non-technical or human behavioural aspects of ship operations. This paper describes the philosophical underpinnings and the evidence-based process upon which one such course, being run at the Centre, was developed. The authors explain how and why the course is designed for the specific development of social and cognitive skills or ‘crew resource management skills’ in ships’ officers. The paper concludes with an outline of future research that will consider how the training context, full-mission simulator or desktop scenario, in which the social and cognitive skills of the ships’ officers are exercised, influences the successful development of these non-technical skills incorporates the Warsash Maritime Centre. After a AUTHORS BIOGRAPHY seafaring career of fifteen years, he studied at the University of Wales, Cardiff and in 1989 was awarded Claire Pekcan a PhD for his work on human error and the use of simulation in training for emergencies. He joined Claire Pekcan is a Senior Research Fellow in the Warsash in 1985 as a lecturer in tanker safety and has Maritime Research Centre at Southampton Institute. been Head of Research at Warsash since 1991. His After an earlier career in the health services, she has current post encompasses responsibility for the gained significant valuable experience over the past 10 management of research and welfare of postgraduate years in human factors, safety management, risk researchers at Warsash and on the Southampton management, and human resource management in the campus. Mike is a Chartered Marine Scientist UK ports, international merchant shipping, and (CMarSCi), Fellow of the Nautical Institute, Fellow offshore environments. Her particular research and current Vice-President of the Institute of Marine interests are in organisational safety culture, Engineering, Science and Technology (IMarEST) and a organisational competence, professional competence, Member of its Council. and human performance influencing factors in the merchant shipping and port operations arena. 1. INTRODUCTION David Gatfield A recent review of accident databases from the USA, UK, Canada and Australia confirms that human error David Gatfield is a Senior Lecturer and Unit Manager continues to be the dominant factor in maritime of the Machinery Space Simulator at Warsash Maritime accidents and reveals that in 70% of recorded incidents Centre. After serving at sea as a Marine Engineering attributed to human error, failures in non-technical Officer, he was appointed Technical Superintendent for skills such as situation assessment and awareness Shell Tankers and was responsible for the support of predominate (ABS, 2004). the instrumentation and control systems onboard all Historically maritime training has addressed the vessels in the fleet. He joined Warsash Maritime Centre development of technical and procedural skills. Until in 1996 and lectures in Engineering Systems recently, providing solutions to the problems of Management, Risk Management, Petrochemical Tanker developing non-technical skills and the optimal use of Engineering Systems and Gas Tanker Reliquefaction crew resources has been neglected in maritime training. Systems. He is currently conducting research for a PhD in behavioural markers for the assessment of Simulator-based training courses were introduced competence in crisis management. David is an primarily to train the skills of passage planning and the Associate Member of the Institute of Marine importance of the Master/Pilot relationship (Gyles and Engineering, Science and Technology (IMarEST) and a Salmon 1978). This training initiative developed into Member of its Council. the Bridge Team Management (BTM) courses that are conducted today on many simulators world-wide and, Professor Mike Barnett although not taught directly, they contain some of the elements to be found in Crew Resource Management Professor Mike Barnett is Head of the Maritime (CRM) courses developed in other industries, such as Research Centre at Southampton Institute, which aviation. These aviation courses were developed to
  • 2. focus on the non-technical skills of flight operations started to break up. The investigation by the Marine and include group dynamics, leadership, interpersonal Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), published in communications, and decision making (Helmreich and June 1999, advised the cause of the grounding was: Merritt 1998). Bridge Resource Management (BRM) “the lack of propulsion and failure to restart the main courses are a more recent initiative, adapted directly engine to arrest the drift of the vessel towards the shore from the aviation model for training the non-technical in the prevailing environmental conditions. of the skills of resource management, and are not always towage attempts and inadequate teamwork” based on the use of simulators. Contributory causes included flooding of the engine The 1980s saw the introduction of Engine Room room, failure to reset the mechanical over-speed trip, simulators and, towards the end of that decade, cargo inadequate knowledge of the cooling water system, operations simulators also became available. However, failure” (MAIB, 1999; pp. 9) it is only recently that the combined use of bridge and engine room simulators to provide a total ship 2.2 The Analysis simulation environment has been undertaken. • An initial technical failure precipitated events In summary, resource management training has become and was compounded by a hostile environment established in the curricula of many maritime training and further technical problems and failures. establishments. Courses take a variety of forms and The situation was escalating in severity. An cover both deck and engine room disciplines. The emergency was becoming a crisis, but the courses are often simulator-based, but not always, and actors in this tragedy did not have the benefit their syllabuses reflect CRM training in other of hindsight to read the ‘script’. industries. As can be seen from the history of this • The available emergency plans, which tended development, most major training initiatives have to be procedures based on single failures, were resulted from the lessons learnt from a succession of not applicable. The individuals involved were casualties. The next section reviews one casualty and forced to fall back on their experience to cope the resource management issues it raises and why with an increasingly complex and technical training alone is insufficient. unpredictable set of circumstances. • Initial diagnosis of the technical failure was 2. A CASE STUDY: THE “GREEN LILY” incorrect and led to a faulty but persistent mental model of the situation. In this case, the 2.1. The Circumstances chief and second engineers, together with the On 18th November 1997, the 3,624 grt Bahamian electrical engineer, failed to understand why registered vessel “Green Lily” sailed from Lerwick in the main engine stopped and were the Shetland Islands with a cargo of frozen fish for the consequently unable to restart it. They Ivory Coast. The weather on departure was bad with believed that the main engine failure was due wind speeds increasing to severe gale force 9. The to the effect of the flooding, previously caused following morning, while hove to about 15 miles south- by the fracture of the sea suction pipe. The east of the island of Bressay in the Shetland Isles in probable reason for the main engine stoppage storm force 10 winds, a sea water supply line fractured was actually due to the mechanical over-speed in the engine room. The engineers controlled the trip either not being reset or reset incorrectly. flooding and pumping out had begun when the main • Awareness of the overall situation by engine stopped. Unsuccessful attempts were made to individuals was based on incomplete or restart the engine while the vessel drifted northwards inaccurate information. In this case, both the towards Bressay. Shetland Coastguard was advised Master, based on his calculation of drift, and and three tugs, the Lerwick RNLI lifeboat and a the engineers, were over optimistic in their coastguard helicopter prepared to proceed to the belief that a tow would be available before the casualty. ship ran aground. Meanwhile, the skippers of Attempts were made by two of the tugs to secure a line the rescue craft had unexpressed reservations and tow the “Green Lily” away from land but although about various aspects of the operation initially successful, each line parted. The starboard including the appropriateness of some of the anchor was released and the third tug attempted to snag towing gear, the weather conditions and sea the cable and pull her head to wind, but the cable room, and the ability of the ship’s crew to parted. At this time, the lifeboat rescued five crewmen, handle the towlines. including two injured, from the ship’s deck. The ten remaining crew members were rescued by the • Individuals and units were separated Coastguard helicopter but the winchman, who had physically and several agencies were remained on the deck of the ship, was swept into the interacting through various forms of sea and lost. The “Green Lily” went aground and communication. In these circumstances, it was
  • 3. very difficult for the key players to the training philosophy. The recognition primed communicate meaningfully and maintain a decision-making theory (Klein, 1993; Orasanu, 1997) shared and agreed awareness of the rapidly suggests that there is a generic metacognitive skill that changing situation. can be developed to be applied to handle any unpredictable situation. One aspect of this theory that is put into practice on the course is the enrichment of 3. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS mental models through the building of repertoire As the above case study illustrates, the majority of patterns. Another aspect is the development of critical accidents and incidents are not caused by technical thinking skills through the practice of specific problems but by the failure of the crew to respond techniques in simulated scenarios (Barnett, 2004). appropriately to the situation. Arguably, most maritime professionals would agree with Helmreich et al., (1998) 4. CONTENT: THE EVIDENCE-BASED that in order to ensure safe and efficient operations there is a need to understand the behaviours of effective PEDAGOGICAL PROCESS error detection and management. However, while other 4.1 Course Aims and Objectives safety critical industries and the military have heeded this message and have been training and assessing Taking as a starting point the aviation industry’s model resource management skills as a way of ensuring that for CRM training as outlined in CAP 737, the course at errors are effectively detected and managed (Flin & Warsash aims to Martin, 2001; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; • enhance the operational safety of the client Brabazon & Conlin, 2000; Flin et al., 2000), the company’s vessels maritime industry continues to lag behind. The only mandatory requirements in the maritime • reduce the likelihood of an incident to a vessel domain for the development of the non-technical skills of resource management are those of the International • reinforce the client company’s Vision and Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Seafarer’s Training, Mission Certification and Watchkeeping Code (International Maritime Organization, 1995). Table A-V/2 of this code These aims are met by emphasising skills that will specifies the minimum standard of competence in crisis increase shipboard officers’ abilities to act responsibly management and human behaviour skills for those to health, safety, and environmental concerns. senior officers who have responsibility for the safety of passengers in emergencies. The competence Table 1. below identifies the types of skills that are assessment criteria detailed within the Code are not taught on the CRM course. based on specific overt behaviours, but rather on generalised statements of performance outputs, and as such are highly subjective and open to interpretation Social Skills Cognitive Skills (Barnett et al, 2003). Although these standards of Co-operation Situation Awareness competence indicate that IMO recognises the need for non-technical management skills, both the standards Open communication Situation assessment and their assessment criteria are immature in comparison with the understanding of non-technical Consideration for others Risk assessment skills, and their assessment, within an industry such as Team working civil aviation. Leadership and Decision Making At the Maritime Centre in Warsash, courses are now Managerial Skills being developed that go beyond STCW 95. One such course, the Crew Resource Management (CRM) Situational leadership Problem diagnosis course, is almost entirely concerned with teaching Assertiveness Option generation human behavioural or non-technical aspects of ship operations. Technical aspects of ship operation, such Planning and coordinating Option selection as ship navigation or power generation, are not covered Table 1. Crew Resource Management Skills as separate items. Rather, the course curriculum is devoted to social and cognitive aspects of seafarers’ Table 2. in the Appendix maps the course objectives performance, i.e. it is devoted to those skills thought to against the Crew Resource Management skills be important in assisting in the detection and displayed in Table 1. management of errors. Understandably, purchasers of education and training A further novel approach of the Warsash course is the for seafarers are asking questions about the value-added incorporation of human behaviour research findings in of the courses that their officers attend. They want to know that at the end of a course, an officer will have
  • 4. learnt what he or she needed to learn, and can apply the “both antecedents and consequences influence skills practised at the training institution, onboard ship. behaviour, but they do so differently: The purchasers’ wish is to be assured that they have spent company money to best effect. • consequences influence behaviour powerfully and directly Lecturers, on the other hand, are acutely aware that to • antecedents influence behaviour indirectly and achieve attitude or behaviour change in days is an serve to predict consequences.” inordinately difficult task, especially when presented with a class of officers of differing rank, experience, The authors maintain that both are important and thus and nationality. Unfortunately, the trap into which have designed the crew resource management course in lecturers fall is to equate value for money with value accordance with Antecedent-Behaviour-Consequence added. Rather than adopting a teaching strategy that (ABC) principles. The course provides the opportunity focuses on how students learn, they adopt a strategy for the students to practice the behaviour (B) that has that focuses on what the teacher teaches (Biggs, 2003). been learnt in the lectures (A) and through the debrief The result is that the expert lecturer transmits as much session after an exercise receive feedback on their of his or her expertise as possible in the time given actions (C). (value for money) rather than changing the attitude or behaviour of their class (value added). 4.2.1 Antecedents The philosophy underpinning the crew resource management course delivered at Warsash Maritime Within the Warsash training course, the lecturer inputs Centre is student centred as opposed to lecturer centred, are descriptions and explanations of the following: and thus represents a course that seeks to add value to the participating officers through attitude, behaviour, models of human error and cognitive change. The instructional system or error chain analysis process employed at Warsash to bring about these situational leadership changes draws on theories of learning e.g. Operant interpersonal influence Conditioning (Thorndike, 1898), the main tenet of cultural awareness which is behaviour that is rewarded will be repeated situation awareness and behaviour that is punished will cease, i.e. the effective communication consequences of one’s actions (rewards or punishments) drive behaviour (Rescorla, 1987). These teacher led activities are antecedent to student- centred activities described under the behaviours 4.2 The ABC of Learning section below. However, just allowing the students to ‘behave’ on the 4.2.2 Behaviours course with the lecturers providing no more than feedback (consequences) would be unlikely to beget the There have been a number of training programs safety behaviours associated with effective error produced that aim to improve the higher order detection and management. The students need to be cognitive skills of the students within specific context presented with new ways of thinking, new techniques, (Woods, 1983; Wales & Nardi, 1985; Resnick, 1987). and new ways of behaving that will facilitate their These techniques have been adapted at Warsash to try abilities to handle problem situations. and improve the students’ social skills such as In the language of behaviour based safety management, communication and co-operation. Some of the these new ways of thinking and behaving are the techniques used are: antecedents to safe behaviour. However, antecedents, such as safety rules, procedures, instructions, toolbox • having students justify their solutions to one talks, and risk assessments, are ineffective in bringing • another; about change on their own. Krause explains, • having students evaluate other students solutions; “Many well-intentioned safety programs fail because they rely too much on antecedents – things that come • allowing students to make and correct errors; before behaviour…All too often these same antecedents have no powerful consequences backing them up.” Other studies have been directed at trying to generate Krause (1997, p. 37) training techniques to improve general problem solving skills that would be transferable into different contexts In the same way, training courses that concentrate on of application (de Bono, 1985; Covington, 1987; instruction (antecedents) where the emphasis is on what Resnick, 1987). These techniques have also been the teacher teaches and not on how the student learns, adapted at Warsash to improve the students’ cognitive are unlikely to bring about behaviour change. As and metacognitive skills: Krause states:
  • 5. 5. CONTEXT: WHAT ARE THE MOST • considering multiple sides of an issue (lateral EFFECTIVE WAYS OF TRAINING • thinking); CRM SKILLS? • considering consequences; • selecting goals and planning strategies; In the year 2000, the Maritime Coastguard Agency • prioritizing factors involved in a situation; (MCA), following a recommendation of the Marine • generating and evaluating evidence; Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in response to • using perceptual rather than logical thinking the loss of the “Green Lily”, awarded a project to a • extensive practice of solving problems; research team at Warsash Maritime Centre. The remit of the project was to investigate the potential use of • teaching the use of heuristic strategies; simulators for training in the handling crises and • use of graphical representations to show the escalating emergencies. This project enabled the • structure of problems; researchers to review current concepts and models in the field of resource and crisis management across a 4.2.3 Consequences range of safety critical industries and to conduct a survey of expert opinion on the optimal training and “Debriefing is the key to the entire learning process, assessment regimes (Barnett et al 2002). during which trainees’ knowledge and attitudes are applied, tested, analysed and synthesised.” (Ellman, In order to ascertain the optimal types of simulation to 1977) provide training and assessment of non-technical skills, the Warsash research team used a panel of 15 experts A student-centred debriefing technique has been shown drawn from marine simulation resources as well as to be more effective because students learn better researchers and practitioners from other similar safety through self-discovery and self-analysis than by lecture. critical industries. Within this project, the Policy Delphi The student-centred debriefing technique draws upon Method (Turoff 1970) was used . The Policy Delphi students’ professional expertise and motivation to process is a form of policy analysis that provides a perform well, and it helps the lecturer understand the decision maker with the strongest arguments on each students’ performance. side of the issue. A range of future implementation scenarios were proposed as training policies that could Until students have the opportunity to reflect on that meet the perceived training requirements relating to the which they have experienced during a simulator exercising of resource management skills. These exercise, it is doubtful that any real learning will take policies were presented to the panel of experts. A place. The ‘debrief’ integrates the simulation subsequent workshop involving some of the panel experience into the learning environment. Debriefing is experts was also used to confirm and develop their the critical phase of learning, where the individual responses. begins to understand events experienced. These accommodations of new information form the essence The following is a summary of the responses received of meaning. Students learn to tie things together, to from the panel of experts in reply to 19 questions sent connect part to part to whole. Students may, or may not to them in order to further clarify the main arguments process their newly acquired information correctly. for and against the proposed training policies. Through the debriefing process, the lecturer can ensure that new learning is processed in the correct manner. Training Policy 1: The Use of Full Mission The debriefing process should provide feedback to the Simulators for Team Based Exercises lecturer on the students’ value of, and understanding of, the simulation. It also provides feedback to the students The panel of experts believed that the strength of this about the consequences of their behaviours. Lecturers option was the ability to undertake team-based need to ascertain whether the students’ experiences activities in an environment that provided realism. matched those of the real world and whether they However, the experts also thought that the cost of full- believed that the experiences were useful. mission simulators was a significant disadvantage. The experts also made some important observations Although the course at Warsash is student-centred, regarding team based activities and these were that: considerable thought is given to the instructional design • training and assessment of resource to ensure that the students have a sound conceptual management skills should only ever be framework to guide them towards achieving the course undertaken separately, and objectives. Good instructional design also includes aspects of the mode and medium of instruction, i.e. the • the tutor should never also be the assessor context in which the training is delivered. The next within the same time-frame section reviews the results of some recent research to determine the likely effectiveness of different forms of simulation in CRM skill development.
  • 6. Training Policy 2: The Use of Full Mission simulation were more team-based it would become Simulators for Single Trainee Exercises more difficult to control and it would be more difficult to carry out assessments. There was agreement that this policy option was not Training Policy 5: The Use of Table-top generally beneficial, but could be useful in special Simulations circumstances such as remedial and pre-team training. All participants agreed that this policy option could be Training Policy 3: The Use of Virtual Environments used for training. However, there were arguments made both for and against the use of this policy option for Although there was still a very positive response to this undertaking assessment. policy option, little empirical evidence was cited to support the opinions given. The argument against was based on the lack of fidelity provided by this type of simulation and the difficulty in There was general agreement that the communications observing relevant competent behaviour in a context systems used within this policy option could be that is very different from the actual workplace. embedded, as long as they allowed actual voice communications, and this could be used in a similar The argument for was based on assessment being way to real communication systems. undertaken against those relevant behavioural markers that could be observed within the context of the Most responses indicated that the co-workers within simulation. virtual reality training environments should be real and not simulated in order to facilitate effective team Training Policy 6: The Use of Class Room Based training. However, the possibility was raised that Workshops simulated co-workers could be used to afford a greater variety of training opportunities for team members. There was general agreement that this policy option is best suited to training only. There was general agreement that a high level of fidelity was required for certain elements of the virtual The following strengths were associated with this environment, but there was a wide diversity of opinion policy option: as to what these elements were. The elements discussed were all part of the functional representation of the real • cost beneficial environment, both physical and procedural. One response stated that virtual environment did not have to • flexible have a high degree of fidelity as long as it allowed for • gives the opportunity to discuss operational / the replication of the skills inherent in the task being emergency problems with others trained. • tutor guided The following weaknesses were associated with this Training Policy 4: The Use of Desktop Computer policy option: Simulations • there is no environment to manage There was agreement that this policy option required a • not suitable for the assessment of competence certain level of interactivity to be effective and that an increase in interactivity could improve effectiveness One response suggested that any weaknesses associated and efficiency up to a point, beyond which the trainee with this policy option could be overcome by providing may start to feel confused. a good tutor and ensuring interactivity. There was a wide spread of opinion regarding which other methods A number of ways of improving interactivity were of training this policy option could be usefully used in proposed including the: conjunction with. The overall range of opinion covered all of the remaining five policy options. One response • creation of multiple training paths suggested that classroom-based workshops followed by • provision of training scenarios with more than one practice in context would allow increased transfer. acceptable outcome • use of a facilitator to guide the trainee. If this policy option could be team-based there was general agreement that this would be more beneficial, because it would allow trainees to discuss alternative solutions. However, one response indicated that if the
  • 7. The following were proposed as being suitable to be increasingly as a fundamental part of the human error trained using this policy option: management philosophy. The International Maritime Organization recognises the need for non-technical or • appreciation of technical risks resource management skills, but both the standards of • knowledge of systems competence and their assessment criteria are immature • knowledge of procedures in comparison with civil aviation. Although CRM • theoretical knowledge training has become well established in the maritime • planning curricula, as with civil aviation, there remains a • risk management question mark about how effective such training • problem solving actually might be in improving safety performance. Analysis of recent casualties also suggest that CRM training, although important, may not be a panacea for The workshop concluded that the inclusion of full prevention of accidents and that organisational factors, mission simulation was the only viable assessment as well as operator error, must also be taken into option. This method is used extensively by the nuclear account. and aviation industries. The argument is that it is the only safe method that guarantees that the majority of In setting an agenda for future maritime research in this the cues that seem important are present and that the area, the authors conclude that the following issues perceived required skills may be demonstrated. need to be addressed: The search for a single cost-effective training option to If the direct training of resource and crisis management deliver the required standard of competence may be skills is pursued, to what extent will such skills, learned misplaced. The principle enshrined in STCW95 and in a simulated environment, transfer to the real world? National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) is that once What are the optimum training environments to ensure the standard of competence has been defined, how an effective transfer? How can these non-technical skills individual reaches that standard is irrelevant. Among a be assessed most effectively, both at the level of the number of variables, it is the motivation of the learner individual and at the level of the team? What and the ingenuity of the trainer that will determine the behavioural markers, both at individual and team level, most cost-effective training option. In an ideal world, predict safe performance? In multi-national the trainer would select the most appropriate method environments, how may cultural factors be from his/her training “toolbox” to suit the individual characterised and what is the impact on overall safety trainee, their learning style, and stage of development performance of cultural differences? identified through continuous assessment. However, as with any scientific endeavour, it is not sufficient to just ask questions. There is much that is Research conducted by Crichton and Rattray (2002) still not known about human behaviour in response to since this exercise describes the potential of Tactical unexpected, unplanned, and seemingly uncontrollable Decision Games (TDGs) for crisis management events. CRM training is a method that has been training. TDGs are a low-cost, low fidelity classroom devised for preparing people to manage such events. based simulation that focuses on improved decision The maritime community is to some extent playing making and heightened situational awareness. ‘catch up’ with the research being carried out in the Evaluation of their effectiveness and their validity and military and aviation arenas; and this is a privileged reliability as a competence assessment tool is currently position. Maritime researchers are able to cogitate on underway. the issues that their counterparts in other industries raise and it is their efforts that have inspired us to offer In summary, the most cost-effective training option will this maritime research agenda. It is offered, not as a be determined by a number of “local” factors, including guiding light for all now to follow, rather as a stimulus the ingenuity of the instructor. At present, however, the for debate. As a research community, interested in assessment of competence, particularly for marine describing, predicting and ultimately, enhancing human certification purposes, through the use of currently performance, we need to make sure we are asking the available full mission simulations represents the most right questions; questions that will lead us to conduct viable option. meaningful and fruitful research. 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH As in similar safety-critical industries, the analysis of maritime accidents over the years has revealed shortcomings in the ability of operators to manage both resources and crises. CRM training has been seen
  • 8. Thinking and learning skills: Vol 1. Relating REFERENCES instruction to research (pp. 363–388). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ABS (2004) ABS Review and Analysis of Accident Databases: 1991-2002 Data. American Bureau of Ellman, N., (1977) Before the simulation fails: shipping Technical Report: SAHF 2003-5.1, March Avoiding potential pitfalls. The Social Studies, 68(6), 2004. 251-253. Washington D.C.:Heldref Publications. Barnett, M. L., Gatfield, D., and Habberley, J (2002) Flin, R., O’Conner, P., Mearns, K., Gordon, R., & Shipboard crisis management: A Case Study. Proc Int. Whitaker, S. (2000). Crew Resource Management Conf. Human Factors in Ship design and Operation. pp Training for Offshore Operations. Factoring the Human 131-145 RINA, October 2002. into Safety: Translating Research into Practice. Volume 3 of UK Health and Safety Executive report HSE OTO Barnett, M. L., Pekcan, C.H., and Gatfield, D. (2003) A 2000 063. London: HSE. Research Agenda in Maritime Crew Resource Management. Proc Int Conf. on Team Resource Flin, R., & Martin, L. (2001). Behavioral Markers for Management, Embry Riddle, Fl. USA, October 2003 Crew Resource Management: A Review of Current Practice. The International Journal of Aviation Barnett, M. L. (2004) Risk management training: the Psychology, 11(1), 95-118. development of simulator-based scenarios from the analysis of recent maritime accidents Proc. Conf Gyles J.L. & Salmon, D. (1978) Experience of Bridge Advances in International Maritime Research. IAMU, team Training using the Warsash Ship Simulator. Proc Tasmania, November 2004 First Int Conf. on Marine Simulation MARSIM (1978) pp 1-26 Nautical Institute. Biggs, J. (2003) Teaching for Quality Learning at University Second Edition. Maidenhead: OU Press. Helmreich, R.L. and Merritt, A. (1998) Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine.” Ashgate, England. Brabazon, P., & Conlin, H. (2000). Assessing the safety of staffing arrangements for process operations in the International Maritime Organization. (1995). Seafarer’s chemical and allied industries. Report for the Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Code (STCW Hazardous Installations Directorate of the UK Health Code). London: IMO. and Safety Executive. London: HMSO Klein, G. Orasanu, J. Calderwood, R. & Zsambok C. Civil Aviation Authority Safety Regulation Group (1993) Decision making in action: Models and (2003). CAP 737 Crew Resource Management (CRM) methods. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Training: Guidance For Flight Crew, CRM Instructors (CRMIs) and CRM Instructor-Examiners (CRMIEs). Krause, T. R. (1997) The Behaviour-Based Safety www.caa.co.uk. Process: Managing Involvement for an Injury Free Culture. Second Edition. New York: Wiley. Canon-Bowers, J.A. & Salas, E. (1998). Individual and Team Decision Making Under Stress. In: J.A. Cannon- Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) Marine Bowers & E. Salas (Eds) Making Decisions Under Accident Report 5/99 “Report of the Inspector’s Stress: Implications for individual and team Inquiry into the loss of mv Green Lily on 19 November training.Washington D.C.: American Psychological 1997 off the East Coast of Bressay, Shetland Islands”. Society. Orasanu, J.M (1997). Stress and naturalistic decision Covington, M.V. (1987). Instruction for problem- making : Strengthening the weak links in ‘Decision solving planning. In S.L. Friedman, E.K. Scholnick & making under stress: emerging themes and R.R. Cocking (Eds.), Blueprints for thinking: The role applications’ (eds: R Flin, E Salas, M Strub and L of planning in cognitive development. Cambridge: Martin) Ashgate. Cambridge University Press. Raths, J., (1987) Enhancing understanding through Crichton, M and Rattray, W (2002) “Tactical Decision debriefing. Educational Leadership. 45(2), 24-27. Games: What are they and how can they help?” Proc. Alexandria VA: Association for Supervision and Critical incident Management Conference, Aberdeen, Curriculum Development. June 2002. Rescorla, R.A. (1987) A Pavlovian analysis of goal de Bono, E. (1985). The CoRT thinking program. In directed behaviour. American Psychologist. 42 2, 119- J.W. Segal, S.F. Chipman & R. Glaser, (Eds.)., 129.
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  • 10. Social Skills Cognitive Skills Co-operation Leadership & Situation Decision Managerial Awareness Making Course Objectives Skills Develop a quality improvement orientated culture with respect to safety of operations, protection of the environment and achieving goals within acceptable limits. Develop a pro-active methodical and systematic approach to the management of systems, operations and communications through teamwork and to evaluate any deviation from a specific operational objective plan and analyse the reasons for this deviation. Identify and analyse risk factors, this to include consideration of human behavioural factors, which contribute to human error and situational awareness. Identify the priorities to which a manager must attend with respect to the safety of operations: i) within hours of joining the vessel; ii) during the commissioning of the vessel; iii) before the vessel gets underway; Develop the skills and confidence of the more junior members of the team through appropriate briefing, guidance and de-briefing techniques.
  • 11. Social Skills Cognitive Skills Co-operation Leadership & Situation Decision Managerial Awareness Making Course Objectives Skills Assess own performance and formulate objectives for 'Continuing Professional Development' purposes. Develop fault diagnosis strategies and methodologies. Identify and terminate the development of error chains. Identify essential on-board training needs of both individuals and the team with regard to both operational, emergency and crisis situations. Practice and develop critical thinking skills during emergency and crisis situations Table 2. The mapping of course objectives against CRM skills.