Mitigation

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Mitigation

  1. 1. <ul><li>Mitigation & Systemic Risk Management </li></ul><ul><li>in </li></ul><ul><li>The USA Perspective </li></ul><ul><li>prepared for ENTPE - Lyon 30 June 2005 </li></ul>
  2. 2. Terror and the new vision of Risk Central Authority Dysfunction <ul><li>The traditional Central Authority crisis management is overwhelmed </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Victims = x 10 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Chaos Thresholds regularly exceeded (1k / 10k) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Speed of “official” Response too slow </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Mutual assistance & NGO’s poorly synergized </li></ul><ul><li>Managing the Biological Quarantine </li></ul><ul><li>Management Principles of Natural / Technology / Terror crisis merging </li></ul>
  3. 3. Terror and the new vision of Risk The Political Impact <ul><li>The Rise of the Political Profit / Risk analysis </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Political Profit = Mayor Guiliani on NYC </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Political loss = Spanish Elections </li></ul></ul><ul><li>The roots of the Crisis (Natural / Technology / Terror) matters little, Only the magnitude of damages are relevant </li></ul><ul><li>Effective damage mitigation brings political profit </li></ul>
  4. 4. Terror and the new vision of Risk The Rise of Legal Liability <ul><li>The rise of Civil / Criminal liability for local Officials </li></ul><ul><li>Embedding the media with the 1st Responders exposes the lack of preparation </li></ul><ul><li>Legal claims based on Negligence </li></ul><ul><ul><li>(EU Precautionary Principle) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Regular Exercises bar the use of Ignorance </li></ul><ul><li>The US Congress is attacking the federal bureaucracy incapacity to move effectively and speedily </li></ul><ul><li>Insurability in question (TRIA cover ? / CBRN?) </li></ul>
  5. 5. Managing the Systemic Cycle of Crisis Crisis Center Locally Elected Officials Central Government Locally Elected Officials Before the Crisis Restart Phase Training Standards Interoperability Communications Lessons learned Insurability
  6. 6. The Critical infrastructure Vulnerability <ul><li>The Cascading Breakdowns </li></ul><ul><li>Electrical GRID </li></ul><ul><ul><li>2003 Electrical Breakdown for US & Canada </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Telecom Network (9/11 NY City telecom breakdown) </li></ul><ul><li>Time Criticality of Transport for GOODS / PEOPLE / DATA </li></ul><ul><ul><li>“Just in time” industrial production (Air / Sea) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Damages ($ Billions) pileup if breakdown > few hours </li></ul></ul>
  7. 7. <ul><li>The Global War on Terror </li></ul><ul><li>=> </li></ul><ul><li>A New Vision of Risk / Mitigation </li></ul><ul><li>A New Paradigm </li></ul>
  8. 8. <ul><li>The USA Homeland </li></ul><ul><li>management of </li></ul><ul><li>The Global War On Terror </li></ul>
  9. 9. The Levels of Crisis Management <ul><li>The Operational and Technical level </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Interoperability </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Communications </li></ul></ul><ul><li>The systemic and organisational level </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The political hierarchy (Decision Flux) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Funding and Budgets </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Lessons learned and best Practices </li></ul></ul>
  10. 10. The Nature of the Central Authority EU vs. US <ul><li>EU networked Regions = US States </li></ul><ul><li>The US Federal Hierarchy and pre-emption (Eu Subsidiarity) </li></ul><ul><li>FEMA in Charge of disaster mitigation (not enough) </li></ul>
  11. 11. Perceived Risk vs. Level of Risk and US Crisis Management <ul><li>Large Counties / cities have done more to prepare </li></ul><ul><li>Perceived Risk is a predictor of improving Preparedness </li></ul><ul><li>Perceived Risk is NOT correlated with the size of Jurisdiction </li></ul><ul><li>Level of Risk is a predictor of Funding </li></ul>
  12. 12. The War On Terror Allocation of Resources /Funding <ul><li>Reallocate Resources </li></ul><ul><ul><li>2/3 of States </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1/4 of Counties </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Increase Resources </li></ul><ul><ul><li>1/2 of States received Federal Funding </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>1/5 of Counties received external Funding </li></ul></ul>
  13. 13. Large Counties & Terror Risk 1 <ul><li>Perception of a HIGH RISK from </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Chemical attack </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Biological attack </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Conventional Explosives </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Focus on Training </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Lessons learned integrated in Table-Top exercises </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Operations of the INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM </li></ul></ul>
  14. 14. Large Counties & Terror Risk 2 Improvements needed For <ul><li>Funding </li></ul><ul><li>Equipment Standards & interoperability </li></ul><ul><li>Operational interoperability </li></ul><ul><li>Intelligence (The Issue of security clearances) </li></ul>
  15. 15. National Conference of Mayors <ul><li>52% of Cities have not received Funds (BUT States have) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Federal 1st Responders ..................................$ 1.5 B </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Urban area Security Initiative .....................$ 600 M </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Airport Law Enforcement Reimbursement </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Port Security Grant program ......................$ 245 M </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Public Health Emergency Preparedness .........$ 1.4 B </li></ul></ul><ul><li>New Technology Show-Room </li></ul>
  16. 16. “ Operational” Crisis management <ul><li>Security Plans Funding allocated based on “risk” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk <= Threat derived (law enforcement/ code) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk < = Vulnerability derived (Engineering) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>“ Acceptable” Damages </li></ul><ul><li>The impact on interstate Commerce </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Rail and local safety (Washington) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>LNG Terminals and national energy policy </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Intelligence = security clearances </li></ul>
  17. 17. TOPOFF 3 <ul><li>USA + UK + CANADA </li></ul><ul><li>10 000 persons </li></ul><ul><li>275 Agencies </li></ul><ul><li>400 Staff + 200 Journalists and technicians </li></ul><ul><li>(3) US States = CT , NJ , DC </li></ul><ul><li>Test Coordination & Intelligence </li></ul><ul><li>USE simulated Television News Network = VNN </li></ul>
  18. 18. TOPOFF 3 Connecticut <ul><li>Chemical attack (Yperite) </li></ul><ul><li>200 evacuated & decontaminated </li></ul><ul><li>6 Local Hospitals </li></ul><ul><ul><li>2,442 hospitalized </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>4,085 treatments and sent home </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Non Local emergency response > 4 H </li></ul><ul><li>use of military air-evacuation </li></ul>
  19. 19. TOPOFF 3 New Jersey <ul><li>Bubonic plague attack </li></ul><ul><li>8 000 Dead + 20 000 hospitalised + 400 000 treatments </li></ul><ul><li>8 million doses of antibiotics within 4 days </li></ul>
  20. 20. TOPOFF 3 Lessons Learned <ul><li>Official Emergency response too slow </li></ul><ul><li>Communications difficult Local <-> Fed </li></ul><ul><li>Slow installation of decontamination facilities </li></ul><ul><li>Forensics overwhelmed </li></ul>
  21. 22. <ul><li>The USA Homeland </li></ul><ul><li>The Global War On Terror </li></ul><ul><li>& </li></ul><ul><li>Internet Usage </li></ul>
  22. 23. Homeland Defense Journal Online <ul><li>Kansas City develops internet Based Security system </li></ul><ul><li>Coalition of States 2 counties 8 Agencies 100 </li></ul><ul><li>Information sharing </li></ul>
  23. 24. Homeland Defense Journal Online <ul><li>Readership 28,199 </li></ul><ul><li>Federal agencies 32% </li></ul><ul><li>Major cities / counties 21% </li></ul><ul><li>State Government 20% </li></ul><ul><li>Corporate integrators 15% </li></ul>
  24. 25. National League of Cities <ul><li>Homeland security & Public safety </li></ul><ul><li>Advocacy </li></ul><ul><li>Programs & Services </li></ul><ul><li>City Knowledge Network </li></ul><ul><li>Weekly Articles on Information sharing </li></ul>
  25. 26. National League of Cities <ul><li>Message to Congress </li></ul><ul><li>1st Responders need compatible communications </li></ul><ul><li>One-stop grant program </li></ul><ul><li>Best Practices Clearinghouse </li></ul>
  26. 27. National Homeland security Knowledgebase
  27. 28. <ul><li>Mitigation of Damages </li></ul><ul><li>Citizen Safety </li></ul><ul><li>Next Steps </li></ul>
  28. 29. Managing the Systemic Cycle of Crisis Crisis Center Locally Elected Officials Central Government Locally Elected Officials Before the Crisis Restart Phase Training Standards Interoperability Communications Lessons learned Insurability
  29. 30. The way Ahead <ul><li>TRAINING </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Awareness training (Procedures / Technology) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Masters Program for the Experts </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Exercises integrating IMAGINATIVE Scenarios / Simulations </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Communications / Interoperability </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Embedding the press </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Transatlantic Best Practices exchanges with </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Large Cities / Counties </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Think Tanks / Research Laboratories </li></ul></ul>
  30. 31. It Is All About Knowledge <ul><li>To mitigate Damages </li></ul><ul><li>=> </li></ul><ul><li>EU Knowledgebase </li></ul><ul><li>EU Masters </li></ul>
  31. 32. <ul><li>Dr. Michael Nesterenko </li></ul><ul><li>[email_address] om </li></ul>

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