CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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  • 1. The Regional Center of Defense Resources Management (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct. (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.2 pct.) (12 pct.) CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) Author: Capt. Gheorghe TUDOR (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) BRAŞOV 2004
  • 2. The Regional Center of Defense Resources Management (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct. (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (12 pct.) (12 pct.) Advisor: Senior Instructor: LTC. Iulian BUJOREANU Author: Capt. Gheorghe TUDOR (12 pct.) (12 pct.) (12 pct.) BRAŞOV 2004 2
  • 3. CONTENTS (TIMES NEW ROMAN 12 BOLD) Introduction…...............................................................................................p.4 I. Theoretical approaches on crises management................................p.5 1. Crisis Definition.............................................................................p.5 2. Crises Causes……………………………………………………..p.5 3. Crisis management model……………………………………….p.6 4. Crisis management process...........................................................p.8 II. International Organizations’ Crises Management …....................p.10 1. OSCE.............................................................................................p.10 2. European Union...........................................................................p.12 3. NATO............................................................................................p.14 4. United Nation...............................................................................p.18 5. WEU……………………………………………………………..p.21 6. Co-operation among organizations…………………………...p.23 III. Romania’s national system for crises management......................p.26 Conclusions..................................................................................................p.30 Annexes…………………………………………………………………p.32 References.........................................................................................................p.35 3
  • 4. “Any free state that has not taken into consideration the major crises occurrence is in danger to die during the first storm” Jean – Jaques Rousseau Introduction The 21-th century will witness an emerging multipolar world, in which both the world competition for the control of strategic resources, the access routes to them and the efforts for identifying solutions to mitigate the negative effects of globalization will be increased. The effects of certain natural processes at global level (the greenhouse effect, shortage of water, changing fertile land into desert, floods, earthquakes, exhaustion of natural resources ), simultaneously with uncontrolled demographic developments, will probably trigger serious destabilizing processes in various parts of the world. We are living in a world where “crisis”word has become a cliche and the occurence of diverse crisis is very high. The crisis arises due to a multitude of factors including: economic, social, political, environmental and so forth. However, the crisis might occur as a result of a mix action of a couple of the previously prezented factors. I will focus on the definition, the roots of crisis as well as the place of crisis when we are talking about peace and war. Crisis could be internal or international. Although the topic of this paper pertains to the international crisis we can not approach it without taking into consideration the internal dimension of the crisis. Even if the status of the state in the international arena is a issue of debate for scholars the state remains the main actor. The state is responsible for maintaining the order within its own borders in order to avoid any emergence of crisis. In the case that the state is not able to handle its problems these will spill over in the neighbouring countries. This will lead to instability in the region that will involve not only the respective countries but also states which have interests in the area. To put it in other way: the security can be achieved provided that there is a crisis management correctly performed. This means not allowing the threats to turn into real facts. In the process of crisis managenment there are a lot of actors involved from international security organisations to individual states and NGO-s. The tools used by the international organisations are presented in this paper. Due to the globalisation, a crisis that takes place somewhere in the world affects not only the region but the continent as well as the world. An current example could be the SARS epidemy which has shaken the entire world. As a result there is a malfunction in the social and economic life in the Asia, the North America and could be massively spread out in Europe, Africa, Australia. The concept of crisis is a common one and is used to characterize the tension that exists in the relationship among western democracies concerning the 2-nd Gulf War. This crisis has recently appeared within North Atlantic Organisation because of the decision of four European allied members to set up a military force that is separate from NATO. The statement given by the North Koreean government concerning the production and trade of nukes to other rogue states heated up the climate in Asia. 4
  • 5. The terrorist attacks of September 11 undoubtedly ushered in a new era in international security affairs. Although terrorism has been a tragically prominent feature of the global condition for most of the past half century, these operations were quantitatively and qualitatively different than those of the past. I. Theoretical approaches on crises management I.1. Crisis Definition A definition for crisis was not agreed upon but is widely accepted Charles F. Hermann’s definition: “A crisis is a situation that threatens the high priority goals of the decision making unit, restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and surprise the members of the decision making unit by its occurence.”1 As a result the crisis features are the elements of surprise, threat, and time pressure, as well as the risk of war. Another definition of crises is given in the international relations dictionary “crisis is considered a turning point in the relationships among actors or between actors and the environment.”2 As examples are, inter alia, given debt crisis( among the Latin America countries and its creditors from the First World). Moreover, issues pertaining to the destruction of the eco-system, as relationships between individual and environment are considered crises. Crisis lie somewhere between peace and war. Michael Lund developed a pattern that places crisis on the closest level to war and above unstablepeace which is divided into unstable, stable and durable. This model depicts PSO involved in every stage. We can assume that crises may be substitutes for war or precursors to it. When the crisis management is succesfully performed there is no occurence of war. I.2. Crises Causes Dynamic changes in world politics, such as the end of the Cold War, while overcoming old security threats and old divisions in international relations, often create or exacerbate new ones. The diversity of causes capable of endangering the viability of the international system - both at global and regional levels - is increasing. Reacting to all the new as well as the old challenges leads to a diffusion of means and raises the possibility of paying insufficient attention to major risks because of having concentrated on those risks which have not yet become fatal. In order to have a global picture of the crisis spectrum one should look at what triggered them. One of the classifications is as follows4: Crises mismanagement that rapidly led to armed : Iranian-Iraqi Crisis (1980-1989), British-Argentinian Crisis (1982) Military intervention carried out by some military powers: Vietnam (1965-1973), Czechoslovakia (1968), Afganistan(1979-1989). Liberation movements against colonial: Cypru (1955-1959), Mozambic (1964-1974). Racial or xenophobic phenomenon: South Africa, USA (1992), Germany (1992). Struggle for independence: Cyprus (1960), Kuwait (1961), South Yemen (1967), 1 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics- trend and Transformations, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988, p. 407 2 Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, Dictionar de relatii internationale, Ed. Universal Dalsi, 2001, p.114-116 4 Theodor Repciuc, Situatiile de criza si gestionarea lor in noul context politic si strategic european. Orientari teoretice si operationale in doctrina militara de aparare a Romaniei, Revista Romana de Studii Internationale, 1993. 5
  • 6. Secessionist movements: Tibet (1955-1959, The Former Yugoslavia, Transnistria, Struggles for changing the political regime that transformed into civil wars: China (1945-1949), Cuba (1956-1959), Venezuela (1962-1967), Liban (1975-1989), Economic problems due to the scarcity of energetic resources and raw materials and the economic embargoes imposed by international community to Iraq, Yugoslavia, Religious problems between Islamism and chrestianism ( Bosnia – Herzegovina, Liban, Azerbaidjan, Filipine, Algeria, etc) and within the same religion between different confessions (Yugoslavia Orthodox vs. Catholics; Northern Ireland Catholics vs. Protestants; Iraq, Iran, Liban Sunit and Shiit Muslims) Ethnic problems that overlap with the religious issue: Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Hungarian Issue in Transylvania, Albanian Issue in Macedonia, Kosovo, Cyprus. Environmental problems generated by natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, fires, and floods and accidental man-made disasters such as oil spills, nuclear-eclectic plants accidents (Chernobyl). Refugees flows as a result of internal or international conflicts as well as of the pauperization existent in not-haves states (South- North issue). Other authors identified other roots that entailed crisis: Changes of the political- strategically milieu: as a result of new military technology and offensive systems acquisition (deployment of SS-20 missiles by Soviets in Europe at the end of 70-s) and international organizations resolutions (the splitting of Palestina between Jewish and Palestinians in November 1947). Political statements: (the ultimatum given by Austria to Serbia in 1914) Military movements: without violence and direct hostile acts, out of war operations (German battalions in the demilitarized Rhenan area in 1936). Political acts similar to the American hostages taken by Iranian students in Teheran 1979. Some sources that generate crisis can be added: Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation, terrorism, health issue, weak state institutions. In this respect there is the crisis caused by the behavior of the North Korean state and the dire consequences of the terrorism and SARS in diverse realms of the social life. A good example of a weak state institution is the Albanian case in 1997. Moreover, the organized crime and corruption are potential sources of crisis. Jean Louis Dufour identifies three types of crises: Security crises can arise as a result of WMD, religious mouvements, terrorist group’s proliferation. Interests crises because of the economic, cultural, informational imperialism rather than the military imperialism. Consciousness crises driven by slaughters as the Cambogian one, genocide as the Ruwandian case, ethnic cleansing as in Croatia, Bosnia, and famine in Somalia. In these crises the impact of mass media on international community was tremendous. Consequently, the electorate pressure determined the states policy. The characteristics of the future crises are: perilousness, sensitivity in handling them, complexity and diversity. I.3. Crisis management model 7 Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, Dictionar de relatii internationale, Ed. Universal Dalsi, 2001, p.114-116 6
  • 7. Crisis management entails finding a balance between coercion and accommodation7: COERCION ENGAGEMENT ESCALATION COMPROMISE CONCESSION BRINKMANSHIP COMPROMISE CONCESSION WAR COMPROMISE Coercion implies firm engagement strategy to convince the opponent that you are determined and your intention is credible. The opponent is allowed to make the next step, the case of quarantine in Cuban Missiles Crises. Engagement could be performed by using statements, actions, but a mix of them is the most efficient. In the enthusiastic rush towards victory it should not be lost from sight the compromise. Flexibility is desired. Therfore is desirable not to burn the bridges. It is preferable the use of warnings instead of threats, but one can bluff. The probable result of engagement is escalation. This concept entails the beginning of a modest engagement followed by an increase of risk to force the opponent to reach a compromise, existing the fear that the alternative might a high degree of escalation. From this point of view the engagement strategy is twofold: explicit and implicit. The implicit option is riskier. The next movement in Cuban Missiles Crises could have been an air attack or invasion. Brinkmanship is the tactic of threatening while hoping to win concessions without actually having to fight. Regarding the crisis before the outbreak of the 2-nd Gulf War, Nicholas Miller, a political scientist at the University of Maryland's said that “there are two levels of brinkmanship... between the U.S. and Iraq, but also between the U.S. and France and the U.N. and Russia and so forth."8 . There is a close correlation between brinkmanship and the game theory, particularly, chicken game. In fact, it is a game where the first person who blinks, in a eyeball to eyeball approach, loses. 8 Dennis B. Roddy, Bush is playing 'chicken' not only with Saddam, but with the U.N. and allies, as well, Post-Gazette, http://www.post-gazette.com/nation/20030316brinkmanship0316p3.asp, March 16, 2003 7
  • 8. ACCOMODATION CONCESSION Mutual One offers concession more COMPROMISE Sign of weaknesses (APPEASEMENT) The other asks for more COMPROMISE Accommodation is a way of crisis management entailing resolution without total surrounding to the wishes and goals of the opponent. When concessions are offered this can be perceived as a weakness sign and make the opponent to ask for more concessions. If the concessions are mutual it leads to appeasement. I.4. Crises management process The crisis management integrative process is a repetitive process having two stages planning and execution and comprising three distinct processes that are interdependent. Every process has some milestones. (Annex and) The planning stage: The planning process: • Preparation -Establishing a framework of authority (defining the process of crisis management, clarifying the subordination and responsibilities); -Setting up links among decision making centers; (building an efficient cooperation system, creating networks, improving preparedness for mobilization in common goals); -Creating a group for crisis information (using the existent mechanisms, developing a variety of internal and external sources, setting up the conditions for an objective analysis); -Establishing the rules (procedures, cooperation among participants, decision making, standard operation procedures); -Practicing (exercises and applications, games, planned and organized and ad-hoc). • Appeasement -Structural changes in the state organisms; -Laws and procedures; -Informing the public opinion; -Public works • Prevention -Anticipating potential crisis; 8
  • 9. -Permanent actualizing of the information regarding potential crisis areas; -Analyzing objective information on evolutions that can lead to crisis; -Corrective intervention in pre-crisis The execution stage: The response process: 1. Response -Controlling the situation (examining the available facts, elaborating a preliminary analysis on the bases of the most valuable available informations, defining the problem nature, assessing the available resources for involvement in crisis management, forecasting the events trend); -Overcoming the initial shock (It must be admitted the following facts: The warning systems are vulnerable, the pace of events make difficulties in understanding them, the threat can be massive and devastating, the individuals and the structures can be perturbated, crisis can break out on a completely new premise, the system can get back to patterns used in the past, the current system may need changes); -Avoiding discredit (avoiding: rash decisions or premature conclusions, confusing early reports to mass -media; under or over estimate the crisis seriousness in front of the public opinion or the authorities); -Activating networks and groups for crisis information (issuing appropriate notice, setting up an adjusted team, discharging the crisis management cell from other activities, making a sound plan regarding the internal and external links, instituing a log, setting up the crisis management cell) ; -Formulating a position (defining the problem, naming the problem, making an initial assessment over milestones to be covered, deciding what aspects must be focused on; -Elaborating an action plan (the response strategy, organization improvement, precise adjustments on information collecting system, examining the goals, establishing preliminary reference points) ; -Mobilizing persons who make decisions (keeping them up with the latest informations, involving them in the process, stimulating their appropriate participation, ensuring their availability by relieving them from other burdens, paying attention to their requests). Normalization and making decisions process • Crisis solving -Administrating the system (separating crisis management from routine activities, controlling the internal communication, adjusting the crisis management team/teams to face the events, assuring them appropriate prerogatives to make decisions, organize tem to act, use the experts smartly); -Coordinating public opinion information (Mass –media, in case there is not a Public Relation officer appoint a person, be the first who informs, either state the whole true or tell them “no comments”; non – media ensure that your structure is correctly informed; rumors - ignore them if are not important, counter attack or deny if they worth taking into account) ; -Appropriate using of experts (individual source; network; separate them from making decision; watch their public remarks; be realistic regarding their capacity to contribute to the making decision preliminary activities). • Getting back to the normal status -Managing till the end of the crisis (disengage smoothly; reestablish carefully the normal state); -Controlling the consequences (take radical measures to prevent from crisis re-escalation; re- inspire confidence to the public opinion). 9
  • 10. II. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS` CRISIS MANAGEMENT II.1. OSCE The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the world with 55 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post- conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative: comprehensive in dealing with a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, democratization, election monitoring and economic and environmental security; co-operative in the sense that all OSCE participating States have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus. The OSCE, along with its various bodies and institutions, takes a comprehensive and cooperative approach to a wide range of security-related issues. These issues are generally classified in the following three "dimensions." • Security - preventive diplomacy, arms control, confidence and security-building measures. • Human rights - promotion of respect for basic human rights, inter-ethnic tolerance, democratization and development of civil institutions, election monitoring, freedom of the media, rule of law, and related issues. • Economic - economic and environmental security. Promotes good governance, liberal economies, and proper environmental stewardship. Works to ensure that economic and environmental issues do not become threats to security. The basic priorities of the OSCE in international crises field are: • to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war torn areas; • to overcome real and perceived security deficits and to avoid the creation of new political, economic or social promoting a co-operative system of security. The OSCE decision-making bodies are: The Permanent Council (PC) - the main regular decision-making body of the Organization, convenes weekly in Vienna to discuss current developments in the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions. The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) - to discuss and make decisions regarding military aspects of security in the OSCE area, in particular confidence- and security-building measures. The Senior Council/Economic Forum - to focus on economic and environmental factors that affect security in the OSCE area. Summits - OSCE Heads of State or Government meet periodically to set priorities and provide orientation at the highest political level. Ministerial Council (MC) - a meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers is convened in those years when no Summit takes place to review OSCE activities and to make appropriate decisions. Chairman-in-Office (CiO) - The Minister of Foreign Affairs of an OSCE participating State, selected each year, bears overall responsibility for executive action and co-ordination of OSCE activities. Parliamentary Assembly (PA) - gathers over 300 parliamentarians from OSCE States Secretariat - under the direction of the Secretary General Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) - is the principal institution responsible for the promotion of human rights and democracy in the OSCE area. High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) - plays a key role in conflict prevention and early warning and seeks early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or friendly relations between OSCE participating States. 10
  • 11. Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) - observes media development in OSCE participating States and provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression. Court of Conciliation and Arbitration - created to settle disputes among OSCE participating States Arms Control, Confidence and Security-Building Measures - the OSCE Chairman-in-Office has appointed Personal Representatives for the implementation of Articles II, IV and V of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace Accords. Long-Term Missions : The OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje ; The OSCE Mission to Georgia; The OSCE Mission to Moldova; The OSCE Centre in Dushanbe; The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina; The OSCE Mission to Croatia; The OSCE Mission in Kosovo; The OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro; Other OSCE Field Activities: The OSCE Centre in Tashkent; The OSCE Presence in Albania; The OSCE Office in Minsk; The OSCE Centre in Almaty; The OSCE Centre in Ashgabad; The OSCE Centre in Bishkek; OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine; The OSCE Office in Yerevan; The OSCE Office in Baku OSCE Activities regarding the Conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference: Minsk Process; The Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference; High Level Planning Group OSCE Assistance in Implementation of Bilateral Agreements: The OSCE Representative to the Latvian-Russian Joint Commission on Military Pensioners; The OSCE Representative to the Estonian Expert Commission on Military Pensioners The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is engaged in standard setting in fields including military security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian concerns. In addition, the OSCE undertakes a variety of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict within and among the participating states. Unlike UN, OSCE “enjoys direct competence to watch not only the affairs among states but intra-state affairs that have the highest probability to create security problems”9. Regular OSCE decision-making is based on the principle of consensus. In very rare cases of urgency or in other extreme circumstances, a rule of "consensus minus one" has developed. OSCE has developed its own tools in order to act in case of situations that have the potential to tranform into conflicts or in conflicts. • The chairman’s in office personal representants; • Ad-hoc cooperation groups; • Mechanisms for a peceful reglementation of disputes OSCE can use these tools for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The decisive point for the effectiveness of any crisis management strategy is how to move smoothly and expeditiously from early warning to early action. OSCE has developed certain mechanisms and procedures that, in cases requiring rapid reaction, facilitate prompt and direct contact between the parties involved in the crisis, and help to mobilize concerted action by the OSCE. In order to ensure early warning there are the following institutions: Permanent Council, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (by monitoring the implementation of human dimension commitments), Chairman-in-Office, the High Commissioner on National 9 John Borawski- The OSCE: In Search of Cooperative Security, Security Dialogue, Vol.27(4), 1996 11 European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) - Council conclusions http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/gac.htm#sd130502b 11
  • 12. Minorities. In order to ensure early warning of situations within the OSCE area which have the potential to develop into crises, including armed conflicts, participating States have the right to draw the attention of the Senior Council to a given situation. This can be done through the Chairman-in-Office by, inter alia: any State directly involved in a dispute; a group of 11 States not directly involved in the dispute; the High Commissioner on National Minorities in situations he deems escalating into a conflict or exceeding the scope of his action; and the Permanent Council. The establishment of the Permanent Council has strengthened OSCE capabilities for early warning, as OSCE participating States can now use this forum to draw the attention of the OSCE to potential crisis situations at any given moment. OSCE can prevent crisis by: • Participation as a result of UN Security Council reques; • Appointing personal representants; • Setting up long term field missions; • Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE; • Provisions for Directed Conciliation. There are some shortcomings in OSCE activity: does not have its own military forces therefore depends on NATO and UE concerning the forces and assets, the decision making is difficult and can be blocked because of the large number of states and sometimes conflicting interests among these. II.2. European Union The European Union (EU) is a family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and prosperity. It is not a State intended to replace existing states, but it is more than any other international organization. Its Member States have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at European level. The idea of European integration was conceived to prevent such killing and destruction from ever happening again. There are five EU institutions, each playing a specific role: • European Parliament (elected by the peoples of the Member States); • Council of the European Union (representing the governments of the Member States); • European Commission (driving force and executive body); • Court of Justice (ensuring compliance with the law); • Court of Auditors (controlling sound and lawful management of the EU budget). New threats and new requirements, linked to the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, have led the Member States to equip themselves with a resource. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992) was the first to contain provisions anchoring the Union’s responsibility for all questions relating to its security, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Treaty envisages that the EU, having no military capabilities of its own, will request the Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement planned military measures on its behalf. The Petersberg tasks of 1992 are define the “humanitarian” aspects of “warfare” .Here the signing nations decided that humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and peace-making missions should be a part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policy. 12
  • 13. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) incorporated the WEU’s “Petersberg tasks” (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) into the Treaty on European Union. This laid the Treaty basis for the operative development of the ESDP. The Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force on May 1, 1999, enhanced the provisions of Common Foreign and Security Policy under Title V of the Treaty on European Union to contribute towards the progressive formation of a common defense policy The Amsterdam Treaty spells out five fundamental objectives of the CFSP: • to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the EU in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter; • to strengthen the security of the EU in all ways; • to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter; • to promote international co-operation; and • to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In June 1999, as a result of the Kosovo conflict, the Cologne European Council placed the Petersberg tasks – as was already the case in the Treaty – and the crisis management at the core of the European Common Security and Defense policy. The fifteen Heads of State or Government decided to develop the Union’s capacity for autonomous action under the ESDP, which is an integral part of the CFSP, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The goal is for the ESDP to be operational in 2003, which would give the EU a unique position in the world thanks to its comprehensive range of instruments (encompassing economic, diplomatic, military, police and other tools). The Petersberg tasks have been incorporated into Title V of the Treaty on European Union. and represent possibility to safeguard security through operations such as the following: • humanitarian and rescue tasks; • peacekeeping tasks; • tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The success of crisis management, which will comply with the United Nations Charter, depends on the collaboration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO ) since the EU will have to use NATO resources, including military capabilities, operational planning capabilities, and so on. The capacities and structure of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) are divided into three components. The first two, military crisis management and civilian crisis management, are known as the Petersberg tasks. Conflict prevention is the third component. The military component (Rapid Reaction Force) was introduced by the Helsinki and Nice European Councils. Firstly, Helsinki (December 1999) established the ‘headline goal’, that is, the Union’s capacity to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least one year, up to 60 000 persons (even some of the candidate countries participate with military forces). This was accompanied by new military structures introduced at Nice, the most important being the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The civilian component , developed at the Feira European Council (1999) and Gothenburg European Council (2001), that consist in possibility of providing up to 5 000 policemen, including 1 000 within 30 days, for tasks ranging from restoring order in cooperation with a military force to the training of local police. strengthening the rule of law: possibility of providing up to 200 judges, prosecutors and other experts in the field; Civil protection: possibility of assisting humanitarian actors through emergency operations, etc. The EU will have to be 13
  • 14. capable, within three to seven hours, of providing two to three assessment teams consisting of ten experts as well as intervention teams consisting of 2 000 people. Furthermore, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been created in order to improve relations between the military and civilian components. Incorporating instruments from the first pillar, this committee ensures cooperation with the Commission whilst highlighting that the success of an operation is closely linked to the reciprocal nature of the military and civilian actions. Conflict prevention , the third component of the ESDP, is a natural development given the human suffering and enormous costs generated by violent conflicts. The Commission plays an important role in this respect by concentrating on improving the consistency and effectiveness of all of the Union’s actions. This new integrated strategy, which is aimed at ensuring long-term structural stability, seeks to establish/restore a favorable political environment in the regions concerned. With the goal of promoting peace and stability, the four main objectives are: • to make more systematic and coordinated use of the Community’s instruments; • to identify and combat causes of conflict; • to improve the capacity to react to nascent conflicts; • to promote international cooperation in this area. EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) started officially on 15th January 2003 was the first crisis management operation under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EUPM follows on from the UN’s International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUPM’s task is to assist in establishing sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia Herzegovina ownership in accordance with best European and international practice. It works side by side with BiH police services to monitor and mentor, inspect and advise in all aspects of police work, including the fight against organized crime and corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUPM is an integral part of the EU’s broader Rule of Law approach in the context of the EU’s overall policy to the Western Balkans Region – the Stabilization and Association Process. It worths highlightening the participation of 18 non-EU countries in the EUPM. “The participation of these countries demonstrates the unity of approach to crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”11 The first-ever EU military operation was launched in Macedonia in spring 2003. Norway contributed to this EU led operation. Norway, as a NATO member, had the right (if she so wished) to participate in this operation, since it was conducted with access to NATO assets and capabilities The EU has under development a new Headline Goal called HG 2010, based on the experience of having launched four crises management operations in 2003, and on the changed security environment since 1999. Of the four operations launched in 2003, two are still on-going: The police missions EUPM in Bosnia and PROXIMA in Macedonia. The military missions in Macedonia (Concordia) and in DR Congo (Artemis) have both been successfully terminated. Concordia was conducted under Berlin +, while Artemis was an autonomous EU led operation. II.3. NATO The North Atlantic Alliance was founded on the basis of a Treaty between member states entered into freely by each of them after public debate and due parliamentary process. The Treaty upholds their individual rights as well as their international obligations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It commits each member country to sharing the risks and responsibilities as well as the benefits of collective security and requires of each of them the 14
  • 15. undertaking not to enter into any other international commitment which might conflict with the Treaty. The fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a common commitment to mutual cooperation among the member states, based on the indivisibility of their security. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance ensure that no member country is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defense, the Alliance enables them to organization their essential national security objectives through collective effort. In short, the Alliance is an association of free states united in their determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries. The means by which the Alliance carries out its security policies include the maintenance of a sufficient military capability to prevent war and to provide for effective defense; an overall capability to manage crises affecting the security of its members; and active promotion of dialogue with other nations and of a cooperative approach to European security, including measures to bring about further progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks: -“Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force. -Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. -Deterrence and Defense: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area: • Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. • Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance The main Civilian Organization and Structures are: NATO Headquarters; Permanent Representatives and National Delegations; The Secretary General; The International Staff; The Private Office; The Office of the Secretary General; The Executive Secretariat; The Office of Information and Press; The NATO Office of Security; The Division of Political Affairs; The Division of Defense Planning and Operations; The Divisions of Defense Support; NATO Headquarters, Consultation and Command and Control Staff ; The Division of Security Investment, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning. The Military Organization and Structures are: The Military Committee, Strategic Commanders, International Military Staff and Partner Country Representation. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has effective political authority and powers of decision, and consists of Permanent Representatives of all member countries meeting together at least once a week. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into 15
  • 16. acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organization; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro- Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighboring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained. The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance Organization that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies’ populations, territory, and forces. Some states, including on NATO’s periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance’s growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO’s superiority in traditional weaponry. The Alliance’s crisis management process is founded on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty which emphasizes the need for Alliance consultation. The article states the following: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” This article established one of the most important mechanisms, the consultation procedure, which is implemented whenever any ally considers the territorial integrity or political independence of any of the allies to be threatened. The new strategic concept highlights the importance of consultations (2nd of “fundamental security tasks”). The language of Article 4 on consultation is mirrored in the PfP invitation. 16
  • 17. In contrast to the predominant threat of the past, the risks for Allied security that remain are multifaceted in nature and multidirectional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. Uncertainty about where and how they could develop into crises or military threats will prevail, and NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. First of all the specified principles required to rule the crisis management process must be considered: • The Alliance being composed of nineteen sovereign member countries, consensus is needed to achieve an Alliance decision; • The highest authority of the Alliance is NAC. In defense policy matters that involve the integrated force structure, the highest authority is the Defense Planning Committee (DPC); • The Council/DPC, in carrying out their main tasks of collective decision-making in a crisis, act as the forum for consultation, wherein member governments can express and compare their views, leading to the organization of these views in the form of collective decisions on measures to be implemented; • All decisions taken in the Council/DPC (and all other NATO bodies) are expressions of national sovereignty and are therefore taken by consensus. The nations have delegated to their Ambassadors the responsibility of representing all elements of their Governments (political, economic, defense, and civil emergency); • The Council/DPC is supported by the Military Committee, the Political Committee, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the Crisis Response Committee, and, when required, other relevant Committees which provide advice and recommendations on aspects and measures within their respective fields of competence; • Major NATO Commanders are responsible for conducting operations, in conformity with political guidance by the Council/DPC; • Finally, at every step in the Crisis Management the re is political control of the military; no decision regarding planning for deployment, or actual employment of military forces, can be taken without political organization. The forum for consultation and co-ordination of crisis management is the Council Operations and Exercises Committee (COEC) at the level of political military representatives from national delegates, concerned with crisis management and exercises. Its role is to provide arrangements, procedures and facilities, including communications issues, questions relating to the NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN), and the preparation and conduct of crisis management exercises, and its sustainability in the management of crisis for this proposal. The Crisis Management and Operations Directorate includes the Crisis Management Section, the Council Operations Section, and the Peacekeeping Staff. The Director of Crisis Management and Operations is also responsible on behalf of the Secretary General for the development and control of the NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN). The Crisis Management Section provides staff support to the Secretary General, the Council and Defense Planning Committee, and relevant subordinate groups on major politico military crisis management policy issues. It is responsible for implementing, monitoring and reporting on Council decisions associated with crisis management and the preparation and conduct of NATO operations. In defining the new strategic environment in which these operations are conducted, it is clear that the Armed Forces have to deal with a complex and diverse spectrum of actors, risks, situations and demands. The following factors must be taken into account: • Environment can range from permissive to hostile and be influenced by the perception of the local population and local organization 17
  • 18. • Institutions of law and order could be fragile or non-existent. • May have a specific mission, such as extraction operations or military support to disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation, or search and rescue. • May be of a humanitarian nature not connected with any potential conflict. • May be enforcement operations, to contain and prevent conflicts by early engagement or to terminate conflicts before escalation into war. The use of force is one area where incorrect application can bring mission failure, and which therefore requires careful judgement. In all cases, the use of force must be in accordance with International Law, and politically approved guidance attached to the Rules of Engagement. While the abiding principle is that only the minimum necessary force should be used, any force should be precise, timely, appropriate and proportionate. Force should be used to resolve a situation, not to escalate it. Where the nature of the mission allows, operations should be conducted impartially, without favor or prejudice to any party. It is important that impartiality is maintained in all situations. Experience shows that once you have lost your impartial status, it is very difficult to re-establish it. The selection of the nation participating in the CROs must be among those that have no interests in the area. NATO will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organization to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage. A coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance, will require the Alliance’s political authorities to choose and co-ordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages. NATO learned some lessons in the Balkans regarding choosing the right moment for intervention. Aliance took steps too late in Bosnia and the bloodshed could not to be averted. Although it reacted quickly in Kosovo the Allies were not able to prevent the ethnic cleansing and atrocities. Eventually NATO recorded its first success in Macedonia because the intervention was in time. However, it is not a minimization of NATO efforts in stabilizing the Balkans. It worths recalling the successful NATO led operations IFOR, SFOR, KFOR. But all of them were reactive measures not preventive. II.4. United Nations The United Nations was established on 24 October 1945 by 51 countries committed to preserving peace through international cooperation and collective security. Today, nearly every nation in the world belongs to the UN: membership now totals 189 countries. When States become Members of the United Nations, they agree to accept the obligations of the UN Charter, an international treaty that sets out basic principles of international relations. According to the Charter, the UN has four purposes: to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. Preserving world peace is a central purpose of the United Nations. Under the Charter, Member States agree to settle disputes by peaceful means and refrain from threatening or using force against other States. Over the years, the UN has played a major role in helping defuse international crises and in resolving protracted conflicts. It has undertaken complex operations involving peacemaking, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. It has worked to prevent conflicts from breaking out. And in post-conflict situations, it has increasingly undertaken coordinated action to address the root causes of war and lay the foundation for durable peace. Principal Organs of the United Nations are: Secretariat, General Assembly,International Court of 18
  • 19. Justice, Security Council,Economic and Social Council,Trusteeship Council and Agencies of the United Nations. General Assembly is the world’s forum for discussing matters affecting world peace and security, and for making recommendations concerning them. It has no power of its own to enforce decisions. On important questions including international peace and security, a two-thirds majority of those present and voting is required. Emphasis is given on questions relating to international peace and security brought before it by any member, the Security Council, or non- members. It also maintains a broad program of international cooperation in economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and for assisting in human rights and freedoms. The Security Council is the primary instrument for establishing and maintaining international peace. Its main purpose is to prevent war by settling disputes between nations. Under the charter, the council is permitted to dispatch a UN force to stop aggression. All member nations undertake to make available armed forces, assistance, and facilities to maintain international peace and security. Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are: • to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations; • to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction; • to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement; • to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments; • to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken; • to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression; • to take military action against an aggressor; • to recommend the admission of new Members; • to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in “strategic areas”; Trusteeship Council. The UN charter originally established the Trusteeship Council as a main organ of the UN and entrusted it with the administration of territories placed under the trusteeship system. Since 1948 there have been 56 UN peacekeeping operations. Forty-three of these operations have been created by the United Nations Security Council since 1988. Thus far, close to 130 nations have contributed personnel at various times; 89 are currently providing peacekeepers The UN had a long campaign against apartheid in South Africa, active support for Namibian independence, a number of electoral support missions and some 20 peacekeeping operations. The most recent operations — in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ethiopia and Eritrea — were established in 1999 and 2000. The UN has helped repatriate refugees to Mozambique, provided humanitarian assistance in Somalia and Sudan, and undertaken diplomatic efforts to restore peace in the Great Lakes region. It has helped prevent new unrest in the Central African Republic, and it is helping to prepare for a referendum on the future of Western Sahara. Elsewhere in Africa, UN field missions continue their peace-building activities in Guinea- Bissau and Liberia, and remain in Angola and Burundi to support various initiatives aimed at promoting peace and reconciliation. At the request of the Security Council, the Secretary-General has provided a comprehensive analysis of conflicts in Africa along with recommendations on how to promote durable peace. The UN family continues working to strengthen Cambodian civil society, human rights and democracy following the massive 1992-1993 UN peacekeeping mission in that country. 19
  • 20. In Afghanistan, the UN worked throughout the last decade to facilitate national reconciliation and reconstruction, needed as a result of the country’s protracted civil war. But despite intense diplomatic efforts by the Secretary-General and his personal envoys, fighting continued at great humanitarian cost, severely hindering attempts by the UN system to provide assistance to the Afghan people. With the escalation of the conflict in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, the Secretary-General in October appointed Lakhdar Brahimi as his Special Representative for Afghanistan. As the situation there unfolded, the UN played a central role in promoting dialogue among the Afghan parties, aimed at establishing a broad-based, inclusive government. In East Timor, UN-brokered talks between Indonesia and Portugal culminated in a May 1999 agreement which paved the way for a popular consultation on the status of the territory. Under the agreement, a UN mission supervised voter registration and an August 1999 ballot, in which 78 per cent of East Timorese voted for independence over autonomy within Indonesia. In August 2001, a major step was taken in that direction, with the election of a Constituent Assembly which drafted the constitution for an independent and democratic East Timor. In Tajikistan, the United Nations Office of Peace-building was created in June 2000 to replace a peacekeeping operation there, providing the political framework and leadership for a variety of peace-building activities. Elsewhere, UN military observers continued to monitor the ceasefire line between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In the Pacific, the UN helped the government of Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville parties reach a comprehensive agreement covering issues of autonomy, referendum and weapons disposal. In Cyprus, the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser have worked to promote negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement. The UN peacekeeping force there continues to supervise the ceasefire lines, maintain the buffer zone and undertake humanitarian activities. The UN worked strenuously towards resolving the conflict in the former Yugoslavia while providing relief assistance to some 4 million people. In 1991, the UN imposed an arms embargo, while the Secretary-General and his envoy conducted diplomatic efforts to end the fighting. From 1992 to 1995, UN peacekeepers sought to bring peace and security to Croatia, helped protect civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and helped ensure that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was not drawn into the war. Following the 1995 Dayton-Paris peace agreements, four UN missions helped secure the peace. Today, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina carries out a wide range of law enforcement functions while coordinating humanitarian, human rights and reconstruction activities. The UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka monitors the demilitarization of that peninsula — a strategic area disputed by Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In Kosovo (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), the Security Council established in 1999 an interim international administration following the end of NATO air bombings and the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. Under the umbrella of the UN, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations are working with the people of Kosovo to create a functioning, democratic society with substantial autonomy. Municipal elections in October 2000, and the promulgation of a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, paved the way for Kosovo-wide elections on 17 November 2001 for a legislative assembly. In Guatemala, UN-assisted negotiations ended a 35-year civil war. Today, the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala, works to see that the comprehensive peace agreements are fully implemented. In Haiti, following international action to restore the democratically elected 20
  • 21. government, the UN has put a comprehensive programme in place, emphasizing human rights, consensus-building and conflict-reduction, with the strong participation of civil society. UN concern over the Arab-Israeli conflict spans five decades and five full-fledged wars. The UN has defined principles for a just and lasting peace, including two benchmark Security Council resolutions — 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) — which remain the basis for an overall settlement. The UN has supported other initiatives aimed at solving underlying political problems, and has despatched various peacekeeping operations to the region. The UN’s first military observer group was set up in 1948 and maintains its presence in the area to this day. The UN’s first peacekeeping force was also set up there, during the Suez crisis of 1956. Two peacekeeping forces are currently in the region. One, established in 1974, maintains an area of separation on the Golan Heights between Israeli and Syrian troops. The other, established in 1978, contributes to stability in southern Lebanon and in 2000 verified the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area. Since the events of September 2000 in Jerusalem and the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada, the Secretary-General has intensified his efforts to end the violence and bring the Israelis and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table. He participated in the October 2000 Summit meeting at Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt — co-chaired by United States President Bill Clinton and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak — which resulted in the establishment of a fact-finding committee chaired by U.S. Senator George Mitchell. Its April 2001 report remains the only broadly acceptable blueprint for confidence-building measures between the parties and eventual resumption of the peace process. The Secretary-General and his representatives participate actively in efforts to implement its recommendations, in close coordination with other interested actors — including the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Union and countries of the region. Elsewhere in the region, a UN observer mission monitors the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait following the restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty in 1991. II.5 WEU WEU was created by the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948 . During the Gulf War, WEU Ministers decided to co-ordinate their operations, with the aim of implementing and enforcing United Nations Resolution 661. In 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council decided that WEU naval forces would participate in monitoring the embargo against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. NATO was also conducting its own operation at the time. Following an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 5 April 1993, it was agreed that WEU Member States would provide assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their efforts to enforce the UN sanctions on the Danube. In June, the three riparian states accepted this offer, and agreed with WEU on the setting-up of a police and customs operation. In 1993, a few days before the Treaty on European Union came into force, the Ministers of the EC Member States requested WEU to examine the contribution WEU could make to the planned EU administration of the town of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result of this request, WEU contributed a police contingent to the EU Administration of Mostar, established early in July 1994. The aim of the WEU police contingent was to assist the Bosnian and Croat parties in Mostar to set up a unified police force for the town. 21
  • 22. In 1997, the WEU Council decided to send a Multinational Advisory Police Element to Albania, as part of the efforts undertaken in that country by the international community, notably the OSCE and the EU. The primary aim of MAPE was to provide advice and train instructors. A key part of MAPE’s work was to provide advice to the Ministry of Public Order on restructuring the Albanian police. A new State Police Law was drawn up with MAPE’s support and contained the foundations for building a democratic police to internationally accepted standards. Approximately 3000 police officers were trained in the Tirana Training Centre (Police Academy), in a second training centre in Durres and through field training programmes. On 2 February 1999, the WEU Council approved plans for an enhanced MAPE mission with a mandate until April 2000. This mission was conducted by WEU at the request of the EU on the basis of an Article J.4.2 decision, enabling among other things a major part of the costs to be met from the EU budget. WEU’s mission played an important role during the Kosovo refugee crisis from April 1999 by supporting the Albanian police in their responsibilities for receiving, registering, supervising and escorting refugees. MAPE maintained constant contacts with the Ministry of Public Order. WEU assisted the Albanians in setting up their own joint crisis centre and a 24-hour MAPE presence was provided to support them in its operations and decisions. MAPE teams were dispatched to Kukes, near the Kosovo border, to assist the police directorate there, as well as to the police directorates in Tirana and Durres. The MAPE mission finally terminated on 31 May 2001. At the request of the EU , WEU implemented a joint action in the field of mine clearance. Within the framework of the WEU Demining Assistance Mission to Croatia (WEUDAM), which began operations on 10 May 1999, WEU provided advice, technical expertise and training support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) in the areas of program management, planning and project development, geographic information systems, and level II surveys. Sweden acted as lead nation for this nine-strong mission. The mission was funded by the EU. The WEUDAM mission was terminated on 30 November 2001. In response to a request from the European Union based on Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, in November 1998 the WEU Satellite Centre embarked on a mission of “general security surveillance” of the Kosovo region. The initial focus of the general security surveillance mission was to gather information for the EU as well as the NATO and OSCE missions on the state of implementation of the Belgrade agreements dated 15 and 16 October as well as on the situation of refugees and displaced persons and the related infrastructure. The mission of general security surveillance was conducted in close co-ordination with the WEU Military Staff, which provided additional information for each of the Satellite Centre reports transmitted to the EU, NATO and OSCE. With the changed situation in Kosovo, with KFOR troops and other representatives of the international community on the ground, the Satellite Centre concentrated its work from July 1999 on the visualization of a geographic information system (GIS) on Kosovo. The GIS was a digital map of the entire Kosovo region with visualization and analysis tools and could be used to assist in several aspects of reconstruction work in Kosovo. In July 1999, this system was also made available to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). * * * Other international organizations are involved in international crises management: Council of Europe The Council of Europe's monitoring and protection mechanisms for fundamental freedoms and basic rights have been considerably strengthened during the last few years (since 22
  • 23. 1 November 1998: new permanent European Court of Human Rights, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 1995, the Office of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights established in 1999, monitoring of specific countries by the Parliamentary Assembly, monitoring of specific issues by the Committee of Ministers, periodic reports and recommendations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance - ECRI - established in 1993). As a result of the strengthening of its operative capacities (among others, field missions in Kosovo, participation of experts from the Council of Europe in the office of the Russian human rights commissioner for Chechnya, Kalamanov) and the extension of its activities in the field of promoting and stabilizing democracy (ADACS programme), the Council of Europe has by now developed a considerable capacity in crisis prevention and rehabilitation. G8 Conflict prevention as an independent issue has been included in the G 8 agenda at Germany's suggestion (special Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in Berlin in December 1999). At the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Miyazaki in July 2000 concrete initiatives have been agreed upon (fight against uncontrolled and illegal transfer of small arms and against the illegal diamond trade being used to finance wars; crisis-preventive orientation of development policy; ending of the use of child soldiers and the alleviation of the impact of armed conflicts on children; as well as the provision of civilian police officers for international operations). New initiatives are to be considered at the forthcoming meeting of G8 Foreign Ministers in Rome 18. /19. July 2001. After the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, ICG launched a major new project on international terrorism, designed to both bring together ICG's work in existing program areas (notably in Central Asia, Sudan, Algeria, Indonesia, the Balkans and Colombia) while establishing a new geographical focus on the Middle East and West Asia. A Middle East regional office was established in Amman, and a new Afghanistan/South Asia project, was established in Islamabad. ICG The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational organization whose mission is to assist the efforts of "actors" within the international community (states, nongovernmental organizations, international bodies, concerned individuals) in responding to world crises and problems. Using field research techniques, ICG gathers information from teams of political analysis in countries "at risk." Their analytical reports are then given to decision makers and members of the press. Their Web site provides free, highly detailed reports, press releases, and news bulletins about various international crises around the globe. Though the ICG is an advocacy organization, the contents of their reports provide very valuable facts and analysis. II.6 Co-operation among organizations ESDI The process leading to the development of a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO has taken place progressively over a period of about ten years. By the early 1990s, it seemed to many in Europe and North America that the time had come for a rebalancing of the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic and for concrete steps to be taken by the European member countries to assume greater responsibility for their common security and defense. European countries embarked upon a process designed to provide a genuine European military capability without unnecessary duplication of the command structures, planning staffs and military assets and capabilities already available within NATO, while simultaneously strengthening their contribution to the Alliance’s missions and activities. Such an approach was seen as responding both to the European wish to develop a Common 23
  • 24. Foreign and Security Policy, and to the need for a more balanced partnership between the North American and European member countries of the Alliance. Accordingly, at their meeting in Washington in 1999, it had set in train work on the further development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance. Discussions were initiated to address a number of specific aspects, namely: • means of ensuring the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between the European Union (EU) and the Alliance, based on the mechanisms that had been established between NATO and the WEU; • the participation of non-EU European Allies; • practical arrangements for EU access to NATO planning capabilities and NATO’s assets and capabilities. The improvement of European military capabilities is a fundamental aspect of ESDI. A Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), was therefore launched in Washington to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of NATO missions. The principles which have formed the basis for future work on ESDI set out at the Washington Summit and at subsequent meetings, and are as follows: • The Alliance acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. • In taking this process forward, NATO and the EU must ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on the mechanisms developed for cooperation between NATO and the WEU. • Alliance leaders applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defense capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication. • They attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on consultation arrangements developed within the WEU. Canada’s interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities is also recognized. NATO-EU cooperation At the very heart of NATO-EU cooperation in the field of military crisis management lies the so-called Berlin Plus agenda, which, as is stated in the Washington communiqué (NATO Summit, April 1999), consists of four topics that need to be settled so that the EU can have access to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance: • assured access to NATO's planning capabilities • pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets being at the disposal of the EU • identification of a range of European command options, including the role of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) • further adaptation of NATO's defense planning system so as to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations. EU-NATO relations include many other important issues, such as the Security Agreement, the permanent arrangements for consultations in crisis and outside crisis periods, as well as cooperation in the fields of capabilities development and exercises. All these issues, which are interrelated and should be dealt with in a comprehensive manner, constitute the so-called “permanent arrangements” between NATO and the EU. Cooperation between NATO and the European Union has been developed in a number of specific fields and specifically in relation to the campaign against terrorism. Direct contacts have 24
  • 25. increased and, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the Secretary General of NATO participated in the deliberations of the EU General Affairs Council held on 12 September to analyze the international situation following the attacks. Cooperation between the two organizations has also contributed to the security situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where NATO is providing security for EU and OSCE monitors of the peace plan. Regular contacts have taken place between the two organizations as well as the OSCE to maximize international support for political reforms in the country and the maintenance of the political process. A joint delegation consisting of the NATO Secretary General, the EU High representative, the Chairman in Office of the OSCE and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe visited Skopje on 18 October 2001 for discussions with President Trajkovski and other political leaders. Discussions of the situation in the Western Balkans have become a regular feature of meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee of the EU (2001) in order to review cooperation across the board, and underlined their continued engagement in strengthening the peace process in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as elsewhere in the Western Balkans. Further contacts between the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative have continued to contribute to cooperation and, in May 2002, Foreign Ministers of both organizations met again in Reykjavik reaffirming their commitment to achieve a close and transparent relationship. The situation in southern Serbia has also been the subject of consultations and cooperation, following the need for international intervention in 2001 to defuse the risk of civil conflict in the area and to help to broker a ceasefire. Closer proximity between the Serb and Federal Yugoslav governments and European institutions continues to manifest itself and has been reflected, for example, in the interest shown by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in participation in the Partnership for Peace program. The strengthening of the political process, for example through the successful conduct of municipal elections in southern Serbia in July 2002, has continued to be a priority concern of both NATO and the EU, each of which has acted to defuse set-backs when these have occurred. NATO-WEU Cooperation Arrangements made for cooperation between NATO and the WEU from 1991 to 2000 laid the groundwork for the development of a strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union. These included: • taking WEU requirements into account in NATO’s defense planning procedures for developing forces and capabilities. The WEU began contributing to the Alliance defense planning process in 1997 by providing an input to the 1997 Ministerial Guidance ; • introducing procedures for identifying NATO assets and capabilities on which the WEU might wish to draw with the agreement of the North Atlantic Council; • establishing multinational European command arrangements within NATO, which could be used to prepare, support, command and conduct an operation under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. • introducing consultation and information-sharing arrangements to provide the coordination needed throughout a WEU-led operation undertaken with NATO support; • developing military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions. In practice these arrangements were designed to ensure that if a crisis arose in which the WEU decided to intervene (and the Alliance chose not to), it could request the use of Alliance assets and capabilities, possibly including a CJTF headquarters, for conducting an operation under its own political control and strategic direction. 25
  • 26. The assets requested could then be made available for the WEU’s use by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. Conditions for their transfer to the WEU, as well as for monitoring their use and for their eventual return or recall, would be registered in a specific agreement between the two organizations. During the operation, NATO would monitor the use of its assets and regular political liaison with the WEU would be maintained. European commanders from the NATO command structure could be nominated to act under WEU political control. The assets would be returned to NATO at the end of the operation or when required. Throughout the operation, including its preparatory phase, NATO and the WEU would consult closely. III. Romania’s national system for crises management Crisis management entails organizing, making the arrangements and measures taken in order to bring the crisis under the control of crisis mangers and to allow them, following the actions taken, to shape crisis evolution and to lead it towards an acceptable solution. The procedures and activities cover a large spectrum of measures starting with collecting information and evaluations, establishing objectives to be attained, elaborating actionable alternative and comparing them, implementing the chosen alternative and analyzing possible reactions of the involved parties. In order to approach the crisis management issue three basic rules have to be accepted12: • Crisis is unavoidable; • Crisis must be planned. Consequently, certain management procedures can be foreseen and applied when the crisis occurs; • Crisis management is manager’s reponsability. An effective crisis management depends on the efficiency of the links established both inside and outside the organisation. At the end of the Cold War, Romania’s experience in the field of crisis management was relatively reduced. Due to the changes in the international environment Romania has put a premium on crisis mangement and established a coherent and viable national system of crisis mangement. Crisis that may cause serious turbulence to public order having implications on national security: • Internal armed conflict among legal armed forces and organised groups of people that have a responsible command and exert control over a part of the national territory ; • Serious internal tensions as a result of diverse causes and may generate considerable clashes; • Demonstrations and other gatherings that take place agitatedly with any kind of arms or violating other legal provisions; • Internal agressions set up by previously prepared groups in clandestinity, with paramilitary structures against the independence and integrity of the national teritory; • Organizing, preparing, leading or controling some groups of persons in order to disrupt the functions of police, geandarmery or armed forces; • Unfolding illegal activities in order to change the political regime; • Plot carried out against a community by massive poisoning, infecting the water, spreding a epidemic disease. 12 Documentar privind sistemul national de gestionare a crizelor in Romania, Romania Crisis Mangement and Conflict Resolution Seminar, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 16-20 Nov. 1998, Bucharest 26
  • 27. In order to prevent internal crisis and to find effective solutions to this crisis will be taken into account the rule of law, respecting the constitutional provisions, the rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual specified in international documents. An intervention using the force, including the troops, to guarantee or reinstitution the constitutional order will be an ultimate measure taken differentially, in stages according to the degree of perilousness against the basic values of the state. The following principles will be respected regardless of the seriousness of the turbulence and tensions that affect the state: • Actions using force will unfold respecting legal provisions; • Arms and ammunitions will be used differentially, circumspectly by using non- lethal means; • It will be considered neutralization and capturing the turbulent elements. Crisis monitorization is performed by actions performed by institutions and persons that have responsabilities in the leadership of the state both centrally (Parliament, Presidency, Supreme Council of Defence, Government, ministeries, public administration authorities having responsabilities in guaranteeing public order, safety and national defence) and locally( prefects as goverment representants exert the leadership of centralised public services of the ministeries and other central organisations). The legal framework is ensured by the art. 93 in the Constitution of Romania and “The Law regarding the siege state regime and emergency state regime”. Any state has to face any crisis by exercising possible scenarious and in this way avoiding the surprising element. In order to have a functional system for crisis management must organize performant units specialised in collecting, analysing and processing information. It is important to posess a mobile, flexible and modern equipped military force with a high readiness. Enhanced security through the extension of the North Atlantic Alliance to the East, the development oh Partnership for Peace, the strengthening of European Security Defense identity and the extension of regional co-operation will give Romania the opportunity to prove its constructive and stabilizing potential. Romania contribute to the prevention of regional risk proliferation (conflict situation, dissemination of nuclear technologies and materials, of conventional armaments and other lethal weapons, terrorist activities and organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, interethnic and religious conflicts). The national military strategy acknowledges that the Romanian Armed Forces are and will be capable of repelling and if necessary, of defeating a possible military aggression, within the limits of our capabilities. The Romanian Armed Forces are prepared to promote the national interests, in compliance with the political decisions of the national command authorities, while not being perceived as a source of concern by other states. Our Armed Forces must to guarantee the strict observance of human rights for all Romanian citizens in a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible state, actively engaged into the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, by a political regime based on constitutional democracy, while keeping a strict political civilian control over the Armed Forces. To accomplish this mission, the military body is and will be subject exclusively to the Romanian people's will. Under such circumstances, the Romanian Armed Forces must be prepared to prevent, deter, and if necessary, defeat any aggressor that threatens and endangers the security of the Romanian state, simultaneously with providing the capability to participate in conflict prevention, crisis management and collective defense at regional level. The Military Strategy of Romania was developed upon the following basis: Romania has no stated enemies; it enjoys peaceful relations with its neighbors and the probability of an emerging major military short- and medium-term threat to our security, is minimal. The strategy is clearly an active - 27
  • 28. defensive one. The essence of the strategy includes four strategic concepts. The concept - CREDIBLE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY, implying a permanent capability to respond efficiently and properly to the current and predictable risks posed by the security environment. Based on a realistic assessment of risks, we must permanently maintain quantitatively sufficient and credible forces, trained according to modern standards. The concept - ENHANCED AND MORE OPERATIONAL PARTNERSHIP - is based on specific, bilateral and multilateral partnerships and on developing some others supporting the strengthening of national security. The fourth concept - GRADUAL INTEGRATION - consists in accelerating the process of acceding to European structures which will allow Romania to take the desired and deserved position in the international community. An environment of collective security is the best means to protect our interests in the 21st century. The Romanian Armed Forces take an active part in developing co-operation with the military of other states in order to sustain enhanced confidence and stability. The current security environment provides an opportunity to reshape our armed forces within acceptable limits of risk. The Romanian Armed Forces maintain a permanent capability to effectively and adequately respond to risks generated by the security environment. A gradual and flexible response, including a combination of simultaneous or sequential actions, using surveillance and early warning forces, as well as crisis operations forces, main and reserve forces, provides an adequate response to threats. Early Warning: specialized peacetime forces, deployed in the neighborhood of the border areas and in the depth of the national territory, provide surveillance and early warning capability. Heir purpose is to participate in preventing strategic surprise, to discover and monitor any indication related to the emergence and development of crisis and conflict situations or the danger of breaking out an armed aggression against Romania. Rapid Reaction: It is achieved by promptly starting the specific procedures envisaged by the agreements on confidence - building measures, arms control, regional cooperation, consultations within Partnership for Peace and mechanisms included in the UN Charter. If the threats increase, emphasizing the imminent danger of hostile actions, the deployment of forces should be carried out immediately and adequately. The military will have available immediate zone engagement forces and rapid reaction forces, capable of promptly responding to any type of military aggression. Their action will be based on a special responsiveness and it will be timely, selective, dynamic and flexible Depending on the scope of threat, part of the main forces may be called to support the actions conducted by the Rapid Reaction Force. In well-defined situations, in accordance with the objectives of foreign policy and the international commitments of our state, the Romanian Armed Forces should be capable to prepare, deploy and support the participation of forces in peace support operations, aiming at solving crisis situations affecting the Romanian national interests or those of the international community. Through these partnerships developed by our Armed Forces, we are able to continue improving our crisis management system. Within the sub regional cooperation, we will take an active part in: • the Multinational Peace Force - South-Eastern Europe (MPF-SEE) together with Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Greece, Italy and Turkey; • the Central-European Cooperation Initiative (CENCOOP), together with Austria, Switzerland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary; • the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG); the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Group (BLACKSEAFOR) - to include Bulgaria, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. 28
  • 29. The strategic missions of the Armed Forces are based upon the defense policy objectives and its priorities, the strategic principles, the decisions taken by the authorized bodies and also upon the development of the internal and international security environment. According to the security environment, missions are grouped as follows: peacetime missions;missions in crisis situations; at war. In crises field, the main strategic missions are: • prevention of conflicts or participation in conflict prevention and aggression; • preparation of the population, economy and territory for defense and national support to multinational operations; • participation in peace support and humanitarian missions; • support of public authorities in a civilian emergency, natural and other types of disasters. Relating to the character of the crisis (internal or international) directly affecting Romania, the Armed Forces may participate, according to legal provisions and in cooperation with other legal state institutions, in the following actions: provide logistical support to the Ministry of Interior and local public authorities; prevent destabilizing actions; defeat terrorist and other illegally armed elements; control access to certain objectives of strategic importance; prevent proliferation of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction; intervention for the protection of citizens and basic infrastructure; monitoring and warning strategically in depth by our specialized forces; achieve strategic security at the borders and of vital importance objectives; stop arms and ammunition traffic; confine and clear effects of disasters. The participation in regional crisis management and response missions (which may be conducted also in peacetime) will be carried out only after the national command authorities approve these actions and the adequate funds are allocated to them. The military involvement will be stopped in a flexible and gradual manner, in order to prevent the crisis breaking out again. The risk factors The risk of a major military conflict remains low. However, there are regional and local, non-military and military risks difficult to be foreseen, which could evolve into threats. They are categorized into regional, asymmetric, transnational risks and unpredictable hazards. Regional risks include: • strategic imbalance in military capability within Romania's area of strategic interest; • military conflicts and tensions which could extend; • standing economical-social shortcomings directly affecting military capability and depreciating the authority of national leadership institutions of our state; • the possibility of disrupting financial, information, energy, communications and telecommunications of the states systems, and the political-military rivalries between them. Asymmetric risks include strategies or deliberately undertaken actions against the Romanian state, using methods different from classical combat, aiming at attacking vulnerable fields of civil society which may directly or indirectly affect the armed forces as well; they are as follows: • expansion of terrorist networks and activities; • uncontrolled proliferation and dissemination of nuclear technology and materials, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation of armaments and other lethal, unconventional means, information warfare; • Romania's isolation within the global community based on information, because it does not have specific infrastructure. Such risks include the breaking off of critical information flow, the presentation of a distorted image of the Romanian democratic society and observance of international treaties and agreements, the limitation of access to strategic resources, degradation of environment and the presence of high level risk objectives in the very proximity of the national boundaries. 29
  • 30. Transnational risks, by definition, are not confined by national boundaries. Groups that promote separatism or extremism may generate some of these new threats. Others can originate from ethnic disputes, religious rivalries and violation of human rights. Organized crime, smuggling of illegal drugs, arms and strategic materials bring about new risks. Recent events demonstrate the negative consequences of a massive flow of refugees. Unpredictable hazards are the risks resting in the unknown field of uncertainty and they are based on objective and subjective elements. The existing good international relations could change or worsen. CONCLUSIONS Crises are events that are characterized by large destructive potential. Although there were presented multiple causes of crisis, these should be observed from their type standpoint. It is necessary to make the difference between security crisis and othen then security crisis. The impact on national interests of these two types is different. Also one should note the close relationship between crisis and security. An efficient crisis management will lead to stability. Therefore, it is imperative to permanently asses the risks that are indentified and wroted down in the National Security Strategy and not allow them to turn into threats. However, any other risk should be noticed as soon as possible by early warning systems and properly monitorized. The crises type determines the nature of necessary coordination among state institutions. The other then security crisis emphasize the reaction and requires coordination training for an efficient response. Security crises have the tendency to put emphasis on early warning, information aquiring and decision – making. Other then security crises require an extraordinary quantity of resources, such as search and rescue teams, medical assistance, food, and shelter. On the other hand information is the most important resource in security crises. Crises management can be achieved by using political, economic and other non-military means and military means when the previous means fail. During the last decade the involvement of regional organisations in conflict prevention, crisis response and post conflict reconstruction has increased considerably, particularly in Europe. NATO has begun crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and continued them in Kosovo and Macedonia. It has proved to be the most important organisation in the crises management field. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has established over twenty field missions and presences in the Balkans, Central Asia and Caucasus. The European Union deployed its first field mission and replaces the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) by the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003 and began the second mission in Macedonia in April. It is necessary to highlight the need for cooperation among the actors among participants in crisis mangament. This aspect has been proved in Macedonia and Kosovo. It would be adequate if the international community specialised in certain fields by using comparative advantage principle and not to have overlaped missions. There are many examples in the contemporary global crisis management environment that highlight the inadequacy of responding to the symptoms without addressing the substance. Every crisis situation demands its own particular remedy, which takes account of all the relevant circumstances. There is no ‘one size fits all’ in international crisis management. It worths highlightening the importance of preventive measures that means addressing to the crises causes. Reactive measures have their importance but the preventive measures weight must be considerable. When a crisis occures the international community should focus on crisis in that country not allowing the spill over in the region. 30
  • 31. Crisis management involves the activities of a great number of agents confronting the same problems but lacking shared or consistent knowledge, coordination or communications technology or a common user culture. As a consequence, different organisations work wastefully on the same problems, plan and take decisions without consulting other organisations and without access to up-to-date or adequate knowledge. Although competition between organisations is a normal part of life, the real challenge is to overcome these difficulties by understanding the requirements of each stakeholder. To do this a thorough understanding of the behavioural tendencies of collaborative crisis management responses and the political constraints is essential to identifying the means by which improved ICT standardisation can strengthen collaborative crisis management action. In any crisis management situation, the critical factor in making timely, appropriate decisions is to have the benefit of the optimum amount of quality information. This information may come from a variety of sources that need to be integrated in an information system that is appropriate for the environment in which it is operating. Investment in information technology developments in the last decade have radically transformed the way organisations operate. The challenges of technology now are related less to capacity than to the effective management of technology and its appropriate application, including: operational capability, design, securing and implementation in reliable operational environments, ensuring business continuity , and ease of understanding and application. There is already more than enough capacity, and infrastructure is relatively inexpensive, at least compared to the industrial world. However institutions still operate through business processes established before the information age. Vast amounts of information are stored on electronic media and exchanged over the Internet or intranets. But the main point is that the processes which allow this to be turned into useful information and intelligence are still very much in their infancy – most organisations do not know what they know. The technology to share information is there, but business drivers of knowledge sharing are still immature. Purchasing goods or paying people is relatively easy these days, but transforming data into intelligence is a business function that is much more complex, qualitative and requiring a high degree of sophisticated human thinking. The challenge is of information management, not of technology. The trust and drive for this must come from information owners and information users. Communications depend on co-operation, on compatibility through common standards. Without agreement on common language and terminology, even inter-personal, verbal inter- action cannot work, not to mention the intricacies resulting from the need to share resources such as a frequency spectrum or public networks. In increasingly complex humanitarian operations, such as Afghanistan and Central Asia, the success of such operations depends on the teamwork of many institutions. This, in turn, stems from a joint position concerning the environment in which communications in the service of humanitarian assistance take place. The effectiveness of crisis response operations is largely dependent on interoperability between organisations, processes, and technologies in the field. Interestingly it is highlighted the issue that there is plenty of information and the technology exists to transmit, but the central function lies in communication. Development of capabilities requires (1) harmonisation of requirements, (2) readiness to compromise and (3) active participation of all actors. Mechanisms to do this already exist in the military. As to civilian crisis management, mechanisms are in the process of being created. 31
  • 32. Annex 1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCESS PLANNING Preparation Appeasement Prevent EXECUTING Normalization crisis Reaction Rezolution
  • 33. Annex 2 Crisis management recurrent process Notice Analysis Anticipation PREPARATION ---------------------------- APPEASEMENT PREVENTION Alternatives NORMALIZATION CRISIS REACTION RESOLUTION Command and Organization Resources control 33
  • 34. Annex 3 NATO, EU and OSCE Compared NATO EU OSCE Legitimacy Controversial High High Military Very strong Potentially Weak power strong Other Weak Very strong Selectively power strong Security Hard Soft (+ hard) Soft function 34
  • 35. References 1. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics- trend and Transformations, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988, p. 407 2.Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, Dictionar de relatii internationale, Ed. Universal Dalsi, 2001 3. Jean- Louis Dufour- Crizele internationale : De la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999), Ed. Corint, Bucuresti, 2002 4. John Borawski- The OSCE: In Search of Cooperative Security, Security Dialogue, Vol.27(4), 1996 5. John Kriendler, Anticipating Crises, NATO Review, Winter 2002 6. Kelvin Ong, The UN, EU and Crisis Management, Paris, 19-20 OCTOBER 2000 7. Theodor Repciuc Situatiile de criza si gestionarea lor in noul context politic si strategic european. Orientari teoretice si operationale in doctrina militara de aparare a Romaniei, Revista Romana de Studii Internationale, Anul XXVII, Nr.1-2 (123-124), Ed. Academiei Romane, ianuarie-aprilie 1993. 8. Charter of the UN 9. Documentar privind sistemul national de gestionare a crizelor in Romania, Romania Crisis Mangement and Conflict Resolution Seminar, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 16-20 Nov. 1998, Bucharest 10. Romanian National Security Strategy Internet sites http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/files/handbook.pdf http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000p.htm http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/gac.htm#sd130502b http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm Dennis B. Roddy, Bush is playing 'chicken' not only with Saddam, but with the U.N. and allies, as well, The Post-Gazette, March 16, 2003 http://www.post-gazette.com/nation/20030316brinkmanship0316p3.asp