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Crisis Management and European Security

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  • 1. Crisis Management and European Security Prof. Dr. Heinz Gärtner Professor, Österreichsichen Institut fur Internationale Politik (OIIP), Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Austria heinz.gaertner@univie.ac.at Traditional security thinking dominated the dynamics of the Cold War. Reliance on military capabilities was the primary strategy adopted to achieve greater security. In the post-1989 world, and in particular post- 9/11, by far the largest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have shifted away from collective defense. Instead, crisis management became the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of the post-Cold War security system. As part of this reorientation of effort, NATO and the EU are exploring ways to develop cooperation in the fight against terrorism. – What is the benefit for the US in this process? It has become clear that while European governments will support the United States in crisis management operations, even if they take place out of NATO’s core area, such as in the Balkans, Afghanistan and under certain conditions even in Iraq, the episode over Turkey makes it obvious that Europeans may not be willing to follow Washington in every instance, especially where European interests are not clearly at stake. Javier Solana, the High Representative for Foreign Policy of the European Union, presented a European Security Strategy that was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The document asserts a need and role for the European Union in global security and in any actions, including military force, deemed necessary to achieve that security. It calls for member nations to increase their military abilities and share military resources. It explicitly includes preemptive action: Since the European Security Strategy does not explicitly require an authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for ‘preventive engagement’ it will become necessary to formulate preconditions for its application. They may include civilian measures, and in grave situations they may also include military action. But what is a grave situation? Where should we draw the line in determining when military 1 1
  • 2. prevention is indispensable? Who makes the decision to use force preventively? In 2004 the EU Heads of State failed to adopt the new European Constitution in 2005. The member states did, however, agree on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), with some adjustments. This document recognizes that the concept of security is very broad, and by nature indivisible. It is one that goes beyond the purely military aspects and covers not only the security of states but also the security of citizens. It gives the Union military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management. All these suggestions try to optimize existing capacities without introducing the new requirements. In many areas armed forces will move into new security approaches, however. Military capabilities more and more have to be organized and trained to project low-intensity power, keep the peace and assist to reconstruct societies after wars and violent conflict, provide humanitarian action, disaster relief. They are more and more is involved in disaster relief after natural catastrophes such as during the Indian Ocean tsunami, the hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005. Disaster assistance is about logistics - moving people, water, food, medical supplies and heavy equipment to save lives and communities. The distinctions between war and relief, between domestic and foreign deployments, are breaking down. In many areas like disaster relief and also counterinsurgency armed forces will move in soft security areas. The distinctions between war and relief, between domestic and foreign deployments, are breaking down. NATO’s Transformation Based on the assumption that alliances cannot survive without a clear and unifying threat, after the end of the East-West conflict some analysts predicted NATO’s imminent demise. No alliance in history has long survived the disappearance of its enemy. NATO did not expire, but it had to adapt and transform itself more and more, and along the way it effectively jettisoned collective defense as a core rationale for its existence. Since the end of the East-West conflict, NATO has undergone a significant transformation process, one that has been speeded up by the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. After 9/11, NATO was again at risk of becoming irrelevant in a world in which terrorism had become the principal strategic threat. Founded as a collective defense organization at the onset of the Cold War, NATO had to revise its strategic concepts to respond to a broader spectrum of the threats.1 NATO was going to lose or at least change radically its traditional role of as an instrument of collective defense. It has become clear that while European governments will support the United States in crisis management operations, even if they take place out of NATO’s core area, such as in the Balkans, Afghanistan and under certain conditions even in Iraq. 9/11 also had another impact: NATO became an organization with global reach. Not only Article 5 was transformed after 11 September, NATO’s role definitively became global and made the geographical restrictions of Article 6 of the Washington Treaty meaningless. The final document of the NATO-Prague 2002 meeting states that ‘in order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed ... to sustain operations over distance 1 How broad NATO's mission has become is shown by the fact that NATO will help with security during the 2004 Olympics in Greece. 2 2
  • 3. and time.’ NATO’s Secretary General2 concluded that ‘the “out-of-area” debate has been resolved once and for all.’ In Afghanistan, where NATO leads the international stabilization force, and in Iraq, where it will probably support the stabilization of post- Saddam Iraq, NATO not only acts ‘out-of-area’ but ‘out-of-continent’.3 NATO will not actually scrap Article 6, in the same way as it will not scrap Article 5. At the Prague Summit, the heads of governments approved the formation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) of around 20,000 troops to deal with the new threats of the 21st Century. A brigade (usually a military unit of about 5,000 troops) should be deployable wherever it is needed within 5 to 30 days. The new NATO Response Force is intended to be a coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package, technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable. It will not be a permanent or standing force. Rather its component units will be reconfigured as required to meet the needs of a specific operation. The NRF will be able to carry out certain missions on its own, or serve as part of a larger force to contribute to the full range of Alliance military operations. Within the framework of the Prague Capabilities Commitment, individual countries will have to commit themselves within pre-set deadlines to provide specific equipment and expertise. The NRF and the European Union’s Headline Goal Force are intended to be fully compatible and mutually reinforcing initiatives. NATO more and more is involved in disaster relief. In response to U.S. requests after hurricane Katrina NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) coordinated relief support in the form of food supplies.4 Following the earthquake on October 8 the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved an air operation to bring supplies from NATO and Partner countries to Pakistan for assistance in the relief effort. This decision follows a formal request for assistance by the Government of Pakistan. NATO nations have decided to put in place a strategic air bridge to Pakistan to move urgently required relief assets.5It marks the largest operation for the force, which has been used to help protect elections last year in Afghanistan, guard the Athens Olympics and coordinate an airlift of European aid to the United States after Hurricane Katrina. Not much changes for ESDP after the failed Constitution In 2004 the EU Heads of State failed to adopt the new European Constitution in 2005. The member states did, however, agree on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), with some adjustments. This document recognizes that the concept of security is very broad, and by nature indivisible. It is one that goes beyond the purely military aspects and covers not only the security of states but also the security of citizens. It gives the Union military options over and above the civil instruments of 2 G. Robertson, Europe's Transformation, Secretary General's Speech at the Conference of the Aspen Institute Berlin and the NATO Host Committee for the Prague Summit, Prague, 20 November 2002. 3 For the first time ever five NATO nations also held aerial war games with non-members, India and Japan, under an exercise codename Cooperative Copethunder in Alaska in July 2004. 4 A NATO liaison officer has also been dispatched to Washington to work with the US authorities, in particular the Federal Emergency Management Agency. - NATO Press Release (2005)106, 4 September 2005. 5 The Alliance deployed NATO Response Force (NRF) tactical airlift assets to help centralise relief supplies from donor nations to the AWACs airbase at Geilenkirchen in Germany. The SHAPE Air Movement Coordination Centre, in conjunction with the EADRCC, coordinated the movement of material and means to Pakistan using strategic airlift offered by nations and NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) training aircraft. Statement by the Secretary General on NATO Pakistan earthquake relief operation, October 11, 2005. 3 3
  • 4. crisis prevention and management. The ESDP will remain working with intergovernmental structures and without qualified majority. Decisions continue to be taken unanimously. An opt-out from a Member State does not prevent the EU from taking action, but rather means that ESDP activities will be more effective. The document contains specific provisions for implementing the ESPD, including future steps towards framing of a common Union defense policy. These steps could lead to a common defense, when the European Council, acting unanimously, decides it is in accordance with the member states’ respective constitutional requirements. The Constitution was not a prerequisite for further development of the ESDP. It is possible to build on the structures for crisis management, decision-making and planning.6 The changes are marginal: • The institutional structures (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, military Staff) had already been established before the referenda took place. • The tasks of the Union, which are the extended Petersberg missions, include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, and post-conflict stabilization. All of these tasks may also contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries (e.g. the US) in combating terrorism in their territories.7 • The Constitution envisaged that those member states whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and that have made more binding commitments in this area with a view to being able to undertake the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. This permanent structured cooperation will now not be implemented as foreseen. But the battle group concept might well replace the structured cooperation foreseen in the draft constitution. Building on a British-French proposal that member states should create rapid deployment forces or battle groups that, on behalf of the EU, could be sent on emergency missions, notably in Africa, by 2007 the EU should have the capacity to supply, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as combat formations, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to above (extended Petersberg Tasks). These capabilities could operate at either the national level or as a component of multinational force groups, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organization under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter (although not exclusively and necessarily, however). Such formations would be composed of up to 1500 troops, ready to be deployed for combat within a period of 5 to 15 days e.g. in jungle, desert and mountain operations. • A European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency will assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities has been set 6 Ulrich Petersohn/Sibylle Lang, The Future of ESDP in the Wake of the Negative Referenda, SWP Comments, German institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2005. 7 These are the so-called Petersberg Tasks that have been proposed by the Western European Union at the Petersberg in Germany in 1992. Subsequently, they were incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union. The draft constitution extended them by including disarmament efforts, conflict prevention, and terrorism. 4 4
  • 5. up already on the basis of the Treaty of Nice and has started to work. • A proposed Solidarity Clause is designed to help prevent terrorist threats. Should a Member State fall victim to a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, the other member states shall assist it at the request of its political authorities.8 The European Council already anticipated this solidarity clause contained in the Constitution in the joint declaration on 25 March 2004. • There was a clause on security commitments in the Constitution: If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with the self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain member states, however. The clause guaranteeing mutual assistance was not included because of any thorough analysis of the new challenges or threats. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, asymmetric conflicts, instability generated by failed states do not require mutual defense commitments, anyway. No military alliance can respond to these dangers. The true reason for this clause might be that it would be sensible to allow those member states who wished to intensify their cooperation, and in particular to define their defense identity within the framework of the Union rather than outside the Union, to go ahead and do so. For such a purpose the clause is not necessary. In all probability, that is why the United Kingdom, in spite of its strong commitment to NATO, accepted the provision, after previously strong resistance. But the UK also insisted that a second paragraph be added to the clause which reasserts obligations under NATO, which is to remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members: ‘Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO ….’ The neutral and non-aligned states, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria - have expressed reservations over this article, which establishes a mutual defense clause in the case that a member state is attacked. At their meeting in December 2003, the EU Head of States added that the measure concerning assistance in the case of an armed attack on EU land does not affect the individual nature of security and defense policies of certain member states.9 Nothing changes the character of ESDP, which is built on defense policy and crisis management without such a security commitment clause. Member states will10 harmonize the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specializing their defense means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics also without the Constitution – maybe even in a more flexible way. They also will take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces; this may possibly include reviewing their national decision- 8 On March 26 the Heads of State and Government adopted the clause independently of the constitution. This clause must not confused with a mutual defense commitment, since it applies to non-state terrorism and is also not part of the chapter of the ESDP. 9 This formula already is already included in the text of the constitution, but it is now repeated in this specific context. 10 Addendum to the presidency note, Conference of the representatives of the governments of the member states, Brussels, 9 December 2003, Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, established by Articles I-40(6) and III-213 of the Constitution, Article 2. 5 5
  • 6. making procedures. It might well be that efforts to achieve the Headline Goal will slow down under the new provisions, because military capabilities will not stretch to the soldiers and equipment needed within this framework. They could also lead to duplication within the EU itself. To avoid duplication, some states that want to do so could set up such battle groups, which would cover the upper end of the Petersberg Tasks, while other states concentrate more on the middle and lower part. The European Security Strategy Javier Solana, the High Representative for Foreign Policy of the European Union, presented a European Security Strategy11 that was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The document asserts a need and role for the European Union in global security and in any actions, including military force, deemed necessary to achieve that security. It calls for member nations to increase their military abilities and share military resources. It explicitly includes preemptive action: ‘Preventive engagement12 can avoid more serious problems in the future. … With the new threats the first line of defense will often be abroad.’ This also requires ‘early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.’ The battle group concept could meet these criteria and would therefore perfectly able to meet the requirement to act militarily preventively.13 The new strategy involves ‘both military and civilian capabilities.’ Since the European Security Strategy does not explicitly require an authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for ‘preventive engagement’ it will become necessary to formulate preconditions for its application. They may include civilian measures, and in grave situations they may also include military action. But what is a grave situation? Where should we draw the line in determining when military prevention is indispensable? Who makes the decision to use force preventively? One possibility could be applying the criteria of the just war, like just cause (if there is e.g. large-scale loss of life, large-scale ethnic cleansing, planned or acts of terror, actual or imminent), or right intention (to prevent terrorist attacks or human suffering). These criteria still leave open the question who is the competent authority to decide what is right or just. Joseph Nye has argued that ‘preemption that is legitimized by multilateral sanction is far less costly and sets a far less dangerous precedent than the United States asserting that it alone can act as judge, jury, and executioner.’14 On the one hand, Nye is correct that military prevention in particular should be based on a multilateral cooperation that is as broad as possible, to legitimize it and to avoid international isolation and criticism. 11 Version adopted by the European Council, Javier Solana, A Secure Europe In A Better World, December 2003. 12 After some Member States stated concerns about the expression ‘pre-emptive engagement’ it has been replaced by ‘preventive engagement’ in a revised draft. This is mainly a semantic solution, since there is no real difference between pre-emptive and preventive military engagement. 13 The British Defence White Paper to Parliament published Ministry of Defence in December 2003 already makes this connection clear: ‘So, as a result of the end of the Cold War new terrorist threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, our expeditionary stance will be the template for our future operations. We can no longer wait to defend ourselves against attack – it would be too late. We must take on our enemies before they can attack us, by denying terrorists safe havens, and by changing the economic and social environments in which terrorism can flourish.’ Quoted by Geoff Hoon, UK Secretary of State for Defence, Speech to the City Forum, London, Nov. 27, 2003, UK Ministry of Defence; issued Nov. 27, 2003. 14 J. S. Nye, Jr, ‘U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2003). 6 6
  • 7. The objection that there might be no time to negotiate in the UN Security Council, in NATO or the European Council what is just or right if a threat is imminent, is not convincing. The principle of self-defense in the UN-Charter applies perfectly to this situation. Reliable intelligence is critical here, however. Whether there is a threat and how imminent it is, is basically a question of good intelligence. However, even the best intelligence can turn out to be wrong, as was the case in Iraq. Using intelligence and risk assessment that are vague as the basis for preemptive war - and it is hard to say whether they are sketchy or not – can lead to wrong decisions about whether military prevention is justified or not. Given these uncertainties, a broad multilateral legitimacy is all the more indispensable and this is best provided by the United Nations. In addition, it is hard to imagine that the EU’s civilian and military preventive engagement will be used for regime change. It will rather serve as conflict prevention and preventive deployment, an approach that worked well, for example, when 800 NATO troops prevented the spread of the Balkan wars to Macedonia in the 1990’s. NATO-ESDP: Interblocking? An often-quoted example for interblocking institutions is the relationship between NATO and EU’s common security and defense policy (CFSP). Both have an overlapping area of activity. Both institutions and the capitals involved have an interest to keep the agenda alive. The result is both cooperation and competition of two international institutions. This assumption is incorporated in the idea or better call for “complementarity of European security institutions.” 15 There is the well-meaning request that “states need to cooperate more intensively not only within the organisations but also across the structures.” But also, there is evidence that NATO or the US within NATO tries to limit the development of an independent European Security and Defense Policy. The US National Security Strategy states that „America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge …“, what, of course, can be interpreted as a signal that the US is not willing to accept an equally strong Europe. NATO itself is anxious not to loose its status as the privileged collective defense organisation. Sometimes, the institutionalist phrase “interlocking institutions” has been paraphrased as “interblocking institutions.” Because of these alleged competition the European treaties and the draft constitution included a clause that “commitments and cooperation in this area (i.e. common security and defence policy) shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.” And the NATO Secretary of Defense does not become tired to stress NATO-EU complementarity: “But we need more than just discussions within NATO. Given the global nature of the security challenges we face, the Alliance also needs a more structured political dialogue with other international organisations, especially the United Nations and the European Union. It would be foolish and wasteful not to make the most of the synergies between these international organisations in the places where we so often work side-by-side. … We also need to strengthen the relationship, and the dialogue, with the European Union. And let me be frank there is plenty of room for improvement. … The NATO-EU agenda is artificially constrained for reasons, which can, and should be put behind us as 15 Towards Complementarity of European Security Institutions, Achieving Complementarity between NATO, EU, OSCE and the Council of Europe, Report of the Warsaw Reflection Group, January 31 – February 1, 2005. 7 7
  • 8. soon as possible. NATO and the European Union both work to build security and promote democracy and freedom. … And as the membership of our two organisations increasingly overlaps, I am convinced that closer cooperation will become inevitable.”16 At the same time when the final communiqué of the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Brussels on June 9, 2005, underlined the close cooperation between NATO and other international organizations, “in particular the European Union,”17 NATO and the EU could not agree on a common humanitarian mission in Dafur that has been requested by the African Union. France insisted on a EU led operation, the US did not want to their transport carriers under EU command. There is a technical and a political dimension. The technical level is the more easy part. NATO and EU are trying to harmonising the defense planning processes to, for example that a “single set of forces” can be committed to EU or NATO operations. That made it possible that both organisations are involved in the Balkans. To establish some political complementarity the North Atlantic Council and the EU Political and Security Committee started to meet regularly though the agendas are rather narrow. In 2005 the meetings have temporarily been suspended except for coordination of the EU operation Althea in Bosnia where NATO keeps liaison officers. There are attempts to support each other and to avoid duplication. Bosnia is a positive example of cooperation and division of labour between NATO and the EU. It provides the first significant use of Berlin Plus arrangements, which gives the EU access to NATO planning and assets. The decisive question is who takes the decision for certain operations, however. If it is the EU, NATO becomes a toolbox or force provider for either the US or the EU. Both parts have to agree, however. Is it NATO, the EU becomes even more dependent on the US. This is the background of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's remarks (read by defense minister Struck) at the security conference in Munich in January 2005 that the EU and not NATO is the primary forum for the transatlantic relations. Since then NATO tries to promote its political role. NATO and EU: A common command structure? In April 2003 France and Germany proposed the creation of a EU military command and planning structure, separate from that of NATO. The US expressed consternation about this proposal and stated its strong desire that the EU works within NATO. NATO’s European members have long been searching for ways to enable themselves to undertake military actions independently from the United States without dividing the Alliance and needlessly duplicating existing capabilities. France and Britain had already agreed in St. Maló in 1998 to allow European Union members to undertake autonomous operations ‘where NATO as a whole’ was not ‘engaged.’ To meet these requirements, however, the EU has to develop some independent capacities for the civil and military aspects of security at the lower to middle levels of intensity and for multilateral peace operations. This includes the need for an operational planning headquarters, a fundamental requirement if the EU is to carry out missions independent of NATO. So far, in the autonomous European interventions in the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire, neither the United States had any interest in joining nor 16 NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech at NATO Annual Conference, Brussels, 14 April 2005, Transforming NATO A Political and Military Challenge: NATO’s political and military transformation: Two sides of the same coin. 17 Final Communiqué, Meeting Of The North Atlantic Council In Defence Ministers Session, Brussels, 9 June 2005. 8 8
  • 9. was ‘NATO as a whole engaged.’ After some debate, the EU and NATO agreed in December 2003 to locate a EU planning cell at NATO’s military headquarters, rather than a new and separate ‘headquarters’ in Trevuren. This planning cell is used when the EU calls of NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations, in accordance with the Berlin plus agreement and to run crisis management operations when NATO is not involved. Some Europeans have complained that the US administration wants to reduce NATO to the role of a military toolbox for the United States to use as and when it desires.18 However, the Berlin plus mechanism allows the Europeans to do the exactly the same thing. The number of planners on the EU’s existing strategic planning nucleus will be increased and NATO liaison officers are to be stationed at the EU. These decisions acknowledge that Europe requires and has its own limited capability to conduct military operations. According to the agreement, the EU would first turn to NATO, then to member states' national headquarters to plan and run a EU military operation. In cases where NATO is not involved, operations will be planned and run by this new planning cell. ‘The Council (of EU foreign ministers) may decide, upon the advice of the Military Committee, to draw on the collective capacity of the EU military staff, in particular where a joint civil/military response is required and where no national Headquarters is identified,’ the text19 says. In other cases operations can be conducted by the command and control centers that several EU states already have. For example, in the case of Operation Artemis in Congo, the EU mission in cooperation with the so-called framework nation, France, acted under the authorization granted by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484, which called for a multinational interim emergency force in Bunya. The EU might also be sending troops to intervene in Sudan. Since NATO would still enjoy clear primacy, except where it is specifically transferred to wholly European auspices, the system - where only select technically more advanced and capable countries could go ahead in a common defense (structured cooperation) - does not hurt the Trans-Atlantic relationship. This arrangement, designed as a compromise among the three big European powers and the US, might turn out to be a complicated and bureaucratic system. To meet new challenges and threats, however, European forces need to be flexible, light and agile, and able to respond quickly to sudden changes. In the long run such a complex and ritualized system is not going to be appropriate if Europe is to react flexibly and rapidly adapt to changing events. To avoid unnecessary duplication it would be more efficient to build a common command structure of NATO and EU for crisis management. The EU’s and NATO’s crisis management activities will have to be increasingly harmonized and coordinated. The aim could be to have a common command structure. The common exercises that are already taking place are a good starting point. They allow the EU to use expensive NATO assets instead of duplicating them. As more exercises are to follow, standing arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the two organizations, mechanisms that can also be used in times of crisis, will be necessary. On an operational level, greater interoperability can progressively be achieved by synchronizing NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) and the EU’s European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). Ensuring consistency, transparency and the mutually reinforcing development of capability requirements 18 For example, German Defense Minister Peter Struck, Deutsche Welle German radio; issued Nov. 4, 2003. 19 Euro Active, Security & Defense, 16 December 2003. 9 9
  • 10. common to the two organizations is already the main objective of the NATO-EU Capability Group. It hopefully will foster mutual reinforcement between the NATO Response Force and the EU's new battle groups. Both are likely to adopt a preventive strategy to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Taking into account limited defense budgets, NATO and EU members will not be able to maintain two separate Rapid Reaction Forces. NRF and EU battle groups will most likely consist of the same troops, merely wearing different hats. An important step towards better EU-NATO cooperation are meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the European Union, which are taking place already. There already is an almost identical analysis of the threats and challenges by NATO and EU. Combating terrorism, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil emergency planning, building new military capabilities are just some of the areas where they have in principle common interests and goals and also considerable expertise. Given the political and budgetary constraints that European capitals face in increasing their defense budgets, there is no shortage of suggestions to address existing shortfalls is through a greater degree of defense integration – that is, coordinating the efforts of individual European countries, the European Union and NATO to meet Europe’s future defense needs.20 The problem with this approach is, however, that since the end of the Cold War the strategic perspectives of the US and Europe do not always overlap. For the US, the existential, overarching threat has shifted from the Soviet Union to terrorism, the Gulf, the Middle East and northeast Asia.21 For the Europeans these risks are important but less immediate and tangible. On the one hand, therefore, the US is more likely to use force in these conflicts than the Europeans. On the other hand, the US might not get involved in conflicts that are hardly existential but are essential for all or some Europeans, such as those in the Balkan or Africa. Therefore, the independent use of the command structure must be possible, whether in the framework of Berlin plus or without NATO involvement for the Europeans, and as ‘coalition of the willing’ for the US. The wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq clearly demonstrated that the overwhelming U.S. contribution is its war-fighting capability - in comparison with the limited European capability in this area. This gap in purely military capabilities between the U.S. and the rest of the world is huge and growing. EU and European NATO defense ministries are not even able to contemplate asking for resources reflected in the Pentagon’s budget request for fiscal 2005 of US$ 402 billion. In contrast, European NATO members spend less than the half this amount and even this smaller sum produces war-fighting capacities that are disproportionately lower. Ironically, US requests for higher defense spending by the Europeans would inevitably lead to duplication of efforts and capabilities. And why should the Europeans catch up with the Americans? There is no arms race between Europe and the U.S. and there are no direct threats to the EU territory. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting alone. European 20 Klaus Naumann General (Former Chief of Defense, Germany & Former Chairman, NATO Military Committee)/ Joseph Ralston (Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Former & Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe), European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities, (CSIS-Report), Lead Investigators Michele A. Flournoy/Julianne Smith, 4. 21 J. Thomson, ‘US Interests and the Fate of the Alliance’, Survival, vol. 45, no. 4, (Winter 2003-04), 207-220. 10 10
  • 11. military capabilities are more tailored towards projecting low-intensity power, peacekeeping, humanitarian action, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction rather than the rapid deployment of large combat forces over long distances. EU members provide up to ten times more soldiers than the U.S. for policing and peacekeeping in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo and several countries in Africa, and European NATO nations have at all times contributed more than 90 per cent of ISAF’s troops in Afghanistan. There does need to be, however, some risk- and responsibility sharing. There should not be a clear-cut division of labor, where the Europeans do the peace and the Americans do the war. The U.S. forces should not be reduced to war fighting alone, but need also to be capable of carrying out humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping operations. Such a qualified division of labor only means that the Europeans concentrate more on the smaller-scale operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, but there should be some European contribution in crises where higher intensity enforcement capabilities are required (as the battle group concept proposes). A new Approach for the Armed Forces A CSIS-Report22 suggests four key defense integration strategies: Developing more compatible visions of Europe’s future defense needs and the military doctrines and capabilities required meeting them. Cooperative research, development and procurement of priority military capabilities Pooling of national capabilities to train, support and field national and multinational units. Specialization by some countries in niche capability areas that make high-value contributions to collective security. All these suggestions try to optimize existing capacities without introducing the new requirements. In many areas armed forces will move into new security approaches, however. First, military capabilities more and more have to be organized and trained to project low-intensity power, keep the peace and assist to reconstruct societies after wars and violent conflict, provide humanitarian action, disaster relief. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting alone. Military capabilities are more tailored towards projecting low-intensity power, peacekeeping, humanitarian action, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction rather than the rapid deployment of large combat forces over long distances. Military forces cannot be reduced to war fighting alone, but need also to be capable of carrying out humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping operations. Militaries should give up its unwillingness to contribute troops for ‘constabulary’ duties, peacekeeping, and nation building.23 The wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan have 22 European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities, (CSIS-Report), Lead Investigators Michele A. Flournoy/Julianne Smith. 23 James Dobbins in his Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (September 18, 2003), rightly criticises that, as to nation-building, ‘if there is any lesson to be learned from our “post- conflict” involvement in Iraq … , it is that we have failed to adequately learn the lessons from previous such experiences. … [W]e have not institutionalized that knowledge; we have not integrated it into our doctrine, our training, and our planning for future operations. Neither have we regarded people with experience in this field as a national asset, to be retained, rewarded for good service, trained further and 11 11
  • 12. shown that for high-intensity war with advanced combat technology ultimately is not sufficient. For post-conflict reconstruction, peacekeeping and state-building and lower intensity capabilities, special equipped and trained armed and police forces are necessary - a chastening lesson U.S. troops24 learned during the occupation in Iraq.25 The U.S. is already changing its attitude towards post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. Based on its experiences in Iraq, the U.S. has brought in more mobile and less obtrusive units, staffed by soldiers with some knowledge of the local language and customs based on undergoing ‘cultural sensitive training’, to replace heavy armored units. 26 Two approaches provide different answers to the nation-building tasks. The realists focus on stability and disregard liberal values. Realists put security first of what for them the core function of a state is. The ‘Hobbesian’ problem of establishing effective institutions that can provide security and stability is what matters in a failed state. For them democratization is not a solution to dysfunctional states. Democracy is a good thing in itself, but it can only work where there is a functioning state. State building comes first. For liberals values such as human rights, democracy and market economy remain core concerns. And as the nation-builders, liberals are “led by a strategic and moral obligation to intervene on behalf of beleaguered citizens. Their main objective is to bring about a world in which the efficient and well-governed export stability and liberty.”27 Second, military forces are more and more is involved in disaster relief after natural catastrophes such as during the Indian Ocean tsunami, the hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005. Disaster assistance is about logistics - moving people, water, food, medical supplies and heavy equipment to save lives and communities. The distinctions between war and relief, between domestic and foreign deployments, are breaking down. Third, this distinction is also true for counterinsurgency. Andrew F. Krepinevich28 calls for a new counterinsurgency strategy. His core insight is that you can't win a war like this by going off on search and destroy missions trying to kill insurgents. There are always more enemy fighters waiting, however. Instead of trying to kill insurgents, Krepinevich argues, it's more important to protect civilians and to set up safe havens where good security can be established. The size of safe havens can slowly be expanded until a town or city is secured with all the economic and political resources available. So, how can the armed forces become better at emergency? Most of the armies, especially those of the U.S. will continue to train primarily for combat. In addition, it will have to develop more niche capacities for missions like rescuing people from rubble and placed in positions from which they can be made available the next time such skills are called for.’ http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/DobbinsTestimony030923.pdf 24 This does not mean that U.S. troops are not capable of conducting non-combat tasks. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with specialized tactics, equipment, and training; foreign, language skills, and flexible unit deployment options, for example, are tailored to a wide range of tasks. Given their linguistic, cultural, and political training, SOF are well suited to both coordinate humanitarian assistance operations and perform combat search and rescue missions. - 2003 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress (http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2003/adr2003_toc.html) 25 See also A. Missiroli, Mind the gaps – Across the Atlantic and the Union, in: G. Lindstrom, Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003), pp. 77-90. 26 Interview with Col. Mike Formica, of the First Calvary, in New York Times, 10 February 2004. 27 Louise Andersen, International Engagement In Failed States: Choices And Trade-Offs, DIIS Working Paper no 2005/20 (Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark) 28 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., How to Win in Iraq, From Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005. 12 12
  • 13. floodwaters. Conclusion NATO’s strategic partnership with the European Union has been formalized in the Berlin Plus arrangements, which provides for ‘separable but not separate’ EU forces. These arrangements allowed the EU to mount its first military operation in Macedonia. Bosnia will be a next case for the application of Berlin plus. NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, calls it a ‘litmus test for the relationship between NATO and the EU’ and ‘litmus test for Berlin Plus agreement.’29 The Constitution was not a prerequisite for further development of the ESDP. It is possible to build on the structures for crisis management involving military and civilian means and the existing institutions. ESDP might even develop in a more flexible way. A qualified division of labor, one where Europe and the US, EU and NATO concentrate on capabilities where each has a comparative advantage seems to be a feasible concept. Other types of division of labor are emerging, too. One is geographical. For NATO, Afghanistan is ‘priority number one;’30 the European Union concentrates more and more on the Balkans Macedonia and Bosnia. While NATO, following in the wake of the United States is getting more and more involved in Iraq, the EU takes over missions in Africa. The other division is functional. An initiative for the ‘Greater Middle East’ provides that NATO would offer countries in the region new forms of military cooperation, including training for peacekeeping missions, border security and counter-terrorism, as well as reforms to encourage civilian control of the military - similar to the Partnership for Peace Program. The European Union, meanwhile, would expand its existing trade and development links along the Mediterranean periphery, with the goal of achieving free-trade arrangements by 2010.31 Despite the transatlantic differences, there is clearly a consensus among some of the EU member states and the U.S. on the need to develop more coordinated and where possible common force planning and strategies for ad-hoc coalitions of the willing, an approach that will allow such coalitions to have access to NATO and EU economic, military and human assets. The compatibility of NATO’s NRF and the EU’s structured cooperation and battle group concept could set an example. Taking this possibility of cooperation into consideration, it is short sighted when Americans still see structured cooperation as a potential seed for decoupling Europe and the United States. The concept is rather to link the NSS to NATO’s NRF and use both as a useful tool to fight terrorism – even preemptively. 29 J. de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, speech at the Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004. 30 J. de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, Speech at the National Defense University, Washington, 29 January 2004. 31 W. Drozdiak, ‘Looking For A Vision’, Newsweek (February 23, 2004). 13 13