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Civilo Sakaru plānošanas komitejas darbības pārskatu ...

  1. 1. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT -- CCPC COMPENDIUM from 7 November 2005 1. PURPOSE . 2. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 2.1. NATO’s Political Goals and Basic Tasks 2.2. Decision Making in NATO 2.3. NATO’s Strategic Concept 2.4. CEP Structure 2.5. CCPC Functions 3. ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST 3.1. Risks and Threats to Civil Communications 3.2. Critical Infrastructure 3.3. Information Society 3.4. Support For Crisis Response Operations (CROs) to be done 3.5. Weapons of Mass Destruction 3.6. CCPC-NC3O Relation to be done 4. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 4.1. Effect of Glob. and Lib. of Electronic COMS 4.2. Definitions . 4.3. Technology 4.3.1. Liberalization and Globalization 4.3.2. Cellular Systems 4.3.3. Satellites . 4.3.4. certs / internet 4.3.5. broadcasting 5. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION 6. NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CEP 7. GUIDANCE FOR THE CONT. AVAILABILITY OF CIVIL ELEC. COMS 7.1. General 7.2. Need for Coordination 7.3. Coordination in Emergency, Crisis and War 7.4. Measures to be Considered 7.5. Staffing and Management 7.6. Network and Services Planning 7.7. Electronic Coms Installations and Equipment 7.8. Support Services 7.9. Maintenance and Operations 7.10. Network Management NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 1
  2. 2. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7.11. Preferential Access 7.12. Restoration of International Transmission 7.13. Electronic Coms with Non-Alliance Nations 7.14. National Emergency Tel. Networks 7.15. Electronic Coms for Essential Users 7.16. Functions Supported by Electronic Coms 7.17. International Standards 8. POSTAL SERVICES 8.1. Introduction 8.2. Scope of Postal Services 8.3. Provision of Postal Services 9. TRAINING AND EXERCISE 9.1. Training 9.2. Exercises 9.3. Objective 9.4. Exercise Planning 10. DETAILED INFORMATION ON CCPC CRISIS MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND POSTAL MATTERS 10.1. Introduction 10.2. Co-ordination 10.3. Article 5 and non-article 5 crisis arrangements 10.4. Peacetime arrangements 10.5. CCPC responsibilities in time of crisis 10.6. Use of civil experts 10.7. Nominations of experts 10.8. Electronic Communications Liaison Officers (ECLO) 10.9. Postal Services Liaison Officers (PSLO) 10.10. The Tampere Convention . 11. ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS 12. LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS to be done 13. CCPC TOR’s to be done 1. PURPOSE 1.1. The purpose of this Compendium is to assist NATO HQ bodies, member nations, and EAPC nations coordinate and harmonize the continued availability of communications during peacetime, crisis, and emergencies by providing designated NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 2
  3. 3. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED industrial experts and civil emergency planners at national and international levels with appropriate documentation and guidance for the planning and implementation of measures and arrangements needed for such circumstances. 2. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 2.1. NATO’s Political Goals and Basic Tasks 2.1.1. The North Atlantic Alliance embodies the transatlantic partnership between the European members of NATO and the United States and Canada, designed to bring about peace and stability throughout Europe. The objectives of the Partnership between the European and North American members of the Alliance are primarily political, underpinned by a shared defence planning and military co-operation and by co-operation and consultation in the economic, scientific, environmental and other relevant fields. Through the years of the Cold War, however, NATO focused above all on the development and maintenance of collective defence and on overcoming the fundamental political issues dividing Europe. Today its focus has expanded to include promoting stability throughout Europe as well as outside traditional NATO boundaries through co-operation and by developing the means for collective crisis management and for operations in response to crisis situations. 2.1.2. NATO is an Alliance based on political and military co-operation among independent member nations, established in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. As stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, Alliance members are committed to safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. 2.1.3. Article 4 of the Treaty provides for consultations among the Allies whenever any of them believes that their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened. NATO member states are committed to the defence of one another by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This stipulates that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all. Other missions, such as peace support operations, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief, are referred to as non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs). 2.2. Decision Making in NATO 2.2.1. NATO decisions are made on the basis of consensus, after discussion and consultation among the member nations. As a multinational, inter-governmental association of free and independent states, NATO has no supranational authority or policy-making function independent of its members. Decisions taken by NATO are therefore decisions taken by all its member countries. In the same manner, NATO can only implement a course of action if all the member countries are in agreement. 2.3. NATO’s Strategic Concept 2.3.1. The Strategic Concept adopted at the 1991 Rome Summit meeting combined a broad approach to security based on dialogue and co-operation with the maintenance of NATO’s collective defence capability. The Strategic Concept was notable for setting out the road map by which NATO would evolve in the future. There were three key areas of new emphasis: NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 3
  4. 4. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED • a broad approach to security, in which co-operation and dialogue would play a prominent part; • military capabilities, which would be reduced but restructured for crisis management missions, as well as for collective defence; and • the European Allies, who would assume a greater responsibility for their own security. 2.3.2. The Concept provided for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and introduced major changes in NATO’s integrated military forces, including: substantial reductions in their size and readiness; improvements in their mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different contingencies; increased use of multinational formation; the creation of a multinational Rapid Reaction Corps; and the adaptation of defence planning arrangements and procedures. 2.3.3. NATO’s military command structure was streamlined and the Alliance’s defence planning arrangements were adapted in order to take into account future requirements for crisis management and crisis response. 2.3.4. The direction set by the Strategic Concept was intensified by subsequent decisions. Partnership for Peace (PfP) created permanent mechanisms for close military co-operation. The concept of Combined Joint Task forces (CJTF) was introduced at the 1994 Brussels summit, designed to make NATO’s joint military assets available for wider operations by NATO nations. The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) has been undergoing development within NATO since 1996. 2.3.5. Following the Washington Summit of 1999, a new Strategic Concept was adopted, recognizing the changed strategic environment which faces NATO, and was published as Military Committee (MC) Document 400/2, MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy. The approach of this updated document is very direct in establishing the relationship between the Strategic Concept’s guidance and the missions of the Alliance military forces in supporting the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks as agreed in Washington. 2.4. CEP Structure 2.4.1 The aim of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO is to coordinate national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in collective support of Alliance strategic objectives. Civil Emergency Planning is a national responsibility and civil assets remain under national control at all times. 2.4.2 However, at the NATO level, national intentions and capabilities are harmonized to ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and that necessary assets are available. These assets include ships, aircraft, trains, medical facilities, communications, disaster response capabilities and other civil resources. 2.4.3 The main roles of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO reflect the fundamental security tasks of the Alliance and consist of civil support for the military under Article 5 and non-Article 5 crisis response operations, support for national authorities in civil emergencies and the protection of civilian populations. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 4
  5. 5. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 2.4.4 Beneath these very broad headings, Civil Emergency Planning has a role to play in managing the availability of civil assets and facilities and the maintenance of normal life during emergency situations such as war, crises and disasters. Increasingly, this work is carried out in close cooperation with Partner countries, who now play an active part in Civil Emergency Planning in NATO. 2.4.5 Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, renewed efforts have been made to assist member nations in protecting civilian populations against the consequences of attacks from chemical, biological and nuclear agents. 2.4.6 All of this is brought together by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC), which reports directly to the North Atlantic Council. The SCEPC meets at least twice a year in plenary session and eight times a year in Permanent session. The secretary General is Chairman of plenary sessions, but in practice these are chaired by the Assistant Secretary General for Security Investment, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning while Permanent sessions are chaired by the Director of Civil Emergency Planning. 2.4.7 Country representation at plenary level is drawn from heads of national Civil Emergency Planning organizations in capitals. At Permanent level, members of national delegations at NATO Headquarters normally attend but may be reinforced from capitals. Reflecting the deep involvement of Civil Emergency Planning in PfP activities, SCEPC's twice-yearly Plenary meetings are also held in EAPC format, with attendance open to all Partner nations, and Permanent meetings with Partners are held at least four times a year. 2.4.8 Under the direction of the SCEPC, a number of technical Planning Boards and Committees (PB&Cs) bring together national government and industry experts and military representatives to coordinate planning in several areas of civil activity, namely: • Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport (PBIST) • Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) • Civil Aviation Planning Committee (CAPC) • Food and Agriculture Planning Committee (FAPC) • Industrial Planning Committee (IPC) • Civil Communications Planning Committee (CCPC) • Civil Protection Committee (CPC) • Joint Medical Committee (JMC) 2.4.9 These bodies meet regularly and provide the vital link between NATO policy and the means to carry it out. They are supported in their work by smaller, flexible working groups or specialized technical committees. 2.4.10 Overall direction of Civil Emergency Planning, at NATO and national level, is by Foreign Ministers, who decide priorities. However, the very wide range of Civil Emergency Planning requires careful coordination in capitals of contributions from the many ministries and national agencies involved in Civil Emergency Planning today. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 5
  6. 6. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 2.4.11 As NATO adapted itself to the requirements of the changed security environment in Europe; it became clear that the role played by Civil Emergency Planning within the Alliance's overall strategic concept would also need to be examined. The principal tasks resulting from this review can be summarized as follows: • Supporting Alliance military operations under Article 5; • Supporting non-Article 5 crisis response operations; • Supporting national authorities in civil emergencies; • Supporting national authorities in the protection of their populations against the effects of weapons of mass destruction; and • Cooperation with Partners in the Civil Emergency Planning field. These priorities are reflected in the activities of the SCEPC and in the work program of its eight Planning Boards and committees. 2.5. CCPC Functions 2.5.1 The Civil Communications Planning Committee (CCPC) was established by the North Atlantic Council in 1957. It is one of the eight civil Planning Boards and Committees (PB&C). 2.5.2 CCPC is responsible for civil communication matters under NATO civil emergency arrangements. Civil communication planning provides for the maintenance of communication services for political, economic and military purposes; in this context the term "civil communications" is seen as all electronic public and non-public communications networks, services, associated facilities, postal services and any other related services. 2.5.3 CCPC is required to maintain a pool of civil experts prepared, in an evolving crisis and in the planning for military operations, to provide advice on the use of civil electronic communications and postal resources to the Council, the SCEPC (in NATO or EAPC format), NATO military Authorities (NMAs), nations or other appropriate bodies as agreed by the Council/SCEPC. There may also be a need for civil experts to support nations and international organizations in case of large-scale emergencies. 2.5.4 CCPC must keep under review the existing civil communications with a view to determining their suitability to meet the requirements of crisis and war and to make recommendations thereon as appropriate, taking into consideration new and emerging technologies, the role of international organizations in the civil communications fields and national legislation and arrangements. 2.5.5 CCPC must co-ordinate with the appropriate NATO electronic and postal communications bodies any civil communications plans or measure which, in the opinion of the CCPC and/or the above mentioned bodies, may influence military communications plans. 2.5.6 CCPC must review its activities with the aim of ensuring economic use of resources available to the Committee and avoiding duplication of the product of other international organizations. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 6
  7. 7. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 2.5.7 The CCPC is composed of senior members representing national electronic communications and postal authorities that are responsible in each NATO country for matter pertaining to civil communications. CCPC in Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) format is also represented by senior EAPC members representing their national electronic communications and postal authorities. CCPC and EAPC members can be accompanied by national experts. 2.5.8 CCPC, in which all nations are entitled to participate, will generally meet twice a year, as required. 2.5.9 CCPC must direct its efforts to the fulfillment of a two years work programme approved by the SCEPC and prepare every two years a progress report to the SCEPC on the attainment of the objectives. 2.5.10 CCPC and the Working Groups are supported by a CEP Staff Officer. 3. ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST 3.1. Risks and Threats to Civil Communications 3.1.1 Threats to communication networks can manifest themselves in numerous ways, but two broad categories are accidental and intentional. 3.1.2. Physical threats to communication networks include natural causes, accidents and intentional acts. Natural causes and accidents are by far the most common source of communications outages. Telecommunication cables are regularly damaged by construction activities, but the results of the outages are effectively managed. 3.1.3. Intentional acts are far less common, but could have the potential to be far more costly to repair, could have a greater impact on the network, and could be much more difficult to prevent. The trend towards the physical consolidation/co- location of telecommunication providers means that a single attack could have an even greater impact. 3.1.4. Electromagnetic attacks are designed to disrupt radio signals, or destroy or upset electronic systems and components. For the most part, telecommunications providers are continuing to migrate away from metallic cables and radio-based systems for backbone transmission in favour of electromagnetic resistant fibre optics. However, mobile networks and broadcasting are heavily reliant on radio signals that can be disrupted or jammed. 3.1.5. When using electromagnetic jamming, strong electromagnetic signals are directed towards or from radio-based transmitters overlapping the transmitted radio frequencies that can destroy the information being transmitted. Normally, jamming will not physically destroy the components. In order to jam modern public radio- based telecommunication systems e.g. cellular telephony, information about particular radio frequencies and modulation techniques employed is readily available and jamming is not very difficult. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7
  8. 8. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 3.1.6. Numerous studies have been conducted on the vulnerability of telecommunications equipment to electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMP can occur naturally as a consequence of lightning, and on a more limited basis by radio transmitters, non-solid state thermostats and power connections. It is also a by- product of a nuclear blast and this form of EMP can be extremely damaging to electronics. However, measures can be taken to protect critical systems against the effects of EMP. 3.1.7. High Power Microwaves (HPM) is a relatively new type of radiation weapon that uses modern radar technology to generate a very short and intense pulse similar to EMP. Although not widely documented, there is reason to believe that disruption or damage of electronic equipment without any protection can be accomplished up to a range of a few kilometres. HPM weapons, in contrast to EMP weapons, are relatively inexpensive and can be built from readily available technology. Protection against the effect of HPM may differ from that of EMP. 3.1.8. Cyber attacks are those directed at computer based functions that are used for example to operate the various network management control systems of a communication network. Cyber attackers take advantage of flaws in software used throughout a corporation to carry out a wide variety of actions, typically delivered in the form of viruses, worms, Trojans, back doors and distributed denial of service attacks. Hacker activities can range from simple defacement of Web pages, to theft of proprietary information, and disrupting the smooth operation of critical infrastructure assets. 3.1.9. The range of activities a hacker could conduct once inside a network is disturbing, in that essential systems, such as national emergency services could be significantly affected, law enforcement surveillance could be compromised and phone numbers re-routed. Additionally, the impact of such an attack could be dramatically increased if it were carried out in conjunction with a physical attack, or during a national crisis. 3.1.10. Another significant threat posed to telecommunication networks comes from the insider. The typical insider is a disgruntled employee (or agency support staff) who may have a number of reasons for causing damage to an employer’s network or providing critical information to others who would do harm to the network. The insider is able to carry out his or her actions from within more easily, because they would have fewer security features to bypass and may have an intimate knowledge of the specific systems attacked. The insider might be from foreign origin and could have a different point of view in a crisis. 3.1.11. Telecommunication networks are dimensioned to permit the maximum availability at an economically efficient level. During exceptional circumstance, congestion could arise locally or regionally whenever the number of calls made exceed the capacity of any part of the network or the capability of the receiving party to handle the calls received. 3.1.12. Damage to telecommunications infrastructure, whether intentional or unintentional, man-made or others, can result in diminished capacity to carry traffic. Many networks experience temporary difficulties under events such as “phone-ins” or unusual incidents such as large accidents, where the networks are offered far NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 8
  9. 9. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED more calls than the available capacity or where the call receiving ability is much lower. 3.1.13. Good business continuity practices such as building in network redundancy can mitigate the impacts of certain outages, although no amount of planning or preparation can completely eliminate all risks or threats. 3.2. Critical Infrastructure 3.2.1. Today’s society has become highly dependent on information and communication technology. In fact society can no longer function effectively without products and services based on information and communication technology. An emerging issue is that telecommunications infrastructures, until recently perceived to be independent from other sectors, are becoming entangled into network-of-networks, and are recognized having multiple interdependencies. Another issue is that the majority of services and business applications will be run outside the corporations and/or countries borders. Therefore, the dependability of some systems may be put beyond the direct control of who owns or operates them. Interdependencies among industry sectors are such that disturbances in one sector may have a cascading effect and could result in long-term consequences in other sectors. 3.2.2. A very large part of all services or products are dependent on a few amongst these products or services. It therefore can be argued that the more critical ones amongst the critical infrastructures should be given more attention when developing a strategy regarding the continuity of these few more critical infrastructures. This should be based on the determination of interdependencies between infrastructures 3.2.3. In order to associate the communications infrastructure interdependencies with other critical infrastructures it is necessary to identify those assets upon which society depends. Also, a varying degree of integration and interdependencies exists between the different functions and applications performed by critical infrastructures. 3.2.4. The key observations regarding critical infrastructures are: • Infrastructures, until recently perceived as independent, are now recognized as having multiple interdependencies. • The consequence of the interactions of critical infrastructures is that critical infrastructures are heavily dependent upon each other. These interactions are in general characterised by their evolving complexity and increasing exposure to risks. • Interdependencies between critical infrastructures are not bidirectional equal. This results to identification of a main few critical infrastructures upon which a very large number of services or products are dependent. • Direct and indirect interdependencies must be taken into account. For example, equipment is directly dependent on energy, but in its turn energy is dependent on fuel supply; hence equipment is indirectly dependent on fuel. This can also lead to an even longer chain of interdependencies. • Awareness of interdependencies is an important element in training and exercising in Civil Emergency Planning. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 9
  10. 10. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 3.2.5. It is recommended that civil communications emergency planners should consider and analyze the presence of sectoral interdependencies, develop specific intersectoral joint plans and implement appropriate national measures, including training and exercises. Also, from the NATO point of view it is recommended to ensure that the national point of view is consistent with the overall NATO CEP approach for the protection of critical infrastructures. 3.3. Information Society 3.3.1. The development of information society becomes dependable on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). This is recognized by many national and international parties; United Nations has also put development of information society on its agenda. The society on a global spectrum is already transforming into an information society and this sets new demands on civil emergency planning. 3.3.2. While a number of international organizations have proposed various definitions of Information Society, the one developed by the United Nations is considered quite appropriate here. 3.3.3. The United Nations common declarations are intended to promote equal development worldwide. It is recognized that development of the Information Society is vital to achieve this goal. Quoting the declaration of principles from the UN meeting on the information society in Geneva: “We, the representatives of the peoples of the world, assembled in Geneva from 10-12 December 2003 for the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, declare our common desire and commitment to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life, premised on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. 3.3.4. The information and telecommunications infrastructure is in the process of converging infrastructure and services. This conversion could result in less direct control with dependable systems that are vital in emergency situations. Another issue is that services and applications will be run beyond the direct control of those who own or operate them. Protective measures rely on a holistic approach and the ability to see that security only can be achieved when security is adopted on cross-sectoral activity. It is therefore necessary to approach the situation from different directions such as; awareness, preparedness, regulatory framework, capacity management and contingency planning. In context of CEP, the instruments to initiate the work are appropriate through regulations and to focus on the possible problems in the individual nations. CCPC adopt the following strategy: • CCPC should recognize that the development of the Information Society is a major transformation, where information-, service- and network-infrastructures are changing and converging and thereby bringing new risks into account. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 10
  11. 11. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED Therefore CCPC must immediately consider the inclusion of expertise in IP- network topology and services. • Civil emergency planners should be aware of the continuing and very rapid development of the Information Society. They should take account of the risks associated with this development, and consider how to make the necessary adjustments. CCPC must consider the views of the national authorities and participate in the development of a course of action for national authorities to assist in the mitigation of the risks associated with the emerging Information Society. • The CCPC point of view should be incorporated in the overall NATO approach to meet future demands for CEP. 3.4. Support For Crisis Response Operations (CROs) 3.4.1. NATO- CEP doc’s 3.4.2. CCPC doc – Support to PKO 3.5. Weapons of Mass Destruction 3.5.1 CCPC developed technical and policy documents to study the civil emergency planning (CEP) consequences of the use of existing and future weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on modern civil electronic communication with conclusions and recommendations. 3.5.2 Those studies include chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons of massive destruction (WMD) on modern civil electronic communications networks with conclusions and recommendations. 3.5.3 Telecommunication networks, facilities and services have always been first targeted in time of conventional wars and conflicts. The need for organized telecommunication networks and services during crisis and for the economic wellbeing of our modern society is recognized by terrorist groups. Terrorists would not hesitate to attack telecommunication critical infrastructures if they have a chance and if we are not enough vigilant to protect them. Other critical infrastructures like the postal system or public air/land /sea transportation systems may and were used as part of a CBR dissemination method. 3.5.4 A wide range of potentially deadly chemical and biological agents including various insecticides, industrial chemicals and potent toxins such as ricin may be relatively easy to produce or otherwise acquire. CBR agents are not specifically designed to impact the physical electronic communication or postal infrastructures. However, their use would have a direct impact on all employees including the critical one. The use of CBR agents may request quarantine of employees, equipment to be destroyed and building to be evacuated for indefinite period of time. 3.5.5 CBR agents and first response actions are complex. It is recommended to the electronic communication operator to provide a basic training session on CBR to security officers assumed to be the first on scene and to the emergency planner who will design a CBR response plan. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 11
  12. 12. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 3.5.6 The electromagnetic pulse caused by a high altitude nuclear explosion poses a serious threat to civil communications networks. Even if a high altitude nuclear explosion is not seen as an immediate threat, specific measures should be taken to provide adequate protection to national critical infrastructures as it would be difficult to introduce such measures retrospectively. 3.5.7 Electromagnetic pulse generation techniques and high power electromagnetic technology have matured to the point where portable and mobile weapons have become technically feasible and available. The technology is simple enough to be applied by almost any competent technical person intent on creating damage or disruption. 3.5.8 No single method will afford a quick and easy solution to protect postal or electronic communication assets from the effect of a CBRN weapon. 3.6. CCPC-NC3O Relation 4. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 4.1. Effect of Globalization and Liberalization of Electronic COMS 4.1.1. The electronic communications market is changing rapidly in its technology, in liberalization and globalization. Competition leads to a worldwide market driven electronic communications sector. The emergence of new services and competition broadens customer choice, encourages investment and reduces costs. Services are more powerful and more numerous and diversified. Equipment costs are decreasing and users have access to multi-functional, resilient electronic communications. 4.2. Definitions New definitions are indispensable in order to take into account the convergence phenomenon by bringing together under one single definition all electronic communications services and/or networks which are concerned with the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means (i.e. fixed, wireless, cable television, satellite networks). Thus, the transmission and broadcasting of radio and television programmes should be recognised as an electronic communication service and networks used for such transmission and broadcasting should likewise be recognised as electronic communications networks. Furthermore, it should be made clear that the new definition of electronic communications networks also covers fibre networks which enable third parties, using their own switching or routing equipment, to convey signals. The definition of electronic communications networks should also mean that Nations are not permitted to restrict the right of an operator to establish, extend and/or provide a cable network on the ground that such network could also be used for the transmission of radio and television programming. "Electronic communications network" means transmission systems and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit - and packet - switched, including NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 12
  13. 13. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, and electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed; "Public communications network" means an electronic communications network used wholly or mainly for the provision of public electronic communications services; "Electronic communications services" means a service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for broadcasting but exclude services providing or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services. "Publicly available electronic communications services" means electronic communications services available to the public; 4.3. Technology Flexibility and mobility in the use of NATO communications in crisis, emergency and war are ever more required by the Alliance New Strategic Concept. Cellular systems such as GSM or UMTS are, consequently, very important means to meet such requirements. UMTS, for example, will offer an integrated global roaming system able to handle voice, facsimile, data, video, and Internet access in pocketsize equipment and at a bit rate of up to 2 Mbps. 4.3.1. Liberalization and Globalization The technological evolution also brings about a change in regulatory environment. Whereas in earlier days individual monopolies were the usual way wherein the telecommunication business was constructed, today the differentiation of services, service providers, infrastructure providers, etc., requires a different regulatory approach. The circumstances that have brought about these changes are advances in technology which have reduced the cost and increased the funcionality of electronic communications networks and services, and an emerging consensus that competition is the most effective way to provide services. In particular, the development of optical fibre cables and the development of fully digital switching and transmission systems have reduced the cost and increased the funcionality of traditional electronic communications networks, while the development of radio and satellite technology has opened up the possibility of providing competing networks based on alternative technologies. World-wide liberalization and globalization are changing the electronic communications sector and as a result the need for world-wide co-operation in regulatory measures has been recognised. National authorities should review the provisions for being prepared to cause changes to be made where necessary periodicaly for civil emergency planners. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 13
  14. 14. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED Advances in technology have reduced cost and broadened the functionality of electronic communications networks and devices. In the long run, monopolies have proved not to be the most efficient way of providing new services to the costumers and the demand for liberalization has grown. The lessons learned from liberalization of telecommunications are that the introduction of competition tends to produce a world-wide market driven communications sector. It also promotes a faster development and emergence of new innovative services, broadens and customer choice, encourages investment and lowers costs. Electronic communications consumers are benefitting from increased quality, greater efficiency, widespread availability and low prices. Liberalization, however, raises issues concerning, among others, security and civil emergency planning aspects, which should be considered themes. Society is heavily dependent upon electronic communications and applications carried over electronic communications links. There is therefore an increasing concern with the integrity and security of networks. These become even more critical when defence and CEP needs are taken into consideration. Modern technology has opened up new possibilities for the overall availability of electronic communications, with competing vendors offering a wide range of services. CEP planners have an opportunity to take advantage of these developments to acquire multi-functional, resilient communications, given a supportive regulatory regime. Nations should consider in the context of these developments, further legislation or regulation to meet CEP requirements. Nations should continue to monitor the electronic communications sector in relation to globalization, liberalization, convergence, interconnection and interoperability. 4.3.2. Cellular Systems The rapid development of technology applied to the field of electronic communications makes it possible today to communicate almost everywhere in the world. The development and implementation of cellular radio systems allows subscribers who are on the move to use their personal mobile station to communicate between each other and with users connected with line-based Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). With the introduction on the market of the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), it has been possible to provide interoperability of systems between different operators internationally. Current technology can determine a mobile station within a few hundred meters, depending on mobile base station density. Recent developments in technology however are likely to permit localisation of a caller with increasing precision. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 14
  15. 15. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED Standardisation of the GSM technology internationally provided roaming between nations. Nations have seen the benefits of extending roaming capabilities between networks nationally as well. While this is currently possible in a number of nations, others are in the process of introducing this capability. Priority access can be achieved by using specially programmed SIM cards that enable “essential” people to obtain new connection to the overloaded network (without affecting calls in progress); by the use of pre-programmed analogue mobiles or by applying network management techniques. An additional vulnerability that is exceedingly hard to overcome is that of electronic attack, fraud and abuse. Communications security technologies, increased service reliability and network accessibility are areas in which commercial service providers should continue to focus time and expense to ensure availability for users. Wireless services, although of great impact in the field of emergency and crisis recovery, do demonstrate a vulnerability to physical damage from man-made and natural disasters. When available, cellular mobile communications augment emergency management effectiveness: a). By their immediate accessibility; b). Ease of use in communicating wide-area, nation-wide or world-wide; c). Services offered today are comparable to wireline services including voice, video and data applications; d). Reliability; The use of commercial wireless communications in different critical situations have provided important communications means in disaster recovery. The evolution of wireless technology with the use of transportable, rechargeable power supplies has shown how it has been possible to install and enhance mobile base stations quickly offering to both stricken population and emergency recovery teams all the necessary communications assistance. Recent events indicates a need for implementing priority access arrangements to ensure that the emergency management communications are available in crisis situations. 4.3.3. Satellites "Satellite earth station network" means a configuration of two or more earth stations which interwork by means of a satellite; In the Information Society, regulatory and trade barriers in electronic communications, including the satellite sector, constrain the difusion of new global services and applications. Removing these barriers will increase competition, improve the quality and range of services, lower prices to consumers and stimulate further research and development. National Regulatory Authorities, therefore, have a fundamental task to remove barriers to the benefit of their countries. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 15
  16. 16. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED There is already significant competition and liberalization taking place and rapid strides have been made towards a fully open satellite communications market. Nevertheless, some barriers remain. Nations shall ensure that any regulatory prohibition or restriction on the offer of space segment capacity to any authorised satellite earth station network operator are abolished, and shall authorise within their territory any space-segment supplier to verify that the satellite earth station network for use in connection with the space segment of the supplier in question is in conformity with the published conditions for access to such person's space segment capacity. Nations which are party to international conventions setting up international satellite organisations shall, where such conventions are not compatible with the competition rules, take all appropriate steps to eliminate such incompatibilities, as access to spectrum is increasingly used as a competitive tool. 4.3.4. certs / internet The Internet truly became a crucial infrastructure that supports communications, commercial and financial transactions, and public services to the citizens. There is a growing dependency of several agents of society as governments, schools, banks and general business in relation to the Internet. In this context, the protection of this infrastructure is becoming as important as other already considered critical, like the water and electricity supply, or telephone communication. Today, the technical level required to connect a system to the Internet, is far lower that the level required to administer securely that same system. While connection to the Internet is in most cases easy and cheap, finding a good systems administrator isn't, on most of the cases. Consequently, many systems aren't properly secured, are a danger to data integrity, and are being used to compromise other remote systems. The recent increase of identified vulnerabilities and corresponding exploitation, are a cause of large business financial loss, and user's low confidence on services available on the Internet. CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team), is a common name given to an entity that focus, exclusively, in supplying security services on computers and/or computer networks. Two fundamental characteristics of a CERT are that it supplies security incident handling, and has a clear authority and constituency. CERT may include the following aspects: - Offering technical support to computer users in resolving security incidents, advising on best-practices, analysing artefacts, and coordinating actions with the parties involved. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 16
  17. 17. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED - Gather and disseminate a set of information about vulnerabilities and recommendations, pertaining to potential security risks and ongoing malicious activities - Gather from accredited sources information related to security vulnerabilities, and act on the community with the goal of minimizing impact at the National level - Promote the creation of new CERT/CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) in the Nations, and raise awareness of security issues on computer users. 4.3.5. Broadcasting Radio and TV broadcasting is a kind of communication directed from the source to the listeners/viewers. Fundamental differences are determined by the frequencies of transmission and power of transmitters. a. The use of long-wave technology is mostly limited for navigation purposes, it is not too prevalent, and this is why it is not included in the scope of examination. However it can be stated that this technology is very similar to medium-wave technology, so results of analysis of medium-wave technology equipment, and recommendations can be applied to long wave stations as well. The long-wave broadcast stations transmit from 150 Khz to 285 Khz. b. Medium-wave technology constitutes a separate group for examination. It can be characterized by large size antenna towers, in some cases a fairly long feeder line between the transmitter and the antenna tower and in the case of older technology transmitters, a rather large transmission building, and an energy supply system that provides large electric power input. Naturally, size of more modern technology transmitter and support equipment is much less. • Naturally, the scope of this examination includes only non-mobile, high power, long distance transmission equipment serving broadcasting purposes. • In the broadcast industry, the medium-wave transmitters are also known as AM commercial broadcast transmitters from 535 Khz to 1705 Khz. c. Short wave technology is similar to medium-wave technology in many respects. Here the most significant difference is to be found in the antenna systems, because physical dimensions may vary to a great extent (dipole curtains). Buildings that house transmitters, antenna control units and other support equipment are greater compared to those of middle-wave stations. The input power can also be compared to that of middle-wave technology. The short- wave broadcast transmitters operate on different bands inside a range between 2300 Khz to 26100 Khz. d. The technologies and sites for FM radio and television transmitters in VHF and UHF frequency bands are examined together. This technology can be characterized by substantially lesser dimensions, and a higher level of integration. Usually there are more transmitters at one site, so more programs NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 17
  18. 18. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED can be transmitted at the same time. Their electric power requirement is much lower compared to the technologies described above. e. Satellite transmission technology provides the possibility of direct program broadcasting and distribution as well. The technology can be characterized by a satellite broadcasting up-link station and a satellite down-link receiving station— often on one site. Older equipment is placed in a larger transmission building, and uses larger satellite dishes. More modern equipment is characterized by up- link and down-link equipment installed in containers, and equipped with smaller sized satellite dishes. Their energy supply does not demand a high level of input. f. Cable broadcasting - Considering cable broadcasting is present in a considerable number of households, its role is addressed in the context of civil emergency planning. g. Digital Radio: The radio broadcast industry mainly uses analogue systems to carry programmes from their studios to the listeners. Due to the growing number of broadcasters and programme services, the frequency bands allocated to AM and FM radio in many regions of the world are full. The resulting congestion in the radio spectrum has led to a decline in reception quality and is a real constraint to further growth. Digital transmission technology can offer much improved coverage and availability. It is expected to replace analogue transmissions in many areas, but as digital systems are incompatible with current AM and FM broadcasting systems, new receivers will be needed. Ideally, to reach the widest range of listeners, a genuinely universal digital radio system should be capable of being transmitted via terrestrial, satellite and cable systems. Different technologies using different frequency bands are in development. One of the five roles for Civil Emergency Planning is the Support for national authorities in civil emergencies. The broadcasting sector can play a vital role in terms of communications in these circumstances, due to its popularity among people and the fact that almost everybody possesses a receiver device of some sort . In time of emergency, radio broadcasting is a proven means of alerting and the public generally expects to receive warning via their local or national radio stations. The public requires to be informed reliably and nearly immediately. Most populated areas are within the coverage area of several radio stations which have the potential to simultaneously reach a large number of people at home during the day, in the work place or in vehicles. Every emergency plan to protect the population and/or the national critical infrastructures that include public safety, emergency management, power and gas distribution, transportation, telephone networks, public works, etc. depend on public broadcast. However, there are several other means and ways to realize an emergency warning system too. 4.3.6. All of these technologies have significant benefits for electronic communications providers and users, including civil emergency planners. It is essential, however, that national authorities put processes in place, which allow for the periodic review of the provisions for CEP, being prepared to cause changes to be made where necessary. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 18
  19. 19. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 5. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ORGANISATION 5.1. The organisation of electronic communications has also undergone changes in most of the member nations of the Alliance. Formerly the whole of electronic communications regulation, infrastructure and service provision was the responsibility of a single government department, usually known as the PTT. Over the years there has been a separation of regulatory aspects in several countries from those of provision of networks and services. Regulatory affairs generally continue to be the responsibility of a government department - referred to in this document as the "National Regulatory Authority". 5.2. The provision of the electronic communication infrastructure and the services provided over the infrastructure may be carried out by separate entities. Any of these organisations can be owned by national governments or by private bodies, dependant upon the extent to which liberalization and privatization has been carried out. This document refers to those collectively responsible for the provision of electronic communications as "Electronic Communications Providers” (c.f. AC/121- WP/193(3rd Revise) of 29 November 1996). Where necessary to differentiate, those responsible for the provision of service without possessing infrastructure are referred to as "Service Providers". 5.3. Due to this dispersal of responsibility and expertise, special consideration needs to be given as to how best to focus the efforts of all the organisations involved on a common CEP strategy. 6. NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CEP The purpose of this paragraphs is to outline the impacts and opportunities the development of information society has on Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). It is useful to focus on four current trends relevant to the Information Society concept, i.e. globalisation, convergence, liberalisation and centralisation. 6.1. Globalisation As ICT becomes more accessible, industries have matched that growth and increased their multinational presence. Under normal circumstances, these companies reflect the needs of stockowners, national authorities and customers. Under some abnormal circumstances, the needs of the national authorities in a geographical area might be different. As more networks are being managed by fewer multinational companies, failures can cause serious disruption across several countries. Globalisation introduces challenges to CEP and the multinational community needs to identify the costs and benefits of any capabilities or enhancements. This border-less dependency reflects the need for a well co- ordinated and planned multinational approach to CEP. 6.2. Convergence Traditionally, separate networks have been used to provide voice, data and videoservices, each requiring separate access mechanisms. Convergence allows these different kinds of services to be transformed into packets and combined into a single mode of transport. Convergence also provides inter-working between existing networks such as PSTN, ISDN and GSM by means of gateways. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 19
  20. 20. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED In general convergence can be viewed as all IP (Internet Protocol) or packetbased integrated networks with a number of characteristics. Convergence does not only cover network characteristics but also service characteristics, which provide new opportunities to network operators, service providers, communications manufacturers and users. IP based networks also provide challenges to security and dependability. Convergence will need security mechanisms to protect services from attacks, such as denial of service and viruses, and hence to protect the sensitive information of customers from malicious activities. It must be recognized that the security features of the traditional networks and services might be lost in the converged environment. Policy makers and regulators need to continue to ensure that appropriate measures are being taken to protect the convergence of networks and services from disruptive shocks such as technical failure, physical or cyber attack or accidental damage. As an example, many telecommunications operators are in the process of transforming of ordinary PSTN to IP based telephone service (often referred to as VoIP). This migration will provide for example, what might be termed ‘nomadic’ access to the IP network. Users are not limited to connect at fixed locations but will have access to their service from any suitable point in the network. This makes it very difficult to regulate or set demands on the service provider. There is no practical experience of the availability of such access points in a crisis situation. These access systems also need an external power-supply to function, which could be another potential problem. The convergence also includes broadcasting and telecommunication services. 6.3. Liberalisation The liberalization of the electronic communications sector and the lowering of the barriers for entry to the market place, have resulted in a greater number of service providers. These service providers may not necessarily have a culture of security and emergency preparedness due to the added cost in a competitive arena. A good example of this is the transformation to Voice over IP (VoIP) telephones. Because VoIP uses the established IP network infrastructure, the VoIP service provider can provide the service from different locations in the world. Companies providing electronic communications services are being operated according to generally acceptable commercial criteria. In the context of CEP, it is vital to have a communications system that is reliable and available at any time. 6.4 Centralisation The liberalisation of the free market has accelerated the movement to increased centralisation. Increasing efficiencies through consolidation of organisations, equipment and staff could result in a single event with great global repercussions. It is important that emergency planners recognise the various impacts which centralisation can have. Societal, political, economical, technological, and cultural changes, have both the impact on and opportunities for CEP. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 20
  21. 21. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 6.4. Societal impacts and opportunities Civil Emergency Planning in the Information Society will be faced with elements of interest not envisioned two decades ago. Information once thought to be relevant only to national authorities has become critical to private individuals and business managers alike, impacting on the daily decisions of millions of people. Interruptions to that flow of data might well harm, not only the day-to-day operations of family life, but financial markets and transactions involving significant amounts of money. Civil emergency planners must now acknowledge the importance of maintaining the flow of information to a broader spectrum of users, which now must include residential communications users as well as business and national authorities. With such a diverse user base, emergency planners may well have to institute a system of priority restoration procedures. Within that community of critical communications systems users, one must consider the increased importance of the media outlets such as radio, television, newspapers, and other publication vehicles. 6.5. Political impacts and opportunities Privatisation of once governmental and monopoly owned communications sources has greatly increased the base of service providers, which can adversely affect the situation during a crisis. Emergency planners now must develop multiple paths of communications to retain and assure dependable communication connectivity at all times. Previously, a single provider could once provide a complete picture of the regional or national situation, that now requires multiple providers reporting on multiple services and technology. Traditional wireline carriers are now supplemented by wireless carriers and Internet providers. While the traditional providers may retain some of the former regulatory restraint and reporting requirements, the less traditional have less stringent, or no reporting requirements. Wireless providers, generally less constrained by government oversight, promote mobile communications as a social statement and standard. The wireless phone allows one to call in the case of a personal emergency and the ability to be contacted at anytime, but ignores the facts of cell congestion and lack of adequate signal strength when an emergency strikes. As an example, in the US, the wireless market is advocating total dependency on the mobile phone and the elimination of the residential wireline instrument. During the recent power failures in the US Northeast, many wireless users found themselves without any means of communications because of cell congestion and depleted battery backup for many of the cell towers. 6.6. Economical impacts and opportunities Economic impacts of the Information Society will have economic impacts on CEP. The wider spectrum of services will require a broader examination by the emergency planner. Every added element of protection and control will add to the planning budget. With the increased privatisation of the industry comes the need to balance expense with revenue. Who is to pay for the crisis preparedness efforts? Certainly the cost of protecting one’s stockholders should fall to the corporation, but what about protection of national security aspects of critical industry sectors, (e.g. the financial industry, which depends on the communications network)? The additional protection is for the good of all citizens of that nation; should they not share the costs, rather than only the stockholders of the communications company? While emergency planners should embrace the enhancements brought on by the Information Society, they should also engage with politicians to seek national compensation solutions, to ease the stockholder’s burden of costs. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 21
  22. 22. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 6.7. Technological impacts and opportunities Emergency planners, once eavily concerned with cable cuts and switch failures, must now be concerned with latency, software-code, viruses and other network operations. Not only is there more information, provided by more sources, but there are more platforms for providing the communications media. Increased use of the Internet Protocol (IP) demands revisions in oversight and analysis procedures of the emergency planner. Operations centres must consider greater bandwidth capacity. A Network Operations Centre (NOC) must now maintain human resources with specialised IP skills, as well as cutting-edge technology. Positive elements of these changes include the many automatic analysis processes and the effective reach of a single NOC to very large and distant services and networks. Among the analysis tools available to the civil emergency planner is the recent development of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). CERTs are generally comprised of highly skilled information technology specialists. The teams may be formed at the private sector level within corporations, or at varying levels of the Government oversight sector. Their role is to react to attacks or severe crisis situations within the internet protocol environment. Increased dependency on IP based services will soon demand attention from teams such as this to assure an acceptable standard of performance within the Information Society 6.8. Cultural and environmental impacts and opportunities Acknowledging the increased awareness and individual and business needs of the Information Society, the civil emergency planner must now be prepared to assist with information gathering during a crisis. The more aware public will now demand timely information on the event, frequent updates and a demonstration by national authorities that they have the situation in hand. Critical sectors, such as civil communications, will need to know the consequences of the event for their sectors. From the electrical sector, communications managers will need to know the availability of commercial power, and if geographical areas are safe to enter to facilitate repairs. Authorities responsible for public evacuation will need to know the availability of telephone services within a geographical area. The public sheltering in the area will need emergency communications facilities. Civil emergency planners should be prepared to work closely with the authorities to provide near-real time information updates to assist the public, emergency workers, and others. The Information Society will place greater demands, not only on the communications sector, but also on national authorities. The public’s thirst for information grows not only to encompass additional sources and types of data, but also increases as the severity of the crisis rises. During a period of crisis, industry sectors with critical infrastructures will require increased information relevant to the immediate situation. National authorities will need information to maintain public understanding, safety, and the provision of governmental assistance when required. The role of CEP is changing from analysis, mitigation and restoration, to providing information to national authorities. 7. GUIDANCE FOR THE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF CIVIL ELECTRONIC COMS 7.1. General NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 22
  23. 23. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7.1.1. It is imperative that NATO Member States regard their national and international electronic communication facilities as part of the overall defence capability of the Alliance, which includes Civil Preparedness. 7.1.2. This Chapter provides guidance to meet the civil electronic communications requirements of the Alliance. Some aspects of the guidance may also be appropriate to satisfy military requirements. 7.2. Need for Coordination 7.2.1. It is important that, in each nation, effective machinery is set up by means of which it is possible to introduce, and monitor the implementation of, appropriate measures in national electronic communication services, in order to achieve continued availability of communications internationally and nationally in emergency, crisis and war. To that end, the chosen national machinery should provide means of regular consultation, coordination and exchange of information among members of the Alliance. 7.2.2. Electronic communications Providers need to have advance information about defence requirements in order to fit in smoothly in the conduct of business (which is mostly commercial by nature) and to avoid delays and additional costs. This points to the necessity for a continuous process of consultation between Electronic communications Provider and their appropriate National Authorities. 7.2.3. There is a need for bi- and multilateral consultation between the appropriate national authorities and the electronic communications providers to ensure that NATO's CEP requirements are taken into account in the planning, implementation and continued operation of essential international services. No benefit will accrue for the achievement of NATO objectives for civil electronic communications in emergency, crisis and war, if compatible actions to maintain services are not introduced in all Member Nations. It is therefore desirable that Member Nations should exchange information on measures found to be most effective and convenient in enhancing the potential availability of their electronic communication networks and services in emergency, crisis and war. It is the Alliance’s ambition to share all of this information with the Partner Nations. 7.2.4. As the circumstances within individual nations differ so widely, it would not be appropriate for the CCPC to recommend any precise form of mechanism for consultation, coordination and the exchange of information. However, as an essential part of that mechanism, Nations are urged to actively participate in the planning and coordinating of the work carried out by the CCPC. In the event that it does not prove possible to resolve situations in bilateral discussions or to overcome shortcomings from the standpoint of electronic communications in emergency, crisis and war in the course of normal development of international systems, it is of vital importance that such issues are brought to the attention of the CCPC for information and possible coordination. 7.2.5. The results of studies in other international bodies (such as International Telecommunication Union (ITU), European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), Commission of European Post and Telecommunications (CEPT), European Union (EU), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), etc.) may be of importance to NATO as they may influence international electronic communication policies and may provide additional guidance on protective measures. The CCPC should therefore keep under review any relevant studies. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 23
  24. 24. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7.3. Coordination in Emergency, Crisis and War 7.3.1. In emergency, crisis and war electronic communication networks and services would have to cope with rapid changes in traffic patterns and with urgent needs to support defence activities. The extent of damage to networks may vary widely from country to country and within individual countries. In these circumstances the essential activities of electronic communication operators in establishing, maintaining and restoring international electronic communications cannot be achieved without proper coordination. From a stage of crisis, depending on national decisions, the electronic communications provider should make arrangements for transition to their planned wartime organization. These measures should include: 7.3.2. Bringing into service means of exchanging secure electronic communications on international coordination; and imposing security restrictions on usual peacetime channels (PSTN, telegraph and telephone engineering service lines) to prevent the divulgence of sensitive information concerning the location and extent of damage to networks. 7.3.3. Establishing contact with the appropriate national authorities responsible for decision making, when commercial facilities are becoming insufficient to meet all the CEP and defence requirements and priorities must be allocated. 7.3.4. Introducing arrangements for the exchange of incident reports (TELINCREPS) and situation reports (TELSITREPS) between national control centres. 7.3.5. Establishing contact with the appropriate national authorities responsible for decision making, when commercial facilities are becoming insufficient to meet all the CEP and defence requirements and priorities must be allocated. 7.3.6. Means of fallback emergency coordination may be required at a national or if necessary at a subordinate level in the event of catastrophic damage to public networks and when planned emergency coordination is no longer possible. This function could be assigned to the Electronic Communications Liaison Officer (ECLO) in each nation and the ECLO should be the initial point of contact. 7.4. Measures to be Considered 7.4.1. As part of their peacetime operations, Electronic Communication Providers have to respond to a wide variety of events, which affect their capacity to handle traffic and to provide services. Highly evolved and effective network management capabilities are essential for Electronic Communication Providers to control their networks and guarantee a quality of service to their customers including NATO. The manner in which Electronic Communication Providers operate during peacetime should be continued in an emergency, crisis or war situation as much as possible. However, Electronic Communication Providers must plan and prepare during peacetime for unforeseen circumstances which may occur as the crisis escalates. The paragraphs that follow outline several factors which need to be considered. 7.5. Staffing and Management NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 24
  25. 25. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7.5.1. Account should be taken of the possibility of appropriate available manpower being reduced by general national mobilisation and of the need to ensure through appropriate national action the availability of qualified electronic communication personnel. Appointed personnel must be instructed and trained, e.g. by taking part in exercises or training seminars. 7.5.2. Preparations should be made for: 7.5.3. Establishment of crisis management centres and/or war headquarters, including provision of adequate and secure means of electronic communications and of procedures for dealing with gradual or rapid transition to crisis and war functions. 7.5.4. Strengthening of the organisation and services in areas where increased activities are to be expected. 7.5.5. Reduction of activities deemed to be of lesser importance. 7.5.6. Establishment or strengthening of internal security and augmenting the personnel on duty to safeguard against sabotage, subversion, etc. 7.5.7. Identifying alternative facilities, stocks, production capacity and repair capabilities and making provision, where possible, for their use in times of emergency, crisis and war. 7.5.8. Informing and instructing the public about voluntary or mandatory constraints on their use of electronic communication services according to the actual situation. 7.6. Civil Electronic Communication Network and Services Planning 7.6.1. Civil electronic communication networks and services are critical infrastructures which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of our society. It is necessary that peacetime planning aims at the development of a network structure flexible enough to meet requirements in emergency, crisis and war and to limit the consequences of possible damage to a manageable deterioration in service. 7.6.2 In order to achieve the necessary degree of flexibility, consideration should be given to the following measures, bearing in mind the need for an adequate balance between defence requirements, technical feasibility and financial constraints: o Geographically separated routes should be established with each NATO and partner country. o Maximize diversity between cables (submarine, optical fibre, copper), microwave and satellite routes between countries. o Interconnection of important arteries should be established in such a manner as to bypass vulnerable points and to augment the flexibility of the networks. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 25
  26. 26. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7.6.3 In time of crisis, the normal electronic communications traffic will be required to carry additional traffic grow for essential purposes like food, raw materials, shipping, transports, etc. There should be sufficient capacity to accommodate this expected growth with another potential increase for defence traffic. Nations who already have a national or international preference scheme may decide to activate the essential network features they have for priority dial tone, priority call setup and exemption from restrictive management control. 7.6.4. Normal practice for network management centers is routing traffic over as many different routes as possible (with automatic overflow). This should enable vital traffic to be handled in the event of several of the routes breaking down. A well organized and continuous supervision of individual parts of the electronic communication networks, together with suitable reporting systems and well established common channels are essential for the continued operation of the networks in a crisis and war environment, as well as after a civil emergency. 7.7. Electronic Communication Installation and Equipment 7.7.1. To achieve the necessary degree of survivability, consideration should be given to the following measures, keeping in mind the need for an adequate balance between the Alliance requirements, the technical feasibility and the financial constraints. 7.7.2. To reduce the risk of service being severely affected by the destruction of one or more centres, national and international telecommunication switching and control centres should, when possible, be mutually supported. 7.7.3. Additional measures are required when telecommunication installations are identified as a critical infrastructure to assure a continuity of operation in case of natural or man-made disasters. Those additional measures may include as example; storage depots, workshop, physical protection, contingency plans, standby power generator with adequate fuel supply, etc. 7.7.4. National authorities should decide if a critical infrastructure, vital for its security, should be equipped with an Emission Control (EMCOM) protection system to minimize the risk of radio installation, within telecommunication networks, being used for direction finding, targeting, information gathering and sabotage. 7.8. Support Services 7.8.1. In the peacetime planning of support services full attention must be given to the increased demands that would be made on such services in times of emergency, crisis and war. In order to meet these requirements the following specific measures should be considered: 7.8.2. In the evaluation and procurement of electronic communications equipment, where other factors are equal, preference should be given to the equipment considered to be more resilient under wartime conditions. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 26
  27. 27. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7.8.3. Extra stocks of critical items of equipment should be procured and dispersed to suitable locations, where they can be made available for the rapid restoration of services. 7.8.4. Mobile and transportable equipment, including emergency power units, with full documentation, logistic support and trained personnel should be provided or augmented for temporary use following heavy damage. 7.8.5. An effective repair capability should be established, which meets the demands of emergency, crisis and war situations. 7.8.6. In order to enhance the capacity of the support services under crisis and war conditions, preparation should be made to use the alternative facilities, stocks, etc. 7.9. Maintenance and Operations 7.9.1. In time of emergency, crisis and war public electronic communication networks will have to cope with the rapid changes in traffic patterns and with the urgent needs to support Alliance activities. In war, even after heavy damage, conditions may vary within a country so that in some areas, services are totally disrupted while in others, they are capable of functioning normally. Under these circumstances the activities of civil electronic communication administrations lie primarily in ensuring the continued operation of their country's essential national and international electronic communication services in coordination with, where necessary, other administrations. 7.9.2. During normal times, increasing demand for international services has been met by advances in both technology and operational techniques and by the development of larger digital transmission and switching systems, along with common channel signalling, to provide the required capacity. This has resulted in an international electronic communication network that is highly interconnected and interactive. 7.10. Network Management 7.10.1. Within the context of this document, Network Management is defined as the set of activities required to monitor and maintain all network components in order to provide maximum utilisation of network services in all situations. Network management controls provide a means to regulate the flow of traffic in networks and their application should be based on network performance parameters, which indicate that action is required. 7.10.2. The key requirements of network management, within the context of network operations are: 7.10.3. Maximising the number of effectively handled calls by the coordination of all activities related to the utilisation and availability of networks. 7.10.4. A flexible network structure so that maximum advantage can be taken of facilities such as automatic re-routing, automatic route switching and dynamic traffic control. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 27
  28. 28. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7.10.5. Remote surveillance and control of switching and transmission systems to be aware of the state of the whole network at all times. 7.10.6. Real-time traffic control to minimise congestion and maximise the number of successful call completions. 7.10.7. Standby transmission network capacity with automatic protection. 7.10.8. Restoration plans and rapidly deployable equipment to replace damaged items or to provide supplementary capacity. 7.10.9. Computer support systems for on-line monitoring and control of network elements, and comprehensive information management and display the cause of the problem. 7.10.10. Pro-actively monitoring and maintaining direct customer network services and network interconnections with other licensed operators including international correspondents. 7.10.11. Network management controls and techniques will provide the network operators with commercial benefits in normal times but will be of critical importance in emergency, crisis and war for the continued operation of electronic communication services. Because of that important role, it should be a requirement on Network Operators that their Network Management Centres (NMCs) should be continuously manned and, preferably, should be housed in protected accommodation located away from vulnerable areas. Communications linking the NMCs to the network nodes should be highly survivable. NMCs should be duplicated or the functions should be capable of being performed on a regional or local level or in International Switching Centres (ISCs). 7.11. International Emergency Preference Scheme 7.11.1. When International Telecommunication Service is restricted due to damage, congestion, and/or other faults the IEPS allows authorised users to have access to the telephone service in public telecommunication service, whereby users can communicate directly and temporarily between themselves in conversational mode. 7.11.2. The primary goal of IEPS is to support crisis management arrangements. IEPS should significantly increase the ability of essential users to initiate and complete their communications (voice and data) via Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) and Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). 7.11.3. ITU-T Recommendation E.106 was prepared by ITU-T Study Group 2 (1997-2000) and was approved under World Telecommunication Standardisation Conference (WTSC) Resolution NO. 1 procedure on 13 March 2000. 7.11.4. IEPS allows authorised users to have access to the International Telephone Service as described in ITU Recommendation E.106. 7.11.5. IEPS is needed when there is an emergency or a crisis situation, which causes abnormal telecommunication requirements for governmental, military, civil NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 28
  29. 29. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED authorities and other essential users of public telecommunications networks such as Public Switched Telephony Network (PSTN). It allows authorised users to have access to the International Telephone Service while the service is restricted due to damage, congestion, and/or other faults. 7.11.6. Most nations have national preferences schemes to allow this essential internal traffic to flow. Therefore, it is important that to enable NATO/EAPC nations to support NATO during emergencies and crisis they establish interoperability principles necessary to allow international telecommunications of essential users. 7.11.7. A technical evolution in civil telecommunication is developing very fast, there is today a request to implement preference scheme in the Mobile Telephone Services and in the Internet Protocol Telephony (INPTEL) area. 7.12. Restoration of International Transmission 7.12.1. International transmission systems form the interconnections between the ISCs of the public switched electronic communication services and may be routed directly between two countries or transit third countries. Internationally established and coordinated plans and procedures have been agreed by the Electronic communications Providers to be applied in the restoration of any part of the normal transmission systems which have been lost due to failure or planned interruption. 7.12.2. In emergency, crisis and war the continued application of the restoration plans could be made difficult by the cumulative impact of damage to international transmission systems, since many planned restoration links could either be in use or out of action. It would be necessary to resort to "ad hoc" restoration arrangements using the best available surviving facilities. Consultation would be needed between civil electronic communication operators and between them and their national civil and military authorities. 7.12.3. The peacetime priority rules, which primarily take account of commercial considerations, may not be applicable in many situations in emergency, crisis and war. In a situation of heavy or cumulative damage the normal objective of complete restoration would not be achievable and available facilities would have to be allocated as directed by the appropriate national authorities. Nations should pursue the need to identify civil international leased circuits which are considered vital to the total defence of the Alliance and which are thus required to continue in service in emergency, crisis and war. 7.13. Electronic Coms with Non-Alliance Nations 7.13.1. In a crisis every effort must be made to ensure the continued use of international electronic communication services. Particularly, diplomatic and other vital electronic communications between Alliance members and between the Alliance and enemy, potential enemy, neutral governments and partners are essential for effective efforts to avoid crisis, and, where such efforts are unsuccessful, necessary towards the achievement of peace. However in times of emergency, crisis and war it may be necessary to introduce control measures so that appropriate action can be taken with regard to direct and indirect electronic communication routes between the Alliance and enemy, potential enemy, neutral countries and partners according to prevailing circumstances. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 29
  30. 30. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7.13.2. In this context, "control" means the regulation of circuits and the traffic carried by them; it does not relate to the contents of the information transferred. 7.13.3. Electronic communications Providers when directed by appropriate national authorities shall apply controls on both public and leased international electronic communications services. 7.13.4. Technical arrangements for control measures to be adopted by the Electronic communications Providers will need to be agreed upon among the NATO nations. These can be an extension of their normal peacetime network management functions previously described. 7.13.5. For international electronic communication services to be effectively controlled, it is important that all NATO nations activate their agreed control measures at the same time and in compliance with appropriate NATO measures. 7.14. National Emergency Electronic Communications Networks 7.14.1. There is a need for a communication facility, called a National Emergency Electronic Communications Network separated from public electronic communication services, for use by National Authorities in emergency, crisis or war. This facility is intended to be used at the administrative level, but should have interconnecting functions to the communication networks at the operational level. The facility can be implemented in several ways: as a physically dedicated communications network, as a functionality within existing public communications networks, or as a combination of those. It will have to support the need for electronic communication networks and services at all administrative levels -being local, regional or national- during an emergency situation, crisis or war. The National Emergency Electronic Communications Network will bring the most benefit if it is capable of supporting all levels of emergency and has a high level of preparedness and availability. The network should be resilient and capable of being deployed in both fixed and mobile locations. The equipment should be robust and simple to use and be fully interoperable with other emergency response service networks. When deciding on the national implementation of such national emergency network the decision making authority should make a thorough analysis of the exact needs for electronic communication networks and services in an emergency situation, crisis or war before deciding on the kind of implementation of a national emergency network. Subject to the adoption of an appropriate international signalling system and the possibility of a resultant good transmission performance, it is considered advantageous to internationally interconnect national emergency networks during peacetime or early in a crisis to enable appropriate vital users to communicate. The national authority should consider the possible need to enhance the national implemented facility to be able to carry the subsequent additional international traffic. 7.14.2.In order to use these interconnected national emergency networks for passing calls under wartime conditions arrangements must exist to ensure seamless continuous electronic communications. This implies diverse routing, multi-gateway NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 30
  31. 31. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED distribution of circuits, and, in addition, methods of system hardening could be considered. In view of the possible capacity limitations, specially when the national emergency network is implemented through public telecommunications networks, nations may wish to exercise some control over external calls coming into their national emergency network; semi-automatic operator service with the operator located in the receiving country would meet the requirements and provide additional assistance to the caller in successfully completing his call. Operators employed should be multilingual in addition to the mother tongue. 7.15. Electronic Coms for Essential Users 7.15.1. Civil electronic communication networks and services are part of the total electronic communications resources available to the NATO Alliance to be used in civil emergency, crisis and war. Effective operation of these civil networks and services for the benefit of essential users in emergency, crisis and war must be a mandatory responsibility of civil electronic communication network operators and service providers. National Authorities should ensure that network operators and service providers throughout the NATO Alliance are required to take this responsibility as part of their normal, commercial, peacetime planning. 7.15.2. In order to guide their civil electronic communication network operators and service providers in their planning, Nations should specify those functions whose essential operations in a civil emergency or in crisis and war would rely on civil electronic communications. A list of functions considered of relevance for NATO crisis management purposes, both civil and military, can be found below. The list is not in order of priority: the relative importance of the functions must be decided by Nations on the basis of the actual situation and on national circumstances. 7.15.3. In their planning to meet the emergency, crisis and wartime requirements of these functions for networks and services, civil electronic communication network operators and service providers should pay particular attention to the need for prompt provision of networks and services; and, to the extent practicable, for the restoration of those networks and services as quickly as possible after interruption, if appropriate in accordance with priorities decided by National Authorities. 7.16. Functions Supported by Electronic Coms 7.16.1. Functions (civil and military) reliant on civil electronic communications and of relevance for NATO crisis management: 7.16.2. Military purposes 7.16.3. Civil defence/"home defence" e.g. public warning systems 7.16.4. Diplomatic and other vital governmental purposes 7.16.5. State security purposes including customs and immigration 7.16.6. Emergency services by local authorities, including police, fire services, etc. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 31
  32. 32. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 7.16.7. Restoration of electronic communication services 7.16.8. Public utilities including energy, water supply etc. 7.16.9. Air and sea rescue 7.16.10. Vital industries sustaining the war effort (armaments, ammunition, electronics, chemicals, food, etc.) 7.16.11. National and international transport, such as: 7.16.12. Airports and air services (in particular the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN) and the Societé Internationale des Télécommunications Aéronautique (SITA) network) 7.16.13. Road services 7.16.14. Seaports and maritime services 7.16.15. Railway systems 7.16.16. Inland waterways 7.16.17. Meteorological services (in particular the meteorological electronic communications network) 7.16.18. Broadcasting and press services (radio, television, press agencies, etc.) 7.17. International Standards 7.17.1. Introduction A number of electronic communication related standards are published by many international and national bodies. These are increasingly used by electronic communication providers and the others. Electronic communications networks and information systems are nowadays an essential part of the daily lives of our citizen and are fundamental for the functioning of our societies. The convergence of telecommunications, media (broadcasting) and information technology sectors, and the implications for regulation towards the Information Society have led to a new regulatory framework for electronic communications. As a result of the development of information and communications technology there is an increasing globalisation in many sectors of our society. These development also has resulted in worldwide electronic communications networks and services across national boundaries. Electronic communications networks and information systems play a vital role in emergencies, the health services, the public administrations, defence, commerce and other economic activities. Without reliable and available electronic NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 32
  33. 33. NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED communications networks and information systems the functioning of emergency services and disaster relief operations are severely hampered or even not possible. Worldwide standardisation is a key issue in the development of telecommunications, broadcasting, information technology and the Information Society. Worldwide bodies: 7.17.2. International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Under the provisions of the Constitution and Convention (Geneva 1992) the mission of the ITU Telecommunications Standardisation Sector is to fulfil the purposes of the Union relating to telecommunications standardisation by studying technical, operational and tariff questions and adopting Recommendations on them with a view to standardising telecommunications on a worldwide basis. The ITU Radiocommunication Sector carries out similar activities related to the use of radiocommunications. Emergency telecommunications is another area where renewed efforts are required. The most relevant activities of the ITU regarding emergency telecommunications are addressed below. a. Radiocommunication objectives and requirements for Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR); b. ITU Workshop on Telecommunications for Disaster Relief 2002; c. Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunications Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations; d. ITU Handbook on Disaster Communications; e. ITU Partnership with Inmarsat to Provide Satellite Services for Disaster Management; f. ITU-R Recommendation M. 1637 on Global cross-border circulation of radiocommunications equipment in emergency and disaster relief situations; g. ITU Resolution 645 (WRC-2000/WRC-03) invites ITU-R to conduct studies for development of a Resolution concerning technical and operational bases for global cross-border circulation of radiocommunication equipment in emergency and disaster relief situations (Resolution now suppressed (WRC-03); h. ITU Resolution 644 Rev (WRC-2000) which urges administrations to take all practical steps to facilitate the rapid deployment and effective use of telecommunications resources for disaster mitigation and disaster relief operations by reducing and where possible removing regulatory barriers; i. ITU Resolution 36 (Marrakesh 2002) of the Plenipotentiary Conference urges member states to facilitate use of telecommunications for the safety and security of the personnel in humanitarian organisations; j. ITU Resolution PPDR2.1-1 (WRC-03) on Public Protection and Disaster Relief telecommunicaitons; k. Description of an International Emergency Preference Scheme (IEPS). 7.17.3. International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) sets world-wide standards for any subject not covered by a specialist agency. The International Electrotechnical Committee (IEC) sets world-wide standards in electrontechnical area. Both organisations co-operate in a Joint Technical Committee (JTC), which is the central NATO/EAPC UNCLASSIFIED 33