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  • 1. A330 SIMULATOR LOFT # 1 JULY-DECEMBER 2012FLT WX PERFORMANCESA MAD-HAV DIVERT LIS/OPO MAD: 280/12 4500M OVCST 500 ZFM 168.0 FUEL 64.7 CGZFM 30% 12/8 1003 LIS: 250/10 5000M OVCST 700 19/17 1017 OPO: VRBL 3 2000M HZ SCT CB 2500 16/12 1015 OVERWEIGHTLANDING OVERWEIGHT LDG ILS APPR. OVERWEIGHT LDG. ICING CONDITIONS APPROACH DIVERSION TO ALTERNATE? DIVERSION TO ENROUTE ALTERNATE? AIR DUAL BLEED FAULT SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE DUE TO SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS SMOKE DUE TO ELECRICAL SMOKE ENG BLEED 2 LEAK AT CRUISE ELECTRICAL SMOKE CONDUCTING TO ELEC CONDUCTING TO ELEC EMER CONFIG EMER CONFIG TCAS WITH TCASFAULT TCAS WITH TCAS VOICE VOICE NORMAL START FAULT AND T.O. VENT EXTRACT FAULT ON GROUND AFTER ENG. START. RESET AEVC PACK REGUL FAULT AT DISPATCH PACK REGUL FAULT AT DISPATCH MEL DISPATCH WITH ENGINE MEL CHECK CHECK BLEED AIR 1 U/S FLIGHT A FLIGHT B
  • 2. MANUAL FLIGHT TRAINING JULY/DECEMBER 2012LEMD/LEMD FL ZFM 150 FUEL32.0 ZFM CG 30% A/P OFF SESSION VISUAL TRAFFIC PATTERN LDG. RWY WET CROSS RAW DATA WIND LANDINGS ILS APROACH N-1 GO AROUND ON FINAL XWIND LANDINGS, STALLRECOVERY STALL RECOVERY PRACTICE IMMEDIATE VMC LDG. XWIND LANDINGS,UP TO XWIND GRADUALLY GRADUALLY HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW PRACTICE INMEDIATE VMC LDG. FOLLOWING ENG. FAIL UP TO XWIND LIMIT HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW FOLOWING ENG FAIL ON T.O ON T.O. LIMIT ALTITUDES ALTITUDES XWIND VISUAL LANDINGS REPOSITION IN FLIGHT ENG FLAMEOUT ENG FLAMEOUT WITHWITH (REPOSITION IN DOWNWIND FORCE FCTL ALTN LAW DAMAGE AFTER V1 DAMAGE AFTER V1 AFTER LDG.) (IR 1+3 FAULT , PFD’s & ND’S CONFIGURE) A B C
  • 3. A330 JAR-FCL 1240 CHECK JULY-DEC 2012 /CAE MOTOR RR-T772B/GE CF6-80E1FLT MAD-MAD WX LOAD SHEET & PERFORMANCESA&B T.O RVR 125M//LDG RVR 200/125/100 ZFM 150 ZFWCG 30% FUEL 30.0/ 60.0 (FLIGHTS C&D) T.O RWY 36L CONF 2 DRY ZERO WIND TOGA 1--/--/--C&D SID 280/12 G25 RA 4000M OVC800 CONF 2 DRY ZERO WIND F 1--/--/-- LDG RWY 33L/33R MS1/MS5 1022 RWY WET SMOKE CONTINUES SMOKE CONTINUES AFTER LANDING. PAX AFTER LANDING PAX. EVAC. EVAC A/P FAIL G/A VISUAL PATTERN CAT3A ILS APP MANUAL APPROACH TRAFFIC CONDITIONS AUTOLAND AND LANDING VOR DME APPROACH LOW GO AROUND RUNWAY CHANGE ACFT. TOUCHES RUNWAY CARGO SMOKE G/A CARGO SMOKE RTO CAT3 B3 B ILS CAT ILS APP APP AIRCRAFT UPSET SEVERE ICING CONDITIONS ENG FIRE IN FINAL APPROACH EXTING. FIRST AGENT (SEVERE WINDSHEAR) AUTO RELIGHT/ WING BLEED LEAK ENG RELIGHT INFLIGHT MEDIUM TO SEVERE LOW VIS. T.O, 125M RVR T.O LOV VIS SIDE STICK FAULT TURBULENCE ILS APPROACH SIDE ENG FAIL AT V2 STICK FAULT (PITCH FAULT) ENG. FIRE AT ROTATION (PITCH FAULT) AT AT ROTATION APU BLEED FAIL LOW VIS T.O. EXTING. FIRST AGENT -RESTORE- ROTATION FLIGHT A FLIGHT B FLIGHT C FLIGHT D
  • 4. FLIGHT TO SLCB DIVERTED FROM FL 180 , CLEARED TO VAREB PORKI ZFM 158 FUEL7.0SLVR APPROACH RWY 32 ZFM CG 30%SLCB Wx CALM 9999 OVCST 1500 ILS 4 Rwy 32/ DESCENT LIMA10/04 1026 VOR DME 3 Rwy 32 COCHABAMBA PROCEED BACK TO PORKI ENG FAIL AT G/A ENGINE FAIL AFTER G/A GO AROUND AT MDA (9400’) LANDING GO AROUND AT DA (9400’) ILS 4 Rwy 32 VOR DME 3 Rwy 32 VOR DME 3 Rwy 32
  • 5. BRIEF INST
  • 6. Siempre que tengamos que realizar un aterrizaje con un pesosuperior a nuestra MLM debemos realizar el procedimiento de“OVERWEIGHT LANDING”. (MLM 182t para GE – 180t para RR).Dicho procedimiento lo podremos encontrar en el QRH. ApartadoABN/EMER PROC sección MISCELLANEUS página 80.06
  • 7. La aeronave está certificada para aterrizar en automáticohasta el peso máximo al aterrizaje. (MLM 182t para GE – 180t para RR).De todas formas se han realizado vuelos de pruebasatisfactorios con pesos de hasta 229t. Por lo que estáaprobada para realizar aterrizajes automáticos hasta dichopeso.
  • 8. Configuración FULL es el calaje recomendado para optimizarlas performances al aterrizaje.Por lo tanto, siempre y cuando ECAM o algún abnormal nonos indique lo contrario seleccionaremos FULL.
  • 9. Si vamos a aterrizar con el flap en FULL antes debemoscomprobar que nuestro peso esté por debajo del peso máximopara go around con conf. 3.Para ello analizamos la tabla que se encuentra al final de laabnormal procedure.
  • 10. Esta tabla nos indica el peso máximo que es capaz de soportarun solo motor en caso de go around con conf. 3.En el caso de que nuestro peso sea superior deberemos realizarla aproximación con conf. 3.
  • 11. En caso de go around con overweight y nuestro calaje sea distinto aFull entonces pasaremos los flaps a 1+F.Veamos unos ejemplosAterrizaje con flap full (ej. Emergencia médica) … flap 3 en pull upAterrizaje con flap 3 (ej. Fallo de motor) ……….. flap 1+F en pull upAterrizaje con flap 2 (ej. Rudder Jam) ……………. flap 1+F en pull up
  • 12. Se recomienda apagar los packs o alimentarlos con el APU. Esto nos dará una potencia extra a la hora de tener que realizar un “go around”También se nos recomienda reducir la velocidad a VLS una veztengamos la toma asegurada, estemos sobre el umbral de pista yaterrizando en manual. En caso de aterrizaje automáticomantendremos VLS + 5.Intentaremos una toma lo más suave posible.
  • 13. Una vez realizada la toma emplearemos la máxima reversa y sies posible no aplicaremos los frenos a tope para poder disfrutarde toda la pista y evitar altas temperaturas de los mismos.Recordamos que podemos esperar una deflación de losneumáticos a temperaturas a partir de 800 grados. FIN INST
  • 14. Disponemos de información adicional para el overweight landing enel FCTM, apartado Abnormal Operations y en la secciónMiscellaneus. Página AO-090 4/5. VEAMOSLA CON UN POCO MÁS DE DETALLE.
  • 15. Debemos tener en cuenta que la decisión de realizar JETTISON escuestión del comandante. Es importante analizar la situación deemergencia, longitud de pista, condición de la aeronave etc.Nuestra función será comprobar que se estudian y analizan lasdistintas situaciones y que se toma la decisión correcta.
  • 16. Para pesos muy altos podemos tener problemas para ensuciar elavión, al poder estar la velocidad de green dot por encima de VFEpara CONF 1. En este caso seleccionaremos VFE NEXT – 5KT, peronunca por debajo de VLS, y una vez en esta velocidadseleccionamos CONF 1.Para poder sacar flap 2, es posible que tengamos un “flap relief”
  • 17. Sabemos que, si ECAM no nos dice lo contrario, la configuracióndeseada será CONF FULL. Siempre que empleemos estaconfiguración debemos comprobar la tabla que nos aparece en elQRH. Si nuestro peso está por encima del “maximum weight for goaround” debemos emplear CONF 3 para el aterrizaje.
  • 18. El approach climb gradient que nos ofrece el QRH comparado conel del FCOM puede variar dependiendo del QNH.
  • 19. Tabla para GO AROUND en CONF 3 que se nos presenta en el QRH.
  • 20. Tabla para GO AROUND en CONF 3 que se nos presenta en elFCOM.
  • 21. Los pesos de “Maximum Brake Energy” y de “Maximum TireSpeed”nunca serán limitativos para un overweight.Si la toma es superior a 360 ft/min es obligatorio reportarlo y sedeberá realizar una inspeccion de mantenimiento.
  • 22. Landing distances computation Presented by: Philippe TODINI Performance Programs Manager From normal to overweight landing
  • 23. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance softwareApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 24
  • 24. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance softwareApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 25
  • 25. Regulatory landing distances • For Airbus FBW aircraft, the Flight AIRBUS Manual makes a reference to the A318/A319/A320/A321 AIRCRAFT PEP-FM module for calculation of all FLIGHT MANUAL low speed performance, including landing distances •The first type of landing distance is the actual (or unfactored) landing distance•The actual landing distances (ALD) are certified on : dry and contaminated runway states for EASA regulation dry runway state for FAA regulationApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 26
  • 26. Regulatory landing distances• Furthermore, required landing distances (RLD) are provided by the PEP-FM module – The RLD is a factored landing distance, based on the ALD, used for dispatch of the aircraft – The factor depends on the runway state Dry ALD dry runway 67% RLD dry = ALD/ 0.6 Wet runway 15% RLD wet = 1.15 x RLD dry Conta ALD contaminated runway 15% RLD conta RLD conta = max of (ALD conta x 1.15 or RLD wet)April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 27
  • 27. Operational landing distances• The PEP-FM module has the capability to calculate other landing distances, for operational purposes only : – Landing distance with Autobrake – Landing distance with Autoland• These distances are not subject to approval from the Airworthiness Authorities, but are useful for the pilots •They are published in the FCOM and the QRHApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 28
  • 28. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance softwareApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 29
  • 29. Normal landing distance computation • The calculation assumptions are based on JAR/FAR 25.125 subpart BDistance measured between a point 50ft above the runway threshold,the aircraft being at a calibrated airspeed not lower than VLS, and the point where the aircraft comes to a complete stop V VLS V=0 50ft ALD April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 30
  • 30. Normal landing distance computation• Conditions of calculation (dry runway): – Standard temperature (ISA) – Correction factors on the wind (50% of headwind, 150% of tailwind) – Non excessive vertical speed (Vz < 480ft/min) – Level, smooth, hard-surfaced runway – Brakes application after main gear touchdown – Most adverse landing CG – No thrust reversers, but spoilers can be used when they are safe and reliableApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 31
  • 31. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance softwareApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 32
  • 32. Overweight landing distance computation• Reminder : An overweight landing is a landing at a weight higher than the maximum structural landing weight•A specific operating procedure is described in the FCOM•2 main elements differ from the standard landing procedureApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 33
  • 33. Overweight landing distance computation • These 2 elements have an effect on the landing distance Normal V VLS Brakes application Vz = 480 ft/min 50ft ΔTbraking (1s)Overweigh Brakes V VLSt application Vz = 240 ft/min Nosewheel 50ft touchdown April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 34
  • 34. Comparison normal/overweight landing Normal Overweight Vz 480 ft/min 240 ft/min Procedure Brakes After main gear After nose gear application touchdown touchdown Center of gravity Most forward Most forward at landing at takeoff Calculation assumptions Reversers None Available effectApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 35
  • 35. Overweight landing - Results • 2 types of overweight landing distances can be calculated with PEP-FM Actual Landing Distance – Same regulatory assumptions as for normal landing – Approved on dry runway only (without thrust reversers effect) Operational Landing Distance – Not approved, but provides results on wet and contaminated runway states (with thrust reversers effect if needed) Both can be combined with in-flight failure coefficientsApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 36
  • 36. Overweight landing - Results•Example of calculation (sea level), ALD function of weight A380-841/842 - landing distance 2500 2000 Actual Landing Distance [m] 1500 Δ ALD due to the overweight landing 1000 procedure 500 Normal procedure Overweight procedure 0 300000 350000 400000 450000 500000 550000 600000 Aircraft weight [kg]April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 37
  • 37. Content  Reminder on the different landing distances  Regulatory landing distances  Operational landing distances  Normal landing distance computation  Overweight landing distance computation  Impact on performance software  PEP  OISApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 38
  • 38. Impact on performance software - PEP• PEP – FM (Flight Manual) module – New option “Overweight landing” available in • Landing distance • Operational landing distanceApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 39
  • 39. Impact on performance software - PEP• PEP – FM (Flight Manual) module – New option “Overweight landing” available in • Landing distance • Operational landing distance•PEP – TLO (Takeoff and Landing Optimization) module New option “Overweight landing”Changes the available in constraint on the landing distance : – Point optimization ALD < LDA – Chart optimization (instead of RLD < LDA)April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 40
  • 40. Impact on performance software - OIS• OIS – Landing module – A landing weight above the MLW triggers the activation of the overweight modeApril 2007 Landing distances computation Page 41
  • 41. Conclusion• A new type of calculation is available in Airbus software : overweight landing distance•It takes into account a longer flare and a delayed braking action, which leads to longer landing distances•Certified on dry runway, operational results are available for the other runway states•Already available for A380 (in PEP and OIS), will be progressively extended to the other FBW aircraft (in PEP and LPC) April 2007 Landing distances computation Page 42
  • 42. Proprietary document.By taking delivery of this Presentation (hereafter “Presentation”), you accept on behalf of your company to comply with the following. No otherproperty rights are granted by the delivery of this Presentation than the right to read it, for the sole purpose of information. This Presentation, itscontent, illustrations and photos shall not be modified nor reproduced without prior written consent of Airbus S.A.S. This Presentation and thematerials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, or licensed to any third party subject to payment or not. This Presentation maycontain market-sensitive or other information that is correct at the time of going to press. This information involves a number of factors which couldchange over time, affecting the true public representation. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any information contained in this document orwith respect to the information described herein. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer or form part of any contract. They arebased on Airbus information and are expressed in good faith but no warranty or representation is given as to their accuracy. When additionalinformation is required, Airbus S.A.S can be contacted to provide further details. Airbus S.A.S shall assume no liability for any damage in connectionwith the use of this Presentation and the materials it contains, even if Airbus S.A.S has been advised of the likelihood of such damages. This licence isgoverned by French law and exclusive jurisdiction is given to the courts and tribunals of Toulouse (France) without prejudice to the right of Airbus tobring proceedings for infringement of copyright or any other intellectual property right in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
  • 43. El mayor problema que suelen tener las tripulaciones con el“overweight” es en el momento del pull up.Están acostumbrados a realizar el overweight con el fallo de motor,y rara vez con, por ejemplo, una incapacitación. Por lo que engeneral desconocen el sentido de la tabla “GO AROUND IN CONF3”.El briefing debería estar orientado hacia esto último y realizarejercicios en el simulador.También suelen olvidarse de seleccionar VLS con la tomaasegurada sobre el umbral de pista, así como quitar los packs oalimentarlos con el APU. FIN
  • 44. BRIEF INST SIM
  • 45. Recall on the Smoke Procedure “AVIONICS SMOKE” ECAM Crew (cockpit or cabin) perception Any other Smoke Alert without ECAM Alert ECAM warning SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE47
  • 46. Smoke Procedure Lay out SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE LAND ASAP •APPLY IMMEDIATELY : - VENT EXTRACT ......................................................... OVRD Immediate actions - CAB FANS ……………………………………………… OFF - GALLEY ....………….................................................... OFF - SIGNS ...................…………......................…................. ON - CKPT/CABIN COM …………………….…….. ESTABLISH - CREW OXY MASKS ………………….. ON/100%/EMERG • IF SMOKE SOURCE IMMEDIALTELY OBVIOUS ACCESSIBLE AND EXTINGUISHABLE: Diversion / Descent - FAULTY EQUIPMENT…………………..……ISOLATE • IF SMOKE SOURCE NOT IMMEDIALTELY ISOLATED: -DIVERSION ……………………………………..INITIATE -DESCENT (FL 100/MEA)……………………….INITIATE •At ANY TIME, of the procedure, if SMOKE/FUMES becomes the GREATEST THREAT : - SMOKE / FUMES REMOVAL ……………..CONSIDER “AT ANY TIME” items - ELEC EMER CONFIG…………...………….CONSIDER •At ANY TIME of the procedure, if situation becomes UNMANAGEABLE: - IMMEDIATE LANDING…………...………...CONSIDER •IF AIR COND SMOKE SUSPECTED : APU BLEED.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…………..OFF .. PACK 2…………………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………..……….OFF SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL………………………………………………………………………...……………….………CONSIDER SMOKE SOURCE IF CAB EQUIPMENT SMOKE SUSPECTED : EMER EXIT LT…………………………….………………………………………………………...………………………………………...….ON COMMERCIAL…………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………….OFF Research/Isolation SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL…………………………………………………..……………………...……………………….CONSIDER IF SMOKE SOURCE CANNOT BE DETERMINED AND STILL CONTINUES OR AVNCS:ELECTRICAL SMOKE SUSPECTED: AC BUS 1-1 + 1-2 can be shed as follows :  …. AC BUS 2-3 + 3-4 can be shed as follows :  …. Electrical Emergency TO SET ELEC EMER CONFIG : EMER ELEC PWR……………………………………………………………………………………...……………………..…………....MAN ON WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL : .. Configuration ELEC EMER CONFIG APPLY ECAM PROCEDURE WITHOUT PERFORMING THE GEN RESET. 54
  • 47. Smoke Procedure Lay Out Electrical Shedding If unsuccessfull: consider59 elec emer config
  • 48. “ELECTRICAL EMERGENCY CONFIGURATION SUMMARY”
  • 49. Los “SUMMARIES” siempre los realiza el PNF.
  • 50. Se inician cuando hemos terminado de realizar las ECAM ACTIONS y hemos leído completamente STATUS. OK. ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM SUMMARY PROCEDURE ACTIONS COMPLETED PF PNF
  • 51. Lo primero que necesitamos saber, es la distancia requerida a latoma. Para así poder elegir el aeropuerto alternativo más idóneo. PF PNF
  • 52. Por lo tanto el PNF se irá a la parte final del SUMMARY, y desde allí calculará la distancia que necesitamos. PF PNF
  • 53. Bien, ya sabemos la distancia requerida y podemos decidir a que aeropuerto proceder. Lo siguiente que necesitamos es saber lavelocidad de aproximación. Para ello el PNF la comprobará en la tabla de la parte de CRUISE del SUMMARY. PF PNF
  • 54. Ahora el PF ya tiene todos los datos que necesita para poderpreparar la aproximación. Por lo tanto, cede el control al PNF que en ese momento pasa a ser PF. Voy a preparar la aproximación. YOU HAVE I HAVE CONTROLS CONTROL AND AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS PF PNF
  • 55. Es en este momento, cuando el PNF le lee la parte de “CRUISE” del SUMMARY al PF. Para recordarle los puntos importantes que se deben tener en cuenta en crucero. PNF PF
  • 56. Una vez el PNF ha terminado de preparar la aproximación, nos dará el briefing. Será como siempre excepto, que nos leerá la parte de LANDING y GO AROUND del SUMMARY. PNF PF
  • 57. Ya está todo claro por lo que el PNF toma los mandos, pasando a ser PF OK. I HAVE CONTROLS YOU YOU HAVE CONTROLS AND HAVE COMMUNICATIONS I HAVE COMMUNICATIONS PNF PF
  • 58. Iniciamos el descenso como siempre. Al llegar a FL100 pedimos la“APPROACH CHECKLIST” normal. Cuando terminemos de realizar la APPROACH CHECKLIST, el PNF leerá y hará la parte de APPROACH del SUMMARY. PF PNF
  • 59. Durante la aproximación el PNF le recordará al PF que es lo quetendremos a la hora de la toma y que nos ocurre en caso de go around leyendo la parte correspondiente del SUMMARY. PF PNF
  • 60. FIN INST
  • 61. A320 Family – A330/A340 Operational Liaison Meeting 2008 Update on SMOKE procedure Review of enhancements on paper and ECAM procedures
  • 62. Introduction (1/2) – Main Enhancements• On Single Aisle aircraft: Removal of electrical shedding – Because in specific conditions, electrical shedding may lead to an unrecoverable normal electrical configuration for landing On Long Range aircraft: Enhancement of ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAMprocedure With future ECAM, display of a specific procedure taking into account the smoke detection when the flight crew sets the Elec Emer Config following smoke detection in avionic bay: - no generators reset - restore generators before landing - set generators to off when aircraft is stopped78
  • 63. Introduction (1/2)• Training is not significantly affected since: – The Smoke paper Procedure template and philosophy remain unchanged – Smoke Paper Procedure is not a memory item79
  • 64. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion80
  • 65. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion81
  • 66. Recall on the Smoke Procedure (SA/LR) “AVIONICS SMOKE” ECAM Crew (cockpit or cabin) perception other Smoke Any Alert without ECAM Alert ECAM warning SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE82
  • 67. Recall on the Smoke Procedure (SA/LR) SMOKE / FUMES / AVNCS SMOKE LAND ASAP •APPLY IMMEDIATELY : - VENT EXTRACT ......................................................... OVRD Immediate actions - CAB FANS ……………………………………………… OFF - GALLEY ....………….................................................... OFF - SIGNS ...................…………......................…................. ON - CKPT/CABIN COM …………………….…….. ESTABLISH - CREW OXY MASKS ………………….. ON/100%/EMERG • IF SMOKE SOURCE IMMEDIALTELY OBVIOUS ACCESSIBLE AND EXTINGUISHABLE: Diversion / Descent - FAULTY EQUIPMENT…………………..……ISOLATE • IF SMOKE SOURCE NOT IMMEDIALTELY ISOLATED: -DIVERSION ……………………………………..INITIATE -DESCENT (FL 100/MEA)……………………….INITIATE •At ANY TIME, of the procedure, if SMOKE/FUMES becomes the GREATEST THREAT : - SMOKE / FUMES REMOVAL ……………..CONSIDER “AT ANY TIME” items - ELEC EMER CONFIG…………...………….CONSIDER •At ANY TIME of the procedure, if situation becomes UNMANAGEABLE: - IMMEDIATE LANDING…………...………...CONSIDER •IF AIR COND SMOKE SUSPECTED : APU BLEED.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…………..OFF .. PACK 2…………………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………..……….OFF SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL………………………………………………………………………...……………….………CONSIDER SMOKE SOURCE IF CAB EQUIPMENT SMOKE SUSPECTED : EMER EXIT LT…………………………….………………………………………………………...………………………………………...….ON COMMERCIAL…………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………….OFF Research/Isolation SMOKE/TOXIC FUMES REMOVAL…………………………………………………..……………………...……………………….CONSIDER IF SMOKE SOURCE CANNOT BE DETERMINED AND STILL CONTINUES OR AVNCS:ELECTRICAL SMOKE SUSPECTED: AC BUS 1-1 + 1-2 can be shed as follows :  …. AC BUS 2-3 + 3-4 can be shed as follows :  …. Electrical Emergency TO SET ELEC EMER CONFIG : EMER ELEC PWR……………………………………………………………………………………...……………………..…………....MAN ON WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL : .. Configuration ELEC EMER CONFIG APPLY ECAM PROCEDURE WITHOUT PERFORMING THE GEN RESET. 83
  • 68. Recall on the Smoke Procedure (SA/LR) – SA example Electrical Shedding If unsuccessfull: consider84 elec emer config
  • 69. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion85
  • 70. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical If: Shedding on SA Electrical shedding procedure applied on both sides, and, At least one battery in charge during the shedding The electrical shedding leads to the permanent loss of DC 1, DC 2 and DC BAT bus bars  DC 1, DC 2 and DC BAT bus bars cannot be recovered for landing86
  • 71. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA• TR is MONitored thanks BAT 1 BAT 2to opposite DC bus bar TR2 MON TR1 MON TR 1 TR 2 If TR is inop and GEN 1 GEN 2 opposite DC bus bar is powered TR definitively lost IDG 1 IDG 2 87
  • 72. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 • BUS TIE to OFF • AC ESS FEED to ALTN TR 1 TR 2 GEN 1 GEN 2 IDG 1 IDG 2 88
  • 73. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 • BUS TIE to OFF • AC ESS FEED to ALTN • GEN 1 to OFF AC 1 bus bar inop TR 1 definitively lost TRESS DC 1 supplied by DC 2 TR 1 TR 2 GEN 1 GEN 2 OFF IDG 1 IDG 2 89
  • 74. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 • BUS TIE to OFF • AC ESS FEED to ALTN • GEN 1 to OFF AC 1 bus bar inop TR 1 definitively lost TRESS DC 1 supplied by DC 2 TR 1 TR 2 If smoke continues: • GEN 1 back to ON GEN 1 GEN 2 • AC ESS FEED to NORM IDG 1 IDG 2 90
  • 75. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 If BAT in charge before setting GEN 2 to OFF: • GEN 2 to OFF AC 2 bus bar inop TR 2 is inop DC1/2/BAT bus bars remain TR 1 TRESS TR 2 supplied by batteries during a confirmation time GEN 1 GEN 2 TR 2 monitoring is OFF available for a while (DC1 IDG 1 IDG 2 avail) leading to the lost of TR 2 91
  • 76. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 After the confirmation time, DC 1/2/BAT bus bars are no longer supplied by batteries, and TR 2 is definitively lost TR 1 TRESS TR 2 GEN 1 GEN 2 OFF IDG 1 IDG 2 92
  • 77. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SAElectrical Shedding Procedure: BAT 1 BAT 2 After the confirmation time, DC 1/2/BAT bus bars are no longer supplied by batteries, and TR 2 is definitively lost TR 1 TRESS TR 2 If smoke continues: - GEN 2 back to ON GEN 1 GEN 2 - Consider elec emer config  DC 1/2/BAT bus bars IDG 1 IDG 2 not recoverable for landing 93
  • 78. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA Analysis performed with Airbus Flight Test pilots, Training pilots, and Design Office Keeping or Removing the electrical shedding?  Balance between advantages and drawbacks…94
  • 79. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA Keeping the - In some cases, - Normal electricalelectrical shedding possibility to isolate configuration may be the smoke source unrecoverable for without setting elec landing emer config95
  • 80. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA Keeping the - In some cases, - Normal electricalelectrical shedding possibility to isolate configuration may be the smoke source unrecoverable for without setting elec landing emer config Removing the - Normal electrical - No possibility toelectrical shedding configuration always isolate the smoke recoverable for landing source while keeping a -Straight forward less degraded procedure configuration than elec emer config96
  • 81. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA It is preferable to keep the normal electrical configurationrecoverable for landing: FCOM/QRH updated since June 08.97
  • 82. Paper Procedure: Removal of Electrical Shedding on SA because: Electrical shedding is kept on Long Range aircraft • Normal electrical configuration always recoverable for landing (TR cannot be lost when applying the electrical shedding procedure). • More degraded configuration in Elec Emer Config than on A320 Family. •Mission profile is different (A340 vs A320)98
  • 83. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion99
  • 84. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements• On Single Aisle aircraft, with current FWC Std: – The ECAM displays 2 different ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM procedure depending on if smoke is detected or not in the avionic bay: Smoke NOT Detected: Smoke Detected: - No « avionic smoke » ECAM caution - The AVIONICS SMOKE ECAM caution is displayed displayed -The ECAM requests to reset generators -The ECAM does not request to reset (ELEC EMER CONFIG warning for main generators. It is relevant. generators loss case) – Disregard it - The ECAM requests to restore generators before L/G extension 100
  • 85. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements On Long Range aircraft, with current FWC Std:  When in Elec Emer Config following smoke in avionic bay (detected or not detected), the ECAM displays the same ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM procedure as in case of generators loss Smoke NOT Detected and Smoke Detected: -The ECAM requests to reset generators – Disregard it 101
  • 86. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure On Long Range aircraft, with future FWC Std T2/L11:  Single Aisle aircraft definition is reported on Long Range aircraft, and enhanced compared to Single Aisle aircraftSmoke NOT Detected: Smoke Detected:-The ECAM requests to reset generators – -The ECAM does not request to resetDisregard it generators. It is relevant - The ECAM requests to: - Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement) - Set ALL GEN to OFF WHEN A/C IS STOPPED (enhancement) 102
  • 87. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG ProcedureSmoke Detected: Enhancements-The ECAM does not request to reset generators 103
  • 88. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG ProcedureSmoke Detected: Enhancements-The ECAM does not request to reset generators- The ECAM requests to: - Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement)To minimize smoke reactivation:- Restore Gen 3 MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG(instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION) 104
  • 89. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG ProcedureSmoke Detected: Enhancements-The ECAM does not request to reset generators- The ECAM requests to: - Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement) - Set ALL GEN to OFF WHEN A/C IS STOPPED (enhancement)To minimize smoke reactivation:- Restore Gen 3 MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG(instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION)- WHEN A/C IS STOPPED, set ALL GEN toOFF 105
  • 90. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements On Long Range aircraft, with future FWC Std T2/L11:  Single Aisle aircraft definition is reported on Long Range aircraft, and enhanced compared to Single Aisle aircraftSmoke NOT Detected: Smoke Detected:-The ECAM requests to reset generators -The ECAM does not request to reset generators - The ECAM requests to: - Restore generators 3 MIN OR 2000 FT BEFORE LDG (enhancement) - Set ALL GEN to OFF WHEN A/C IS STOPPED (enhancement) To minimize smoke reactivation: - Restore Gen 3 MIN/2000FT BEFORE LDG (instead of BEFORE L/G EXTENSION) - WHEN A/C IS STOPPED, set ALL GEN to OFF 106
  • 91. ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements• Enhancements introduced on Long Range aircraft with FWC Standards T2/L11 are reported on Single Aisle aircraft with FWC Standard F5: Restore generators « 3 MIN OR 2000 FT AAL BEFORE LANDING » instead of « BEFORE L/G EXTENSION » Set all generators to OFF, WHEN A/C IS STOPPED 107
  • 92. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion108
  • 93. FCOM: Enhancement on Smoke Paper Procedure The 2 cases « Smoke detected » and « Smoke not detected » in avionicbay are clearly identified in the Smoke paper procedure:Smoke not detected:- Do not reset gen- Restore gen beforelanding (wordingfunction of FWC Std) 109
  • 94. FCOM: Enhancement on Smoke Paper Procedure The 2 cases « Smoke detected » and « Smoke not detected » in avionicbay are clearly identified in the Smoke paper procedure:Smoke not detected:- Do not reset gen- Restore gen beforelanding (wordingfunction of FWC Std)Smoke detected:- Apply ECAM 110
  • 95. Contents1 Introduction2 Recall on the Smoke Procedure3 Paper Procedure: Removal of the Electrical Shedding on SA4 ECAM: ELEC EMER CONFIG Procedure Enhancements5 FCOM: Enhancements on Smoke Paper Procedure6 Conclusion111
  • 96. Conclusion Electrical Shedding Single Removed: Aisle - To recover normal elec config for landing, -Straight forward procedure Long Kept because: Range - Normal elec config recoverable - More degraded config in Elec Emer Config, than on SA112 -LR mission profile
  • 97. Conclusion Electrical ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM Shedding Procedure, when smoke detected Removed: Enhancement (FWC F5):Single ECAM significantly enhanced, particularly on Long -Aisle - To recover normal - Restore generators 3MIN/2000FT Range aircraft for landing, elec config BEFORE LDG instead of BEFORE L/G - Straight forward EXTENSION procedure - Set all generators to OFF when - No significant impact on training (no memory item) aircraft is stoppedLong- Smoke Paper ProcedureNew specificand philosophy Kept because: template ELEC EMER CONFIG - Normal ECAM Procedure (FWC T2/L11): unchanged elec configRange recoverable - No generators reset - More degraded - Restore generators 3MIN/2000FT config in Elec Emer before landing Config, than on SA - Set all generators to OFF when -LR mission profile aircraft is stopped 113
  • 98. Antes de activar el “Smoke Generator” del simulador debemos avisar al personal demantenimiento para que inutilicen las alarmas y sistemas de emergencia.En la pantalla principal (MASTER INDEX) seleccionamos “SERVICES”
  • 99. Una vez aquí seleccionamos “SMOKE GENERATOR”. Comenzará a parpadear, en cuantotermine estará listo para ser utilizado. Tarda unos cinco minutos en estar listo.
  • 100. Una vez que tengamos listo el “smoke Generator” seleccionamos “MALFUNCTIONS”
  • 101. Dentro de “MALFUNCTIONS” nos vamos al apartado “ATA 26 FIRE PROTECTION / SMOKE”
  • 102. Aquí escogeremos la emergencia “Avionic Smoke”, y que termine en un “electricalemergency configuration” FIN
  • 103. BRIEF INST SIM
  • 104. TRAFFIC!!! TRAFFIC!!!TCAS I HAVE CONTROLS
  • 105. CLIMB!!! CLIMB NOW!!!AUTOPILOT OFF, FLIGHT MADRID AEA123 TCAS DIRECTORS OFF RESOLUTION
  • 106. CLEAR OF CONFLICTFLIGHT DIRECTORS ON, MADRID AEA123 FLXXX AUTOPILOT ON RESUME FIN
  • 107. OLM FBW 2006 Presented by Yves LEMELLE Director of A320/A330/A340 Operational Standards TCAS Recommendations
  • 108. BackgroundEach year, numerous reports reveal that mid-air collisions are avoided by a whisker.Air Traffic Controllers (on ground) strive to avoid such events.The onboard Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) was developed to prevent mid-air collision, particularly in case Air Traffic Controller guidance is incorrect. TCAS Recommendations 127 OLM FBW 2006
  • 109. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 128 OLM FBW 2006
  • 110. Background Resolution Advisory AP1• TCAS calculates two types of Resolution Advisories (RA): – Preventive Advisory ( “MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED – MONITOR”) • Red sector appears on V/S scale, the V/S needle is in the grey area. • The red square is displayed on the Navigation Display. • No pilot action on the sidestick (maintain the current vertical speed). TCAS Recommendations 129 OLM FBW 2006
  • 111. Background Resolution Advisory TCAS calculates two types of Resolution Advisories (RA):  Corrective Advisory: – The vertical speed needle is in the red area. – The red square is displayed on the Navigation Display  Follow aural warnings.  Follow vertical speed green sector on the PFD. TCAS Recommendations 130 OLM FBW 2006
  • 112. Background Resolution Advisory• Corrective Advisory (e.g. “DESCENT, DESCENT”): – TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model: – Assumes pilots reaction within 5 seconds and accelerates with 0.25g in climb or descent until +/-1500 ft/min is reached – V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict. Smoothly and firmly follow green sector within 5 seconds TCAS Recommendations 131 OLM FBW 2006
  • 113. Background Resolution Advisory• Corrective Advisory TAU TAU Vertical miss distance « DESCENT, DESCENT » CPA (Closest Point of Approach) Generally: – Deviation caused by a RA maneuver is between 300 and 500 ft – Vertical miss distance at the Closest Point of Approach is around 400 ft TCAS Recommendations 132 OLM FBW 2006
  • 114. Background Resolution Advisory• Corrective Advisory TAU TAU Relative altitude « DESCENT, DESCENT » CPA (Closest Point of Approach) Do not overreact Do not disregard a weakening RA It could create another conflict with another aircraft TCAS Recommendations 133 OLM FBW 2006
  • 115. Background Resolution Advisory Additional Corrective Advisory (E.g.: “INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT”)  TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:  Assumes pilots reaction within 2.5 seconds and accelerates with 0.35g in climb or descent until +/-2500 ft/min is reached  V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict. Firmly follow green sector within 2.5 seconds TCAS Recommendations 134 OLM FBW 2006
  • 116. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 135 OLM FBW 2006
  • 117. Review instruction opposite to RA …Event N° 1 : ATC avoiding of TCAS Events « CLIMB, CLIMB » RA FL 70 AIRCRAFT 1 « DESCEND, DESCEND » RA AIRCRAFT 2 « INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT » RA FL 50 AIRCRAFT 3 AIRCRAFT 2Simultaneous descend FL 60. vertical and horizontal crossing at less than 1 NM TCAS Recommendations 136 OLM FBW 2006
  • 118. Review of TCAS Events …FCOM 3.04.34TCAS Recommendations 137 OLM FBW 2006
  • 119. Review of of “Adjust Vertical Speed” RAEvent N°2 : Misinterpretation TCAS Events … « CLIMB, CLIMB » RA FL 270 AIRCRAFT 2 AIRCRAFT 1« ADJUST VERTICALSPEED, FL 260ADJUST » RA Minimum crossing margin: 300 feet, 0.8 NM TCAS Recommendations 138 OLM FBW 2006
  • 120. Review of TCAS Events …FCOM 1.34.80TCAS Recommendations 139 OLM FBW 2006
  • 121. Review of TCAS Events …Event N°3 : Inefficient visual avoiding maneuver FL 370 « CLIMB, « DESCEND, CLIMB » RA DESCEND » RA AIRCRAFT 2 Order incorrectly interpreted by AIRCRAFT 1 AIRCRAFT 1 AIRCRAFT 2 Descend to FL 350. AIRCRAFT 1 passes slightly below AIRCRAFT 2, with no lateral separation !!! TCAS Recommendations 140 OLM FBW 2006
  • 122. Review of TCAS Events …• Do not base the maneuver on visual acquisition of the intruder: FCOM 3.04.34 : TCAS Recommendations 141 OLM FBW 2006
  • 123. Review of TCAS Events …Additional informationATC versus TCAS information:• ATC Radar: – An update rate of several seconds (from 4 to 10). – Altitude data in 100-foot increments. – Sudden vertical maneuvers are not immediately displayed. TCAS:  Interrogates all surrounded transponders every second.  Mode S-equipped aircraft provide TCAS information in 25-foot increments. TCAS Information is: - Updated 4 to 10 times faster TCAS Recommendations - 4 times more accurate 142 OLM FBW 2006
  • 124. Review … TCAS Events …Additional information ofVisual acquisition limitations:• At high altitudes, it is difficult to assess: – The range – The heading – The relative height At low altitudes, it is difficult to assess :  Whether the aircraft is climbing or descending. The traffic in contact MAY NOT BE the one that causes the RA to trigger. TCAS Recommendations 143 OLM FBW 2006
  • 125. Review of TCAS Events …Lessons learnt - Always follow TCAS RA orders: - In the correct direction - Even if it is in contradiction the ATC instruction - Even at max ceiling altitude - Do not overreact: Set the vertical speed to the green sector. - Do not try to visually acquire intruders, in case of RA orders. TCAS Recommendations 144 OLM FBW 2006
  • 126. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 145 OLM FBW 2006
  • 127. New change in TCAS procedureCurrent QRH AP/ FD ……… OFF Only for corrective RA TCAS Recommendations 146 OLM FBW 2006
  • 128. New change in TCAS procedureFuture QRH (July 2006) AP/ FD …..OFF for any RA TCAS Recommendations 147 OLM FBW 2006
  • 129. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Emergency Descent :Should we select TA not to reduce the rate of descent? Airbus recommend RA mode.• Performing an emergency descent in a busy airspace increases the risk of generating traffic conflict.• Temporarily reducing the rate of descent is not a concern.• A “CLIMB, CLIMB” RA order is not always requested: – An “ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST” RA TCAS Recommendations 148 OLM FBW 2006 can be triggered (decrease the V/S).
  • 130. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Emergency Descent … ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST DESCEND, DESCEND TCAS Recommendations 149 OLM FBW 2006
  • 131. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Emergency Descent … TCAS Recommendations 150 OLM FBW 2006
  • 132. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Engine Failure• In case one engine fails, the TCAS must be set to TA mode to comply with AC 20-131:  After an engine failure, aircraft performance is degraded.  When TA is selected:  Affected aircraft is not requested to perform an RA maneuver. TCAS Recommendations 151 OLM FBW 2006
  • 133. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Engine Failure …• The ECAM’s ENG SHUT DOWN Procedure requests the crew to select TA TCAS mode. TCAS Recommendations 152 OLM FBW 2006
  • 134. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Engine Failure … Airbus recommends the selection of TA mode, in case of an engine failure. – To avoid entering in angle of attack protection at low altitude. In addition, subsequent loss of altitude could lead to reversal RA orders. – To have a common procedure for all aircraft – If the intruder is TCAS-equipped: • The intruder TCAS will detect that you are in TA mode. • The intruder TCAS will perform an RA maneuver. TCAS Recommendations 153 OLM FBW 2006
  • 135. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude• AC 20-131A defines the maneuvers that the aircraft must be able to perform.• In particular, the aircraft must prove that it can respond to a TCAS RA CLIMB order, even when it is at its maximum altitude. TCAS Recommendations 154 OLM FBW 2006
  • 136. Recurrent TCAS Questions …Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude … Speed (knots) Time (s) Time (s) V/S (feet/minute) TCAS Recommendations Time (s) 155 OLM FBW 2006
  • 137. Recurrent TCAS Altitude …Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Questions …• These graphs show that the aircraft can follow: –A “CLIMB, CLIMB” TCAS RA order (1500 feet/minute) –An “INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB” TCAS RA order (2500 feet/minute).• Always below VMO/MMO and above VLS: –A330 aircraft, at 41000 feet, initial speed is M 0.82 (243 knots) The maximum weight is 177 tons. –The Final Speed is 228 knots RA climb orders can be followed. (Buffet Speed is 212 knots at 42000 feet) Airbus does not recommend selecting TA mode, TCAS Recommendations 156 OLM FBW 2006 when the aircraft is at its maximum ceiling altitude.
  • 138. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 157 OLM FBW 2006
  • 139. Future TCAS DevelopmentsBackground• Overreaction: –Most vertical deviations for each aircraft (following a TCAS RA order) are often greater than 300 feet. – Very large altitude changes often lead to conflict with other aircraft in a busy airspace. – Due to excessive pilot reaction, uncomfortable load factors are reached.• Cases of reaction in the wrong sense. TCAS Recommendations 158 OLM FBW 2006
  • 140. Future TCAS Developments …Developments status – Keep the current Vertical Speed indicator • Allow to check the result of pilot action on V/S raw data • Constitute a back up indication – Display must be reactive enough to avoid any over-reaction • Fast interpretation is necessary – RA order with AP engaged • Procedure should be intuitive TCAS Recommendations 159 OLM FBW 2006
  • 141. Future TCAS Developments …Developments status… Concept: new AFS “TCAS RA” longitudinal mode that would allow an automatic reaction. Symbology: no specific symbology (except new mode on FMA), the FD follows the TCAS order and the pilot cross-checks the VSI raw data. SPEED TCAS NAV AP FD ATHR Law: new AFS “TCAS” law, based on V/S law with increased authority Computation of Outer loop ControlTCAS the V/S target TCAS law Inner surfaces V/S target NZ loop deflectionComputer orders TCAS Recommendations 160 OLM FBW 2006
  • 142. Future TCAS Developments …• AP/FD behaviour in case of TCAS RA alert: – If AP/FD not engaged: • Automatic engagement of FD in TCAS mode – If AP Off but FD already engaged: • Automatic reversion of FD to TCAS mode – If AP already engaged: • Automatic reversion of AP to TCAS modeTCAS Recommendations 161 OLM FBW 2006
  • 143. Future TCAS Developments …:SPEED ALTexample of Corrective RA CRZ NAV AP1 1FD2 ATHR “Climb, Climb”SPEED TCAS NAV AP1 1FD2 ATHR “Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust”SPEED TCAS NAV AP1 1FD2 ATHR “Clear Of Conflict”SPEED V/S-1000 NAV AP1 ALT 1FD2 ATHR TCAS Recommendations 162 OLM FBW 2006
  • 144. Future TCAS Developments …• Expected definition for flight test by second half of 2008TCAS Recommendations 163 OLM FBW 2006
  • 145. Contents1 Resolution Advisory2 Review of TCAS Events3 Recurrent TCAS Questions4 Future TCAS Developments5 ConclusionTCAS Recommendations 164 OLM FBW 2006
  • 146. Conclusion - Always follow TCAS RA orders: - In the correct direction - Even if it is in contradiction the ATC instruction - Even at max ceiling altitude - Do not overreact: Set the vertical speed to the green sector. - Do not try to visually acquire intruders, in case of RA orders.  Some improvements are being developed to further assist pilots in effectively responding to TCAS warnings.TCAS Recommendations 165 OLM FBW 2006
  • 147. Conclusion Upcoming FOBN « Response to TCAS Alerts »TCAS Recommendations 166 OLM FBW 2006
  • 148. Eurocontrol ACAS II BulletinEUROCONTROL is publishing a series of ACAS II Bulletins, each with adifferent safety related theme. http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa TCAS Recommendations 167 OLM FBW 2006
  • 149. FIN
  • 150. Solo para el SIM ISeleccionamos la opción TCAS / desde el MASTER INDEX
  • 151. Este fallo consiste en que el TCAS carece de aviso acústicoNo tendremos ningún aviso ECAM.Debemos emplearlo cuando los dos alumnos esténdespistados por ejemplo cargando la aproximación.Recordamos “allways one head up at all time”.
  • 152. Es la página 2 delos fallos denavegación FIN
  • 153. BRIEF INST SIM
  • 154. MEL ITEMS
  • 155. MEL OPERATIONALPROCEDURES
  • 156. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure Current ECAM alerts give appropriate procedures in the case of Dual Bleed failuresHowever, A QRH procedure has been created to handle a dual bleed loss  To improve airline operationsBy means of  Anticipated descent before CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT triggering  Attempt to recover the lastly lost BLEED System (when possible)  Use of the APU Bleed (when possible) This QRH Procedure  Covers a wide range of Dual Bleed failures  Is technically too complex to be put on the ECAM 186
  • 157. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 187
  • 158. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 188
  • 159. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT ? - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 189
  • 160. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure  If ENG 1 (2) BLEED was lost due to a :X-BLEED LEAK on side 1 (2)CLOSED ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed openX-BLEED  In all other casesOPEN 190
  • 161. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure  If ENG 1 (2) BLEED was lost due to a :X-BLEED LEAK on side 1 (2)CLOSED ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed openX-BLEED  In all other casesOPEN191
  • 162. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN In all other cases : INITIATE DESCENT Attempt recovery of Both packs available the lastly lost bleed system One pack inoperative, or Bleed Recovery unsuccessful192
  • 163. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 1 BLEED lost first PACK 1 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ON 193
  • 164. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 1 BLEED lost first PACK 1 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ON 194
  • 165. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 2 BLEED lost first PACK 2 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 1 BLEED ON 195
  • 166. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 2 BLEED lost first PACK 2 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 1 BLEED ON 196
  • 167. DUAL BLEED FAULTOPEN X BLEED procedure In all other cases : INITIATE DESCENT Failures of the lastly lost Bleed Recovery unsuccessful or bleed system One pack inoperative other than due to excessive demand197
  • 168. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT Recovery unsuccessful, PACK 1 PACK 2 Or One pack inoperative Use HP IP APU IP HP APU BLEED APU BLEEDOENG 1 BLEED N ENG 2 BLEED DESCEND to FL for APU BLEED use 198
  • 169. Using the QRH procedure in the case of Dual Bleed Loss• Typical scenario of reported Dual Bleed Loss events – Loss of first BLEED system (overheat or overpressure) – X-BLEED valve open (as per ECAM procedure) – 1 BLEED / 2 PACKS configuration – Loss of second BLEED system (due to excessive demand)199
  • 170. Using the QRH procedure in the case of Dual Bleed Loss• As failure is not due to  LEAK on side 1 (2)  ENG 1 (2) FIRE  Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed open INITIATE DESCENT And both PACKs are available Attempt recovery of the lastly lost BLEED System – If successful Continue flight to destination – If unsuccessful Continue descent to appropriate FL for APU BLEED use200
  • 171. Conclusion To prevent DUAL BLEED loss events Technical precautionary measures are available Preventive Maintenance actions Component modifications If a DUAL BLEED Loss occurs Applying the DUAL BLEED FAULT QRH procedure may avoid201 In-Flight Turn Back FIN
  • 172. DUAL BLEED LOSS ON SINGLE AISLE- Meeting 2008 A330/A340 BLEED AIR SYSTEM- Bangkok 2012 A330 DUAL BLEED LOSS- Rome 2011
  • 173. A320 Family – A330/A340 Operational Liaison Meeting 2008 DUAL BLEED LOSS on Single Aisle Using the QRH procedure
  • 174. Contents1 In-Service events2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure4 Conclusion204
  • 175. Contents1 In-Service events2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure4 Conclusion205
  • 176. In-Service events description Nearly all reported events  Single Aisle family  bleed overheat after one engine bleed system failure Typical event description  First Engine Bleed system failure  ECAM procedure application – X-BLEED open – 1 BLEED / 2 PACKS configuration Loss of the remaining bleed system due to overheat Most common operational consequence  In-Flight Turn Back  Emergency descent206
  • 177. Normal Bleed System Operation Normal Operation PRECOOLER Fan Air Valve (FAV) provides TCT cold fan air to the PRECOOLER FAV BLEED upon signal from the VALVE Temperature Control Thermostat (TCT) IP HP207
  • 178. Bleed System Failure – Identified cause• Hidden failure in the FAV actuation system •TCT drift PRECOOLER •Sense line leakage •FAV cover leakage TCT FAV 1 BLEED / 2 PACKs operation BLEED VALVE Increase of bleed air temperature IP HP FAV actuation system fails to compensate 208
  • 179. Contents1 In-Service events2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure4 Conclusion209
  • 180. Dual Bleed Loss – Action Plan Preventive Maintenance actions  Temperature Control Thermostat filter cleaning at 6,000 FH mandatory  TCT: Filter cleaning Mandatory MPD task ……………………………………………Available Feb. 2007  New procedures to identify Fan Air Valve malfunction  AMM: Improved FAV leak check procedure (new tooling) ………………Available Feb. 2007 Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS) customized Report  Approach developed by Airbus with the cooperation of A320 operators  Define parameters, thresholds and logic for alerts triggering  Monitoring of the BLEED system  Preventive troubleshooting can be launched before BLEED failure 210
  • 181. Dual Bleed Loss – Action Plan Component modification to ensure appropriate FAV operation  Temperature Control Thermostat (Standard 342B05)  Optimization of temperature function reactivity ………………………SB 36-1061 (VSB 342-36-08) Available May 2008  Fan Air Valve  Improvement to avoid early leakage ………………….…………VSB 6730F-36-01 & VSB 6730-36-03 Available Aug. 2007  Temperature Limitation Thermostat  Temperature limitation function shifting at 270°C …………………………………………VSB 341-36-06 Available Nov. 2007 Additional details are available in TFU 36.11.00.059, OIT 999.0061/08, RIL 916.0468/08 211
  • 182. Contents1 In-Service events2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure4 Conclusion212
  • 183. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure Current ECAM alerts give appropriate procedures in the case of Dual Bleed failuresHowever, A QRH procedure has been created to handle a dual bleed loss  To improve airline operationsBy means of  Anticipated descent before CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT triggering  Attempt to recover the lastly lost BLEED System (when possible)  Use of the APU Bleed (when possible) This QRH Procedure  Covers a wide range of Dual Bleed failures  Is technically too complex to be put on the ECAM 213
  • 184. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 214
  • 185. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 215
  • 186. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure • Scenario of the reported events PACK 1 PACK 2 AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT ? - ENG 2 BLEED…….OFF - X BLEED…………OPEN HP IP APU IP HPENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED 216
  • 187. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure  If ENG 1 (2) BLEED was lost due to a :X-BLEED LEAK on side 1 (2)CLOSED ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed openX-BLEED  In all other casesOPEN 217
  • 188. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure  If ENG 1 (2) BLEED was lost due to a : X-BLEED LEAK on side 1 (2) CLOSED ENG 1 (2) FIRE Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed openX-BLEED  In all other casesOPEN 218
  • 189. DUAL BLEED FAULTOPEN X BLEED procedure In all other cases : INITIATE DESCENT Attempt recovery of Both packs available the lastly lost bleed system One pack inoperative, or Bleed Recovery unsuccessful219
  • 190. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 1 BLEED lost first PACK 1 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ON 220
  • 191. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 1 BLEED lost first PACK 1 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ON 221
  • 192. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 2 BLEED lost first PACK 2 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 1 BLEED ON 222
  • 193. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT PACK 1 PACK 2 Both packs available If ENG 2 BLEED lost first PACK 2 OFF reduces demand Attempt recovery of the HP IP APU IP HP lastly lost bleed systemENG 1 BLEED ENG 2 BLEED ENG 1 BLEED ON 223
  • 194. DUAL BLEED FAULTOPEN X BLEED procedure In all other cases : INITIATE DESCENT Failures of the lastly lost Bleed Recovery unsuccessful or bleed system One pack inoperative other than due to excessive demand224
  • 195. DUAL BLEED FAULT procedure X BLEED OPEN INITIATE DESCENT Recovery unsuccessful, PACK 1 PACK 2 Or One pack inoperative Use HP IP APU IP HP APU BLEED APU BLEEDOENG 1 BLEED N ENG 2 BLEED DESCEND to FL for APU BLEED use 225
  • 196. Using the QRH procedure in the case of Dual Bleed Loss• Typical scenario of reported Dual Bleed Loss events – Loss of first BLEED system (overheat or overpressure) – X-BLEED valve open (as per ECAM procedure) – 1 BLEED / 2 PACKS configuration – Loss of second BLEED system (due to excessive demand)226
  • 197. Using the QRH procedure in the case• As failure isof Dual to not due Bleed Loss  LEAK on side 1 (2)  ENG 1 (2) FIRE  Start Air Valve 1 (2) failed open INITIATE DESCENT And both PACKs are available Attempt recovery of the lastly lost BLEED System – If successful Continue flight to destination – If unsuccessful Continue descent to appropriate FL for APU BLEED use227
  • 198. Contents1 In-Service events2 Dual Bleed Loss Action Plan3 Dual Bleed Fault Procedure4 Conclusion228
  • 199. Conclusion To prevent DUAL BLEED loss events Technical precautionary measures are available Preventive Maintenance actions Component modifications If a DUAL BLEED Loss occurs Applying the DUAL BLEED FAULT QRH procedure may avoid229 In-Flight Turn Back
  • 200. By taking delivery of this Presentation (hereafter “Presentation”), you accept on behalf of your company to comply with the following. No other property rights aregranted by the delivery of this Presentation than the right to read it, for the sole purpose of information. This Presentation, its content, illustrations and photos shall notbe modified nor reproduced without prior written consent of Airbus S.A.S. This Presentation and the materials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, orlicensed to any third party subject to payment or not. This Presentation may contain market-sensitive or other information that is correct at the time of going to press.This information involves a number of factors which could change over time, affecting the true public representation. Airbus assumes no obligation to update anyinformation contained in this document or with respect to the information described herein. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer or form part of anycontract. They are based on Airbus information and are expressed in good faith but no warranty or representation is given as to their accuracy. When additionalinformation is required, Airbus S.A.S can be contacted to provide further details. Airbus S.A.S shall assume no liability for any damage in connection with the use of thisPresentation and the materials it contains, even if Airbus S.A.S has been advised of the likelihood of such damages. This licence is governed by French law and exclusivejurisdiction is given to the courts and tribunals of Toulouse (France) without prejudice to the right of Airbus to bring proceedings for infringement of copyright or anyother intellectual property right in any other court of competent jurisdiction. FIN
  • 201. FIN
  • 202. FIN
  • 203. 1.- Debemos estar a FL3502.-Autorizamos a FL330 y pedimos que aceleren. En cuantobajan del 60% de potencia, aproximadamente, se abren las HPvalves. En este momento introducimos el fallo.
  • 204. Explicación del fallo. FIN
  • 205. BRIEF SIM
  • 206. El “inmediate VMC landing after engine fail”, siempre esdecisión del comandante.Las condiciones meteorológicas deben ser de buena visibilidad.Debemos estar en un campo conocido.Debemos estar seguros que la longitud de pista es suficiente.Un ejemplo claro de un “VMC landing after engine fail”, es en undespegue donde nos hemos encontrado una bandada depájaros. Se nos ha parado un motor, y tenemos serias dudas dela integridad del restante.Otro ejemplo sería fallo de motor con pesos muy bajos y encampos muy conocidos.
  • 207. FIN
  • 208. Para poner el BIRD STRIKE seleccionamos WEATHER.Está en la primera página. Tarda unos 40 nudos en aparecer
  • 209. Ponemos el fallode motor quemás nos guste
  • 210. Para crear estrés adicional y facilitar la toma de decisión estoleamos el otro motor
  • 211. FIN
  • 212. FIN
  • 213. ENG FAIL
  • 214. SEQUENCE OP CLIMB MCT “I HAVE STOP CONTINUE ECAM CONTROL AND ECAM ACTIONS COM ACTIONS AT OEB & ECAM EO ACC ALT & ENG FLY ACTIONS” SECURED THEAIRCRAFT
  • 215. FLY THE AIRCRAFT• CANCEL WARNING• GEAR UP• CONSIDER TOGA• PITCH ADJUST,BETA TARGET• CONSIDER A/P
  • 216. CONSIDER TOGA• PILOT’S DISCRETION• TOGA REQUIRES MORE RUDDER INPUT
  • 217. PITCH ADJUST,BETA TARGET PITCH ADJUST- FOLLOW SRS , MONITOR SPEED BETA TARGET
  • 218. ECAM ACTIONS
  • 219. ENG SECURED• NO DAMAGE.- ENG MASTER OFF• DAMAGE.- ENG FIRE PB PUSHED & ONE SQUIB DISCHARGED• FIRE-. - ENG FIRE PB PUSHED & TWO SQUIBS DISCHARGED
  • 220. ENG RELIGHT FIN
  • 221. BRIEF INST
  • 222. FIN
  • 223. Instructores
  • 224. FIN
  • 225. BRIEF INST SIM
  • 226. FIN INST SIM
  • 227. FIN
  • 228. Para poder estar en “Alternate law” debemos desconectar 2 ADR
  • 229. Ahora debemos reconfigurar las pantallas para copiar la información del ADR bueno. FIN
  • 230. Evacuación de Emergencia
  • 231. EMERGENCIAS EN DESPEGUES Y ATERRIZAJES• El procedimiento de evacuación de emergencia consiste en una serie de normas y situaciones, establecidas de forma lógica y ordenada, que permitan facilitar la rápida salida de los pasajeros de un avión después de haber sufrido un accidente en el que la permanencia en su interior, suponga un grave riesgo para las vidas humanas.• En una situación de emergencia la seguridad de los pasajeros dependerá de la calma, el equilibrio y la eficacia de la Tripulación.
  • 232. Condiciones para una evacuación.• Una vez esté el avión parado con motores parados:1. Orden del Cmte. “EVACUATE, EVACUATE, EVACUATE!/ ¡EVACUAR, EVACUAR, EVACUAR”2. Observar fuego o humo que de evidencia de que está ardiendo el avión (en el interior o exterior)3. Observar daños estructurales que afecten la seguridad de los pasajeros.4. Ver iniciar la evacuación en otra área del avión.5. Un amerizaje.6. Una Emergencia Prevista.
  • 233. PREPARAR LA EVACUACION.COORDINAREMOS CON LA TRIPULACIÓN DE CABINA ELPROCEDIMIENTO A SEGUIR:• EMERGENCIA PREVISTA.• EMERGENCIA IMPREVISTA.• ATERRIZAJE INSEGURO.Una vez iniciada la evacuación NO DEBE INTERRUMPIRSE.Pueden producirse en tierra incidentes por los cuales seanecesario que el Comandante tome la decisión de realizar unDesalojo Controlado de Urgencia.Ej. Aviso bomba, salida depista…
  • 234. Emergencia Prevista:Planificamos el aterrizaje de emergencia. Damos seis puntos en unbriefing al SB:1. Tipo emergencia2. Estimated Time of Arrival.3. Lugar de aterrizaje.4. Señal de protección.5. Instrucciones especiales.6. Confirmación de la evacuación con el Comandante.Emergencia Imprevista:Se tendrá la cabina asegurada por procedimiento y evacuaremos tanpronto sea posible.Aterrizaje inseguro:En un principio no se requerirá evacuación. Se informará de Tipo deemergencia, ETA, Coordinación.
  • 235. FCOMEMERGENCY EVACUATION1Applicable to: EC-LMN, EC-LNH, EC-LQO, EC-LQPApply this procedure when considering an emergency evacuation.Carefully analyze the situation before deciding to evacuatepassengers. However do not waste valuable time. AIRCRAFT/PARKING BRK ……………………..........................................................STOP/ONATC (VHF1)......................................................................................................NOTIFY Notify ATC of the nature of the emergency, and state intentions. Only VHF1 is available on batteries.CABIN CREW (PA)..............................................................................................ALERT Make a short and precise announcement to warn that an emergency evacuation maybe required.
  • 236. ΔP (only if MAN CAB PR has been used)..................................CHECK ZEROIf ΔP is not at zero, MODE SEL on MAN and V/S CTL FULL UP, to fullyopen the outflow valves.ENG MASTER (ALL)...............................................................................OFFAssociated LP and HP valves close.FIRE Pushbuttons (ALL: ENG and APU)..............................................PUSHAGENTS (ENG and APU)...............................................................AS RQRDThe use of agents is required if the ENG FIRE or APU FIRE displayed.  Evacuation required: IfEVACUATION................................................................................INITIATENotify the cabin crew about the emergency encountered and theintentions.Press the EVAC COMMAND pb.  Evacuation not required: IfCABIN CREW and PASSENGERS (PA)................................................NOTIFY
  • 237. • Se recomienda hacer la evacuación sin abandonar la pista. Al ser esta mucho mas ancha que la rodadura, facilitaremos así el total acceso al avión de los servivios de emergencia.• Ordenaremos la evacuación sin indicar por donde realizarla, (derecha o izquierda) ya que son los TCP´s quienes dispondrán de la puerta operativa mas conveniente para completarla.• Comprobaremos que la Presión Diferencial sea CERO.En modo automático los CPC se encargarán de ello pero será en MAN PRESS MODE cuando seremos nosotros los encargados de que Delta P sea cero!
  • 238. FIN
  • 239. CARGO SMOKE A 330BRIEF SIM
  • 240. INDICE• 1.- Descripción del sistema• 2.- Información operativa.• 3.- Ecam
  • 241. DESCRIPCION DEL SISTEMA
  • 242. PARTES DEL SISTEMA• DOS CAVIDADES EN LA BODEGA DELANTERA.• DOS CAVIDADES EN LA BODEGA TRASERA Y UNA EN EL BULK.• CADA CAVIDAD CON DOS DETECTORES DE HUMO Y UN SPRAY NOZZLE.• UN SDCU (SMOKE DETECTION CONTROL UNIT) QUE DA INFORMACION AL FWC PARA EL AVISO EN CABINA.
  • 243. DISTRIBUCION DE LOS DETECTORES
  • 244. DESCRIPCION DE LOS DETECTORES
  • 245. COMO FUNCIONA EL SISTEMA
  • 246. ECAM
  • 247. INFO OPERATIVA FIN
  • 248. CARGO SMOKE A 330PANELES DEL SIMULADOR
  • 249. En el “MALFUNCTION INDEX” seleccionamos “FIRE PROTECTION/SMOKE”
  • 250. En el menú “FIRE PROTECTION/SMOKE” seleccionamos “CARGO SMOKE” FIN
  • 251. SIDE STICK FAULT
  • 252. SIDESTICK LOGIC‐ Two sidestick controllers are used for pitch and roll manual control. One is on theCAPTs latera console, the other is on the FOs lateral console.The two controllers are springloaded to neutral, and are not mechanically coupled.Each controller independently sends electrical signals to the flight control computers.
  • 253. SIDESTICKSSidesticks, one on each lateral console, are used for manual pitch and roll control. They arespringloaded to neutral. When the autopilot is engaged, a solenoid-operated detent locksboth sidesticks in the neutral position. If the pilot applies a force above a given threshold(5 daN in pitch, 3.5 daN in roll), the autopilot disengages and the sidestick unlocks and thedeflection is sent as command to the computers.The hand grip includes 2 pushbuttons:‐ Autopilot disconnect/sidestick priority pushbutton‐ Push-to-talk button
  • 254. Sidestick priority logic‐ When only one pilot operates the sidestick, his demand is sent to the computers.‐ When the other pilot operates his sidestick, in the same or opposite direction, both pilotsinputs are algebraically-added. The addition is limited to single-stick maximum deflection.Note: In the event of simultaneous input on both sidesticks (2 °deflection of the neutral position in any direction) the two green SIDE STICK PRIORITY lights, on the glareshield, come on and the “DUAL INPUT” voice message activates.A pilot can deactivate the other sidestick, and take full control by pressing and keepingpressed his takeover pushbutton.For latching the priority condition, it is recommended that the takeover pushbutton bepressed for more than 40 s . The takeover pushbutton can then be released without losingpriority.However a deactivated sidestick can be reactivated at any time, by momentarily pressingeither takeover pushbutton on either stick.If both pilots press their takeover pushbuttons, the last pilot to press their pushbutton willhave priority.Note: If an autopilot is engaged, any action on a takeover pushbutton will disengage it.
  • 255. In a Priority Situation‐ A red light will come on, in front of the pilot whose stick is deactivated.‐ A green light will come on, in front of the pilot who has taken control, if the othersidestick is not in the neutral position (to indicate a potential and unwanted controldemand).Note: If one stick is deactivated on ground, at takeoff thrust application, the takeoff«CONFIG» warning is triggered.
  • 256. SIDE STICK PRIORITYArrow red lt :‐ Illuminates in front of the pilot losing authority.‐ Extinguishes if he has recovered his authority, ie: • If the other take-over pushbutton is released prior priority condition is latched, or • If he has used his take-over pushbutton to cancel a latched priority situation.Sidestick priority audio: a "PRIORITY LEFT" or "PRIORITY RIGHT” audio voice message isgiven each time priority is taken.L (R) SIDESTICK FAULTTransducers on pitch or roll axis are failed on one sidestick.FCOM PRO ABN- Abnormal and Emergency Procedures.F/CTL L (R) SIDESTICK FAULTL2 Crew awareness
  • 257. SIDESTICK/RUDDER PEDALS STIFFEven if the autopilot is disengaged, the sidesticks and/or the rudder pedals may be stiff.This may affect either:‐ Both sidesticks (CAPT and F/O) at the same time, but not the rudder pedals, or‐ One sidestick and the rudder pedals at the same time.The piloting technique remains the same: The aircraft remains responsive. However, the flight crewshould keep in mind that they may need to use extra force on the sidesticks and/or the rudder pedals.The extra force required to move the controls out of the neutral position is moderate.This extra force does not significantly affect the handling of the aircraft.If sidesticks and/or rudder pedals are stiff after autopilot disengagement, apply the followingprocedure:AP DISENGAGEMENT.....................................................................................CONFIRMConfirm autopilot disengagement by checking that either:‐ The FMA no longer displays the AP1(2) indication, or‐ The AP lights on the FCU are off, or‐ The ECAM displays the AP1(2) OFF red message, or‐ The cavalry charge audio alert has triggered.CONSIDER TRANSFERRING CONTROL TO PNFIf the PNFs sidestick is not affected. FOR DECRAB, ROLLOUT, OR ENGINE FAILURE:BE PREPARED TO APPLY EXTRA FORCE ON RUDDER PEDALNot applicable if both sidesticks are stiff.
  • 258. FINFIN
  • 259. LOW VISIBILITY TAKE OFF• RVR < 400 mts• IF ALTN AIRPORT REQ: >Within 1 hour >ETOPS approved time or 2 hours ( if etops > 120 mins) (@ 1 eng inop speed )• Air Europa crews are allowed 125 mts ( Only authorized operators)
  • 260. UNDER U.S. OPS SPEC (Foreign Operations Specifications)• STD Take Off Minimuns are defined: RVR 5.000 (≤ 2 eng a/c) RVR 2.400 (a/c > 2 eng)“When a take off minimum is not published, the foreign air carrier may use the applicable standard takeoff minimum and any lower than standard takeoff minimuns described in these operations specifications” [Air Europa US Ops Spec] * A copy of this US OPS SPEC is onboard all A-330´s
  • 261. RVR REQUIREMENTS OPS ≥ RVR 1.600 (500 mts) : TDZ RVR is controlling, if available MID RVR may be substituted for an available TDZ RVR OPS < RVR 1.600 (500 mts) : TWO OPERATING RVR REQ ALL available RVR REQWhen a FAR END RVR is avail, is not controlling, and not to be used as one of the tworeq RVR
  • 262. The Foreign Operator may use lower than STD Take Off minimum• If Vis ¼ sm or RVR 1600, at least ONE avail HIRL CL RCLM Other markings or lighting provide adequate visual ref to ident. rwy sfc and maintain lateral ctl during T.O.
  • 263. The Foreign Operator may use lower than STD Take Off minimum• If TDZ RVR 1200, MID RVR 1200, & Roll Out RVR 1000, may be used, provided RVR Equip is avail + 1 of the following:• Daylight RCLM or HIRL or CL• Night Time HIRL or CL
  • 264. The Foreign Operator may use lower than STD Take Off minimum• If TDZ RVR 1000, MID RVR 1000, & Roll Out RVR 1000, may be used, provided RVR Equip is avail + 1 of the following:• CL or HIRL+ RCLM• If TDZ RVR 500, MID RVR 500, & Roll Out RVR 500, may be used, provided ALL RVR Equip is avail and:• HIRL + CL
  • 265. 500 ft = 150 mts 1000 ft = 300 mts
  • 266. Take Off ALTN• INCORPORAR C-055 FIN
  • 267. All Weather Ops Low Visibility Procedures CAT II / IIIBRIEF INST
  • 268. FIN
  • 269. All Weather OpsLow Visibility Procedures CAT II / III
  • 270. LOW VISIBILITY TAKE OFF• RVR < 400 mts• IF ALTN AIRPORT REQ: >Within 1 hour >ETOPS approved time or 2 hours ( if etops > 120 mins) (@ 1 eng inop speed )• Air Europa crews are allowed 125 mts ( Only authorized operators)
  • 271. UNDER U.S. OPS SPEC (Foreign Operations Specifications)• STD Take Off Minimuns are defined: RVR 5.000 (≤ 2 eng a/c) RVR 2.400 (a/c > 2 eng)“When a take off minimum is not published, the foreign air carrier may use the applicable standard takeoff minimum and any lower than standard takeoff minimuns described in these operations specifications” [Air Europa US Ops Spec] * A copy of this US OPS SPEC is onboard all A-330´s
  • 272. RVR REQUIREMENTS OPS ≥ RVR 1.600 (500 mts) : TDZ RVR is controlling, if available MID RVR may be substituted for an available TDZ RVR OPS < RVR 1.600 (500 mts) : TWO OPERATING RVR REQ ALL available RVR REQWhen a FAR END RVR is avail, is not controlling, and not to be used as one of the tworeq RVR
  • 273. The Foreign Operator may use lower than STD Take Off minimum• If Vis ¼ sm or RVR 1600, at least ONE avail HIRL CL RCLM Other markings or lighting provide adequate visual ref to ident. rwy sfc and maintain lateral ctl during T.O.
  • 274. The Foreign Operator may use lower than STD Take Off minimum• If TDZ RVR 1200, MID RVR 1200, & Roll Out RVR 1000, may be used, provided RVR Equip is avail + 1 of the following:• Daylight RCLM or HIRL or CL• Night Time HIRL or CL
  • 275. The Foreign Operator may use lower than STD Take Off minimum• If TDZ RVR 1000, MID RVR 1000, & Roll Out RVR 1000, may be used, provided RVR Equip is avail + 1 of the following:• CL or HIRL+ RCLM• If TDZ RVR 500, MID RVR 500, & Roll Out RVR 500, may be used, provided ALL RVR Equip is avail and:• HIRL + CL
  • 276. 500 ft = 150 mts 1000 ft = 300 mts
  • 277. Take Off ALTN• INCORPORAR C-055
  • 278. CAT I APPROACH
  • 279. CAT I• Minimum vis ½ sm (800 mts)• TDZ RVR is controlling (subst by mid)• Reduced landing minima ( as published)
  • 280. CAT II / III
  • 281. 1000 ft US OPS SPECCat II below 1.200ft (1.000ft) on CAT III facilities arpts & rwys(DGAC & Ops Spec)
  • 282. CAT II• Sufficient visual reference for a manual landing• Equivalent level of safety by; – airborne equipment – ILS Facility
  • 283. CAT II UNDER U.S. OPS SPECLowest authorized RVR =1.000 ft Lowest authorized DH = 100 ft
  • 284. CAT II U.S.• App Ban concept →“Final app segment”• When TDZ RVR report < 1800, ALL the following equipment is required:• ALSF I or ALSF II (SFL may be inop)• HIRL + TDZL + CL• One RVR is controlling ( RVR ≥ 1600)• Two RVR are controlling(RVR ≥ 1200) (TDZ & Roll Out) (Roll Out may be subs. by mid) (far end?)• Crosswind ≤ 15 Kts
  • 285. Air Europa A 330CAT III A III B
  • 286. Air Europa A 330SOME CONCEPTS:
  • 287. CAT III A IIIB• Minimum to allow the pilot to decide whether aircraft will land in touchdown zone (CAT IIIA) and ensure safety during roll-out (CAT IIIB)CAT III A = Fail Passive = CAT III SINGLECAT III B = Fail operational = CAT III DUAL
  • 288. • Fail-passive automatic landing system - in the event of a failure there is no significant deviation of aeroplane trim, flight path or altitude but the landing will not be completed automatically.
  • 289. • Fail-operational automatic landing system - if in the event of a failure, the approach, flare and landing can be completed by the remaining part of the automatic system.
  • 290. DA/DH• Decision altitude/height (DA/H) - is the wheel height above the runway elevation by which a go-around must be initiated unless adequate visual reference has been established and the aircraft position and approach path have been assessed as satisfactory to continue the approach and landing in safety (JAA)
  • 291. Decision Height• JAA - for CAT II and CAT IIIA the visual reference to contain not less than a 3 light segment• JAA - CAT IIIB visual reference to contain one centreline light
  • 292. Alert Height• Alert Height - height above runway based on the characteristics of the aeroplane and its fail operational automatic landing system, above which a CAT III approach would be discontinued and a missed approach initiated if a failure occurred in one of the redundant parts of the automatic landing system, or in the relevant ground equipment
  • 293. Alert Height• Go-around above Alert Height for failures (AFM) affecting fail operational system• Below Alert Height continue except for Autoland warning• Height evaluated during certification – A 330 = 200feet• Operators can select lower Alert Height
  • 294. RVR• Runway Visual Range - range over which a pilot of an aircraft on the centreline of the runway can see the runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centreline• Three basic portions of runway - the touchdown zone (TDZ), the mid-runway portion (MID) and the rollout portion or stop end• There might be a 4th transmissometer, called “far end”
  • 295. RVR• For CAT II TDZ required• For CAT III TDZ and Mid required• For lowest weather FAA requires all (only two, TDZ & MID in case the 3rd is inop)• For CAT III with no DH JAA require only one• RVR is not the Slant Visual Range (SVR) seen by the pilot
  • 296. RVR Minima• Establish an RVR to to be associated with that DH to ensure required visual reference is established• Correlation between visual segment SVR - RVR• Eye position is important• Landing lights can obscure required visual reference in CAT III
  • 297. Types of Minima• Airfield Operating Minima - established in accordance with aerodrome OCH• Operator Minima - Lowest minima approved by authority for use by an air operator• Crew Minima - lowest for a crew depending on their qualification/experience• Aircraft minima - demonstrated during aircraft certification and found in the AFM
  • 298. 1000 ft US OPS SPECCat II below 1.200ft (1.000ft) on CAT III facilities arpts & rwys(DGAC & Ops Spec)
  • 299. CAT III A III B U.S. OPS SPECField Length Factor: 1.15Lowest RVR: Cat III A: 700 ft ( 200 mts ) ( 175 mts ) Cat III B: 600 ft Cat III A: 50 ftLowest DH : Cat III B: 0 ft
  • 300. BUT, according Air Europa Ops Specs (C 060, d. (4) )…• “For CAT III landing minimums as low as Touchdown Zone RVR 300 ( 75 mts ) Mid RVR 300 and Roll Out RVR 300, rq: 1. The TDZ, MID & Roll Out RVR systems are normally req. And are controlling[…] 2. If one of this RVR is temp inop, ops may be continued using the two remaining RVR and both are controlling […]
  • 301. *
  • 302. LUCES DE PISTA Y APP
  • 303. CAT III B
  • 304. MUCHAS GRACIAS POR VUESTRA ATENCIÓN
  • 305. Aeroplane and Equipment
  • 306. Aeroplane and Equipment Certification• Aircraft requires CAT II/III approval• Operational approval is required• JAR AWO section 1 (Autoland), Section 2 CAT II and section 3 (CAT III)• FAA AC20-57A (autoland), AC 120-29 (CAT II) and AC 120-28D (CAT III)
  • 307. Aerodrome Requirements• Standards and Recommendations from ICAO Annex 10 (ILS) and ICAO Annex 14 (Aerodrome) are internationally accepted• Additional requirements/variants may be found in national regulations• Summary view of typical CAT II/III airfield
  • 308. Aerodrome Requirements - Runway• Runway length - operational requirement• Runway width - normally < 45m• Slope 1st/last quarter < 0.8%• Auto Landing - maximum 2% per 30m in area just before threshold (60m by 200m)• Objects on runway strip - nil within 60m of centreline (except frangible)• Taxi-holding positions not < 90m
  • 309. Aerodrome Requirements Visual Aids -Aerodrome• Markings centreline, touchdown, taxiway, taxi- holding position markings• High intensity threshold, runway end lights, runway touchdown zone lights and runway centreline lights, taxiway centreline lights if <400m visibility, stop bars <400m visibility
  • 310. Aerodrome Requirements Visual Aids - Approach• Approach Lights required for CAT II only• Extended centreline, side row, crossbar
  • 311. Aerodrome Requirements Obstacle Clearance Area• Obstacle Clearance Altitude/Height (OCH/OCA) - lowest height above threshold (aerodrome) used in establishing compliance with appropriate obstacle clearance criteria• Minimum DH for CAT II cannot be less than established OCH/A• OCH/A is a function of aircraft category
  • 312. Aerodrome Requirements Obstacle Clearance Area• Obstacle Free Zone – airspace above inner approach surface, inner transitional and balked landing surfaces and that portion of the strip – not penetrated by obstacles except frangible mounted required for air transportation purposes
  • 313. Aerodrome Requirements ILS Facility• Three categories (Annex 10) – 60m (200ft) for CAT I – 15m (50ft) for CAT II (acceptable to be used for CAT III with the highest minima (DH not< 50ft) – Runway surface and along the runway for CAT III
  • 314. Aerodrome Requirements ILS Facility• ILS Critical Area - aircraft/vehicles are excluded during all ILS operations because they will cause disturbances to ILS signal• ILS Sensitive Area - area extending beyond the critical area where movement and/or parking of aircraft and vehicles is controlled to prevent the possibility• ILS beam to be protected by longitudinal separation
  • 315. Aerodrome Requirements RVR Measurements• Number depend on type of operation• Generally 110 to 150m from centreline• Nominally 5m-10m in height• ICAO recommends readout of 50m increments when RVR less than 800m and 25m increments when RVR less than 150m• Normally ATC give Mid unless the others lower
  • 316. • Title 14 CFR Part 97 (Cat II ops)• CFR Code of Federal Regulations FIN
  • 317. COCHABAMBA SLCB/CBBBRIEF SIM
  • 318. FLIGHT TO SLCB DIVERTED FROM FL 180 , CLEARED TO VAREB PORKI ZFM 158 FUEL7.0SLVR APPROACH RWY 32 ZFM CG 30%SLCB Wx CALM 9999 OVCST 1500 ILS 4 Rwy 32/ DESCENT LIMA10/04 1026 VOR DME 3 Rwy 32 PROCEED BACK TO PORKI ENG FAIL AT G/A ENGINE FAIL AFTER G/A GO AROUND AT MDA (9350’) LANDING GO AROUND AT DA (8600’) ILS 4 Rwy 32 VOR DME 3 Rwy 32 VOR DME 3 Rwy 32
  • 319. CBB EFP’sRwy 14"NON-STD. At D6.5 CBA turn RIGHT to CLIZA. AtCLIZA turn LEFT to 300°, intercept and followR150 to CBA to CBA HP. D112.1 CBA HP:Inbound 102°, RIGHT turn.“Rwy32"NON-STD. At D5 CBA turn LEFT to CBA HP.D112.1 CBA HP: Inbound 102°, RIGHT turn.”
  • 320. Para la aproximación ILS a la pista 32, pondremos los mínimos VOR (9350´). Encaso de “GO AROUND” antes de estos mínimos, realizaremos el procedimiento defrustrada de la ficha. Si tenemos que frustrar después de estos mínimos (windshear, avión en pista, etc..) entonces en la frustrada realizaremos elprocedimiento de fallo de motor.
  • 321. A330-GE FOR TRAINING ONLY
  • 322. A330- 772B FOR TRAINING ONLY
  • 323. Seleccionamos la opción WEATHER / desde el menú principal.
  • 324. Dentro de la opción TEMPERATUREPROFILE seleccionamos la temperaturadel campo.También seleccionamos TEMP GRAD y lomodificamos a -3 grados para que latemperatura en altura sea la correcta.
  • 325. FIN

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