A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
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NES 20th Anniversary Conference, Dec 13-16, 2012 ...

NES 20th Anniversary Conference, Dec 13-16, 2012
A Model of Party Discipline in Congress (based on the article presented by Galina Zudenkova at the NES 20th Anniversary Conference)
Author: Galina Zudenkova

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A Model of Party Discipline in Congress Presentation Transcript

  • 1. Introduction Model Results AppendixA Model of Party Discipline in Congress Galina Zudenkova University of Mannheim December 2012 Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 2. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapMotivation Party Discipline refers to control that party leadership has over its legislature Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 3. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapMotivation Party Discipline refers to control that party leadership has over its legislature – ability of party leaders to get their partisan congress members to support party line. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 4. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapMotivation Party Discipline refers to control that party leadership has over its legislature – ability of party leaders to get their partisan congress members to support party line. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 5. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapResearch Questions What determines the level of party discipline? Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 6. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapResearch Questions What determines the level of party discipline? Is party discipline weaker in the majority party or in the minority party? Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 7. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapResearch Questions What determines the level of party discipline? Is party discipline weaker in the majority party or in the minority party? What are the impacts of party discipline on policy outcomes? Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 8. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapResearch Questions What determines the level of party discipline? Is party discipline weaker in the majority party or in the minority party? What are the impacts of party discipline on policy outcomes? How does party discipline affect distribution of government spending among national districts? Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 9. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapResearch Questions What determines the level of party discipline? Is party discipline weaker in the majority party or in the minority party? What are the impacts of party discipline on policy outcomes? How does party discipline affect distribution of government spending among national districts? I analyze distribution of government spending in a two-party legislature within the presidential system. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 10. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapRoadmap Allocation of scarce government spending is modeled as an asymmetric contest between congress members. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 11. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapRoadmap Allocation of scarce government spending is modeled as an asymmetric contest between congress members. Majority party has relative advantage in directing spending into its partisan districts. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 12. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapRoadmap Allocation of scarce government spending is modeled as an asymmetric contest between congress members. Majority party has relative advantage in directing spending into its partisan districts. Party leaders can enforce discipline in their corresponding parties to make their congress members support party line Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 13. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapRoadmap Allocation of scarce government spending is modeled as an asymmetric contest between congress members. Majority party has relative advantage in directing spending into its partisan districts. Party leaders can enforce discipline in their corresponding parties to make their congress members support party line – maximize party’s total share of spending (rather than follow interests of their home districts). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 14. Introduction Model Results Appendix Motivation Questions RoadmapRoadmap Allocation of scarce government spending is modeled as an asymmetric contest between congress members. Majority party has relative advantage in directing spending into its partisan districts. Party leaders can enforce discipline in their corresponding parties to make their congress members support party line – maximize party’s total share of spending (rather than follow interests of their home districts). I show that party discipline favors minority party and leads to less biased distribution of government spending among national districts. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 15. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 16. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress (legislative branch of government), two-party system. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 17. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress (legislative branch of government), two-party system. One congress member for each of national districts. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 18. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress (legislative branch of government), two-party system. One congress member for each of national districts. Each congress member is affiliated with one of two political parties. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 19. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress (legislative branch of government), two-party system. One congress member for each of national districts. Each congress member is affiliated with one of two political parties. Party that holds a majority – majority party maj. Other party – minority party min. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 20. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress (legislative branch of government), two-party system. One congress member for each of national districts. Each congress member is affiliated with one of two political parties. Party that holds a majority – majority party maj. Other party – minority party min. nmaj and nmin – number of congress members affiliated with maj and min. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 21. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress performs purely distributive task of allocating government spending to nmaj + nmin national districts. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 22. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress performs purely distributive task of allocating government spending to nmaj + nmin national districts. Distributive policies benefit only districts in which spending occurs. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 23. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress performs purely distributive task of allocating government spending to nmaj + nmin national districts. Distributive policies benefit only districts in which spending occurs. Size of government spending is normalized to 1. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 24. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress performs purely distributive task of allocating government spending to nmaj + nmin national districts. Distributive policies benefit only districts in which spending occurs. Size of government spending is normalized to 1. To bring spending into home district, each congress member exerts effort ai ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., nmaj + nmin . Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 25. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Congress performs purely distributive task of allocating government spending to nmaj + nmin national districts. Distributive policies benefit only districts in which spending occurs. Size of government spending is normalized to 1. To bring spending into home district, each congress member exerts effort ai ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., nmaj + nmin . Cost of effort: C (ai ) = ai . Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 26. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Legislative process of the US Congress: A bill is introduced to the congress (by any congress member). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 27. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Legislative process of the US Congress: A bill is introduced to the congress (by any congress member). It is referred to appropriate committee (where it may be accepted, amended, or rejected). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 28. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Legislative process of the US Congress: A bill is introduced to the congress (by any congress member). It is referred to appropriate committee (where it may be accepted, amended, or rejected). If approved, the bill is reported to the congress, and majority party leadership decides when to place it for consideration. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 29. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Legislative process of the US Congress: A bill is introduced to the congress (by any congress member). It is referred to appropriate committee (where it may be accepted, amended, or rejected). If approved, the bill is reported to the congress, and majority party leadership decides when to place it for consideration. When the bill comes up for consideration, debate starts where each congress member may introduce amendments or filibuster it. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 30. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel Legislative process of the US Congress: A bill is introduced to the congress (by any congress member). It is referred to appropriate committee (where it may be accepted, amended, or rejected). If approved, the bill is reported to the congress, and majority party leadership decides when to place it for consideration. When the bill comes up for consideration, debate starts where each congress member may introduce amendments or filibuster it. Once debate is over, the vote of simple majority passes the bill. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 31. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel This suggests: Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 32. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel This suggests: 1 Government spending to district i, si ∈ [0, 1], increases with effort ai and decreases with effort of all other congress members aj , j = i. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 33. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel This suggests: 1 Government spending to district i, si ∈ [0, 1], increases with effort ai and decreases with effort of all other congress members aj , j = i. 2 Legislative process is biased in favor of majority party maj. Ceteris paribus, congress member affiliated with maj finds it easier to bring spending to home district than congress member affiliated with min. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 34. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModel This suggests: 1 Government spending to district i, si ∈ [0, 1], increases with effort ai and decreases with effort of all other congress members aj , j = i. 2 Legislative process is biased in favor of majority party maj. Ceteris paribus, congress member affiliated with maj finds it easier to bring spending to home district than congress member affiliated with min. Spending allocation is modeled with the Tullock contest success function (1980):   nmajβi amin +n i if max a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin > 0, si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin = j=1 βj aj 1  nmaj +nmin otherwise, where βi = β > 1 if i ∈ maj, βi = 1 if i ∈ min. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 35. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelCongress Members and Party Leaders Congress members want to bring spending to their home districts: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − C (ai ) . ai Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 36. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelCongress Members and Party Leaders Congress members want to bring spending to their home districts: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − C (ai ) . ai Party leaders (majority leader and minority leader) care about total share of spending directed into party’s partisan districts. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 37. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelCongress Members and Party Leaders Congress members want to bring spending to their home districts: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − C (ai ) . ai Party leaders (majority leader and minority leader) care about total share of spending directed into party’s partisan districts. Party leadership’s objective – party line. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 38. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelCongress Members and Party Leaders Congress members want to bring spending to their home districts: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − C (ai ) . ai Party leaders (majority leader and minority leader) care about total share of spending directed into party’s partisan districts. Party leadership’s objective – party line. Majority party line – to maximize si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin . i∈maj Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 39. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelCongress Members and Party Leaders Congress members want to bring spending to their home districts: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − C (ai ) . ai Party leaders (majority leader and minority leader) care about total share of spending directed into party’s partisan districts. Party leadership’s objective – party line. Majority party line – to maximize si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin . i∈maj Minority party line – to maximize si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin . i∈min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 40. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders can impose a certain type of control – party discipline – on their congress members. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 41. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders can impose a certain type of control – party discipline – on their congress members. Party discipline – ability of party leader to get his congress members to support party line rather than to follow special interests of their home districts. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 42. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders can impose a certain type of control – party discipline – on their congress members. Party discipline – ability of party leader to get his congress members to support party line rather than to follow special interests of their home districts. Party leaders can impose discipline levels λmaj ≥ 0, λmin ≥ 0, which determine strength with which congress members share preferences of their party leadership. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 43. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders can impose a certain type of control – party discipline – on their congress members. Party discipline – ability of party leader to get his congress members to support party line rather than to follow special interests of their home districts. Party leaders can impose discipline levels λmaj ≥ 0, λmin ≥ 0, which determine strength with which congress members share preferences of their party leadership. Net objective function of congress member i ∈ maj: si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin + λmaj sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − C (ai ) . j∈maj Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 44. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders can impose a certain type of control – party discipline – on their congress members. Party discipline – ability of party leader to get his congress members to support party line rather than to follow special interests of their home districts. Party leaders can impose discipline levels λmaj ≥ 0, λmin ≥ 0, which determine strength with which congress members share preferences of their party leadership. Net objective function of congress member i ∈ maj: si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin + λmaj sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − C (ai ) . j∈maj Net objective function of congress member i ∈ min: si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin + λmin sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − C (ai ) . j∈min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 45. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders bear costs c (λmaj ) = λmaj and c (λmin ) = λmin of imposing party discipline. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 46. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders bear costs c (λmaj ) = λmaj and c (λmin ) = λmin of imposing party discipline. Majority leader’s problem: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmaj ) . λmaj i∈maj Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 47. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders bear costs c (λmaj ) = λmaj and c (λmin ) = λmin of imposing party discipline. Majority leader’s problem: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmaj ) . λmaj i∈maj Minority leader’s problem: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmin ) . λmin i∈min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 48. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders bear costs c (λmaj ) = λmaj and c (λmin ) = λmin of imposing party discipline. Majority leader’s problem: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmaj ) . λmaj i∈maj Minority leader’s problem: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmin ) . λmin i∈min Party leaders’ incentives are negatively aligned. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 49. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelParty Discipline Party leaders bear costs c (λmaj ) = λmaj and c (λmin ) = λmin of imposing party discipline. Majority leader’s problem: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmaj ) . λmaj i∈maj Minority leader’s problem: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmin ) . λmin i∈min Party leaders’ incentives are negatively aligned. Intra-party alignment of incentives: congress member cares not only about her home district’s interests but also about party line. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 50. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelTiming Timing of events: Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 51. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelTiming Timing of events: Party leaders impose discipline levels λmaj and λmin . Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 52. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelTiming Timing of events: Party leaders impose discipline levels λmaj and λmin . Congress members exert efforts ai , which determine shares of spending si in each national district. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 53. Introduction Model Results Appendix Outline Congress Members Discipline TimingModelTiming Timing of events: Party leaders impose discipline levels λmaj and λmin . Congress members exert efforts ai , which determine shares of spending si in each national district. Game is analyzed backwards to find subgame perfect equilibrium. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 54. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level is higher in min party: λ∗ > λ∗ > 0. min maj Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 55. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level is higher in min party: λ∗ > λ∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: min leader has more stake in imposing discipline than maj leader (”disadvantaged” min party gains more than ”advantaged” maj party from same increment of discipline level). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 56. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level is higher in min party: λ∗ > λ∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: min leader has more stake in imposing discipline than maj leader (”disadvantaged” min party gains more than ”advantaged” maj party from same increment of discipline level). min members exert higher effort: a∗ > a∗ > 0. min maj Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 57. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level is higher in min party: λ∗ > λ∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: min leader has more stake in imposing discipline than maj leader (”disadvantaged” min party gains more than ”advantaged” maj party from same increment of discipline level). min members exert higher effort: a∗ > a∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: maj member has more members from her own party to care about and less rivals to compete with for spending than min member Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 58. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level is higher in min party: λ∗ > λ∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: min leader has more stake in imposing discipline than maj leader (”disadvantaged” min party gains more than ”advantaged” maj party from same increment of discipline level). min members exert higher effort: a∗ > a∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: maj member has more members from her own party to care about and less rivals to compete with for spending than min member ⇒ with party discipline, maj member has less incentive to exert effort than does min member. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 59. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level is higher in min party: λ∗ > λ∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: min leader has more stake in imposing discipline than maj leader (”disadvantaged” min party gains more than ”advantaged” maj party from same increment of discipline level). min members exert higher effort: a∗ > a∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: maj member has more members from her own party to care about and less rivals to compete with for spending than min member ⇒ with party discipline, maj member has less incentive to exert effort than does min member. nmaj s∗ maj Total share of spending is greater in maj party: nmin s∗ = β > 1. min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 60. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level is higher in min party: λ∗ > λ∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: min leader has more stake in imposing discipline than maj leader (”disadvantaged” min party gains more than ”advantaged” maj party from same increment of discipline level). min members exert higher effort: a∗ > a∗ > 0. min maj Intuition: maj member has more members from her own party to care about and less rivals to compete with for spending than min member ⇒ with party discipline, maj member has less incentive to exert effort than does min member. nmaj s∗ maj Total share of spending is greater in maj party: nmin s∗ = β > 1. min nmaj nmaj s∗ > s∗ if β > maj min nmin , s∗ ≤ s∗ if β ≤ maj min nmin . Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 61. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults With party discipline, per district spending share of maj party decreases, while that of min party increases, relative to allocation with no party discipline: s∗ < s0 , maj maj s∗ > s0 . min min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 62. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults With party discipline, per district spending share of maj party decreases, while that of min party increases, relative to allocation with no party discipline: s∗ < s0 , maj maj s∗ > s0 . min min Party discipline favors min party and leads to less inequitable distribution of government spending. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 63. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults With party discipline, per district spending share of maj party decreases, while that of min party increases, relative to allocation with no party discipline: s∗ < s0 , maj maj s∗ > s0 . min min Party discipline favors min party and leads to less inequitable distribution of government spending. min members exert higher effort under party discipline: a∗ > a0 . min min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 64. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults With party discipline, per district spending share of maj party decreases, while that of min party increases, relative to allocation with no party discipline: s∗ < s0 , maj maj s∗ > s0 . min min Party discipline favors min party and leads to less inequitable distribution of government spending. min members exert higher effort under party discipline: a∗ > a0 . min min maj members’ effort might increase or decrease with party discipline (depending on parameters’ values). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 65. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults no discipline party discipline λmaj = λmin = 0 λ∗ > λ∗ > 0 min maj Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 66. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults no discipline party discipline λmaj = λmin = 0 λ∗ > λ∗ > 0 min maj amaj a0 maj ? a∗ maj efforts ∨ ∧ amin a0 min < a∗ min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 67. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults no discipline party discipline λmaj = λmin = 0 λ∗ > λ∗ > 0 min maj amaj a0 maj ? a∗ maj efforts ∨ ∧ amin a0 min < a∗ min smaj s0 maj > s∗ maj per district ∨ ? spending smin s0 min < s∗ min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 68. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults no discipline party discipline λmaj = λmin = 0 λ∗ > λ∗ > 0 min maj amaj a0 maj ? a∗ maj efforts ∨ ∧ amin a0 min < a∗ min smaj s0 maj > s∗ maj per district ∨ ? spending smin s0 min < s∗ min nmaj smaj nmaj s0 maj > nmaj s∗ maj total ∨ ∨ spending nmin smin nmin s0 min < nmin s∗ min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 69. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level of minority party is higher than that of majority party. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 70. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level of minority party is higher than that of majority party. Minority party members exert more effort and might even get a higher per district share of government spending than members of majority party. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 71. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level of minority party is higher than that of majority party. Minority party members exert more effort and might even get a higher per district share of government spending than members of majority party. (The latter happens if relative advantage of majority party in allocating government spending is sufficiently low.) Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 72. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level of minority party is higher than that of majority party. Minority party members exert more effort and might even get a higher per district share of government spending than members of majority party. (The latter happens if relative advantage of majority party in allocating government spending is sufficiently low.) ⇒ Party discipline favors minority party, which gets greater per district share of spending relative to the allocation with no party discipline. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 73. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResults Discipline level of minority party is higher than that of majority party. Minority party members exert more effort and might even get a higher per district share of government spending than members of majority party. (The latter happens if relative advantage of majority party in allocating government spending is sufficiently low.) ⇒ Party discipline favors minority party, which gets greater per district share of spending relative to the allocation with no party discipline. Party discipline leads to less biased distribution of federal resources among national districts. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 74. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureEmpirically Testable Predictions Per district spending share is increasing in discipline strength in corresponding party and decreasing in discipline strength in rival party. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 75. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureEmpirically Testable Predictions Per district spending share is increasing in discipline strength in corresponding party and decreasing in discipline strength in rival party. Minority leader imposes stronger discipline on his party’s congress members than majority leader. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 76. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureEmpirically Testable Predictions Per district spending share is increasing in discipline strength in corresponding party and decreasing in discipline strength in rival party. Minority leader imposes stronger discipline on his party’s congress members than majority leader. Total share of government spending of majority party exceeds that of minority party regardless of discipline strength in both parties. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 77. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResearch This presentation focuses on specific stylized framework. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 78. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResearch This presentation focuses on specific stylized framework. More general framework: Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 79. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResearch This presentation focuses on specific stylized framework. More general framework: relative advantage of maj party β might be related to maj party size nmaj and min party size nmin ; Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 80. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResearch This presentation focuses on specific stylized framework. More general framework: relative advantage of maj party β might be related to maj party size nmaj and min party size nmin ; maj party may take credit for passing a bill, which benefits min member district; Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 81. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResearch This presentation focuses on specific stylized framework. More general framework: relative advantage of maj party β might be related to maj party size nmaj and min party size nmin ; maj party may take credit for passing a bill, which benefits min member district; other powers of congress such as powers to lay and collect taxes and imposts, to pay debts, to provide defense and general welfare of the society, etc.; Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 82. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureResearch This presentation focuses on specific stylized framework. More general framework: relative advantage of maj party β might be related to maj party size nmaj and min party size nmin ; maj party may take credit for passing a bill, which benefits min member district; other powers of congress such as powers to lay and collect taxes and imposts, to pay debts, to provide defense and general welfare of the society, etc.; endogenous size of government spending. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 83. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureLiterature – Formal Models Informational argument: Strong party discipline informs voters about candidate’s future policy (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2004, Castanheira and Crutzen 2010, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Snyder and Ting 2002). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 84. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureLiterature – Formal Models Informational argument: Strong party discipline informs voters about candidate’s future policy (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2004, Castanheira and Crutzen 2010, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Snyder and Ting 2002). Commitment to party platforms: Party’s ability to induce ex-post adherence to pre-announced position (Grossman and Helpman 2008). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 85. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureLiterature – Formal Models Informational argument: Strong party discipline informs voters about candidate’s future policy (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2004, Castanheira and Crutzen 2010, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Snyder and Ting 2002). Commitment to party platforms: Party’s ability to induce ex-post adherence to pre-announced position (Grossman and Helpman 2008). Ability of party leadership to control its legislators such that they vote in line with party ideological position (Colomer 2005, Eguia 2011, Iaryczower 2008, McGillivray 1997, Patty 2008, Volden and Bergman 2006). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 86. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureLiterature – Formal Models Informational argument: Strong party discipline informs voters about candidate’s future policy (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2004, Castanheira and Crutzen 2010, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Snyder and Ting 2002). Commitment to party platforms: Party’s ability to induce ex-post adherence to pre-announced position (Grossman and Helpman 2008). Ability of party leadership to control its legislators such that they vote in line with party ideological position (Colomer 2005, Eguia 2011, Iaryczower 2008, McGillivray 1997, Patty 2008, Volden and Bergman 2006). Institutional explanation: Vote-of-confidence procedure common in parliamentary democracies creates incentives for cohesion in voting (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 87. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureLiterature – Formal Models Informational argument: Strong party discipline informs voters about candidate’s future policy (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2004, Castanheira and Crutzen 2010, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Snyder and Ting 2002). Commitment to party platforms: Party’s ability to induce ex-post adherence to pre-announced position (Grossman and Helpman 2008). Ability of party leadership to control its legislators such that they vote in line with party ideological position (Colomer 2005, Eguia 2011, Iaryczower 2008, McGillivray 1997, Patty 2008, Volden and Bergman 2006). Institutional explanation: Vote-of-confidence procedure common in parliamentary democracies creates incentives for cohesion in voting (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). Little done with regard to impacts of party discipline on policy outcomes. This paper contributes to this line. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 88. Introduction Model Results Appendix Related LiteratureRelated Literature Empirical literature: Heller & Mershon (2008), Krehbiel (2000), McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal (2001), Snyder & Groseclose (2000). Literature on inter-group contests: Katz, Nitzan & Rosenberg (1990), Baik (1993), Riaz, Shogren & Johnson (1995), Esteban & Ray (2001), Konrad & Morath (2012). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 89. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 90. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Problem of congress member i ∈ maj: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin +λmaj sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin −C (ai ) . ai j∈maj Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 91. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Problem of congress member i ∈ maj: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin +λmaj sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin −C (ai ) . ai j∈maj Problem of congress member i ∈ min: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin +λmin sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin −C (ai ) . ai j∈min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 92. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Problem of congress member i ∈ maj: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin +λmaj sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin −C (ai ) . ai j∈maj Problem of congress member i ∈ min: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin +λmin sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin −C (ai ) . ai j∈min Due to symmetry, congress members affiliated with same party will exert same effort. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 93. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Problem of congress member i ∈ maj: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin +λmaj sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin −C (ai ) . ai j∈maj Problem of congress member i ∈ min: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin +λmin sj a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin −C (ai ) . ai j∈min Due to symmetry, congress members affiliated with same party will exert same effort. amaj – effort of congress member affiliated with maj. amin – effort of congress member affiliated with min. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 94. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Theorem Given discipline levels λmaj ≥ 0, λmin ≥ 0, congress members’ exert efforts amaj (λmaj , λmin ) and amin (λmaj , λmin ): amaj (λmaj , λmin ) =   fmaj (λmaj , λmin , β, nmaj , nmin ) if β < (1+λmin )nmaj nmaj −1 , nmaj −1  n2 otherwise, maj Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 95. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Theorem Given discipline levels λmaj ≥ 0, λmin ≥ 0, congress members’ exert efforts amaj (λmaj , λmin ) and amin (λmaj , λmin ): amaj (λmaj , λmin ) =   fmaj (λmaj , λmin , β, nmaj , nmin ) if β < (1+λmin )nmaj nmaj −1 , nmaj −1  n2 otherwise, maj amin (λmaj , λmin ) = (1+λ )n fmin (λmaj , λmin , β, nmaj , nmin ) if β < nmaj −1 maj , min 0 otherwise. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 96. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAppendix: Congress Members’ Efforts Congress Members’ Efforts amaj (λmaj , λmin ) =   1 ((1 + λmaj ) βnmin − (nmin − 1)) Ω if β < (1+λmin )nmaj β nmaj −1 , nmaj −1  n2 otherwise, maj amin (λmaj , λmin ) = (1+λ )n ((1 + λmin ) nmaj − β (nmaj − 1)) Ω if β < nmaj −1 maj , min 0 otherwise, where (1+λmin )nmaj ((1+λmaj )βnmin −(nmin −1))+(nmin −1)((1+λmin )nmaj −β(nmaj −1)) Ω= . (nmaj ((1+λmaj )βnmin −(nmin −1))+nmin ((1+λmin )nmaj −β(nmaj −1)))2 Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 97. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Congress members’ efforts increase with discipline levels in their corresponding parties: ∂amaj (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂amin (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂λmaj > 0, ∂λmin > 0. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 98. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Congress members’ efforts increase with discipline levels in their corresponding parties: ∂amaj (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂amin (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂λmaj > 0, ∂λmin > 0. Spending share increases with discipline level of the party but decreases with discipline level of the rival party: ∂smaj (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂smaj (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂λmaj > 0, ∂λmin < 0, ∂smin (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂smin (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂λmin > 0, ∂λmaj <0 Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 99. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Congress members’ efforts increase with discipline levels in their corresponding parties: ∂amaj (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂amin (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂λmaj > 0, ∂λmin > 0. Spending share increases with discipline level of the party but decreases with discipline level of the rival party: ∂smaj (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂smaj (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂λmaj > 0, ∂λmin < 0, ∂smin (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂smin (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂λmin > 0, ∂λmaj <0 maj party relative advantage β increases smaj but decreases smin : ∂smaj (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂smin (λmaj ,λmin ) ∂β > 0, ∂β < 0. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 100. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Theorem Given discipline levels λmaj ≥ 0, λmin ≥ 0, spending shares smaj (λmaj , λmin ) and smin (λmaj , λmin ) are: smaj (λmaj , λmin ) = (1+λ )n gmaj (λmaj , λmin , β, nmaj , nmin ) if β < nmaj −1 maj , min 1 nmaj otherwise, Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 101. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisCongress Members’ Problem Theorem Given discipline levels λmaj ≥ 0, λmin ≥ 0, spending shares smaj (λmaj , λmin ) and smin (λmaj , λmin ) are: smaj (λmaj , λmin ) = (1+λ )n gmaj (λmaj , λmin , β, nmaj , nmin ) if β < nmaj −1 maj , min 1 nmaj otherwise, smin (λmaj , λmin ) = (1+λ )n gmin (λmaj , λmin , β, nmaj , nmin ) if β < nmaj −1 maj , min 0 otherwise. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 102. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAppendix: Pork-Barrel Shares Government Spending Shares smaj (λmaj , λmin ) = 1 (1+λ )n ∆ ((1 + λmaj ) βnmin − (nmin − 1)) if β < nmaj −1 maj , min 1 nmaj otherwise, smin (λmaj , λmin ) = 1 (1+λ )n ∆ ((1 + λmin ) nmaj − β (nmaj − 1)) if β < nmaj −1 maj , min 0 otherwise, where ∆ = nmaj ((1 + λmaj ) βnmin − (nmin − 1)) + nmin ((1 + λmin ) nmaj − β (nmaj − 1)) . Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 103. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisParty Leaders’ Problem Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 104. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisParty Leaders’ Problem Problem of maj leader: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmaj ) . λmaj i∈maj Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 105. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisParty Leaders’ Problem Problem of maj leader: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmaj ) . λmaj i∈maj Problem of min leader: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmin ) . λmin i∈min Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 106. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisParty Leaders’ Problem Problem of maj leader: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmaj ) . λmaj i∈maj Problem of min leader: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmin ) . λmin i∈min Party leaders simultaneously choose discipline levels. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 107. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisParty Leaders’ Problem Problem of maj leader: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmaj ) . λmaj i∈maj Problem of min leader: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmin ) . λmin i∈min Party leaders simultaneously choose discipline levels. (1+β)2 In equilibrium, λmaj > 0 and λmin > 0 only if nmin > 1+β−β 3 where 1 + β − β 3 > 0. Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 108. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisParty Leaders’ Problem Problem of maj leader: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmaj ) . λmaj i∈maj Problem of min leader: max si a1 , ..., anmaj +nmin − c (λmin ) . λmin i∈min Party leaders simultaneously choose discipline levels. (1+β)2 In equilibrium, λmaj > 0 and λmin > 0 only if nmin > 1+β−β 3 where 1 + β − β 3 > 0. Otherwise, either λmin > 0, λmaj = 0 or λmaj = λmin = 0 (depending on parameters’ values). Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
  • 109. Introduction Model Results Appendix Congress Members’ Efforts Shares Party DisciplineAnalysisParty Leaders’ Problem Theorem If min party has sufficient number of seats in congress and maj party (1+β)2 advantage is not very high (formally, nmin > 1+β−β 3 where 1 + β − β 3 > 0) then there is a unique equilibrium: nmin −1 1 1+β+β 2 λ∗ maj = − , nmin β (1+β)2 nmaj −1 1+β+β 2 λ∗ min = nmaj β − , (1+β)2 2 nmaj nmin (1+β+β 2 ) −(nmaj +β 2 nmin )(1+β)2 a∗ maj = , n2 nmin (1+β)4 maj 2 nmaj nmin (1+β+β 2 ) −(nmaj +β 2 nmin )(1+β)2 a∗ min = , nmaj n2 (1+β)4 min s∗ maj = β nmaj (1+β) , s∗ min = 1 nmin (1+β) . Galina Zudenkova A Model of Party Discipline in Congress