2013 King Hall Day 1 Session 4 - 1
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×
 

2013 King Hall Day 1 Session 4 - 1

on

  • 221 views

2013 King Hall Conference Proceedings

2013 King Hall Conference Proceedings

Statistics

Views

Total Views
221
Views on SlideShare
221
Embed Views
0

Actions

Likes
0
Downloads
1
Comments
0

0 Embeds 0

No embeds

Accessibility

Upload Details

Uploaded via as Microsoft PowerPoint

Usage Rights

© All Rights Reserved

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Processing…
Post Comment
Edit your comment

2013 King Hall Day 1 Session 4 - 1 2013 King Hall Day 1 Session 4 - 1 Presentation Transcript

  • Dr. John R. Schindler U.S. Naval War College
  • `A Hundred Years On (Nearly) Rethinking The Great War, finally … maybe? Austria-Hungary? Really? What does a second-tier naval power matter now? What does intelligence from 100 years ago have to tell us today?
  • Die k.u.k. Kriegsmarine Austria-Hungary and the Mediterranean naval arms race before 1914 KM OOB 1914: 4 BB (DN) 9 BB 7 CA 6 CL 30 DD 6 SS
  • Austro-Hungarian Intelligence Vienna’s military espionage apparatus before 1914 - readiness for war? The Evidenzbureau - roles & missions - the Redl debacle The Marine-Evidenzbureau - roles & missions
  • Vienna’s “Great Secret” A-H code-breaking before 1914 and its place in the intelligence system The (Viennese) birth of SIGINT War planning, strategy, and A-H strategic concepts on the eve of the Great War
  • Crisis and War Sarajevo assassination and the July Crisis The Navy and the coming of the war Vienna plays va banque … and loses The Navy and the Italian threat
  • Intelligence in the Adriatic Understanding the intelligence battlefield in the Adriatic KM SIGINT and the Navy’s strategic thinking, 1915-1918 How code-breaking becomes a critical enabler for Austria-Hungary
  • Fleet (In)Action and Intelligence ADM Haus and his “fleet in being” KM HUMINT, covert action, and sabotage against Italy A-H Naval aviation and intelligence over the Adriatic
  • Austria-Hungary and the U-Boat War Vienna and unrestricted submarine warfare The KM’s U-Boat arm and its role in the Mediterranean naval struggle SIGINT and AustriaHungary’s submarine arm
  • 1917: The Pivotal Year Unrestricted submarine warfare and the Allied blockade’s impact on Austria-Hungary Otranto and limited surface fleet action The “Caporetto Miracle” and illusions of victory
  • 1918: Decline and Fall January: Naval mutiny and the general crisis of the war effort Piave: one last (doomed) gamble by Vienna The Navy and the last months of war: imminent defeat The final collapse
  • Assessing the Impact What is the real role of intelligence in AustriaHungary’s naval war? What lessons today can be derived from the experience of the k.u.k. MarineEvidenzbureau? History, legacies and remembrances