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Turner.john

  1. 1. Taking Program Risk Management To The Next Level on NASA’s Constellation Program John V. Turner, PhD Constellation Program Risk ManagerCxIRMA
  2. 2. Agenda • CxP Overview • Pre-Historic Risk Management • Risk Informed Decision Making – CRM Process and Tools – Risk Informed Design – Integration with Systems Safety – Risk Informed Test Program – Knowledge Management • CxP RIDM Status – Where are we Really on this? • Areas for ImprovementPage 2 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  3. 3. CxP Lunar Mission Overview MOON Ascent Stage Altair Performs LOI Expended 100 km Low Lunar Orbit EDS Expended Service Module Low Expended Earth Orbit Orion EDS, Altair Direct Entry Land Landing EARTHPage 3 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  4. 4. Constellation Systems Altair Lander Orion Capsule Ares I and Ares V RocketsPage 4 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  5. 5. Lunar Outpost ConceptPage 5 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  6. 6. CxP Risk Management • The complexity of the CxP, the ambitious nature of our mission, and the significant constraints placed on our program make effective RM essential • We have to more proactive identify and manage our risks than previous human spaceflight programsPage 6 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  7. 7. Early Risk Management Continuous Risk Management (CRM) A meeting…. IRMA A scorecard….. A database……. Hierarchical risk roll-upPage 7 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  8. 8. Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) • NASA NPR 8000.4A Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements • Integration of RIDM and CRM into a coherent framework: – to foster proactive risk management: – to better inform decision making through better use of risk information, – and then to more effectively manage implementation risks using the CRM process - which is focused on the baseline performance requirements emerging from the RIDM process. • Within an RIDM process, decisions are made with regard to outcomes of the decision alternatives, taking into account applicable risks and uncertainties; • As part of the implementation process, CRM is used to manage those risks in order to achieve the performance levels that drove the selection of a particular alternative • Proactive risk management applies to programs, projects, and institutional or mission support offices.Page 8 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  9. 9. RIDM What Kind of Decisions? Where Are They Made? Acquisition Strategy Selection Boards and Panels Mission Concept Definition Tiger Teams Requirements Definition ATP Milestones Design Trades Safety Review Panels Establish Controls / Ops Safety Baseline Flight/Test Readiness Mgt of Change Reviews Source Boards Budget Scrubs . . . Design Risk Acceptance . . Operational Risk Acceptance . . . . .Page 9 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  10. 10. Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) Knowledge • KBRs Management • PAL • Knowledge Capture Systems Engineering • Requirements and TPM ATP MMRs Ops/Test Achievability • Analysis priorities • Test Objectives • Iterative Design and • Risks Reviewed at Analysis Authority to Proceed • Readiness Reviews • C/S/T Baseline • Real Time Decisions Systems Safety Boards/Panels • Systematic Analysis • Formal Risk Acceptance • Establish Operational Safety Continuous Risk • Managing risk Baseline (OSB) through change IRMA Management (CRM) Probabilistic Design • Standards for risk characterization • CLAS for risks and Analysis • Risk Communication and Reporting • Standards of Practice Process • LOC LOM Reqts • Prioritization of risk mitigation • Integrated Campaign, proposals Architecture, System, Element AnalysisPage 10 Dynamic Information Linkages NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  11. 11. CRM • The CxP follows the NASA Continuous Risk Management ParadigmPage 11 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  12. 12. CRM • The CxP has established Risk Management offices at the Directorate level, program level and project level – In some cases level IV (element) have a RM office as well • RM policy is flowed from the agency to directorate, to program to project level, and in some cases to elementsPage 12 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  13. 13. CRM • A Risk Management Working Group (~bi-weekly) has been established to ensure common practice and guide the development of RM policies, practices, and tools – Including the CxP RM database application – IRMA • A program risk scorecard has been put in place to help establish consistency in risk prioritiesPage 13 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  14. 14. CRM • A Top Risk Review Process is used to escalate the most significant risks to higher levels for communication and action – Occurs ~ bi-monthly – Top Project risks are discussed – Risks requiring higher level awareness or action are escalated to the directorate risk review • The CxP Risk Team provides training to all program elements in order to promote awareness, consistent practice, improvement – Several hundred personnel trainedPage 14 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  15. 15. CRM - Risk Review Process ESMD CxP Ares Orion Altair EVA Project Project Project Project Ground Ops Mission Ops Lunar Surface Project Project Systems SEI PPC SRQA OTIPage 15 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  16. 16. CRM - CxP Cost Threat Process • The PP&C organizations at all program levels are responsible for ensuring that the impact of risks on program reserves is identified • This effort involves the Cx program and projects identifying and quantifying new cost impacts related to risk mitigation planning • A threat is money required to mitigate a risk that is not currently in the Program or project budget • Cost threats are documented and tracked in CxIRMA • During the risk review, management considers risks with technical performance, operations, safety, cost and schedule impacts – Balances requests for new mitigation funding identified in threats – What is the best portfolio of risk mitigation options that can be funded based on threat profile and reserves?Page 16 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  17. 17. Fully Characterize the Risk Team Brainstorming Integrated Project Control Analysis L2 SEI Data (TDS) IMSPRA Risk Drivers SRQA AresAcc Risk Hazards IMS (FMEA) OTI Risk 2564 Orion Requirements Risks (CARD) IMS Orion Integrated Analysis (TDS) . .Problem Reports PRA . . (PRACA) . . Identification Assessment Handling Communication (stakeholders)
  18. 18. CxIRMA • The CxP uses the IRMA risk database application to document, track, and communicate CxP risks • CxIRMA users guide and training available in the tool • IRMA is used in the ISS and Shuttle Programs and has been modified to complement the Cx risk process • The CxIRMA database is accessed in the CxP through the ICE environment • Users are assigned a role and to a Cx organization, and can be assigned to multiple organizations – Permissions are set by user type: • All risks are visible in CxIRMA regardless of organization affiliation • Candidates are only visible to those users assigned to the owning organizationPage 18 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  19. 19. CxIRMA • CxIRMA is based on a “homepage” concept – Each org has it’s own riskl list or homepage • Risk they own, risks for which they are stakeholder, escalated risks – Captures risk relationships – Easy to generate reportsPage 19 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  20. 20. CxIRMA • Significant updates in work – Update CxIRMA sw technology • Database, middleware, interface – New user friendly interface – Data relationships with other data systems • Requirements • Critical Analyses (TDS) • Schedule (IMS) • Hazards • PRACA – Embedded in Program Control Data System – Improved mitigation planning capability • MS Project type interface – Improved graphical reports • Mitigation Gant or “Waterfall” chartsPage 20 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  21. 21. Risk Informed Design (RID) • Risk Informed Design means that the design of the CxP architecture will consider risk as a critical design commodity so that the designs produced most effectively balance risk against performance and cost. – The ESAS used risk analysis to prioritize various architecture approaches based on risk – The establishment and allocation of LOC and LOM requirements applies design pressure on architecture development at all levels – Various risk analysis methods are used to identify risk drivers and identify the most beneficial use of design commodities (mass, power, budget, etc) to better meet LOC and LOM • Hazard Analysis • FMEA • PRA • Physics models and simulations – Risk associated with Cost, Schedule, and other design commodities are also considered – The Iterative Design Analysis Process provides regular integration forums where design insights can be madePage 21 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  22. 22. Risk Informed Design (RID) • RID uses LOC and LOM requirements to provide top down allocations of risk based on generic design reference mission configurations, – LOC and LOM were initially defined at the generic DRM level per the ESAS and architecture changes made after CxP startup • These mission risk requirements were allocated to the system and subsystem level • PRA, simulation, and physics modeling methodologies were used to used to evaluate adequacy of current designs and operational plans in meeting these requirements • LOC and LOM analysis addresses hardware, software, environments, human reliability, external events, phenomenological events, etc. • LOC and LOM analysis is part of the IDAC process – LOC and LOM is incorporated in diverse assessments and trade studies as integrated abort system design, launch order, land vs water landing, etc • The program is developing a campaign analysis capability that will allow us to evaluate the integrated effect of current designs and plans over a campaign of missions – Could result in a re-assessment of mission allocations and their allocations to the subsystem level – Could result in new requirements to drive more specific design issuesPage 22 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  23. 23. Risk Informed Design (RID) • The program is using PRA to provide more robust risk characterization during the hazard analysis process – Significant hazards will be quantified, and these incorporated in the PRA mission models – Functional Hazard Analysis performed to provide a top down, mission based review of hazards to provide a basis for IHA and system HA allocations and a starting point for mission PRA models – Mission PRA models and hazards will have a common basis • Integration of PRA and HA through FHA, and the quantification of significant hazards, promotes better understanding and intelligent management of the operational safety risk baseline • FMEA, Hazard Analysis, PRA • Controls, VerificationsPage 23 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  24. 24. Development of Mission Concepts and Architectures M a rs M is s io n A rc h ite c tu re R is k A s s e s s m e n t A rc hite c ture 6 A rc hite c ture 1 0 S ys te m s R e lia b ility A rc hite c ture 5 E ntry / L a nd ing R isk F O M A rc hite c ture 8 A rc hite c ture 3 M a rs O rb it Ins e rtio n A rc hite c ture 1 L a unc h / Inte g ra tio n A rc hite c ture 7 Tra ns M a rs Inje c tio n A rc hite c ture 4 A rc hite c ture 9 M a rs A s c e nt A rc hite c ture 2 Tra ns E a rth Inje c tio n 0 .0 0 1 .0 0 2 .0 0 3 .0 0 O the r H a za rd s R e fe re n c e M is s io n s Example Only – Not Real DataPage 24 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  25. 25. Development of Mission Concepts and Architectures Cut No. % Cumul. % Cut Set Prob./Frequency Cut Sets 1 29 29 1.60E-04 Loss of crew due to common cause failure of parachutes during landing 2 50 22 1.20E-04 Loss of crew due to MMOD impact 3 67 16 9.08E-05 Loss of crew due to Capsule software failure 4 78 11 6.16E-05 Loss of crew due to LV Upper Stage Engine Upper Stage Engine Catastrophic Failure 5 85 8 4.31E-05 Loss of crew due to Abort System separation jettison motor fails to function 6 89 4 2.16E-05 Loss of crew due to ground operations induced malfunction 7 95 5 3.02E-05 SRM case burst Example Only – Not Real DataPage 25 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  26. 26. Systems Safety and Risk Management • The CxP Risk Management program differentiates between risk acceptance decisions made during early design and operations, and longer term acceptance decisions – The Safety Review Process considers residual risk hazards and makes initial acceptance decision – These risk are captured in the program CRM process to decide if longer term mitigation is needed – Periodic reviews are made of acceptance rationale to determine if further risk mitigation is warranted based on new information, new capabilities, evolving risk vulnerabilities, changes to designs and operating plans, or new fundingPage 26 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  27. 27. The Life of a Safety/Mission RiskDevelopment OperationsSystems Safety Process Hazard Hazard Hazard Hazard HA, FMEA, PRA Acceptance Acceptance Acceptance Acceptance CSERP Ops MS Ops MS Ops MS Define And Implement Maintain Controls Characterize Risk Controls CRM Process Residual CRM Risk “Top” residual Hazards Acceptance are entered in CRM process (Defined by Risk Review place on matrix) Implement Strategic Mitigation Cease Mitigation?Page 27 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  28. 28. Integrated Risk Management: CRM is the Glue DDTE Operations Acceptance Systems Safety Continuous Risk Management • Define Risks and Controls • Residual Risk Acceptance • Capture most significant AR • Establish Operational Safety hazards as IRMA risks Baseline (OSB) • Continue to mitigate accepted risk hazards as appropriate Boards/Panels • Evaluate risks associated with proposed changes • Document risks associated • Conscious risk acceptance with decisions in CR and assoicated with change mitigate ATP milestones • Define risks as part of ATP • Document risks identified as prep and consider these in part of MMR process and decision mitigate • Conscious risk acceptance • Identify new risksPage 28 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  29. 29. Apollo Test Program 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Vision ESAS LAS DFT LAS LAS RRF RRF RRF ISS Speech Roll-Out 1 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Kennedy Speech 5/25 11/7 5/13 12/8 5/19 6/29 Apollo LES Sputnik “…before this decade Is out…” PA-1 A-001 A-002 A-003 PA-2 Saturn 10/27 4/25 11/16 3/28 1/29 1 ATP SA-1 SA-2 SA-3 SA-4 SA-45 SO SO SO SO SO Saturn I 5/28 9/18 2/16 5/25 7/30 SA-6 SA-7 SA-9 8 10 Saturn I flew 4 times before adding an upper stage Saturn IB Saturn I flew 6 times with S-IV before moving to S-IVB Saturn IB flew 4 times before first manned flight Saturn V flew 2 times before first manned flightPage 29 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  30. 30. Constellation’s Integrated Flight Test Strategy Low Earth Orbit Servicing Capability CEV CDR CLV CDR CxP CDR Validation Flight Tests (Production Systems) Ares I-X Ares I-Y Orion 1 Orion 2 Orion 3 Orion 4 Development Flight Tests High Orion Orion Altitude Abort Project Prime AA-1 AA-2 AA-3 Max q Transonic Tumble Abort Abort AbortPA-1 PA-2 FIRST FEIT MEIT9/08 4/09 7/09 10/09 1/10 4/10 7/10 10/10 1/11 4/11 7/11 10/11 1/12 4/12 7/12 10/12 1/13 4/13 7/13 10/13 1/14 4/14 7/14 10/14 Page 30 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  31. 31. Risk Informed Test Planning • Goals of Test Program – Validate requirements – Validate models – Enhance reliability growth – Better support Risk Acceptance • Methodology 1) Identify Hazards Early using Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) 1) High level functional hazards vs Cause level 2) Evaluate likelihood of occurrence using available knowledge and historical analogs 3) Determine the capability of analysis, ground test, flight test to characterize risks and reduce uncertainty 4) Recommend analysis and test activities needed to balance uncertainty reduction and achieve reliability growth 5) As hazard analysis and PRA mature, re-assess Pilot Project • Examine 10-12 hazards, evaluate the adequacy of current planned activitiesPage 31 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  32. 32. RM and KM Integration • In pursuit of becoming a learning organization, CxP risk management will include the integration of knowledge management and risk management processes into the program/project life cycle • Designing a complex architecture of hardware, software, ground and space-based assets to return to the Moon and then on to Mars will require an effective strategy to generate, capture and distribute knowledge • Premise: Risk Managers, who already use lessons-learned as a source of information for risk identification, are in a unique position within the organization to effectively perform these functions • Strategies – Knowledge-Based Risks – Pause and Learn (PAL) Events – Knowledge Capture/IntegrationPage 32 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  33. 33. Cx Knowledge-Based Risks • NASA’s Cx Program plans to create KBRs from pre-existing program risks (housed inside of CxIRMA) as well as incorporate KBRs into new program risks as they are identified. • As the Cx Program evolves, KBRs will be integrated into the existing continuous risk management (CRM) process. – Similar to CRM, the Cx KBR process includes Identification, Disposition, Documentation, and Distribution. KBR identification will become synonymous with risk identification. – The process also interacts with all levels and members of the Cx Program including: Cx Orgs, Cx Risk Management Working Group (RMWG), KBR Owners (similar to risk owners), ESMD, and SE&I. • If the Cx Program decides a KBR is “significant,” the program has identified the need for further exploration (including interviewing subject matter experts on the topic, collecting related documentation, etc…) into how this KBR relates to other NASA programs and projects. ESMD is responsible for significant KBR development. • Once the KBR implementation process has been tested successfully within the Cx Program, other programs will have the ability to participate in the process, creating a continuous KBR operation across the agency.Page 33 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  34. 34. CxP RM Status • The CxP RM program is very strong – Established Program Risk Management plan, risk review process, RM tool, RM working group, and RM training (over 500 trained) – All Cx Projects are actively identifying and mitigating risks and participating in the top risk reporting process – Integration of RM process & tools between levels I, II, and III going well – Risk Management is integrated with project control and ATP Milestone processes – Overall, level of detail and fidelity of mitigation planning is excellent for this stage of the program’s life and improves monthly – Risk identification processes such as Reqts Design Compliance, HA, FHA, Independent Cost Analysis, and PRA are in place to provide legs to the RM process – Integration of Technical Requirements, TPMs, TDSs, Cost Threats, Safety Analysis, Cost and Schedule under way – CxIRMA continues to develop improved capability to support new risk integration initiatives and ease of usePage 34 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  35. 35. CxP RM Status • Results are Evident – Risk is driving the design of Ares, Orion, and Altair to obtain a more optimal balance of risk across the architecture and mission timeline – Significant decisions are informed by risk analysis, including technical, safety, cost, schedule, and mission success factors – RM practice is present at all levels and in all decision making forums in the CxP – The CxP has created a RIDM culture • Having said that….there are areas where we can improve on this practice – Policy / Practice • Streamline and focus risk reviews, Continue to improve the quality of our risks. Integration of risks with other critical data elements – Tools • Risk Informed Test Planning Methodology. IRMA Enhancements. Knowledge Based Risks – Training • Case based trainingPage 35 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  36. 36. BackupPage 36 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  37. 37. Page 37 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  38. 38. RIDM relies on being able to both: 1) compare risks to resolve design trades, and 2) aggregate risks to understand risk posture at the mission and campaign level • The Risk Informed Design paradigm has been adopted by Ares, Orion, Lander, and CxAT to establish a more optimal use of design commodities to balance risk – Adaptation of NESC recommended methodology (RP-06-108: Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems) – Define Needs, Objectives, Constraints – Define Minimum Functionality – Make it Work – Make it Safe – Make it Reliable – Make it AffordablePage 38 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  39. 39. Technical Risk Scenario Conditional Conditional Conditional Initiating Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Outcome Event A Nominal LOC Desirability of Outcome Minor Damage LOM Catastrophic LOM Mitigation Events Initiating Event NOM Time • Paradigm works well for safety risk scenarios where discrete probabilities can be assigned to specific events in an accident sequence • Each sequence of events or risk trajectory, has a unique probability, derived from the combination of conditional probability eventsPage 39 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  40. 40. Mission Success Depends Upon a Combination of Many Variables Launch Strategy: Launch: • Two launch Vehicle Reliability: • Time increment • LOM/LOC • Single Launch between launches • Launch Availability Target Characteristics: • Launch Probability • Redundant Landing Sites • Order of Launches • Multiple opportunities to access a select landing site LEO Loiter: • Lighting constraints at • LEO Loiter Duration target • Ascent Rendezvous Vehicle Performance: Opportunities • Orbital Mechanics Variation Tolerance • TLI Windows • Additional Propulsive Capability • Vehicle Life • Launch Mass ConstraintsPage 40 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  41. 41. Example – Functional Risk Timeline Example Only – Not Real DataPage 41 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  42. 42. Saturn / Apollo Development Testing • Saturn “Block 1” Sub-Orbital Flights – First Stage Ascent Tests with Inert Upper Stages (no separation) – Validation of ascent performance, structural loads, functionality of gimbaled nozzles on the outboard engines for S&C. – SA-4 flight included intentional “engine-out” checkout. • Saturn Block II Flights – Functional S-IV Upper Stage – SA-6 through SA-10 flights carried prototype Crew Modules – Test of nominal LES jettison on SA-6 and SA-7. • Un-Crewed SI-B Flights – Functional SIV-B upper stage powered by J-2 Engine. – CM separated and returned to Earth. • Launch Escape System Testing – Abort Test Booster to test the LES at transonic, maximum dynamic pressure, low altitude, and power-on tumbling abort conditions.Page 42 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009
  43. 43. Mars First? MOON MARS Earth ISS • Exploration Campaign Analysis: Identify the activities and architectures required to optimally produce mission success and crew safety within cost and schedule constraints • The high risk associated with manned Mars exploration make risk informed design essential • ISS and Lunar missions are also essential to accomplishing this goal – Technology demonstration – Reliability growth – Operational experiencePage 43 NASA CxP John V. Turner, PMC 2009

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