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Bejmuk bo

  1. 1. Design for OperationsSpace Shuttle vs. Sea Launch Bo Bejmuk
  2. 2. Shuttle Sea Launch Courtesy of the Sea Launch CompanySpace Shuttle designed for ascentperformance, multi functionality Zenit Rocket designed to strictand minimum development cost operational requirementsResult: Result:Costly ground operations Automation and robust designCostly mission planning Simple and cost effective operationsCostly flight operations Great benefit to cost of ownership 2
  3. 3. Space Shuttle – Magnificent flying system but difficult and costly to operate 3
  4. 4. Initial Naive Concept of Ground Operations 4
  5. 5. Operational Reality NASA, KSC Photo, dated September 25, 1979, index number “KSC-79PC-500” 5
  6. 6. Lack of Robustness and Design Margins Complicated flight Planning and Increased CostProblem• The launch probability predictions for early Shuttle flights was less than 50% – More than half of the measured winds aloft violated the vehicle’s certified boundariesCorrective Actions• System Integration led the evolution from a single ascent I-load, through seasonal I-loads, alternate I-loads, and finally arriving at DOLILU• This process extended over a 10+ year period• Concurrently the Program executed 3 load cycles (Integrated Vehicle Baseline Characterization - IVBC) combined with hardware modifications to expand vehicle certified envelopes• Current launch probability is well in excess of 95%Lesson• Commit to a DOLILU approach during early development – Significantly improves margins• Use additional margins on not well understood environments 6• Will enhance robustness and simplify operations
  7. 7. Ascent Design Operations Evolution 100 High Lesson Learned: Reliance on Operations ProcessPercent of Winds Violating Certification (%) to Maintain Margin is Expensive Operations Overhead Ascent Operations Overhead 50 Med Certification Violations 0 Low 1975 1985 1995 2005 Seasonal Alternate Annual Monthly Day-of-Launch 7
  8. 8. Day-of-Launch I-Loads Evolution (10 years +) Early Flights Present Flights Single I-Loads DOLILU Qa Over 50% of winds Qa violated certified envelope Qb Qb Expanded Certified Envelope 3-Hour Wind VariationCertified Annual WindEnvelope Variation DOLILU drives toward center of Qa – Qb envelope and reduces winds violation to < 5% 8
  9. 9. Where did We go Wrong?Problem• Insufficient definition of operational requirements during development phase – Concentration on performance requirements but not on operational considerations – Shuttle design organizations were not responsible for operational cost – Very few incentives for development contractorsResult• Very labor intensive (high operational cost) vehicle was developed and put into operationsLesson• Must have the Concept of Operations defined• Define and levy the operational requirements on contractors to support the Concept of Operations• Must have continuity and integration between designers, ground operations, and flight operations requirements during the developmental phase 9
  10. 10. Sea Launch Zenit Rocket Very Efficient andEasy to Operate Courtesy of the Sea Launch Company 10
  11. 11. Launch Platform Courtesy of the Sea Launch Company 11
  12. 12. Assembly and Command Ship Courtesy of the Sea Launch Company 12
  13. 13. Launch 13 Courtesy of the Sea Launch Company
  14. 14. Sea Launch – Zenit Derived Launch System • Major integration of existing and new elements – Two stage Ukrainian Zenit – 3rd stage Russian Block DM – New payload accommodation & composite fairing – Modified semi-submersible oil drilling platform into a launch pad – New command and control and rocket assembly shipCourtesy of the Sea Launch Company • System was built and brought to operational state in less than 3.5 years – 24 flights to date 14
  15. 15. Sea Launch Operations • Integration of rocket stages and payload at home port in Long Beach, CA • Launches performed from the Equator, 154 degrees west (south of Hawaii)Courtesy of the Sea Launch Company Small Team performs ground checkout and launch Ground Processing Launch Team Team* Americans 80 40 Russians 200 140 Ukrainians 50 50 Norwegians 75 70 Totals 405 300 * Launch Team is a subset of the Ground Processing Team; Ground Processing team members that are not required to participate in launch at 15 sea are sent back to their companies and are off the Sea Launch payroll
  16. 16. Lessons Learned from Sea Launch• Zenit extremely automated launch vehicle – Very little interaction with crew during checkout, pre-launch, and flight• Single string accountability, no duplications of effort (to some extent driven by export compliance restrictions)• Low operational cost benefited from original design criteria of Zenit – Rollout to pad, fuel and launch in 90 minutes – Allows very little time for ground or flight crew involvement – Imposes requirements for automatic processes 16
  17. 17. The Big Lesson• If we want simple and cost effective operations we must design for operations – Shuttle designed for performance and minimum development cost – Sea Launch Zenit Rocket designed to strict operational requirements• NASA is in control of operations destiny of new programs – Narrow window of opportunity 17