Non-Public Provision of
Basic Education
Harry Anthony Patrinos
The World Bank
2010
70 million Children out of School
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
OutofSchoolChildren(mill...
Low Academic Achievement
PISA 2006 Math
26.6
18.9
17.0
13.1
19.0
10.8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Primary Secondary Higher
Private Social
High Returns to Schooling
EDUCATION SPENDING, STUDENT
PERFORMANCE
Economics of Education System
• Structure of system may be contributing factor
to high cost & poor performance
• Costly fo...
• Public school administrators have
strong incentive to expand budgets
by seeking additional funding
• Resulting in higher...
• But concerns about:
– Exclusion
– Beneficiaries from high income families
– Social imbalance
– Funds from public schools...
Growth of Private Schooling
Source: Primary school enrollments, 1991-2004, from UNESCO 2006
113%
109%
12%
1%
76%
21%
52%
1...
Service Delivery
Provision
Finance Private Public
Private  Private schools
 Private universities
 Home schooling
 Tuto...
Impact of Vouchers & Charters
Targeted Vouchers
Colombia Strong Positive Evidence
Significant increases in
learning:
0.2 of a standard deviation
Universal Vouchers
Chile Mixed Evidence
4 studies show positive effects
4 show 0 or sorting effects
Charter Schools
Growth of Charters in USA
Center for Education Reform
Impact of Charter Schools
Program Learning Access
Harlem Children’s
Zone
0.8 of standard deviation (SD) &
0.3 in math & En...
International Evidence
• Positive effects in Canada (Ontario, Quebec),
Netherlands, Sweden
• No effect in Denmark
• Mixed ...
Evidence on Private Management
• Colombia concession schools
• Venezuela Fe y Alegria schools
A Public School:
Ciudad Bolivar, Bogotá, Colombia
Concession School:
Ciudad Bolivar, Bogotá, Colombia
Evidence on Private Management
• Colombia concession schools: positive impact
on test scores: 0.2 & 0.3 of standard deviat...
Evidence on Private Management
• Colombia concession schools: positive impact
on test scores: 0.2 & 0.3 of standard deviat...
Low Cost Private Schools
Punjab Education Foundation,
Pakistan
• Results
– Large positive impacts on number of students, teachers, classrooms &
bla...
Benchmarking Education Systems
Indicators to map education system:
• Are private schools allowed to operate?
• Is public-funding for private schools allo...
Indicators to map education system:
• Are private schools allowed to operate?
• Is public-funding for private schools allo...
Benchmarking Education Systems
Nascent IntegralEmerging EngagedLacks
Belgium
Chile
Finland France
Netherlands
Poland Swede...
Benchmarking Education Systems
70
65
60
10
5
30
25
20
15
0
United States
Spain
England
Scotland
Korea
Coverage
Mexico
Estonia
Brazil
Italy
Ireland
Greece...
Regulatory and Design Dimensions of Private
Sector Participation in Education Systems
Enabling Regulatory Environment yes/...
Thank you
Harry Anthony Patrinos
hpatrinos@worldbank.org
Extending public education through private provision (patrinos updated)
Extending public education through private provision (patrinos updated)
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Extending public education through private provision (patrinos updated)

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  • Out of school childrenOften low-income, girls, indigenous, ethnic left outQuality of education is poorIn recent decades concerns about poor performance of students & rising costs of education emergedThere is still a pressing challenge:Access low in several developing countries, mostly affecting South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.Quality lags considerably in others as shown by results in international assessments (PISA and TIMSS).Clearly, having passed the midpoint of the ambitious Education for All goals, many developing countries are off-track of achieving comprehensive and inclusive systems of quality education (since the Dakar framework in 2000)
  • Private Enrollment is already happening: This graph show us that the rate of private enrollment at the basic level between 1991 and 2004, was higher relative to public enrollment. In other words, private enrollment rates grew by 58% (from 39 to 62 million) while public grew 10% (from 484 to 530 million) during the same periodThe main message from this chart is that the public sector remains as the most important player in the provision of education, but the private sector is playing an increasingly important role in catering for students, particularly in the regions of most need, Sub-saharan Africa and South and East Asia. The fact that private enrollment rates are increasing at a higher rate than public enrollment and that in several countries governments already finance the operation of private schools; leads to question of what is the most effective way for governments to contract private education providers to help them meet access and learning goals.
  • This chart shows that the responsibility to provide and finance education is shared between the public and the private sectors. The policy alternative we are referring to in this presentation is one where the government finances education and the private sector takes responsibility for a portion of the provision. Such option is located on the left bottom quadrant of the chart and illustrates instances in which governments contract out the delivery of education to private education institutions by means of a payment. This can be done through several mechanisms, some of which are named, for example vouchers and contract for school management.
  • Two fronts of analysis:Effects on students attending voucher/charter schoolsEffects at a systemic level, on students that remain in public schools Caveats:Attrition: some students failed to participate in follow upsOften times, studies reflect short-term effectsSome vouchers that allowed parents paying top-up fees led to large amount of non-users amongst lottery winnersQuestionable external validity because small treatment groups and specific student populations
  • Dobbie and Fryer 2009;Angrist et al 2010;Kane et al 2009Boston: Charters schools (1993): freed from some regulations, flexibility, no collective bargaining, accountable for results;Pilot schools (1995): public schools with flexibility but remain subject to local school district regulations and collective bargaining; Coverage: 17% of 10th grade & 21 % of 7th grade students enrolled in Charters and Pilots; 75 charters granted in past 15 years, 10% revoked; Standardized tests: 4 /10 top public schools were charters in 2008; Skepticism: self-selection in charters by more motivated & educated; Observational & experimental evaluation: each year of attendance in middle school Charter schools raise student achievement 0.09 to 0.17 standard deviations in English; 0.18 to 0.54 standard deviations in math; relative to those attending traditional schools in BostonKIPP:Largest charter management organization, 80 schools; “No Excuses“ focus on traditional math & reading skills, long school day/year, selective teacher hiring, strict behavior norms, strong student work ethic; KIPP producing substantial score gains, but critics argue that advantage is driven by selection of those who need most support poorly served; Quasi-experimental evaluation of KIPP school in Lynn, Mass. Show reading gain of 0.12 standard deviations (s.d.) for each year student at KIPP; Larger gains for special education & limited English students of 0.3-0.4 s.d.; KIPP raises scores more for those whose achievement lags peers; KIPP boosts achievement primarily by moving students up from lowest group; Therefore, KIPP benefits weakest students mostOnly 1 KIPP school, but lots of program standardization, replicability so expect similar gains & interactions to emerge from larger sample; Students in Lynn Public Schools (LPS) score about a third of a standard deviation below the Massachusetts average on standardized tests; Each KIPP school sets its own curriculum, but KIPP Lynn shares many features with other KIPP schools across the nation; KIPP Lynn operates long school year, starting August & some Saturdays, long school day from 7:30 to 5:00; The school emphasizes basic reading and math skillsStudents expected to adhere to behavioral code, includes speaking only when called on in class and orderly movement between classes; Students receive paychecks," points awarded for good work that can be spent on field trips and other perks; Parents or guardians, students, & teachers sign a Commitment to Excellence, a promise to come to school on time & work hard; KIPP Lynn's teachers are not unionized, work an unusually long day, and are expected to respond to students phone calls in the evening; KIPP was founded by alumni of the national Teach For America (TFA) internship program, and many KIPP Lynn teachers are graduates of TFA; KIPP Lynn teachers are much younger than those in the rest of LPS: 88 percent are 40 or under, compared to 29 percent in LPSPerhaps reflecting their age, KIPP teachers are far less likely to be licensed in their teaching assignment (26 %, compared to 98% in LPS)Harlem Children’s Zone: 97-block area in central Harlem, New York; Charters with web of community services for children;Health, incentives, meals, parental supports, committed staff; Lottery for entry and for treatment/control groups; HCZ enormously effective at increasing achievement of poorest minority children; Students enrolled in 6th grade gain more than full standard deviation in math, 1/3 to ½ in English, by 8th grade; Enough to reverse the black-white achievement gap
  • Subsidy: Rs. 300 ($4.3) per student per month; subsidy level set at upper-end of price range for low-cost sector;Use of subsidy largely unfettered;Teacher bonus: Rs. 10,000 ($143) per teacher per year for 5 teachers in schools in which at least 90% of students in tested classes obtain score of 40% or higher; 370% of mean monthly teacher salary at baseline; School bonus: Rs. 50,000 ($714) to school in each district with highest pass rate per year;76% of mean monthly subsidy payment to schools given mean enrollment size at baseline; School bonus: Rs. 50,000 ($714) to school in each district with highest pass rate per year; 76% of mean monthly subsidy payment to schools given mean enrollment size at baseline;Impact Evaluation Strategy: Since entry into program is a function of a minimum student pass rates in test (average at school level), Regression Discontinuity approach used 2 entry school wavesBoth administrative & collected data via phone survey to schools near discontinuity point
  • `
  • So where are we going? We are working to identify the specific areas in the regulatory framework and the design of the policies that would make a program successful. We have identified the ones in the table as part of our work to benchmark regulatory frameworks for education systems, which applies to systems of public finance and private delivery
  • Extending public education through private provision (patrinos updated)

    1. 1. Non-Public Provision of Basic Education Harry Anthony Patrinos The World Bank 2010
    2. 2. 70 million Children out of School 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 OutofSchoolChildren(millions) . EAP Other ECA MNA LAC SAS SSA
    3. 3. Low Academic Achievement PISA 2006 Math
    4. 4. 26.6 18.9 17.0 13.1 19.0 10.8 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Primary Secondary Higher Private Social High Returns to Schooling
    5. 5. EDUCATION SPENDING, STUDENT PERFORMANCE
    6. 6. Economics of Education System • Structure of system may be contributing factor to high cost & poor performance • Costly for parents & students to shift from low-quality schools
    7. 7. • Public school administrators have strong incentive to expand budgets by seeking additional funding • Resulting in higher costs & disconnect between quality & preferences Economics of Education System
    8. 8. • But concerns about: – Exclusion – Beneficiaries from high income families – Social imbalance – Funds from public schools Solution?
    9. 9. Growth of Private Schooling Source: Primary school enrollments, 1991-2004, from UNESCO 2006 113% 109% 12% 1% 76% 21% 52% 15% -13% -1% 18% -5% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% Africa Arab States Latin America Pacific South & East Asia Central Asia Privat e Public
    10. 10. Service Delivery Provision Finance Private Public Private  Private schools  Private universities  Home schooling  Tutoring  User fees  Student loans Public  Vouchers  Contract Schools  Charter schools  Contracting out  Public schools  Public universities
    11. 11. Impact of Vouchers & Charters
    12. 12. Targeted Vouchers Colombia Strong Positive Evidence Significant increases in learning: 0.2 of a standard deviation
    13. 13. Universal Vouchers Chile Mixed Evidence 4 studies show positive effects 4 show 0 or sorting effects
    14. 14. Charter Schools
    15. 15. Growth of Charters in USA Center for Education Reform
    16. 16. Impact of Charter Schools Program Learning Access Harlem Children’s Zone 0.8 of standard deviation (SD) & 0.3 in math & English (3 years) Poorest minority students KIPP 0.35 & 0.1 of SD in math & reading (each year) Low income & minorities (KIPP Lynn opened 2004, 300 students in grades 5-8 Massachusetts 0.2 & 0.6 of SD in English & math (1 year) 61 charter schools and 25,000 students in 2007-08 (21,300 students in waiting list)
    17. 17. International Evidence • Positive effects in Canada (Ontario, Quebec), Netherlands, Sweden • No effect in Denmark • Mixed effects in USA
    18. 18. Evidence on Private Management • Colombia concession schools • Venezuela Fe y Alegria schools
    19. 19. A Public School: Ciudad Bolivar, Bogotá, Colombia
    20. 20. Concession School: Ciudad Bolivar, Bogotá, Colombia
    21. 21. Evidence on Private Management • Colombia concession schools: positive impact on test scores: 0.2 & 0.3 of standard deviation in reading & math Sources: Barrera-Osorio 2007
    22. 22. Evidence on Private Management • Colombia concession schools: positive impact on test scores: 0.2 & 0.3 of standard deviation in reading & math • Venezuela Fe y Alegria schools: positive impact on test scores: 0.1 of standard deviation in math & verbal Sources: Barrera-Osorio 2007; Allcott & Ortega 2007
    23. 23. Low Cost Private Schools
    24. 24. Punjab Education Foundation, Pakistan • Results – Large positive impacts on number of students, teachers, classrooms & blackboards – Students: teacher ratio remains constant – Impact emerging within a short period 26 Barrera-Osorio & Dhushyanth Raju (2010)
    25. 25. Benchmarking Education Systems
    26. 26. Indicators to map education system: • Are private schools allowed to operate? • Is public-funding for private schools allowed? • Is there a contract that (explicit or implicit) governs the use of funds transferred to non-public schools? • Is the non-public operation of public schools permitted? • Does public funding follows the student to the school of their choice? Benchmarking Education Systems
    27. 27. Indicators to map education system: • Are private schools allowed to operate? • Is public-funding for private schools allowed? • Is there a contract that (explicit or implicit) governs the use of funds transferred to non-public schools? • Is the non-public operation of public schools permitted? • Does public funding follows the student to the school of their choice? A continuum Nascent IntegralEmerging EngagedLacks Moderate Benchmarking Education Systems
    28. 28. Benchmarking Education Systems Nascent IntegralEmerging EngagedLacks Belgium Chile Finland France Netherlands Poland Sweden Moderate Korea Scotland Austria Czech Rep Denmark Germany Hungary Iceland Luxembourg New Zealand Norway Portugal Slovak Rep Switzerland Israel Slovenia Greece Ireland Japan Mexico Brazil Estonia Italy England Spain United States Categorization of countries
    29. 29. Benchmarking Education Systems
    30. 30. 70 65 60 10 5 30 25 20 15 0 United States Spain England Scotland Korea Coverage Mexico Estonia Brazil Italy Ireland Greece Japan Netherlands Finland Chile Belgium Sweden Poland France Czech Rep Slovak Rep Hungary Germany Denmark Austria Slovenia Israel Portugal Norway New Zealand Luxembourg Iceland Switzerland Nascent IntegralEmerging EngagedModerateLacks
    31. 31. Regulatory and Design Dimensions of Private Sector Participation in Education Systems Enabling Regulatory Environment yes/no Policies and requirements for the existence of private schools --- Enforceable standards for private school operation --- Private for-profit schools allowed --- Characteristics of mechanisms of public funding to private schools --- Public funding of private schools guided by the existence of a contract --- Contract pays for inputs or outputs --- Enforceable standards for private schools to receive public funding yes/no Ability to set own fees --- Ability to hire and fire teachers --- Ability to select curriculum --- Student selection criteria by schools --- Schools have the ability to select student --- Students have the ability to select schools (choice) ---
    32. 32. Thank you Harry Anthony Patrinos hpatrinos@worldbank.org

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