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Future of the Japan-U.S. alliance       “How Japan’s defense posture  should change for a sustainable alliance”           ...
ContentsNew National Defense Program Outline( NDPO)Four scenarios for the future of Japan-U.S. allianceand their analysesF...
New National Defense             Program Outline( NDPO)Security environment surrounding Japan   Regional security issues(K...
Policy underlying                        the conversion to a new SDFCapability                                            ...
Scenario for the future of                    Japan-U.S. alliance                             axis T                 Threa...
Scenario for the future of                     Japan-U.S. alliance                             axis T                 Thre...
Current Japan-U.S. alliance                           axis T               Threat perception of Japan-U.S.                ...
The 1st scenario                Community typeOverlapping strategic goalsJapan cooperates more closely with the U.S.milita...
The 2nd scenario        The Offshore balancing type Global posture review of U.S.Forces- Putting the emphasis on contingen...
The 2nd scenario        The Offshore balancing type Same threat perception is shared - Request Japan to have a higher powe...
The 3rd scenario          The Reluctant alliance type The threat perception is not shared. Becomes a nominal alliance Only...
The 4th scenario      The Selective engagement type Same bed, different dreams- U.S.(Focus on security cooperation on worl...
Summary of scenario research                                        axis T    Large             The 2nd scenario          ...
Future of Japan’s defense policyChanges of Japanese defense strategy  The Basic Concept of Japan’s Defense Policy  Positiv...
Image of “Active Deterrence”                  Active     Deterrence by action                 Deterrence Deterrence by exi...
Roles & Mission of Japan-U.S.                                                           HRO, Peacetime EngagementRemote Ar...
Future shape of    the Ground Self-Defense Force         (“What it should be”)New organization  Establishment of internati...
Future shape of    the Ground Self-Defense Force         (“What it should be”)New organization  Establishment of internati...
Future shape of    the Ground Self-Defense Force         (“What it should be”)New organization  Establishment of internati...
"A light and strong" Force IT soldier                   Improve mobility            Coordinate        integrate operation ...
Future shape of       the Ground Self-Defense Force            (“What it should be”)Improvement of Japan-U.S. interoperabi...
Future shape of       the Ground Self-Defense Force            (“What it should be”)Improvement of Japan-U.S. interoperabi...
ConclusionsJapan-U.S. alliance should move toward the 1stscenario, and must avoid the 3rd scenario.Easing the interpretati...
“Final Goal Keeper of Defense”           Questions & Comments ?
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Stimson report final

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  1. 1. Future of the Japan-U.S. alliance “How Japan’s defense posture should change for a sustainable alliance” December 20, 2004 COL. Katsuki TAKATA Visiting Fellow The Henry L. Stimson Center The views expressed herein are those solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Henry L. Stimson Center, Japan Self Defense Force, or the Government of Japan
  2. 2. ContentsNew National Defense Program Outline( NDPO)Four scenarios for the future of Japan-U.S. allianceand their analysesFuture shape of the Ground Self-Defense Forceresulting from scenario research.(What it should be)Conclusion
  3. 3. New National Defense Program Outline( NDPO)Security environment surrounding Japan Regional security issues(Korean Peninsula, Taiwan strait) The new threat and Various situationThe basic policy of Japan’s security Basic policy Japan’s own effort+cooperation to U.S.+cooperation to international community(Follow the 4 principle)The defense posture of Japan Roles of defense capability Effectively & appropriate respond to the new threat and various situation Preparations to deal with full-scale invasion To proactively & positively engage in actives for peace & stability of international community
  4. 4. Policy underlying the conversion to a new SDFCapability Improve Readiness Mobility Flexibility Sustain at minimum level Function Prepare for full-scale invasion to Japan Education & training Logistic capability Capability Capability Nuclear capability for ForCapability Capability for Anti- Anti- Anti-new International For Attack Air MD Threat & Cooperation C4I Enemies’ bases armor submarine operations Anti-various Activity Mobile strike operations operations situation Power on sea Effectively && appropriaterespond Effectively appropriate respond NDPO Proactively &positively engage New NDPO
  5. 5. Scenario for the future of Japan-U.S. alliance axis T Threat perception of Japan-U.S. Large The 2nd scenario The 1st scenario The Offshore The Community type balancing type axis P Large U.S. militarySmall Presence The 3rd scenario The 4th scenario (Capability) The Reluctant The Selective alliance type engagement type Small
  6. 6. Scenario for the future of Japan-U.S. alliance axis T Threat perception of Japan-U.S. Large The 2nd scenario The 1st scenario The Offshore The Community type balancing type axis P Large U.S. militarySmall Presence The 3rd scenario The 4th scenario (Capability) The Reluctant The Selective alliance type engagement type Small
  7. 7. Current Japan-U.S. alliance axis T Threat perception of Japan-U.S. Large Same threat is recognized about domestic emergency and contingency surrounding JapanSmall Large axis P U.S. military Current Presence Japan and U.S. don’t have Japan-U.S. alliance (Capability)same threats perceptionabout global activity. Small
  8. 8. The 1st scenario Community typeOverlapping strategic goalsJapan cooperates more closely with the U.S.military campaigns worldwide.Big barrier to develop this relationship- Problems with so-called “integration with the use ofmilitary forces” remain to be solved in the minimum.Organization review of the JSDF- Based on "Territorial defense model" for a Cold War typethreat should be change to “Capable base model” Improve the power projection capability
  9. 9. The 2nd scenario The Offshore balancing type Global posture review of U.S.Forces- Putting the emphasis on contingency response in the Middle East and Central Asia [Post-9.11] USEUCOM USEUCOM USCENTCOM USCENTCOM USPACOM USPACOM Arc of Instability Arc of Instability Uneasiness and doubt in each country will increase- Emphasis of defense of Japan should be shifted from that based on Japan-US joint response to independent defense capability
  10. 10. The 2nd scenario The Offshore balancing type Same threat perception is shared - Request Japan to have a higher power projection capability Independent defense capability - Revision of the force structure - “Capability to attack enemies’ bases" and “Mobile strike power on sea” It will be politically challenging ,both with Japanese public and Japan’s Asian neighbors
  11. 11. The 3rd scenario The Reluctant alliance type The threat perception is not shared. Becomes a nominal alliance Only economic interdependence remain Japan’s independent defense capability(same as 2nd scenario)- “It sounds appropriate to choose US force’s withdrawal from Japan than to continue Marine Corps in Okinawa without support from Japanese people in order to strengthen the alliance in long-range” (Mike Mochizuki)- “Prime Minister Hashimoto should offer to President Clinton about redeployment of Marine Corps to south of Korea from Okinawa.” (Jo Sakon; former Chief, Joint Staff Office)
  12. 12. The 4th scenario The Selective engagement type Same bed, different dreams- U.S.(Focus on security cooperation on worldwide)- Japan (USFJ for “Ensuring the security of Japan” ) Limited contribution to a military campaign of the U.S. worldwide- Vital national(JPN) interest- Financial support etc.( In other region) Friction between both countries4th scenario will finally develop into the 3rd scenario
  13. 13. Summary of scenario research axis T Large The 2nd scenario The 1st scenario ○ Same threat perception is shared ●Overlapping the strategic goals ○ Independent defense capability ○Big barrier to developing ○ Difficulty getting peoples support ○Improve the power projection capability axis PSmall Large The 3rd scenario The 4th scenario ○ Same bed,different dreams ○ The threat perception is not shared. ○ Japan’s military contribution to ○ Becomes nominal alliance U.S. military campaigns worldwide ○ Independent defense capability will be limited ○ Worst scenario ○4th scenario will finally develop   into the 3rd scenario Small
  14. 14. Future of Japan’s defense policyChanges of Japanese defense strategy The Basic Concept of Japan’s Defense Policy Positive use defense power globally (Active Deterrence)Further promotion of Japan-U.S. strategicdialogue “What Japan should do” “ What Japan are able to do”
  15. 15. Image of “Active Deterrence” Active Deterrence by action Deterrence Deterrence by existence Deterrence byexistence + action deterrence by existence =Exclusively defense-oriented Policy
  16. 16. Roles & Mission of Japan-U.S. HRO, Peacetime EngagementRemote AreasRemote Areas ACSA Info- : Japan’s Role & mission : Sharing, RAS for : U.S.’s Role & mission MNF Offensive OPS HRO : Japan’s challenge Deterrence (Security Nation- Red letter : Restricted by legislation Options OPS, Use of Building Force, RAS for DDR、 Military MNF CeaseJapan’’s Proximity Japan’’s Territories CMIC)Japan s Proximity Japan s Territories NEO, Presence International HRO Info- RAS Fire PSI, (Balance), SLOC Defense Exchanges Sharing, SAR ACSA Security Counter- protection Combat Terrorism Operations Deterrence area SLOC SLOC Protection、ACSA Options protection Nuclear SLOC Protection、ACSA Deterrence, Counter Counter Counter- Terrorism、 Terrorism Invasion, Offensive Reconstructio Deterrence LIC, OPS Domestic Territorial S&R n Options MD Security Protection etc. NEO etc. Assistance Info-Sharing SLOC Protection, ACSA Info-Sharing, Protection of USFJ, SLOC protection ProtectionCONUS PSI、Multilateral Ex/Tng OPS for USFJ, Nuc-Strikes Rapid National LIC Reconstruction Deployment Building Counter-Terrorism, Disaster MD Nuc Deterrence Relief, Forward Presence MD Peacetime Prevention Deterrence Response Reconstruction
  17. 17. Future shape of the Ground Self-Defense Force (“What it should be”)New organization Establishment of international duty force Establishment of an experimental force that can link to the network of the U.S. Establishment of "A light and strong" force
  18. 18. Future shape of the Ground Self-Defense Force (“What it should be”)New organization Establishment of international duty force Establishment of an experimental force that can link to the network of the U.S. Establishment of "A light and strong" force
  19. 19. Future shape of the Ground Self-Defense Force (“What it should be”)New organization Establishment of international duty force Establishment of an experimental force that can link to the network of the U.S. Establishment of "A light and strong" force
  20. 20. "A light and strong" Force IT soldier Improve mobility Coordinate integrate operation Net work for BMaintenance the center ofgravity of defense posture Net work for R
  21. 21. Future shape of the Ground Self-Defense Force (“What it should be”)Improvement of Japan-U.S. interoperability Eliminate uncertainty The bilateral joint training should be more actively executed. Conducting multinational training in order to maintain peace and stability in Asia Pacific region.Cooperation between ministries, localgovernments and NGOs, etc. in peacetime Establish a liaison branch to each ministry Information exchange and coordination with NGOs in Japan and overseas for international activity
  22. 22. Future shape of the Ground Self-Defense Force (“What it should be”)Improvement of Japan-U.S. interoperability Eliminate uncertainty The bilateral joint training should be more actively executed. Conducting multinational training in order to maintain peace and stability in Asia Pacific region.Cooperation between ministries, localgovernments and NGOs, etc. in peacetime Establish a liaison branch to facilitate interagency coordination Information exchange and coordination with NGOs in Japan and overseas for international activity
  23. 23. ConclusionsJapan-U.S. alliance should move toward the 1stscenario, and must avoid the 3rd scenario.Easing the interpretation of the Constitution overthe right to collective self-defensePromotion of the strategic dialogue"Territorial defense" the only main task any longerPay attention to 4th scenarioLogistical support to the U.S. military and coalitionforcesContinue humanitarian and the reconstructionsupport after conflictsJapan must clearly communicate its “Roles andMissions” to the United States, and have to share acommon understanding.
  24. 24. “Final Goal Keeper of Defense” Questions & Comments ?
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