1. Introduction
1) What is Japan’s Basic Security Policy?
2) How has Japan’s political decision-making impacted
its security policy since the Gulf War?
3) How have Japan’s military capabilities changed since
the Gulf War?
4) What are the implications of the evolution of Japan’s
political decision-making and military capabilities for
Japanese security policy in the next 10 years?
2. Conclusion
Japan’s basic security policy will fundamentally be
unchanged in the next 10 years. Its defense posture will
remain defensive and restrained.
The future direction of Japanese security policy:
1 Japan will gradually and practically orient its posture on
national security to the international security
environment within the framework of its basic security
policy.
2 Japan’s security relations with the U.S. will be gradually
and steadily adjusted to its national security posture.
3 Japan may adopt a limited offensive strategy consistent
with its basic security policy.
3. Article 9
1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling
international disputes.
2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
4. Basic Policy for National Defense
1) To support UN activities and promote international
cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world
peace.
2) To promote public welfare and enhance the people’s love for
their country, thereby establishing a sound basis essential for
Japan’s security.
3) To incrementally develop effective defense capabilities
necessary for self-defense in accordance with the nation’s
resources and prevailing domestic situation.
4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-
U.S. security arrangements pending the effective capacity of
the UN in the future to deter and repel such aggression.
5. Other basic security policies
1) Exclusively defense-oriented policy
2) Not becoming a military power
3) Adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles
4) Ensuring civilian control of the military
The constitution (article 9) Basic Policy for National Defense
“Japan’s Basic Security Policy”
Other basic security policies
6. The Evolution of Political Decision-making 1/4
Persian Gulf War of 1991
• Japan started to change its posture toward
international security issues.
– Dispatch of the MSDF minesweepers
Peace Keeping Operations (PKO)
• Japan tried to realistically enhance its role in PKOs
within the limits of Japanese public understanding.
– International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992.
• Restrictions
7. The Evolution of Political Decision-making 2/4
Response to international terrorism
• Japanese public opinion came to understand to the use of the
SDF which was within legal limits.
– Protect U.S. bases and sensitive Japanese facilities
– SDF in the Indian Ocean
– Restraint
North Korea
• Japanese public are very concerned about the various
ongoing difficulties and imminent threats posed by North
Korea:
– Teapodong-1 -Japan's MD system
– Nuclear program -a threat to Japan
– Suspicious boats -a big impact
– North Korean abductions -an act of terrorism in Japan
8. The Evolution of Political Decision-making 3/4
Iraq Dispatch
• Japan clearly stated its support for the U.S. rather than a
UN-authorized mandate.
– Created a bill to dispatch SDF troops to Iraq
• Help U.S. and other foreign forces
• Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
• Restrictions
• Permanent legal framework to allow the dispatch of SDF
troops overseas.
– 12 years?
9. The Evolution of Political Decision-making 4/4
Japan-US Political Relationship
• Steadily continued to evolve their political relations.
– “Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region” in 1995
– The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996
• The three bills on ensuring the effectiveness of the
Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in
1999
– Restrictions
10. The Evolution of Military Capabilities 1/7
• The SDF gradually oriented their capabilities to the
Japan’s national security circumstance.
– New defense strategy aimed to address the
increase of new types of threats.
– Japanese politicians discuss how to utilize Japan’s
military capabilities to address these new threats.
11. The Evolution of Military Capabilities 2/7
GSDF capabilities
• GSDF has tried to orient their capabilities to the
national security circumstances.
– Operations to counter landing of invading forces
• Long range strike capability
• Transportation capability
– Prepare new assets oriented to the Japan’s current
national security circumstance.
• Western Infantry Regiment
• New organization for ???
12. The Evolution of Military Capabilities 3/7
MSDF capabilities
• MSDF reinforced overseas and air defense capabilities
according to Japan’s national security circumstances
– Decreased ships
– Increased standard displacement (Explain)
– Limited but practical overseas capabilities in 2003
– Suspicious boats
• New missile boats
• Special boarding units
– Two additional Aegis destroyers with improved air
defense capabilities.
13. The Evolution of Military Capabilities 4/7
ASDF capabilities
• Reinforced traditional capabilities and acquired new
capabilities according to Japan’s national security
circumstances.
– The reinforcement of equipment quality
• Ability to use AWACS for air operations.
– Reinforced air strike capabilities for F-2 and F-4EJK
• Why F-4EJK?
– KC-767
• Air refueling capability
14. The Evolution of Military Capabilities 5/7
Other military capabilities (MD system and Satellite)
• Japan still should depend on U.S. military power for its
national security
• MD system
– 4 basic phases in MD
– No capabilities in Japan
– The Missile Defense Joint Task Force
– The exertion of collective security
• Intelligence-gathering satellites
– Monitor North Korea
– Still depend on U.S. satellites?
15. The Evolution of Military Capabilities 6/7
General Experience of the SDF
• The SDF has acquired much experience in international
security since 1991.
– 11 operations 5,313 personnel since 1992 to today
• No SDF personnel causality by military actions
– The participation in UN PKOs has been one of the
major pillars in the SDF.
16. The Evolution of Military Capabilities 7/7
The U.S.-Japan military relationship
• The bilateral security relationship has strengthened
gradually since 1991
– The contents of bilateral training are more practical
• GSDF
– Combat training for a guerrilla-commando or
special operation unit assault
• MSDF
– RIMPAC since 1980
– MSDF’s interoperability
• ASDF
– Cope North Exercise at Guam since 1999
– Cope Thunder Exercise at Alaska in June 2003
17. Conclusion 1/4
• Japan’s basic security policy will fundamentally be
unchanged in the next 10 years. Its posture will remain
defensive and restrained.
– Japan has not ever changed its basic security policy.
– All of Japan’s past security activities have been
based on its basic security policy.
18. Conclusion 2/4
1 Japan will gradually and practically orient its posture on
national security to the international security
environment within the framework of its basic security
policy.
• Reasonable interpretation of Japan’s basic security policy
– A permanent legal framework to dispatch SDF troops overseas
• Restrictions on “the use of arms.”
– The 2003 defense white paper A landmark (Clarify)
• Japan does not need to hastily change its basic security policy.
– Japan has kept its defensive and restrained attitude
– Japan should exploit the right capabilities in the right places
(Clarify).
19. Conclusion 3/4
2 Japan’s security relations with the U.S. will be gradually
and steadily adjusted to its national security posture.
• There are still some political and military problems
– No critical problems
• To keep the currently close relationship in the future
– Need time and patience
– Need to clarify each country’s role
20. Conclusion 4/4
3 Japan may adopt a limited offensive strategy consistent
with its basic security policy.
• The right to adapt a limited offensive strategy
• Overseas capabilities, and advanced strike capabilities
• Limited offensive strategy will be restrained
21. Table 1. What do you think about the participation of SDF? (Question
needs clarification)
Response Percent
1991 2003
Yes 45% 70%
No 39% 13%
Cannot Tell 11% 8%
Don't know 5% 9%
Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. Public poll in
1991 and 2003.
22. Table 2. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery in GSDF
approximate Number
Type Model Owned Comparison Remarks
1991 2003
Recoilless guns 3430 3190 -7%
Mortars 1500 1880 25%
Field artillery 830 750 -10%
Rocket launchers 110 1700 1545%
Anti-aircraft
130 110 -15%
machineguns
Armored vehicles 690 980 42%
Total Tanks 1210 1022 -15%
Type90 40 242 600%
Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
23. Table 3. Number of Helicopter and others in GSDF
approximate
Use Type Model Number Owned comparison Remarks
1991 2003
Anti-tank Helicopter AH-1S 55 89 60%
Observation
OH-1 0 16
Helicopter 2%
OH-6D 174 162
Transport Helicopter CH-47J/JA 18 49
V-107A 39 1
Utility Helicopter UH-60JA 0 21 20%
UH-1H/J 133 157
since
Anti-ship Missile Type88 SSM-1 0 new
1991
Surface to surface since
MLRS (M270) 0 new
rocket 1992
Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
24. Table 4. Number of Ships in MSDF
approximate Number Owned
Class comparison
1991 2003
Destroyer 61(169,000t) 54(203,000t) -12%(20%)
Submarine 14(31,000t) 16(40,000t) 14%(29%)
Mine warfare ship 41(19,000t) 31(27,000t) -25%(42%)
Patrol combatant craft 13(1,000t) 7(1,000t) -47%(0%)
Amphibious ship 9(12,000t) 8(30,000t) -12%(250%)
Auxiliary ship 32(87,000t) 26(97,000t) -19%(11%)
Total 170(319,000t) 142(398,000t) -16%(25%)
Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
25. Table 5. Number of Special Ships in MSDF
Number Owned
Use Type Name of Class Comparison Remarks
1991 2003
Aegis type
Kongo Class (7250t) 0 4 new
Destroyer
Destroyer Murasame Class (4550t) 0 11 new
Shirane Class (5200t) 4 4 0%
Minesweeper
Uraga Class (5650t) 0 2 new
(Ocean)
Minesweeper
Hatsushima Class (440t) 23 11 -53%
(Coastal)
Sugashima Class (510t) 0 17 new
Amphibious Ship Osumi Class (8900t) 0 3 new
Miura Class (2000t) 4 2 -50%
Supply Ship New type class (13500t) 0 0 (2004 Mar)
Towada Class (8100t) 1 3 300%
Missile boat Hayabusa Class (200t) 0 3 new
1-GO Class (50t) 0 3 new
Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
26. Table 6. Number of Aircraft in MSDF
Number
Owned
Use Type Model comparison Remarks
1991 2003
Patrol (Fixed Wing) P-3C 65 99
32%
P-2J 10 0
Patrol (Helicopter) SH-60J 0 91
20%
HSS-2B 81 6
Minesweeping and
MH-53E 6 10 66%
transport
Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
27. Table 7. Number of Aircraft and Missile in ASDF
Number Owned
Use Type Model comparison Remarks
1991 2003
Combat Fighter F-15J/DJ 143 203 41% (AR)
F-4EJ/ (F-4EJK*) 124 (30) 92 (85) -26% (AR)
Fighter Bomber F-2A/B 0 40 new (AR)
F-1 74 26 -65%
Reconnaissance RF-4E/EJ 13 27 207% (AR)
Transport Aircraft C-1 27 26 -4%
C-130 15 16 6%
Transport Helicopter CH-47 10 17 70%
Early warning E-2C 8 13 63%
Early warning and
E-767 0 4 new
control
Air Refueling Aircraft KC-767 0 0 none (4)
Patriot (PAC-3)
new
Patriot (PAC-2) 24FU
SAM
Patriot (PAC-1) 12FU
NIKE 10FU
*F-4EJK: Modified F-4EJ has F-15's Central Computer and F-16A's AI Radar
28. The Range of Ballistic Missiles
Nodong
Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense Teapodong-1
White Paper. in 2003. Teapodong-2
29. BMD Architecture
SPACE
SENCER
Intercept by SM-3
Detect & Track Intercept by PAC-3
Central
Operation Center
Ground Radar
Ballistic Missile ASDF
Patriot
MSDF
Aegis DDG
Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 2003.