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Japan's basic security policy [compatibility mode]
 

Japan's basic security policy [compatibility mode]

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    Japan's basic security policy [compatibility mode] Japan's basic security policy [compatibility mode] Presentation Transcript

    • Introduction1) What is Japan’s Basic Security Policy?2) How has Japan’s political decision-making impacted its security policy since the Gulf War?3) How have Japan’s military capabilities changed since the Gulf War?4) What are the implications of the evolution of Japan’s political decision-making and military capabilities for Japanese security policy in the next 10 years?
    • ConclusionJapan’s basic security policy will fundamentally beunchanged in the next 10 years. Its defense posture willremain defensive and restrained.The future direction of Japanese security policy:1 Japan will gradually and practically orient its posture on national security to the international security environment within the framework of its basic security policy.2 Japan’s security relations with the U.S. will be gradually and steadily adjusted to its national security posture.3 Japan may adopt a limited offensive strategy consistent with its basic security policy.
    • Article 91) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
    • Basic Policy for National Defense1) To support UN activities and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.2) To promote public welfare and enhance the people’s love for their country, thereby establishing a sound basis essential for Japan’s security.3) To incrementally develop effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense in accordance with the nation’s resources and prevailing domestic situation.4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan- U.S. security arrangements pending the effective capacity of the UN in the future to deter and repel such aggression.
    • Other basic security policies 1) Exclusively defense-oriented policy 2) Not becoming a military power 3) Adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 4) Ensuring civilian control of the militaryThe constitution (article 9) Basic Policy for National Defense “Japan’s Basic Security Policy” Other basic security policies
    • The Evolution of Political Decision-making 1/4Persian Gulf War of 1991• Japan started to change its posture toward international security issues. – Dispatch of the MSDF minesweepersPeace Keeping Operations (PKO)• Japan tried to realistically enhance its role in PKOs within the limits of Japanese public understanding. – International Peace Cooperation Law in June 1992. • Restrictions
    • The Evolution of Political Decision-making 2/4Response to international terrorism• Japanese public opinion came to understand to the use of the SDF which was within legal limits. – Protect U.S. bases and sensitive Japanese facilities – SDF in the Indian Ocean – RestraintNorth Korea• Japanese public are very concerned about the various ongoing difficulties and imminent threats posed by North Korea: – Teapodong-1 -Japans MD system – Nuclear program -a threat to Japan – Suspicious boats -a big impact – North Korean abductions -an act of terrorism in Japan
    • The Evolution of Political Decision-making 3/4Iraq Dispatch• Japan clearly stated its support for the U.S. rather than a UN-authorized mandate. – Created a bill to dispatch SDF troops to Iraq • Help U.S. and other foreign forces • Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance • Restrictions• Permanent legal framework to allow the dispatch of SDF troops overseas. – 12 years?
    • The Evolution of Political Decision-making 4/4Japan-US Political Relationship• Steadily continued to evolve their political relations. – “Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region” in 1995 – The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996 • The three bills on ensuring the effectiveness of the Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 1999 – Restrictions
    • The Evolution of Military Capabilities 1/7• The SDF gradually oriented their capabilities to the Japan’s national security circumstance. – New defense strategy aimed to address the increase of new types of threats. – Japanese politicians discuss how to utilize Japan’s military capabilities to address these new threats.
    • The Evolution of Military Capabilities 2/7GSDF capabilities• GSDF has tried to orient their capabilities to the national security circumstances. – Operations to counter landing of invading forces • Long range strike capability • Transportation capability – Prepare new assets oriented to the Japan’s current national security circumstance. • Western Infantry Regiment • New organization for ???
    • The Evolution of Military Capabilities 3/7MSDF capabilities• MSDF reinforced overseas and air defense capabilities according to Japan’s national security circumstances – Decreased ships – Increased standard displacement (Explain) – Limited but practical overseas capabilities in 2003 – Suspicious boats • New missile boats • Special boarding units – Two additional Aegis destroyers with improved air defense capabilities.
    • The Evolution of Military Capabilities 4/7ASDF capabilities• Reinforced traditional capabilities and acquired new capabilities according to Japan’s national security circumstances. – The reinforcement of equipment quality • Ability to use AWACS for air operations. – Reinforced air strike capabilities for F-2 and F-4EJK • Why F-4EJK? – KC-767 • Air refueling capability
    • The Evolution of Military Capabilities 5/7Other military capabilities (MD system and Satellite)• Japan still should depend on U.S. military power for its national security• MD system – 4 basic phases in MD – No capabilities in Japan – The Missile Defense Joint Task Force – The exertion of collective security• Intelligence-gathering satellites – Monitor North Korea – Still depend on U.S. satellites?
    • The Evolution of Military Capabilities 6/7General Experience of the SDF• The SDF has acquired much experience in international security since 1991. – 11 operations 5,313 personnel since 1992 to today • No SDF personnel causality by military actions – The participation in UN PKOs has been one of the major pillars in the SDF.
    • The Evolution of Military Capabilities 7/7The U.S.-Japan military relationship• The bilateral security relationship has strengthened gradually since 1991 – The contents of bilateral training are more practical • GSDF – Combat training for a guerrilla-commando or special operation unit assault • MSDF – RIMPAC since 1980 – MSDF’s interoperability • ASDF – Cope North Exercise at Guam since 1999 – Cope Thunder Exercise at Alaska in June 2003
    • Conclusion 1/4• Japan’s basic security policy will fundamentally be unchanged in the next 10 years. Its posture will remain defensive and restrained. – Japan has not ever changed its basic security policy. – All of Japan’s past security activities have been based on its basic security policy.
    • Conclusion 2/41 Japan will gradually and practically orient its posture on national security to the international security environment within the framework of its basic security policy.• Reasonable interpretation of Japan’s basic security policy – A permanent legal framework to dispatch SDF troops overseas • Restrictions on “the use of arms.” – The 2003 defense white paper A landmark (Clarify)• Japan does not need to hastily change its basic security policy. – Japan has kept its defensive and restrained attitude – Japan should exploit the right capabilities in the right places (Clarify).
    • Conclusion 3/42 Japan’s security relations with the U.S. will be gradually and steadily adjusted to its national security posture.• There are still some political and military problems – No critical problems• To keep the currently close relationship in the future – Need time and patience – Need to clarify each country’s role
    • Conclusion 4/43 Japan may adopt a limited offensive strategy consistent with its basic security policy.• The right to adapt a limited offensive strategy• Overseas capabilities, and advanced strike capabilities• Limited offensive strategy will be restrained
    • Table 1. What do you think about the participation of SDF? (Question needs clarification)Response Percent 1991 2003Yes 45% 70%No 39% 13%Cannot Tell 11% 8%Dont know 5% 9%Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. Public poll in 1991 and 2003.
    • Table 2. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery in GSDF approximate Number Type Model Owned Comparison Remarks 1991 2003Recoilless guns 3430 3190 -7%Mortars 1500 1880 25%Field artillery 830 750 -10%Rocket launchers 110 1700 1545%Anti-aircraft 130 110 -15% machinegunsArmored vehicles 690 980 42%Total Tanks 1210 1022 -15% Type90 40 242 600%Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
    • Table 3. Number of Helicopter and others in GSDF approximate Use Type Model Number Owned comparison Remarks 1991 2003Anti-tank Helicopter AH-1S 55 89 60%Observation OH-1 0 16 Helicopter 2% OH-6D 174 162Transport Helicopter CH-47J/JA 18 49 V-107A 39 1Utility Helicopter UH-60JA 0 21 20% UH-1H/J 133 157 sinceAnti-ship Missile Type88 SSM-1 0 new 1991Surface to surface since MLRS (M270) 0 new rocket 1992 Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
    • Table 4. Number of Ships in MSDF approximate Number Owned Class comparison 1991 2003Destroyer 61(169,000t) 54(203,000t) -12%(20%)Submarine 14(31,000t) 16(40,000t) 14%(29%)Mine warfare ship 41(19,000t) 31(27,000t) -25%(42%)Patrol combatant craft 13(1,000t) 7(1,000t) -47%(0%)Amphibious ship 9(12,000t) 8(30,000t) -12%(250%)Auxiliary ship 32(87,000t) 26(97,000t) -19%(11%)Total 170(319,000t) 142(398,000t) -16%(25%)Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
    • Table 5. Number of Special Ships in MSDF Number Owned Use Type Name of Class Comparison Remarks 1991 2003Aegis type Kongo Class (7250t) 0 4 new DestroyerDestroyer Murasame Class (4550t) 0 11 new Shirane Class (5200t) 4 4 0%Minesweeper Uraga Class (5650t) 0 2 new (Ocean)Minesweeper Hatsushima Class (440t) 23 11 -53% (Coastal) Sugashima Class (510t) 0 17 newAmphibious Ship Osumi Class (8900t) 0 3 new Miura Class (2000t) 4 2 -50%Supply Ship New type class (13500t) 0 0 (2004 Mar) Towada Class (8100t) 1 3 300%Missile boat Hayabusa Class (200t) 0 3 new 1-GO Class (50t) 0 3 new Source: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
    • Table 6. Number of Aircraft in MSDF Number Owned Use Type Model comparison Remarks 1991 2003Patrol (Fixed Wing) P-3C 65 99 32% P-2J 10 0Patrol (Helicopter) SH-60J 0 91 20% HSS-2B 81 6Minesweeping and MH-53E 6 10 66% transportSource: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 1991 and 2003.
    • Table 7. Number of Aircraft and Missile in ASDF Number Owned Use Type Model comparison Remarks 1991 2003Combat Fighter F-15J/DJ 143 203 41% (AR) F-4EJ/ (F-4EJK*) 124 (30) 92 (85) -26% (AR)Fighter Bomber F-2A/B 0 40 new (AR) F-1 74 26 -65%Reconnaissance RF-4E/EJ 13 27 207% (AR)Transport Aircraft C-1 27 26 -4% C-130 15 16 6%Transport Helicopter CH-47 10 17 70%Early warning E-2C 8 13 63%Early warning and E-767 0 4 new controlAir Refueling Aircraft KC-767 0 0 none (4) Patriot (PAC-3) new Patriot (PAC-2) 24FUSAM Patriot (PAC-1) 12FU NIKE 10FU*F-4EJK: Modified F-4EJ has F-15s Central Computer and F-16As AI Radar
    • The Range of Ballistic Missiles NodongSource: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense Teapodong-1White Paper. in 2003. Teapodong-2
    • BMD Architecture SPACE SENCER Intercept by SM-3 Detect & Track Intercept by PAC-3 Central Operation Center Ground Radar Ballistic Missile ASDF Patriot MSDF Aegis DDGSource: Defense Agency. Japanese Defense White Paper. in 2003.