A coalition of militaries, government agencies, NGOs are involved in a stabilization and humanitarian relief effort in Orange Land, a sub-Sahara nation, in the mist of inter-tribal conflict and a three year drought.
The Orange Land government is generally pro-west, but there are two factions that have ties to terrorist organizations through their rhetoric and tribal affiliations.
A tactical wide area network is established to support the coordination and cooperation of the operations.
Each national military, governmental agency as well as the NGOs are on the network with common access based on attributes associated with the group.
The military consistently present information on insurgent locations and dangerous areas (e.g., improvised explosive device locations) to allow non-military group use of the information for safety and planning.
The military provides time-lines for general operations that will go force-on-force with insurgents to ensure the non-military efforts are not caught up in these operations, which could result in civilian casualties.
Key to the level of information sharing provided is the trust established between the organizations that information would be available to each group but groups would not share between themselves the information.
Each organization has its own “ information compartment ” which prevents cross-talk, but allows for coordinated approaches to resolving issues.
This trust relationship has allowed the military to successfully eliminate a number of insurgent strongholds and clearly map the IEDs (improvised explosive devices) planted.
Current Trust Management systems are not designed to deal with variable threat environments in which access to networks resources must be restricted or suspended in response to an elevated threat level.
Ad Hoc Networking Collaboration
Modeling such requirements for ad hoc networking collaboration can be particularly challenging.
Concept is Provable and Buildable – Validation Important
Bibliography: Mike Burmester, Prasanta Das, Martin Edwards and Alec Yasinsac. ` Multi-Domain trust management in variable threat environments using rollback-access '. MILCOM 2008 , San Diego, November 17-19, 2008
Mike Burmester, Breno DeMedeiros and Alec Yasinsac. Community-centric vanilla-rollback access, or: How I stopped worrying and learned to love my computer. Proc. 13th Int. Security Protocols Workshop, Cambridge, LNCS #4631, Springer, pp. 228--237, 2007
Mike Burmester, Breno de Medeiros Rossana Motta. Provably Secure Grouping-proofs for RFID tags , CARDIS 2008.
Mike Burmester, Breno de Medeiros. The Security of EPCGen2 Anonymous compliant RFID Protocols , ACNS 2008
Mike Burmester, Breno de Medeiros Rossana Motta. Robust Anonymous RFID Authentication with Constant Key Lookup . ACM, ASIACCS 2008
Mike Burmester and Breno de Medeiros. Towards provable security for route discovery protocols in mobile ad hoc networks , 2008
Mike Burmester and Breno de Medeiros. Persistent Security for RFID . Conference on RFID Security, RFIDSec07, 2007
Mike Burmester and Breno de Medeiros. RFID Security, Countermeasures and Challenges . 5 th RFID Academic Convocation, The RFID Journal Conference, 2007
Tri van Le, Mike Burmester Breno de Medeiros. Universally Composable and Forward Secure RFID Authentication and Key exchange . ACM, ASIACCS 2007.
Mike Burmester, Tri van Le and Breno de Medeiros. Provably Secure Ubiquitous Systems: Universally Composable RFID Authentication Protocols , SecureComm 2006
Mike Burmester, Tri van Le, and Breno de Medeiros. Towards provable security for ubiquitous applications , ACISP 2006