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Safety Lifecycle Management - Emerson Exchange 2010 - Meet the Experts
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Safety Lifecycle Management - Emerson Exchange 2010 - Meet the Experts

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  • 1. Mike Boudreaux
    DeltaV SIS Brand Manager
  • 2. Not all activities in life are safe…
  • 3. …and we have different levels of risk tolerance
  • 4. Occupational
    safety
    Personal
    safety
    Process
    safety
    Mechanical
    Integrity
    Structural
    Design
    FallPrevention
    Inherently
    Safer
    Design
    Policies &
    Procedures
    Facility
    Siting
    Ergonomics
    Work
    Schedules
    Functional
    Safety
    Safety
    Audits
    Personal
    Protective
    Equipment
    Emergency
    Response
    Employee
    Training
    Risk
    Assessment s
    Total
    Recordables
    Management
    Of Change
  • 5. Process safety
    Mechanical
    Integrity
    Inherently
    Safer
    Design
    Policies &
    Procedures
    Facility
    Siting
    Safety
    Audits
    Functional
    Safety
    Emergency
    Response
    Employee
    Training
    Risk
    Assessment s
    Management
    Of Change
  • 6. Bhopal, India, 1984
    Texas City Refinery, USA, 2004
    Chernobyl, Russia, 1986
    Piper Alpha, UK, 1988
    Why do accidents happen?
  • 7.
  • 8.
  • 9. “You can have a very good accident rate for ‘hard hat’ accidents but not for process ones.”
  • 10. “The fact that you’ve had 20 years without a catastrophic event is no guarantee that there won’t be one tomorrow.”
  • 11. Process safety
    Mechanical
    Integrity
    Inherently
    Safer
    Design
    Policies &
    Procedures
    Facility
    Siting
    Safety
    Audits
    Functional
    Safety
    Functional
    Safety
    Emergency
    Response
    Employee
    Training
    Risk
    Assessment s
    Management
    Of Change
  • 12. Functional safety
    PFDavg
    SRS
    RRF
    IEC 61511
    FMEDA
    SIS
    IEC 61508
    BPCS
    PHA
    HAZOP
    SIL
    LOPA
    SIF
  • 13.
  • 14. For system designers
    integrators and users
    For product designers
    and manufacturers
    IEC61513 :
    Nuclear Sector
    IEC61508: All Industries
    IEC62061: Machinery Sector
    IEC61511: Process Industry Sector
  • 15.
  • 16. Source: http://www.wordle.net/show/wrdl/2276332/IEC_61511
  • 17.
  • 18. Workstation
    Controller
    Control element
    Transmitter
  • 19. Logic solver
    Transmitter
    Final element
  • 20.
  • 21. SIF #1
    SIF #2
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24.
  • 25. PFDSIF1 = PFDPT-101 +PFDlogicsolver+ PFDFV-101
    Logic solver
    SIF #1
    PT-101
    FV-101
  • 26. Source: IEC 61511-1, Table 3 – Safety Integrity Levels: probability of failure on demand
  • 27. Functional safety
    PFDavg
    SRS
    RRF
    IEC 61511
    FMEDA
    TÜV
    SIS
    IEC 61508
    BPCS
    PHA
    HAZOP
    SIL
    LOPA
    SIF
  • 28. ?
  • 29. Safety Lifecycle Management
  • 30. The IEC 61511 Safety lifecycle
  • 31. Safety Lifecycle Management
  • 32. Functional Safety Management
  • 33.
  • 34.
    • Organization and responsibilities
    • 35. Competency management
    • 36. Documentation structure and control
    • 37. Configuration management
    • 38. Supplier assessment process
  • Organization and Responsibilities
    Safety Leadership Team
  • 39. CompetencyRequirements
  • 40.
  • 41. Activity / phase objectives
    Safety Requirements Specification
    Process Hazards Analysis
    Safety Management System
  • 42. Verify
  • 43. Source: IEC 61511-1, Figure 12 – Software development lifecycle (the V-Model)
  • 44.
  • 45. Safety Life-cycle Structure and Planning
  • 46. Safety Lifecycle Planning
  • 47. Verification Planning
  • 48. Safety life-cycle structure
  • 49. ?
  • 50. Analysis Phase
  • 51.
  • 52. Allocation of safety functions to protection layers
    Hazard and risk
    assessment
    Source: IEC 61511-3, Figure 4 – Risk and safety integrity concepts
  • 53. Source: IEC 61511-3, Figure 2
  • 54. SIS
    BPCS
    Plant and
    Emergency
    Response
    Emergency response layer
    Containment,
    Dike/Vessel
    Passive protection layer
    Mitigate
    Fire and Gas
    System
    Active protection layer
    Incident
    Emergency
    Shutdown
    System
    Safety layer
    Emergency
    shutdown
    Trip level alarm
    Prevent
    Process control layer
    Operator
    Intervention
    Operator
    intervention
    Process alarm
    Process control layer
    Process
    Value
    Normal behavior
  • 55. Likelihood
    Increasing Risk
    Inherent Risk of Process
    Non-SIS Mitigating Safeguards
    Baseline Risk
    SIS Risk Reduction
    Overall Risk
    SIL1
    Non-SIS Preventative Safeguards
    SIL2
    ALARP Risk Region
    Unacceptable Risk Region
    SIL3
    Overall Risk
    Overall Risk
    Negligible Risk Region
    Consequence
  • 56. As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)
    Intolerable Risk
    10-3 / man-year (worker)
    10-4 /year (public)
    ALARP or Tolerable Risk Region
    10-5 / man-year (worker)
    10-6 /year (public)
    Negligible Risk
  • 57. Government mandates for tolerable risk levels
    10-2
    10-3
    10-4
    10-5
    10-6
    10-7
    10-8
    10-9
    Australia (NSW) -
    Hong Kong -
    Netherlands -
    United Kingdom -
    The United States does not set tolerable risk levels, or offer guidelines.
  • 58. Chemical industry benchmarks for tolerable risk
    10-2
    10-3
    10-4
    10-5
    10-6
    10-7
    10-8
    10-9
    Company I -
    Company II -
    Company III -
    Small companies -
    Large, multinational chemical companies tend to set levels consistent with international mandates
    Smaller companies tend to operate in wider ranges and implicitly, at higher levels of risk
  • 59.
  • 60.
  • 61. Quantitative Risk Assessment
  • 62. Qualitative Risk Assessment
  • 63. Qualitative risk analysis – Safety layer matrix
  • 64. Source: Exida Safety and Critical Control Systems in Process and Machine Automation July 2007
  • 65. Safety Requirement Specification
  • 66. ?
  • 67. Implementation Phase
  • 68. Implementation Phase
  • 69. Implementation Phase
  • 70. Design and Engineering of theSafety Instrumented System
    Iterate if requirements are not met.
  • 71. Technology selection
    Sensors
    Analog vs. discrete signal
    Smart vs. conventional transmitter
    Certified vs. proven-in-use
  • 72.
  • 73.
  • 74. SIS Application?
    Certified
    Prior-Use
    Mfg proves
    It’s safe
    PFD
    PFD
    User proves
    It’s safe
    PFD
    User proves
    It’s safe
  • 75. Technology selection
    Logic solver
    Relays vs. PLC vs. Safety PLC
    HART I/O vs. conventional analog
    Centralized vs. modular
    Integrated vs. Standalone
  • 76.
  • 77.
  • 78.
  • 79. Centralized Logic Solver
    • 100’s of SIF’s in one box.
    • 80. Good for large projects.
    • 81. Single point of failure.
    Modular Logic Solver
    • Isolates SIF’s
    • 82. Scalable for large & small projects
    • 83. Eliminates single point of failure.
  • Source: ARC Advisory Group
  • 84. Technology selection
    Final element
    Solenoid vs. DVC
    Automated vs. manual diagnostics
    Response time considerations
  • 85.
  • 86. SIL 2
    PFD
    Proof Test Interval (years)
  • 87. Architecture selection
    • Hardware fault tolerance (HFT) impacts performance
    • 88. Safety integrity
    • 89. Availability
    • 90. SIL capability
  • Valve 1
    Valve 2
    Valve 1
    Valve 2
    Valve
    HFTs(MooN) = N – M
    HFTa(MooN) = M – 1
  • 91.
  • 92.
  • 93. Proof test philosophy
    Proof test frequency
    5 yrs, 1 yr, 6 mos, 3 mos?
    Online vs. offline proof testing.
    Turnaround schedule?
    Total SIF proof test or proof test components on different intervals?
  • 94. Reliability evaluation
    Confirm that performance meets specifications
    Safety integrity (PFD)
    Availability (MTTFs)
    Response time
  • 95.
  • 96. λD= 0.02 failures/yr
    λS = 0.01 failures/yr
    T = 1 year
    1oo2
    2oo3
    1oo1
    2oo2
  • 97. PFDSIF1 = PFDPT-101 +PFDlogicsolver+ PFDFV-101
    Logic solver
    SIF #1
    PT-101
    FV-101
  • 98. Source: IEC 61511-1, Table 3 – Safety Integrity Levels: probability of failure on demand
  • 99. Detailed design & build
    Instrument design / specifications
    Wiring drawings
    Hardware design & build
    Software design & implementation
    BPCS / SIS integration
    Factory acceptance testing
  • 100. Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)
  • 101. Installation, Commissioning and Validation
  • 102. Installation, commissioning, and Validation
    Validation is the key difference between control and safety systems.
  • 103. ?
  • 104. Operation Phase
  • 105.
  • 106. Operation and Maintenance Planning
  • 107.
  • 108.
  • 109.
  • 110. SFF = 93%
  • 111. Perform wiring
    continuity test
    Use smart features to test electronics and wiring continuity
    Remove sensor and test on bench
    Test sensors in-situ by other means
    Safely test the SIF using actual process variables
    Sensor testing options
  • 112. Example – Rosemount 3051S Proof Test
    Proof Test 1:
    Analog output Loop Test
    Satisfies proof test requirement
    Coverage > 50% of DU failures
    Proof Test 2:
    2 point sensor calibration check
    Coverage > 95% of DU failures
    Note – user to determine impulse piping proof test
  • 113. Valve Testing Options
  • 114.
  • 115. SIL 2
    PFD
    Proof Test Interval (years)
  • 116. Source: Instrument Engineers’ Handbook, Table 6.10e – Dangerous Failures, Failure Modes, and Test Strategy
  • 117. Modification
  • 118.
  • 119. ?

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