Rapid Deployment
    as a response to an

 Active Shooter
    Incident


   Illinois State Police
         Academy
       ...
Table of Contents



Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
Introduction


In less than 33 years, the U.S. law enforcement                    hostage incidents are infrequent. So, ma...
The current movement to train patrol officers to                    risk to the responding officers and the possibility th...
The Tactic


What is Rapid Deployment? Rapid Deployment is a                     simply too great. For situations where im...
The Incidents

History teaches us not to make a major change in police             Though these incidents are quite rare, ...
The Findings and Patterns

W e always seem to have a compulsion to define the                   Respond er Casualties:
“av...
school or workplace. Over 95 percent of these                      Weap ons:
incidents took place during daylight hours. A...
The Conclusions

There were four general categories o f response                            stop the killing. In five of t...
The Recommendations
Based on our analysis of 44 high profile, active                    •            The training must be ...
on-scene commander must have already assumed                   officers. In some situations, the SWA T eleme nts would
com...
Instant Response:


This response strategy appears to have the best chance                penetrate ligh t intervening co ...
Rapid Deploym ent:


This response strategy is a viable alternative to waiting           to an inciden t.
for a fully-trai...
A Rapid D eploymen t team should shift to an inner                •   hostages being held in a fixed location or
perimeter...
Traditional SWAT Response:


Some agencies ha ve chosen to concen trate on Ra pid                agencies train their Rapi...
Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment

As we were completing the research phase o f this                   effort by...
The Expert’s Opinions

Lieutenant C. W. Black, Littleton (Colorado) Police Department
Lt. C.W. "Bill" Black is with the Li...
Mr. Thomas T. Gillespie, Criminal Justice Training & Consulting Services
M r. Gillespie began his law enforcement career i...
Training Program , Tactical U nit and Incident Review Program as well as the publication of The Tactical E dge journ al.
M...
responders will be capable of establishing inner and outer perimeters, but less prepared to make entry. What good is a
per...
Commander Richard A. Ryan, Decatur (Illinois) Police Department
Commander Ryan is a twenty-nine year police veteran. He ho...
Sheriffs Department and moving on to the Illinois State Police in 198 4. John has been a member of the Tactical
Response T...
Synopsis
                                                                  Active Shooter Incidents

Case    Location     ...
Case#   Location      Type       Suspects    Weapons              Killed   Injured    Times           RD Used?   RD Make a...
Case#   Location       Type        Suspects    Weapons              Killed     Injured   Times            RD Used?     RD ...
Case#   Location       Type        Suspects     Weapons             Killed   Injured   Times            RD Used?     RD Ma...
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  1. 1. Rapid Deployment as a response to an Active Shooter Incident Illinois State Police Academy 2003
  2. 2. Table of Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The T actic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Inc idents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Findings & Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 The Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The Recommend ations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The Experts’ Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Synopsis o f Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 -1-
  3. 3. Introduction In less than 33 years, the U.S. law enforcement hostage incidents are infrequent. So, many SWAT commu nity has experienced two watershe d events teams trained heavily but rarely deployed. which shaped our respo nse to incidents involving an Administrators looking for w ays to justify their active shooter. The first rude awakening was investment in these units realized that the entry team perpetrated by Charles Whitman from the clock tower component of SWA T units was perfectly suited to at the Univ ersity of Texas at Austin. In a sniper conduct high-risk raids for the service of arrest or incident lasting 90 minutes, Whitman killed 15 and search warrants. Many SWAT teams now spend as wounded 31 victims. Whitman's training in the U.S. much as 80 per cent of their time conducti ng pre- Marine Corps apparently prepared him well for dealing planned raids, not eme rgency response missions. with targets as distant as 500 yards from his perch on the 30th floor obse rvation dec k. What does this brief history of SWAT have to do with a study of Rapid Deployment - Immediate Action Many regard this incid ent as the impetus of d ramatic tactics for patrol officers? More than 32 years after change in police training and response. Some agencies Charles Whitma n's rampage , two teenage rs in Colorado issued long-range rifles and trained their officers in the logged a similar death and injury toll at another school role of counter-sn iper, while other agencies formed ... this time a high scho ol. more comprehensive para-military teams with even greater capabilities. The genesis of what would become Within 13 minutes of the first police call to the April Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT) 20, 1999 inc ident at Colu mbine H igh Schoo l, Dylan undoub tedly began at 1 1:48 a.m . on August 1 , 1966 in Klebold and Eric Harris killed 13 and wounded 24. the form of Charles Whitman's murderous spree. Unlike Whitman's sniper incident, the Columbine event Notably, Whitman was finally stopped that day by two was planned around explosives. Klebo ld and H arris police office rs and an arm ed citizen wh o teamed up to had set a large impro vised bom b in the schoo l cafeteria attack his sniper perch and kill him. with a timer set to go off when the lunch crow d would provide nearly 500 victims. The killers planned to The evolution of SWAT teams in U.S. police agencies shoot any fleeing students from positions they w ould followed a rather hopscotch pattern around the nation. take up in the parking lot. Only when their bomb failed Most large cities had very well equipped and trained to detonate did Klebold and Harris enter the scho ol to teams, while some suburban and rural areas basically kill who they co uld with firearm s. ignored the conce pt or deve loped m utual-aid agreements with neighboring tea ms. Outside of major In researching the Whit man shooting in A ustin, little metropo litan areas, few age ncies expe cted incide nts criticism of the police response could be found. requiring a SWAT -type response. Another important Anyone who left cover within Whitman's field of fire consid eration is the fact that SWAT teams are was shot down. Indeed, one police officer was among expensive and time consuming. the dead that day in Austin. No one on that day had heard of S WAT , a concep t which came later. Most agencies developed policies setting clear guidelines for the activation of a SWAT team. Patrol At the Columbine incident, however, the police were officers in these agencies were gener ally trained to wait loudly criticized. Even other police agencies have for SWAT when an incident justified deployment of the joined in the condemnation of the police response to the special team. Patro l officers were ex pected to attack perpetrated by Klebold and Harris. At "Contain, Isolate and Negotiate” until SWAT arrived. Columbine, numerous SWAT units deployed as quick ly as possible an d made e ntry into the school within 45 During this same time, the primary mission of most minutes of the first call. In fact, the shooters committed SWAT teams was evolving. Originally, most SWAT suicide at about the same time the first SWAT team was teams were structured for scenarios involving snipers entering the o ther side of the m assive schoo l. (or other barricaded gunmen) and hostag e incidents. In actuality, active shooters, barricaded gunmen and -2-
  4. 4. The current movement to train patrol officers to risk to the responding officers and the possibility that respond using Rapid D eploymen t tactics began in these tactics could a ctually make some situations worse. earnest in the aftermath of the Columbine shooting. Response strategies like Rapid Deployment have been The concern m any express for the use of Ra pid around for a while in several forms, but emotions Deployment falls into the theory...“a little bit of surrounding the Colu mbine incident caused many knowledge is dangerous.” One SWAT team officers to insist they would “never again wait for commander in Illinois put it this way: “In SWAT, SWAT ” at the scene of an active shooter. making an entry is always our last option, for w hen all other methods of resolution have failed ... but, with Like so many things in the law enforce ment com munity, Rapid Deployment, we’re telling minimally trained we have come full circle; from Rapid D eploymen t - patrol officer s to use SWA T’s last option as the ir first through the evolution of SW AT - bac k to Rapid option. I wonder if we ’ve really thought this thing Deployment in just over 32 years. The resolution of the through?” Texas Tower incident was a Rapid D eploymen t, unorganized as it was, by those police officers and the It is quite easy for two police officers to pencil out a armed citize n. scenario where Rapid Deployment tactics are the obvious answer. In looking at 44 active shooter Our research into these incid ents has uncovered other incidents from the real world, the practicality of R apid instances where an im mediate, unorganized response by Deploym ent is not so clea r cut. arriving police officers probably saved lives. There is no question: R apid De ployment tac tics can save live s in Our mission in this research was to first identify any some circumstances. However, the driving force patterns inherent in active shooting incidents, if indeed behind this research project is the understanding that any such patterns exist. By better understanding how Rapid Deploym ent tactics carry w ith them a substantial these events unfold , we hoped to determine when and where Ra pid Dep loyment is app ropriate. -3-
  5. 5. The Tactic What is Rapid Deployment? Rapid Deployment is a simply too great. For situations where immediate action response strategy utilizing a small team of patrol is not deemed appropriate, the Rapid Deployment officers to assault and neutralize an active criminal team(s) would be used as an inner perimeter to control shooter. The theory behind Rapid Deployment is; we the suspect’s movement while a fully trained S W AT can’t afford to wait for the arrival of a SWAT unit when team is assembled. a killer is actively shooting victims. The Columbine school shooting is the example most often pointed to by Most agencies set a minimum size for the Contact Team Rapid Deployment proponents. Detractors feel the use at four officers, tho ugh some will send in a team with of Rapid Deployment tactics at Columbine would have only two officers. Most agencies dictate the use of long done no good and possibly made the situation even guns for the Con tact T eam, while others will utilize worse. only the officers’ sidearms. Some departments issue ballistic shields and Kevlar © helmets to their patrol There are several variations of this technique, but most officers for use during a rapid de ployment. A few are quite similar. The names given to this technique agencies require one or more members of their SWAT include: Rapid D eploymen t, Immediate Action, H all team to be on-duty around the clock. These SW AT- Boss training, Active Shooter Response, Violent trained officers will assess an active shooter situation Intruder - Police and Educators Response (VIPER) and and lead the Rapid Deployment team when they Quick Action Deployment (QUAD). We’ve determine the tactic is appropriate. undoub tedly missed a few acronyms for this technique, but for the sake of simp licity, we’ll call it Rapid Even the training fo r this technique v aries widely. Deploym ent. Many agencies set up elaborate training exercises for patrol officers using live role-players as suspects and W ith Rapid Deploym ent, a team of patrol officers, victims. Combined with a stressful setting and the use preferably armed with shotguns or carbines, will enter of specialized training weap onry (like Simunitions©), the “Kill Zone” and mov e rapidly to make contact with these sessions can b uild the requisite skills for this high- the shooter. Standard SWAT entry tactics, such as the risk course of action. However, some locales have systematic clearing of all rooms, a re not used during mandated Rapid Deployment training, but deliver it in Rapid Deploym ent. The contact team’s job is to move a short classro om-only form at. rapidly through an area to find and neutralize the active shooter...to e ssentially run to the so und of gunfire . No matter how agencies train initially, the question of continuity of training for these perishable skills remains Depend ing upon the circumstances, the contact team unresolved. If this tactic is to be maintained long-term, may bypass downed victims and proceed past obvious it must be a part of an agency’s in-service refresher hazards, such as explosive devices. Two types of teams program. are generally developed. T he first is the Contact Team whose mission is to find a nd neutralize the active Clearly, many agencies ad opted R apid Deployment as shooter. Following the contact team will be one or an emoti onal response to the Columbine incident and more Rescue Teams who will deal with any victims have not fully developed their policies for use of the bypassed by the contact team. technique or the circum stances for wh ich it is appropriate. The mo st importa nt aspect of this policy Most agencies training Rapid Deployment develop a development may be the supervisory decision making companion policy in their Standard Operating process for approving the entry of a Rapid Deployment Procedures outlining the criteria for response and the team. type of incidents appropriate for its use. As an example, most agenc ies specify that Rapid Deployment is not appro priate for eve nts involv ing a gunman that has barricade d in a fixed loc ation or is known to be holdin g hostages. Commanders theorize that in such circumstances, the risk to patrol officers and h ostages is -4-
  6. 6. The Incidents History teaches us not to make a major change in police Though these incidents are quite rare, they can be very practice based on a single incident, no matter how deadly for those involved. In the 44 incidents we dramatic the incident. Instead, we should base our debriefed, 152 people were killed and 214 were changes on a demonstrated pattern of criminal activity. wounded. These numbers average out to 3.5 killed and W e began by o utlining the catastrophic University of 4.8 wounded per incident. Truly, these are serious Texas and Colu mbine H igh Schoo l incidents , but we events. must remember that they were separated by nearly 33 years. For compar ison purpo ses, we also analyzed a 45 th incident where the Los Angeles (California) Police How frequently do U.S. police agencies face such Department used Rapid Deployment tactics in an overwhelming firefights? Are we justified in spending attempt to rescue a downed officer from a location precious time and money in preparin g for the unlikely controlled by a barricaded gunman. This incident was event that our jurisdiction will ever face such a threat? included in our discussion for two reasons. First, On the other hand, we train extensively with firearms LAPD officers use this incident as an example in a even though we know very few police officers will ever Rapid Deployment training program they have fire a single shot in the line of duty during their career. delivered across the co untry. Secondly, the incident in Training for an event w e may never face is clear ly question points out ho w Rapid Deployment tactics can justified if the potential consequences are seriou s. actually make a bad incident worse, when used in the wrong situation. By searching various sources, we were able to iden tify nearly 80 active shooter incidents in the United States After these inciden ts were deb riefed and a nalyzed, a dating back to the 1966 incident in Austin, Texas. As summit was held to gather input from a number of we tried to debrief these incidents, many proved to not experts with extensive expe rience in resp onding to fit within our parameters of an active shooter and some critical incidents. This report is a compilation of the were simply too old to allow us to obtain worthwhile discussions and reco mmend ations gener ated during this information . meeting held in November of 2001. Each of the experts helped edit this final docu ment and c ontribute their Ultimately, we obtained detailed information about the personal opinions at the end. police response to 44 incidents. Undoubtedly, a number of incidents went undiscovered, but the number of active shooter incidents in an average year from 1966 through 20 01 could easily be cou nted on o ne hand. -5-
  7. 7. The Findings and Patterns W e always seem to have a compulsion to define the Respond er Casualties: “average” of any series of events being measured. The Responders were killed or injured in four of the 44 following average active shooter incident is based on incidents. our analysis o f 44 events. A police officer was wound ed in an exchange of gunfire A single, white male shooter, age d 30, will enter a well at the end of a p ursuit of a suspect who killed four and populated location and open fire without warning. This wounded six firefighters in a wo rkplace sho oting in shootin g spree will probably be over in two to three Jackson, Mississippi in 1996. minutes, usually long befor e even a single police officer can arrive. The suspect will almost certain ly be familiar A New Hampshire Troo per was killed and a second with the locale and will initially target specific people, Trooper was wounded during a traffic stop/ambush at but is very likely to fire rando mly before h e stops. Th is the onset of a five hour shooting spree near Colebrook, shooter will probably be armed with more than one New Hampshire in 1997. In a subsequent ambush set firearm and will fire about 25 rounds, killing th ree to by the rifle-armed suspect, four additional officers were four victims and wounding an additional five people. wounded before the suspect was killed. After the shooting spree, the suspect is likely to end up dead, probab ly by comm itting suicide. The incid ent is A police officer was wounded in a 500 round shootout almost guaranteed to take place during daylight hours following the pursuit of an active shooting suspect from and will probably occur inside a building. a Cal-Trans maintenance yard near Ora nge, Californ ia in 1997. Surprisingly, many of the incidents we debriefed closely fit the average we have outlined above. Incidents like A security guard was killed and two police officers the Texas tower and Columbine are truly exceptional were wounded by a man who had entered the library of and far outside the norm. the Salt Lake City Latter Day Saints church and opened fire in 1999. This 70 ye ar old man was ultimately killed Victims: by police. As mentioned before, these incidents resulte d in 152 deaths and 214 people wounded . The largest death to ll, Response Strategy: 23, was at the Luby’s Restaurant shooting in Killeen, A true Rapid Deployment response, by an agency which Texas in 1991 and the largest number of wounded, 25, had previously trained in this tactic, was only u sed in was at the Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon three of the 44 active shooter incidents we debriefed. in 1998. In two of the Rapid Deployment responses, the use of these tactics affected the outcome of the incident in a Suspects: positive way. In the remaining Rapid Deployment use, Only two incidents involved multiple shooters, with a the incident was over before the team was ab le to make maximum of two suspe cts in any single incident. Of the entry into the scho ol. 46 shooters, only two were females. The age range of shooters ran from 11 to 70. Tw enty of the suspec ts died In the opinion of the writer, Rapid Deployment either at the scene; four were killed by police and 16 did or might have resulted in a positive effect on the committed suicide. outcome of the incident in 11 of the 44 incidents (25 percent). In the incidents where Rapid Deployment Shots Fired: would have made no difference in the ultimate outcome, Suspects in these 44 incidents fired from one to 188 there was no longer an active shooter to engage by the shots. The 188 shot incident was Columbine High time a team could have made entry into the location. In School. Police fired during nine of these incidents, three of these incidents the shooter had already rangin g from two to more than 500 shots. More than barricaded himself, with hostages, in a fixed location. 500 shots were fired by seven police officers in an incident that started at a Cal-Trans maintenance yard Environment of Incident: near Orange, California. The majority of the incidents in our study oc curred at a -6-
  8. 8. school or workplace. Over 95 percent of these Weap ons: incidents took place during daylight hours. About two- More than one-half of the incidents involved su spects thirds of the incidents took place within a b uilding. The armed with one or m ore hand guns. Near ly one-fourth other one-third of the incidents involved some shooting of the suspects used both handguns and long guns in an outdo or environ ment. (rifles and/or shotguns). Four of these incidents (nine percent) involved the use of impro vised explo sive devices. -7-
  9. 9. The Conclusions There were four general categories o f response stop the killing. In five of the incidents, the suspect was identified in these 44 incidents: forcibly detained by citizens at the shooting site (often at great risk to themselves). In two of these incidents, • Immedia te - unorganized response by the suspect was taken into custody by on-scene police personnel on the scene when the incident officers (both at a school). began (police, security or citizens). The need for im mediate ac tion by whomever is there • Immedia te - unorganized response by when the incident begins was born out by the actions of arriving police officers. passengers on Flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and subsequent flights where dangerous activity has been • Immedia te - organized response by encountered. These events happen in seconds and, a r r i v in g p o l i c e o ff i c e r s ( R a p id unless they are quick ly ended b y someon e already on Deployment). scene, the criminals will likely kill until they choose to stop. The police simply cannot be everywhere violence • Arriving police officers contained the may occur and are un likely to arrive before the violence incident and waited for the arriv al of ends. SWA T assets. A parallel example of on-scene personnel minimizing Except in the rarest of incidents, like the shootings at death and destruction has been seen recently in Isra el. the University of Texas and Colum bine High School, Terrorist shooting and bombing attacks have taken a only the most imme diate respo nse will have a chan ce to huge toll in Israel, but some events have surprisingly reduce the number of innocent victims likely to be low death tallies when you consider the weaponry killed or injured b y an active sho oter. Even a rapid brought to the scene by the terrorists. The low body response by a team of officers using R apid Deployment count is generally attribute d to the terrorist being shot tactics will likely find the incident over by the time they by military or police p ersonnel. Other reports suggest enter the shoo ting area. many of these terrorists are being sh ot by armed Israeli citizens who happened to be on the scene or arrived Immedia te action taken by personne l who are on -site before military or police units. when the sho oting starts is the mo st effective way to -8-
  10. 10. The Recommendations Based on our analysis of 44 high profile, active • The training must be refreshed on a shooting incidents, some general recommendations periodic basis (at least annually) and were developed by our panel of experts. should involve all jurisdictions who might respond to a given location. • Effective command and control mus t begin immediately at the onset of the • The incident commander must consider a incident and must take place independent “response in depth,” an d contem plate of the use of Rapid Deployment tactics. delaying the insertion of a contact team The on-scene commander must not until a backup team can be asse mbled, in become personally involved in the the most threatening incidents. response. The incid ent comm ander mu st, instead, conduct a n initial problem • A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) assessment, coordina te the arriving must be develo ped to cover the use of resources, and ensure commun ication is Rapid Deploym ent and th e overall established between all responding units. management of the incident. This SOP should include the minimum requirements • The single greatest problem facing the for manpower, equipment and training for on-scene commander will be the the use of Rapid Deployment teams. The threat/risk assessment (intelligence SOP should also address complicating gathering). Analysis of the incidents issues, such as: explosive devices; suggests the following problems can be ambush survival; and p rocedur es to e x p e c t e d : co n fu s in g in fo rma tio n follow in the event a team takes describing multiple location s and multiple casualties. suspects, a breakdown in nearly all forms of technological and inter-personal • Agencies should pre-plan high-risk communication, being inundated by locations. These plans should include fleeing inhabitants and rapid ly arriving floor plans, initial perimeter points and resources and unfam iliarity with the command post and resource staging incident site. locations. • All officers should have access to single- Based upon this analysis, we recommend police projectile shoulder-f ired weapons, agencies develop procedures for three levels of preferably a carbine chambered for a response to active shooter incidents. Ou r experts have cartridge capable of penetrating soft body drawn up recom mendatio ns for specific tra ining and armor. Such weapons w ill greatly equipment needs for each of these response strategies, increase the effectiveness of contact and which will be o utlined in deta il. rescue teams, as well as allowing some incidents to be terminate d quickly by the The first level of response would be an Instant first arriving officers. Response by personnel who are on-scene when the shooting starts. This would include police officers • The training provided by an age ncy must regularly assigned to patrol schools, business or public include force-on-force sessions in which areas where large numbers of people congregate. In officers move as a team, encountering some instances, this could include a n immedia te high-stress complications and liv e response by the first arriving patrol officer. adversaries. The training must include tactics for team movement in both indoor The second level of response would be a structured and and outdoor se ttings. coordinated response by team(s) of arriving officers - Rapid Deployment. To be most effective, these teams need to be better equipped and more fully trained than the level at which most agencies currently operate. The -9-
  11. 11. on-scene commander must have already assumed officers. In some situations, the SWA T eleme nts would command and cond ucted a pre liminary “threat/risk be the second wave to enter a shooting location. Upon assessment.” The on-scene comman der must also arrival of the SWAT entry team, the Rapid Deployment begin to establish an inner perimeter prior to giving team(s) would switch from the ro le of “Pathfind er” to authorization for entry of any “contact” team s. rescue team, working behind the SWAT element s. However, some shooting situations may require Rapid The third level o f response would be a Traditional Deployment teams to me rely provide c ontainmen t until SWAT Response of highly-trained and fully-equipped SWAT assets arrive on-scene. -10-
  12. 12. Instant Response: This response strategy appears to have the best chance penetrate ligh t intervening co ver, like soft body armor. for successfully stopping an active shooter. However, Positioning such equipment in a secure loc ation at a this type of respo nse also carr ies with it the highest school or other sensitive facility will require some degree of risk to the officer. In the case of a school imagination. These officers must also have the ab ility shooting, this response would be handle d by a School to comm unicate with arriv ing police re sources. Resource Officer (SRO) or possibly a D.A.R .E.© Officer who might be on-site when the shooting starts. Officers likely to make an “instant response” must take In jurisdictions where manpower limitations are severe, part in high-stress training scenarios on a regular basis. a single patrol officer might be duty bound to seek out These are the officers who will have the be st chance to and engage the active shooter without assistance. In the “run to the sound of the guns” and thereby save private sector, properly se lected and trained secu rity innocent lives ... but at extrem e risk. In the event these officers can prov ide instant resp onse to an a ctive officers are unable to neutralize the active shooter, they shooter. will serve as a “pathfinder” for arriving resources. The instant respond er must link up with a Rapid In the past, we have not necessarily chosen an SRO or Deployment or SWAT team and prov ide their intimate DARE officer based upon their ability as a “warrio r.” knowledge of the surroundings. The training provided Whil e is it still highly unlikely any particular SRO or to these officers must address the following issues: DARE officer will need to confront an active shooter, we must now factor that possibility into our selection • individual movement and danger areas process. (hallways, corners, rooms, stairs, etc.); Clearly, all officers assigned to re gularly patrol a high- • when to use covert, as o pposed to overt, risk location must be armed with at least a duty-grade movem ent; sidearm, a flashlight and clearly recognizable police identification. Though the circumstances may require • intelligence gathering/reporting and risk these officers to respond to an active shooter with the assessment; equipment they have on their person, we should consider w ays to make a dditional eq uipment av ailable • communications with arriving resources; to them. Protective gear, like a ballistic helmet and and, tactical vest will enhance the ir survivability. A single- projectile shoulder-fired weapon will allow these • f o r c e - o n - fo r c e scenarios usin g officers to deliver much more precise deadly force and simunition© type weapons. -11-
  13. 13. Rapid Deploym ent: This response strategy is a viable alternative to waiting to an inciden t. for a fully-trained SWAT team, in some circumstances. In the opinion of ou r panel of ex perts, few Ra pid The training must addre ss the following issues: D eployment training progra ms are ade quate . Additiona lly, some situatio ns are beyond the • team command and comm unication; capabilities of a Rapid Deployment response. While a policy may outlin e “safety stops” to help determine • intelligence gathering/reporting and risk when we should wait for SWAT, we know from vehicle assessment; pursuits there will be some hard charging officers who may exceed the bounds of prudence. • team movement indoors (diamond, wedge or “T” formations, etc.); In a perfect world, every police officer would be trained in Rapid De ployment tac tics and wou ld be men tally • team movement outdoors (bounding prepared to succeed . Realistically, some officers are overwatch, etc.); not physically or m entally equipped for specialty teams, like SWAT. Likewise, some of our officers may not be • improvised explosive devices (find approp riate for assignment to a Rapid Deployment another way? ... step over and proceed?); team. In fact, some officers want no part of this type of police response. Forcing such officers to train for and • dealing with downed victims; respond with Rapid Deployment tactics is probably not a good idea. W e can assign re luctant officers to • lifting and rescue techniques; perimeter points and other less dangerous assignments, but most agencies are already hard pressed to assemble • evacuation and control of innocents; and, sufficient manpower for an effective Rapid Deployment response. If an agency chooses not to train a ll its • “failure drills,” in the event a team takes officers for Rapid Deployment, they should devise a casualties without neutralizing the active system for quickly ide ntifying those tr ained. Some shooter(s). agencies are issuing a special pin or patch to denote a Rapid Deployment trained officer. Based upon an on-scene problem assessment, the incident commander may put seve ral “safety stops” in A Rapid Dep loyment response team should have acc ess effect. If one of these “s tops” is enco untered, the R apid to single-proje ctile shoulder -fired weapons equipped Deployment team must stop hunting the active shooters with a practical sling . Weap on-moun ted light sources and shift to a static mode and maintain a tight inner are highly recom mended . Protective gear, like ballistic perimeter. The team ’s goals in a static m ode are to helmets and bullet-resistant shields will enhance an limit the movement of the suspect(s), keep innoc ents officer’s survivability. The team should hav e a well from wandering into the kill zone and relay information equipped “traum a” kit and simple breaching to ols. to the incident commander and arriving SWAT assets. No officers without a uniform or b old “Police” garment should ever enter the Kill Zone or man the inner perimeter. Traffic safety ve sts can easily fulfill this requirement for plainclothes o fficers. Initial Rapid Deployment training should consist of not less than eight hours of instruction, with at least 75 percent of that being practical training under high-stress conditions. The initial training should include minimum performance standards, with tests. The training must follow the established SOP, w hich should be coordinated with other agencies that might respond -12-
  14. 14. A Rapid D eploymen t team should shift to an inner • hostages being held in a fixed location or perimeter mode if there is probable cause to believe one being used as human shields; or more o f the following co nditions exist: • suspect is communicating dem ands; • multiple active shooters; and/or, • boob y trap s or other ambush • the incident involves the release of preparations; hazardous materials (H azMat) or the use or threat of a Weap on of Mass • active shooter(s) barricaded in a Destruction (WMD - biological, nuclear, defensible location; incendiary, chemical or lar ge-scale explosive weapon). -13-
  15. 15. Traditional SWAT Response: Some agencies ha ve chosen to concen trate on Ra pid agencies train their Rapid Deployment teams to deal Deployment tactics to the exclusion of traditional with taking casu alties. Wha t is the rate of “acceptab le SWA T respo nse tactics. Our pan el of experts c ame to loss” for Rapid Deploym ent teams? W hat if multiple realize two important aspects of an active shooter shooters have laid an ambush for the first Rapid incident which point to the need to maintain SWAT Deployment team or have positioned explosive devices assets. along likely response routes? First, few incidents in the real world resemble our Such complica ted criminal e vents are extr emely rare, image where a team can assemble rapidly, run to the but could devastate a Rapid Deployment team. If you sound of the guns and quickly neutralize an active have committed the bulk of your resources to a single shooter. Most incid ents will be ove r before a R apid team, the failure of that team could lead to disaster. An Deployment team has a chance to gather and confusion active shooter is a terr ible event. However, sacrificing at the scene will generally prevent a clear picture of the a number of officers in a noble, but unsuccessful events until long after the shooting is over. response is likely to make the situation worse , not better. Some situations still dictate the use of patrol Second, Rapid Deployment teams are only trained and officers for containment while waiting for a S W AT equipped to deal with relatively simple problems. Few team to arrive. -14-
  16. 16. Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment As we were completing the research phase o f this effort by multiple terrorists intended to lure in and project, the United States was struck with the most eliminate our first responders, clearing the way for the horrific terrorist attack yet experienced. When we terrorists to kill without interference. consider the very real thre at of continued terrorist attacks, parallels can be dra wn to the use o f Rapid The recommendations of this report seem to hold up Deployment tactics. Both federal agencies and U.S. even when compared to attacks like those faced by military assets are gearing up to deal with terrorist Israel: the best chance for neutralizing the attacker is an attacks, but we all know that local police agencies will instant response b y someon e who is there when the be the first to respond to an unexpected strike. And, shooting starts (or when the bomber is recognized). we will be facing terrorists willing to die as a part of Similarly, most of these incidents will be over before their plan. even a sma ll team can be assembled . If the incident is still ongoing as a team arrives, there is a distinct As a profession, law enforcement has a lot to learn possibility they could b e facing multip le terrorists who about responding to critical incidents. Our brothers and have planned and organized their actions. We must not sisters in the fire service have much more experience at underestim ate the terrorists; their p lan will proba bly responding as a team and organizing themselves upon include preparations for our response. Sending a team arrival. Still, the highest price paid by first responders to their death in a well meaning, but futile gesture will at the World Trade Center was paid by the New York do nothing to eithe r neutralize the active shooters or City Fire Department. Fire administrators across the save innocent lives. M ost police comm anders wo uld nation have made a tough decision in the aftermath of never consider sending unprotected officers into the September 11 th. Fire Departments will now make a “hot zone” of a chemical atta ck, but expect their reasoned risk assessment before sendin g their peop le officers to run without h esitation into the “k ill zone” of into the hostile environment of a terrorist attack . We an active shooter. have trained for several years to expect terrorist groups to utilize “secondary devices” with an eye toward Our worst fear is a terrorist attack using a weapon of killing arriving eme rgency responders. The most mass destruction (W MD) . We no w know that th e effective secondary device in history was the second response to a biolog ical attack will pro bably com e in airliner crashing into the second tower in New York the form of an investigation, such as people suffering City. We m ust assume the terrorists expected fire and from unexplained respiratory problems at a sporting police responders to rush the site of the first “crash,” event. Should an attack involve chemical, radiological thereby adding to the tally of victims killed by the or large-scale explosive weapon s, our response must be second airliner. The te rrorists app arently did n’t slowed still further. The initial response will require a anticipate the collapse of the Twin Towers, but we must risk assessment prior to any deplo yment of resources. always consider a worst case scenario. While our goal Only a handful of police agencies have the specialized is always to save as many innocent lives a s possible, to training and equip ment to resp ond to the sc ene of a accomplish this we must stay alive ourselves. W M D attack, though these capabilities are being upgraded at emergen cy speed. In Illinois, State Some in the intelligence community are predicting Weapon of Mass Destruction Teams w ere in training terrorist attacks like the Israelis have experienced for prior to September 11 th. These teams include members several years. The Israeli attacks are committed by of several emergency response disciplines, with the core individuals or small groups who attack with small arms of each team being T actical Response officers from the and/or explo sive devices. The label of “suicide Illinois State Police. Thes e S W AT teams a re fully bomber” is accurate, since these terrorists ex pect to die trained and equipped to respond to terrorist thre ats in the commission of their strike. Like Israel, we must involving a WMD , but their response time is measured be prepare d to engag e these attacke rs quickly and in hours, not m inutes. Local p atrol officers will alw ays effectively, lest they succeed in spreading terror. W e be the first to respond, and the first to die if not must also consider the possibility of a coordinated adequately trained and effectively led. -15-
  17. 17. The Expert’s Opinions Lieutenant C. W. Black, Littleton (Colorado) Police Department Lt. C.W. "Bill" Black is with the Littleton, Colorado Police Department and was Commander of their SWAT T eam during the Columbine High School Inc ide nt. H e wa s ask ed b y the Inc ide nt C omm and er fr om J effe rso n Co unty She riff's Department to deploy the arriving SWAT teams and organize the rescue of students during that incident. Lieutenant Black has been with Littleton Police Department for 23 years and is a Guest Instructor at Thunder Ranch. Lieutenant B lack’s Comm ents: “At last we have some empirical data that supports my view, and that of others, that Active Shooter Response is risky and should only be attempted when no other approach is possible. I still think it is the exception and not the rule. Unfortuna tely, our profession seems to make the exception the rule when it reacts to a horrendous event in law enforcem ent. This study supports the need for BAS IC training in sho oting, movin g and com municating a s an appro ach to any rap id deployment scenario-no t some mag ic "footba ll play." Law enforc ement's strategy is that w e will respond to any "Active Shooter" situation, wherever it may occur. Our tactics are what we do once we arrive. These tactics should include sound, proven, patrol and SWAT tactics as well as stopping the killing where ap propriate . Our tactics should not make things worse. But, without officers who have the will, the skill and some basic equip ment, chanc es of success a re slim.” Mr. Richard E. Fairburn, Illinois State Police Academy Mr. Fairburn has over 20 years of law enforcement experience in both Illinois and Wyoming. Mr. Fairburn’s experience has included assignments in patrol, investigations, administration and training, including a stint as a municipal police chief. Mr. Fairb urn has bee n with the Illinois Sta te Police sinc e 1996 , serving in the C riminal Intell igence Bureau, Critical Incident Re sponse C omman d and T raining Aca demy. Dick developed th e Illinois State P olice Acad emy’s Critical Incident Response training program and those duties served as the impetus for this research project. Mr. Fairburn holds a B.S. degree in Law Enforcement Administration from Western Illinois University and has authored more than 100 articles on police equipment and training issues and a book on police rifle training. Mr. Fa irburn’s Co mments: “As the primary author of this report, my comments are already well represented. My goal when proposing this research project was to more clearly define the mission and practicality of Rapid Deployment. In many respects, the proliferation of Rapid Deployment training is little more than an emotional response to the Columbine High School shooting. As professionals, we must not give in to an emotional response at a horrific incident. The citizens have a right to expect from us an effective and measured response. I feel that Rapid Deploym ent training is bo th practical and worthwhile. Sta tistically, however , active shoo ter incidents are very rare and this research illustrates that almost all of them will be over long before even the quickest teams can hope to make contact with the shooter. What we can do, is to better train and equip all police officer s for “immed iate response” in the event they are very close when the shooting starts. In a few of these incidents, including the Columbine High School incident, had the first arriving officer been armed with a rifle, and well trained it its use, the active shooter(s) might have b een neutralize d almost imm ediately. In my opinion , the single most im portant asp ect of the use o f Rapid Deploym ent tactics by pa trol officers is the ro le of on-scene supervisory personnel. The commander on the scene must take immediate control of the responding assets and conduct a threat/risk assess ment. The comm ander must set the response priorities, including the essential requirement to set perimeters to minimize the number of potential victims in the “Kill Zone” and to ensure the shooter cannot escape to endang er other are as. Before deploying a Rapid Deployment team, the commander has an obligation to ensure the team has a re asonable chance for success.” -16-
  18. 18. Mr. Thomas T. Gillespie, Criminal Justice Training & Consulting Services M r. Gillespie began his law enforcement career in 1970 in Detroit, Michigan. He has served as a police sergeant, municipal police chief, city manager, State of New Mexico law enforcement training director and Director of the New Mexico Attorney G eneral’s Investigations Division. Since 1990, Mr. Gillespie has conducted over 400 Critical Incident Management programs to more than 6,000 law enforcement supervisors and commanders throughout the United States and abroad. He has authored a textbook on the police use of force and provides expert witness case review, evaluation and testimony in crim inal and civil actions involving police training, supervision and use of force. Mr. Gillespie has authored numerous articles in the field of critical incident management and use of force. Mr. G illespie’s Comments: “I have had the distinct honor of training thousands of police supe rvisors and comm anders in critical incident response and mana gement ov er the past 12 years and the invitation to participate in the Rapid Deploym ent Summ it was greatly appreciated. The perspective I was able to bring to the table was an awareness of the wide variety and types of instruction being offered by police agencies in the area of “Rapid Deployment (RD)” training throughout the United States. The participants were dedicated police commanders, trainers and tactical leaders attempting to determine the standard protoco ls to effectively respond to active shooter events. Most were surprised at the various levels of training being offered to police officers nationwide in the response to and handling of active shooter incidents. As mentioned in the report, many “Rapid Deployment” training programs mere ly offer classroom instruction. There was unanimous agreement that RD training must include realistic, hands-on skill building exercises. The failure to conduct practical and realistic ‘team’ exercises would be similar to atte mpting to train an officer to fire a w eapon fo r accuracy w ith only ‘classroom’ instruction on sight alignment and trigger squeeze. The RD protocols recommended in this report are simply minimum standards of training for officers facing — potentially — the most dangerous and high-risk event they may ever deal with in their careers. Tactical officers understand the need for on-going, rigorous and demanding training for the high -risk incidents they a re expecte d to “handle.” We must not use shortcuts in preparing patrol officers to deal with the exact same type of incidents for which tactical officers are training on a regular basis. Lastly, the need to provide p roper comm and and control at these types of even ts must not be ig nored. First responding supervisors are the key to effective and successful resolution of the incident. They mus t take charge a nd assume the role of the COACH, not the PLAY ER. Risk and/or threat assessment, identification of the “kill zone” and establishing a perimeter must be initiated by the on-scene commander prior to authorizing any type of tactical deployment for resolution. It is my hope tha t this effort will attract criticism and comment. It is only through disagreement and discussion of the issues that clarity and agreement can occur. It is only those supervisors that have nev er experien ced a po lice officer’s injury or death at the scene of a critical incident that casually comment, “that’s what we get paid to do, it’s a dangerous job!” We ow e our polic e officers and their families only the best training when confronte d with these type s of life threatening incidents.” Mr. Larry Glick, Executive Director, National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) Mr. Glick has over 28 years experience in the criminal justice field. Mr. Glick spent seven years as a special response team member for the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear W eapons Complex. Four of those years were at the DOE Central Training Academy as a tactics and firearms instructor and Safeguards and Security Training Departm ent Chief. Larry completed four years as a Regional Director with the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Contractor Support Program. After the retirem ent of John K olman in 19 93, Mr . Glick became the Executive Director of the NTOA. Currently he oversees the operations of the NTOA including the NTOA's Information Resources, Regional Seminar and -17-
  19. 19. Training Program , Tactical U nit and Incident Review Program as well as the publication of The Tactical E dge journ al. Mr. Glick has lectured nationally to school and police audiences regarding school and police response to active shooters in schools and public buildings. He testified before the Colorado Governor's Commission on the Columbine High School tragedy concerning po lice training and response to violent active sho oter situations. Mr. La rry Glick’s Co mments: “I want to commend your group on the resea rch and rep ort you pro duced o n Rapid D eploymen t. I have read through the report twice and the information contained in the report is very informative. I would add nothing.” Associate Professor David A. Klinger, Univer sity of M issouri-St. L ouis David A. Klinger is Associate Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missou ri-St. Louis. He also has held positions as A ssistant Profess or (199 2-1998 ) and Asso ciate Professor of Sociology (1998-1999) at the University of Houston. Prior to pursuing his graduate degrees, he worked for three and one-half years as a patrol officer for the Los Angeles and Redmond (WA) Police Depa rtments. He has held research positions at the Police Foundation in W ash ingt on, D.C .; the Uni ver sity o f W ash ingt on, Sea ttle; the W ash ingt on S tate 's Atto rne y's Office; and the Seattle Police Department. He has written num erous scholarly articles, book chap ters, and encyclopedia en tries that address topics such as arrest p ractices, the use of force, and how features of comm unities affect the actions of patrol officers. He has recently completed a research project on officer-involved shootings and is currently nearing completion of a study of police special we apons an d tactics (SW AT) tea ms. He rec eived his Ph .D. in Socio logy from the U niversity of Washington in 1992. Professor K linger’s Comm ents: “I take issue with the argument that officers who aren’t keen o n the idea shouldn’t be trained in rap id response tactics. Since when doe s a line officer get to tell the chief to buzz off and select w hat parts of the d epartmen t mission s/he will and wil l n o t d o ? If the b os s s ay s “M y officers will have rapid response training and they will rapidly respond to active shooting situations” and some officer doesn’t like it, that’s too ba d. S/he can a lways find ano ther job. A s far as I’m concerned, an officer has n o more a right to recuse h im or herself from rapid respo nse training that s/he d oes from b asic firearms, tactics, em ergency veh icle opera tion, report w riting, or any othe r aspect of the job.” Sergeant Patrick Kreis, Winnetka (Illinois) Police Department Patrick Kreis is a Sergeant with the Winnetka Police Department where he manages a comprehensive Use of Force training program . He has sixteen years combined law enforcement and military instructional experience and is certified as a Master Firearms Instructor by the Illinois Po lice Training Institute. Sergea nt Kreis is state b oard cer tified to teach numerous police subjects including Less Lethal Weapons , Tactical Team Operations, Patrol Tactics, Scenario Based Training, Use of Force Policy, and Critical Incident Response. He is a primary instructor for the Rapid Deployment Instructor training offered by Mobile Training Unit #3. Sergeant Kreis is a former SWAT (NIPAS EST) Team Leader and an active me mber of the Illinois Tactic al Officer’s Association . He is a graduate of Northwestern University School of Police Staff and Command and holds a Bachelors degree in Criminal Justice Science. Sergeant Kreis served eleven years in the U.S. Army Reserve with qualifications in Special Forces and Military Intelligence. Sergeant K reis’ Commen ts: “We will have to disagree on the issue of perimeter establishment. I feel strongly that deploying the 10-15 initial officers (5-10 minute response in the urban environment) on scene should be as follows: They are going to be much more effective at protecting life if they deploy in contact teams to stop the active killing. They are going to be less effective trying to control a perimeter that in many cases will be a square city block. My town's high school has 27 different doorway entry points. T he first respon ders are the o fficers that I have the most confidence in. They work together and train together. They have the same radios and are most familiar with the terrain. The second and third wave of -18-
  20. 20. responders will be capable of establishing inner and outer perimeters, but less prepared to make entry. What good is a perimeter outside the b uilding when th e bad guy is inside actively killing multiple victims? This philosophy is even more essential in the rural communities that can't even count on a 10-15 officer response within a 30 minute response time. It’s just not practical to tell them to set a perim eter before deciding to make entry. Regardless of when Klebold and Harris chose to stop killing their victims, the fact of the matter is that those two killers were still seen on video walking around with guns down without an apparent care in the world. Clearly they were not being pursued or engaged by the Police, even 37 minutes after the killing started. Just how is a perimeter going to shorten the amount of killing opportunity time? Recently, we had an example of victims being their best self-protection in Skokie, Illinois. A student brought a loaded gun to school and showed it to a friend. The suspect stated that he was going to kill a particular girl th en get to the cafeteria to do mass murder before suicide. Another kid spotted the gun in the would-be shooter’s bag. The second student calmly told a girl nearby, who used a ruse to leave class and inform the Dean. Then the hero slid the bag away from the bad-guy when he wasn’t looking. The second student turned the bag over to the Dean and the suspect was arrested witho ut incident.” Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II, Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II is a 12-year veteran of the Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department, a suburb of Chicago Illinois. He has been a member of the Northern Illinois Police Alarm Systems Emergency Services Team (NIPAS-EST) for 11 years were he currently serves as the Entry Team Leader. Sergeant Mohn has participated in the successful resolution of numerous critical incidents, felony fugitive apprehensions and high risk w arrant service operation s. He is an Illinois State certified instructor in a wide variety of tactical and firearms related disciplines and is the lead instructor for the NIPAS-EST 96 hour b asic SW AT co urse. Sergea nt Mohn serves on the Board of Directo rs for the Illinois Tactical Officers Asso ciation (IT OA) and is the lead instructo r for the ITO A's Rapid D eploymen t program . He has personally trained over a thousand officers in Rapid Deployment technique and tactics. A Grad uate of Na tional-Louis University, Sergeant Mo hn served six years in the US Arm y as an infantryman prior to starting his law enforcement career. Sergeant E dward F. Mo hn’s Comm ents: "Train Hard ..............For The Day Will Come. This motto has become the driving force behind the training and preparation that I have dedicated my team, my fellow officers and myself too. While the panel of experts p resented in this docume nt do not ag ree on all asp ects of this proj ect, we all strongly agreed and are committed to improving the training police officers are, or should be receiving in rega rds to the response and mana gement of c ritical incidents. W hile active shooter type incidents occur infrequently, they present a unique set of challenges and problems that many officers and agencies are not prepared to face. The traditional response of "Contain, Wait and Negotiate" has served us well and should still be implemented in 99.9% of the critical incidents that occur. But, when an offender is actively murdering innocent civilians how can police officers who are sworn to protect and serve our community and it's citizens stand by and wait? I always ask my students during Rapid Deployment Training "W hat if that was your child, your mother, your wife or husban d inside that b uilding"? W hat would yo u do? It is, and shall always be d ebated as to how Rapid Deployment would of made a difference in many of the active shooter situations that have occurred. It is my belief that the immediate deploym ent of law enforcement resourc es against the active shooter can and does save lives. One mu st only take a look a t the situation in Israe l and see that live s are saved when polic e officers arriv e quickly and deploy against armed offenders. Is this a dangero us endeavor?.… ..Yes. Do these techniques and tactics place officers in greater danger than the tradition al "contain a nd wait" utilized in the past?........Y es. But, if not Rapid Deploym ent, then what? We continually ask and search for a better solution from those who say Rapid Deployment is not the answer..........but none have been presented. As long as there are those in the world who will prey upon and murder innocent people, then there must be those of us who are trained, willing, ab le and ded icated to see king them ou t and stopp ing their dead ly behavior . To do less is inconceiv able. Train Hard...........For The Day Will Come". -19-
  21. 21. Commander Richard A. Ryan, Decatur (Illinois) Police Department Commander Ryan is a twenty-nine year police veteran. He holds a BA from Eastern Illinois University and served four years with the USMC, including one tour with an infantry rifle company in Viet Nam. He is a graduate of the FBI National Academy. Command er Ryan’s police experience includes operational service with both patrol and investigations functions. He has served as coordinator of the K-9 Unit and as Commander of the Professional Standards and Investiga tions Division s of the Dec atur Police Departm ent. Commander Ryan is currently Commander of the Patrol Division of the Dec atur Police Departm ent. He was r esponsib le for the development of the Decatur Police Department's Emergency Response Team and is Commander of the ERT. Commander Ryan was the on-scene Commander for all major events related to the five years of turmoil experienced by the City of Decatur resulting from three maj or labor disputes, a major K lu Klux K lan rally and turmoil during November 1999 involving Jesse Jackson's Rainbow-Push Coalition and white supremacist organizations. The Decatur Police Departm ent’s Emergency Response Team has served in excess of five h undred h igh-risk search w arrants and has been involved in the resolution of both hostage and barricaded suspect incidents, including incidents where deadly force was used. Commander Ryan is a member of the Nat ion al T acti cal O ffice r's A sso ciat ion (NT OA ), th e Ill ino is T acti cal O ffice r's Association ( IT OA), is a fo rme r me mbe r of t he B oar d of Dir ecto rs o f the ITO A an d is c urre ntly C hair of th e IT OA 's Legislative Committee. He is the owner of Ryan Crisis Management Consulting, Inc. He has presented at State and National conferences and has provided training throughout the State for topics related to Tactical Team Operations, Managing Labor Disputes and Interest Group Events, High Risk Strategy and Tactics for Patrol Operations, Developing School Crisis Response Plans and Patro l Rapid R esponse T actics for Activ e Shoote r Incidents. He is Coordinator for Law Enforcement Programming and an adjunct faculty member at Richland Community College in Decatur and an adjunct faculty member an d Advisory Bo ard member a t the Police Training Institute of the University of Illinois. Comma nder Rya n’s Comme nts: “As is often the case in law enforcement, the development of active shooter policies and training were a reaction to an incident. We have reacted by training operators (first responding officers), hopefully well and to the standards indicated above. However, we as administrators too often feel that we have done what is expected of us by providing some training in the area of concern to the oper ators. In a pro fessional law en forcemen t environme nt, it is essential that administration set clear (and high) standards for the agency in terms of the outcomes expected if the "active shooter" situation develops in its jurisdiction. Having done so, the administration has the obligation to the officers to provide the policy, training and equip ment nece ssary to succe ssfully achieve that o utcome. Second ly, it is important to understand that crisis situations involve much more than the first responder's response. Once containment and isolation have been accomplished, the real work of the administration begins... mana ging whateve r is left. That may include managing a hostage or barricade situation (in the traditional fashion), managing a major criminal investigation and crime scene, victim a ssistance, family reu nification, facility man agement, relief of security teams, etc. It is critical that our administrators know, understand and be ready to implement a comprehensive Incident Command Center to ensure that the whole incident is managed professionally--not just the crisis response. Further, it is critical for the responding officers to understand that there are NO EXCU SES if an active shooter situation develops. Whether administration has provided the policy, equipment and training or not, those we are sworn to protect rightfully expect us to be there for them. No matter how many officers we have to respond with, we must be prepared to get the job done. That means that each individual officer has the moral and professional obligation to have the heart to respond, to be tactically proficient in terms of both skill development and the wisdom to know when to apply the approp riate tactics, and must be physically able to perform. It sim ply isn't acceptab le to sit back an d comp lain that the Departm ent, for whatev er reason, d idn't give me eve rything I need. G ood pe ople, using go od tactics will p revail.” Master Sergeant John Simonton, Illinois State Police - Critical Incident Response Command M aster Sergeant John Simonton is a 20-year law enforcement veteran, beginning his career with the Boone County -20-
  22. 22. Sheriffs Department and moving on to the Illinois State Police in 198 4. John has been a member of the Tactical Response Team program since 1986 and is currently the Team Leader for one of three full-time Tactical Response Teams with the Illinois State Police. Master Sergeant Simonton is a certified instructor in close quarter battle, Critical Incident Response and operational planning and management. He holds a bachelors degree in law enforcement administration and has atten ded num erous supe rvisory training c lasses through out his caree r. Master Sergea nt John Simonton’s Commen ts: “While I certainly don’t consider myself an expert in this subject, I d id apprec iate the invitation to discuss the R apid Deploym ent issues with this diverse and educated panel. W e in law enforc ement nee d to do a better job of critiquing high-risk incidents and, most importantly, sharing that information with other law enforcement organizations. This “commu nication gap ” has caused many negativ es in law enforc ement such as: 1. Inconsistent training for high-risk incidents; 2. No basis for decision m aking by new or inexperien ced supervisors facing similar incidents; 3. Repeated improper tactics; and, 4. Improper assessment of high risk factors leading to delayed or disastrous decision-making. It is incumbent upon us, the trainers, to communicate our thoughts and experiences in handling critical incidents to those preparing for them. We would not be here today discussing this issue if we had not created our own luck by exhaustive prepara tions for the ultima te challenge. A few years ago, a few team members and I started teaching an eight hour room clearing / building entry class for patrol officers. This training was created for several reaso ns: 1. Requests by patrol officers assisting investigations with other than high risk (SWAT criteria) search and arrest warrants; 2. a trend was beginning with departments buying equipment for officers, but not budgeting for adequate and consistent training; and, 3. to prepare as many officers as possible in not only the physical art of room clearing, but the mental aspect of risk assessm ent when co nfronted with a n active shoo ter incident that m ay require im mediate ac tion. This type of training has been well received and has been made cost effective through the M obile Te am Tra ining Units throughout Illinois. The training has been cond ucted now for app roximately three years, with several repeat officers and agencies attending. Realistic “win” scenarios are utilized and made progressively more difficult, using Simunition© and incorpo rating decisio n-making am ong peer s in a “stressful” training environme nt.” -21-
  23. 23. Synopsis Active Shooter Incidents Case Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injure Times RD RD make a Narrative # d used? Difference?* 001 Tampa , FL - Workplac 1 male 9mm and .38 5 15+ 1500 hours. NO NO Suspect shot specific co-workers at hotel, Radisson e aged 36 handguns. 4+ officers except last victim (a women killed during a Hotel Many shots on scene Gone on arrival carjacking 2 miles from scen e). Suspect fired (unsure within 5 surrendered after vehicle pursuit. Suspect had #). minutes fled the scene before police arrived. 002 Tampa , FL - Workplac 1 male 9mm handgun. 3 2 1100 hours. NO NO Suspect entered workplace and targeted specific Fireman’s e mid-30's Many shots 4+ officers co-workers. Suspect fled the scene before Fund fired (unsure on the scene Gone on arrival officers arrived and was later found dead, from Insurance #). Probable within 5 a self-inflicted wound, at a nea rby golf course. building reload. minutes. 003 Anaheim, Rampage 1 male 2 revolvers. 7 2 1 1040 hours. NO NO Suspect entered the hosp ital where his mot her CA - after aged 43 shots fired. 4+ officers had recently died and shot random targets. Shot Hospital mother Probable on scene Already in custody 3 people, reloaded revolver and was grabbed died in reload. within 6 and detained by hospital staff before police this minutes. arrived. First arriving officer set-up a hospital Command Post and implemented ICS. 15-20 minutes before police entered the building and took sus pect in to custo dy. 004 Olivehurst, School 1 male 12 gauge 4 10 1405 hours. NO - NO Former student entered school and killed the CA - High aged 19 shotgun and 4+ officers teacher that had flunked out this student the School .22 rimfire on scene BUT Suspect had previous year. Remaining gunshot victims were rifle. within 5 very already barrica ded more random in nature. Suspect then barricaded Estimated 15- minutes. rapid with hostages himself into the upstairs library with 80+ 20 shots fired, SWAT entry response hostages. Two of first arriving officers were most were 3 within 10 by SWAT, who entered as a two man team with inch #4 shot minutes. SWAT long guns, but no other SWAT gear. This team loads. trained withdrew with a victim. Upon re-entering, the officers SWAT duo met a student who had been sent from the library to announce that hostag es were being held. The suspect surrendered through negotiations after about 8 hours. -22-
  24. 24. Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative 005 Pelham, AL Workplac 1 male .40 handgun. 3 0 0730 hours. NO NO Suspect shot specific targets at each of two - multiple e aged 33 9-10 rounds 4+ officers business locations about 6 miles apart. Suspect business fired (6-7 at on scene Gone on arrival at allowed some potential targets to leave locations first scene/2 within 5 both scenes unharmed from each location. Sus pect had fled killed, 3 at minutes. both scenes before police could arrive. Police second scene/1 knew suspect’s name and description after the killed). first shooting incident. Suspect was taken into custody shortly after the second shooting in a felony traffic stop. 006 Jonesboro, School 2 males, Each suspect 5 10 1220 hours. NO NO Suspects used the fire alarm to draw victims AR - aged 11 had 5 guns, 4+ officers from the school gymnasi um and fired wi th rifles Middle and 13 including on scene in Shooting was over from a woodline 93 yards away. The .357 School (used): .44 less than 5 by the time officers handgun was fired at a construction worker in Carbine, .30 minutes. 15- arrived the distance. A Deputy Sheriff located the Carbine, 20 officers suspects as they attempted to flee their shooting scoped .30-06, on scene positio n and to ok them i nto cust ody. .357 revolver. within 10 26 shots fired, minutes. over 400 rounds in possession. 007 Conyers, School 1 male .22 rimfire rifle 0 6 - all 0759 hours. NO NO Suspect got off the school bus (with weapons), GA - High aged 15 (stock cut- wounds 4th officer walked into the “commons” area and began School down for better were arrived in 7 Shooting was over shooting with the .22 rifle. Suspect fired the concealment) below minutes. by the time officers .357 revolver over his shoulder back towards and .357 the Incident arrived school as he fled on foot. Suspect dropped the revolver. Fired waist over in 12 rifle in the school as he fled. Suspect was 12 shots (11 minutes. confronted by an assistant principle (student had from .22 at the .357 in his mouth) and surrendered the victims and 1 revolver to the prin ciple when ordered to do so. at school from First officer to arrive was dealing with victims. .357). Second arriving officer placed suspect into custod y. -23-
  25. 25. Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative 008 Sheridan, School 1 male 9mm handgun. 0 4 1100 hours. NO NO Suspect walked onto middle school playground WY - aged 29 Fired 15-20 First officer and opened fire on a group of 20-25 students. Middle rounds (uns ure) arrived Suspect commi tted All victims had been shot prior to the first School with reload. within 3 suicide as the officer’s arrival. As the arriving officers minutes and officers arrived approached the playground area, the suspect third officer committed suicide with the handgun. arrived within 4 minutes. 009 Newington, Workplac 1 male 9mm handgun, 4 - (3 0 0844 hours. NO NO Suspect killed co-workers at the Lottery CT - State e aged 35. large hunting killed Four+ building. 2 shots were reported fired after Lottery knife. 20 shots by officers Suspect commi tted police arrived. Suspect committed suicide upon Headquarter fired (18 before gunfir arrived at suicide as the arrival of the first officers. s. police arrived e and 0846. officers arrived and 2 after 1 Incident police arrived). killed resolved at by 0846. gunfir e and knife.) 010 Wakefield, Workplac 1 male Shotgun, 7 0 Times NO - NO Suspect entered a business in a huge multi- MA - Office e aged 43 handgun, unsure: business complex and shot employees in his complex AK47 type reported that BUT Shooting was over former employer’s personnel office. The first rifle. At least 7 a 3 officer very by the time officers three officers found a victim and then found the shots fired, team entered rapid arrived suspect a few feet away from that victim. The most from AK, the building response suspect had put down his weapons, was almost some from in from 5-10 by patrol in a trance, and offered no resistance to arrest. shotgun. minutes. 10 officers officers in the building by the time of arrest. -24-
  26. 26. Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative 011 Great School 1 male AR15. Many 2 4 2230 hours. NO NO Suspect, a student at this exclusive school, first Barrington, aged 19 shots fired at 3 The first shot a security guard at the gate, then shot a MA - different officer Shooting was over professor in his car. From there the suspect Preparatory locations arrived by the time officers walked to the library and a dorm, shooting School around the within 5 arrived random targets. Suspect barricaded himself in campus. minutes. 4+ the cafeteria and called 911. An officer at 911 officers on center convinc ed the su spect to surrend er. At scene within time of surrender 7 officers were on the scene 20 minutes. and had just completed setting on-scene Incident perimeters. SWAT team had been called but resolved at was 1-2 hours out. Shooting was apparently about 2300 over by the time offic ers arrived on scen e. hours. 012 Royal Oak, Workplac 1 male in Rifle and 5 4 0800 hours. NO - NO Suspect, a suspended postal employee and MI - Post e 30's. handgun. First officer former Marine, entered the central post office Office Unknown arrived BUT Shooting was over and targeted former supervisors and co-workers. number of within 2 very by the time officers Suspect was found inside dead from a self- shots fired. minutes. 3 rapid made contact inflicted gunshot wound. officers response entered the by patrol building in officers less than 5 minutes. 4-5 officers in the building by the time they found the dead suspect. -25-

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