In less than 33 years, the U.S. law enforcement hostage incidents are infrequent. So, many SWAT
commu nity has experienced two watershe d events teams trained heavily but rarely deployed.
which shaped our respo nse to incidents involving an Administrators looking for w ays to justify their
active shooter. The first rude awakening was investment in these units realized that the entry team
perpetrated by Charles Whitman from the clock tower component of SWA T units was perfectly suited to
at the Univ ersity of Texas at Austin. In a sniper conduct high-risk raids for the service of arrest or
incident lasting 90 minutes, Whitman killed 15 and search warrants. Many SWAT teams now spend as
wounded 31 victims. Whitman's training in the U.S. much as 80 per cent of their time conducti ng pre-
Marine Corps apparently prepared him well for dealing planned raids, not eme rgency response missions.
with targets as distant as 500 yards from his perch on
the 30th floor obse rvation dec k. What does this brief history of SWAT have to do with
a study of Rapid Deployment - Immediate Action
Many regard this incid ent as the impetus of d ramatic tactics for patrol officers? More than 32 years after
change in police training and response. Some agencies Charles Whitma n's rampage , two teenage rs in Colorado
issued long-range rifles and trained their officers in the logged a similar death and injury toll at another school
role of counter-sn iper, while other agencies formed ... this time a high scho ol.
more comprehensive para-military teams with even
greater capabilities. The genesis of what would become Within 13 minutes of the first police call to the April
Special Weapons and Tactics teams (SWAT) 20, 1999 inc ident at Colu mbine H igh Schoo l, Dylan
undoub tedly began at 1 1:48 a.m . on August 1 , 1966 in Klebold and Eric Harris killed 13 and wounded 24.
the form of Charles Whitman's murderous spree. Unlike Whitman's sniper incident, the Columbine event
Notably, Whitman was finally stopped that day by two was planned around explosives. Klebo ld and H arris
police office rs and an arm ed citizen wh o teamed up to had set a large impro vised bom b in the schoo l cafeteria
attack his sniper perch and kill him. with a timer set to go off when the lunch crow d would
provide nearly 500 victims. The killers planned to
The evolution of SWAT teams in U.S. police agencies shoot any fleeing students from positions they w ould
followed a rather hopscotch pattern around the nation. take up in the parking lot. Only when their bomb failed
Most large cities had very well equipped and trained to detonate did Klebold and Harris enter the scho ol to
teams, while some suburban and rural areas basically kill who they co uld with firearm s.
ignored the conce pt or deve loped m utual-aid
agreements with neighboring tea ms. Outside of major In researching the Whit man shooting in A ustin, little
metropo litan areas, few age ncies expe cted incide nts criticism of the police response could be found.
requiring a SWAT -type response. Another important Anyone who left cover within Whitman's field of fire
consid eration is the fact that SWAT teams are was shot down. Indeed, one police officer was among
expensive and time consuming. the dead that day in Austin. No one on that day had
heard of S WAT , a concep t which came later.
Most agencies developed policies setting clear
guidelines for the activation of a SWAT team. Patrol At the Columbine incident, however, the police were
officers in these agencies were gener ally trained to wait loudly criticized. Even other police agencies have
for SWAT when an incident justified deployment of the joined in the condemnation of the police response to the
special team. Patro l officers were ex pected to attack perpetrated by Klebold and Harris. At
"Contain, Isolate and Negotiate” until SWAT arrived. Columbine, numerous SWAT units deployed as quick ly
as possible an d made e ntry into the school within 45
During this same time, the primary mission of most minutes of the first call. In fact, the shooters committed
SWAT teams was evolving. Originally, most SWAT suicide at about the same time the first SWAT team was
teams were structured for scenarios involving snipers entering the o ther side of the m assive schoo l.
(or other barricaded gunmen) and hostag e incidents. In
actuality, active shooters, barricaded gunmen and
The current movement to train patrol officers to risk to the responding officers and the possibility that
respond using Rapid D eploymen t tactics began in these tactics could a ctually make some situations worse.
earnest in the aftermath of the Columbine shooting.
Response strategies like Rapid Deployment have been The concern m any express for the use of Ra pid
around for a while in several forms, but emotions Deployment falls into the theory...“a little bit of
surrounding the Colu mbine incident caused many knowledge is dangerous.” One SWAT team
officers to insist they would “never again wait for commander in Illinois put it this way: “In SWAT,
SWAT ” at the scene of an active shooter. making an entry is always our last option, for w hen all
other methods of resolution have failed ... but, with
Like so many things in the law enforce ment com munity, Rapid Deployment, we’re telling minimally trained
we have come full circle; from Rapid D eploymen t - patrol officer s to use SWA T’s last option as the ir first
through the evolution of SW AT - bac k to Rapid option. I wonder if we ’ve really thought this thing
Deployment in just over 32 years. The resolution of the through?”
Texas Tower incident was a Rapid D eploymen t,
unorganized as it was, by those police officers and the It is quite easy for two police officers to pencil out a
armed citize n. scenario where Rapid Deployment tactics are the
obvious answer. In looking at 44 active shooter
Our research into these incid ents has uncovered other incidents from the real world, the practicality of R apid
instances where an im mediate, unorganized response by Deploym ent is not so clea r cut.
arriving police officers probably saved lives. There is
no question: R apid De ployment tac tics can save live s in Our mission in this research was to first identify any
some circumstances. However, the driving force patterns inherent in active shooting incidents, if indeed
behind this research project is the understanding that any such patterns exist. By better understanding how
Rapid Deploym ent tactics carry w ith them a substantial these events unfold , we hoped to determine when and
where Ra pid Dep loyment is app ropriate.
History teaches us not to make a major change in police Though these incidents are quite rare, they can be very
practice based on a single incident, no matter how deadly for those involved. In the 44 incidents we
dramatic the incident. Instead, we should base our debriefed, 152 people were killed and 214 were
changes on a demonstrated pattern of criminal activity. wounded. These numbers average out to 3.5 killed and
W e began by o utlining the catastrophic University of 4.8 wounded per incident. Truly, these are serious
Texas and Colu mbine H igh Schoo l incidents , but we events.
must remember that they were separated by nearly 33
years. For compar ison purpo ses, we also analyzed a 45 th
incident where the Los Angeles (California) Police
How frequently do U.S. police agencies face such Department used Rapid Deployment tactics in an
overwhelming firefights? Are we justified in spending attempt to rescue a downed officer from a location
precious time and money in preparin g for the unlikely controlled by a barricaded gunman. This incident was
event that our jurisdiction will ever face such a threat? included in our discussion for two reasons. First,
On the other hand, we train extensively with firearms LAPD officers use this incident as an example in a
even though we know very few police officers will ever Rapid Deployment training program they have
fire a single shot in the line of duty during their career. delivered across the co untry. Secondly, the incident in
Training for an event w e may never face is clear ly question points out ho w Rapid Deployment tactics can
justified if the potential consequences are seriou s. actually make a bad incident worse, when used in the
By searching various sources, we were able to iden tify
nearly 80 active shooter incidents in the United States After these inciden ts were deb riefed and a nalyzed, a
dating back to the 1966 incident in Austin, Texas. As summit was held to gather input from a number of
we tried to debrief these incidents, many proved to not experts with extensive expe rience in resp onding to
fit within our parameters of an active shooter and some critical incidents. This report is a compilation of the
were simply too old to allow us to obtain worthwhile discussions and reco mmend ations gener ated during this
information . meeting held in November of 2001. Each of the experts
helped edit this final docu ment and c ontribute their
Ultimately, we obtained detailed information about the personal opinions at the end.
police response to 44 incidents. Undoubtedly, a
number of incidents went undiscovered, but the number
of active shooter incidents in an average year from 1966
through 20 01 could easily be cou nted on o ne hand.
The Findings and Patterns
W e always seem to have a compulsion to define the Respond er Casualties:
“average” of any series of events being measured. The Responders were killed or injured in four of the 44
following average active shooter incident is based on incidents.
our analysis o f 44 events.
A police officer was wound ed in an exchange of gunfire
A single, white male shooter, age d 30, will enter a well at the end of a p ursuit of a suspect who killed four and
populated location and open fire without warning. This wounded six firefighters in a wo rkplace sho oting in
shootin g spree will probably be over in two to three Jackson, Mississippi in 1996.
minutes, usually long befor e even a single police officer
can arrive. The suspect will almost certain ly be familiar A New Hampshire Troo per was killed and a second
with the locale and will initially target specific people, Trooper was wounded during a traffic stop/ambush at
but is very likely to fire rando mly before h e stops. Th is the onset of a five hour shooting spree near Colebrook,
shooter will probably be armed with more than one New Hampshire in 1997. In a subsequent ambush set
firearm and will fire about 25 rounds, killing th ree to by the rifle-armed suspect, four additional officers were
four victims and wounding an additional five people. wounded before the suspect was killed.
After the shooting spree, the suspect is likely to end up
dead, probab ly by comm itting suicide. The incid ent is A police officer was wounded in a 500 round shootout
almost guaranteed to take place during daylight hours following the pursuit of an active shooting suspect from
and will probably occur inside a building. a Cal-Trans maintenance yard near Ora nge, Californ ia
Surprisingly, many of the incidents we debriefed closely
fit the average we have outlined above. Incidents like A security guard was killed and two police officers
the Texas tower and Columbine are truly exceptional were wounded by a man who had entered the library of
and far outside the norm. the Salt Lake City Latter Day Saints church and opened
fire in 1999. This 70 ye ar old man was ultimately killed
Victims: by police.
As mentioned before, these incidents resulte d in 152
deaths and 214 people wounded . The largest death to ll, Response Strategy:
23, was at the Luby’s Restaurant shooting in Killeen, A true Rapid Deployment response, by an agency which
Texas in 1991 and the largest number of wounded, 25, had previously trained in this tactic, was only u sed in
was at the Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon three of the 44 active shooter incidents we debriefed.
in 1998. In two of the Rapid Deployment responses, the use of
these tactics affected the outcome of the incident in a
Suspects: positive way. In the remaining Rapid Deployment use,
Only two incidents involved multiple shooters, with a the incident was over before the team was ab le to make
maximum of two suspe cts in any single incident. Of the entry into the scho ol.
46 shooters, only two were females. The age range of
shooters ran from 11 to 70. Tw enty of the suspec ts died In the opinion of the writer, Rapid Deployment either
at the scene; four were killed by police and 16 did or might have resulted in a positive effect on the
committed suicide. outcome of the incident in 11 of the 44 incidents (25
percent). In the incidents where Rapid Deployment
Shots Fired: would have made no difference in the ultimate outcome,
Suspects in these 44 incidents fired from one to 188 there was no longer an active shooter to engage by the
shots. The 188 shot incident was Columbine High time a team could have made entry into the location. In
School. Police fired during nine of these incidents, three of these incidents the shooter had already
rangin g from two to more than 500 shots. More than barricaded himself, with hostages, in a fixed location.
500 shots were fired by seven police officers in an
incident that started at a Cal-Trans maintenance yard Environment of Incident:
near Orange, California. The majority of the incidents in our study oc curred at a
school or workplace. Over 95 percent of these Weap ons:
incidents took place during daylight hours. About two- More than one-half of the incidents involved su spects
thirds of the incidents took place within a b uilding. The armed with one or m ore hand guns. Near ly one-fourth
other one-third of the incidents involved some shooting of the suspects used both handguns and long guns
in an outdo or environ ment. (rifles and/or shotguns). Four of these incidents (nine
percent) involved the use of impro vised explo sive
There were four general categories o f response stop the killing. In five of the incidents, the suspect was
identified in these 44 incidents: forcibly detained by citizens at the shooting site (often
at great risk to themselves). In two of these incidents,
• Immedia te - unorganized response by the suspect was taken into custody by on-scene police
personnel on the scene when the incident officers (both at a school).
began (police, security or citizens).
The need for im mediate ac tion by whomever is there
• Immedia te - unorganized response by when the incident begins was born out by the actions of
arriving police officers. passengers on Flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and
subsequent flights where dangerous activity has been
• Immedia te - organized response by encountered. These events happen in seconds and,
a r r i v in g p o l i c e o ff i c e r s ( R a p id unless they are quick ly ended b y someon e already on
Deployment). scene, the criminals will likely kill until they choose to
stop. The police simply cannot be everywhere violence
• Arriving police officers contained the may occur and are un likely to arrive before the violence
incident and waited for the arriv al of ends.
SWA T assets.
A parallel example of on-scene personnel minimizing
Except in the rarest of incidents, like the shootings at death and destruction has been seen recently in Isra el.
the University of Texas and Colum bine High School, Terrorist shooting and bombing attacks have taken a
only the most imme diate respo nse will have a chan ce to huge toll in Israel, but some events have surprisingly
reduce the number of innocent victims likely to be low death tallies when you consider the weaponry
killed or injured b y an active sho oter. Even a rapid brought to the scene by the terrorists. The low body
response by a team of officers using R apid Deployment count is generally attribute d to the terrorist being shot
tactics will likely find the incident over by the time they by military or police p ersonnel. Other reports suggest
enter the shoo ting area. many of these terrorists are being sh ot by armed Israeli
citizens who happened to be on the scene or arrived
Immedia te action taken by personne l who are on -site before military or police units.
when the sho oting starts is the mo st effective way to
Based on our analysis of 44 high profile, active • The training must be refreshed on a
shooting incidents, some general recommendations periodic basis (at least annually) and
were developed by our panel of experts. should involve all jurisdictions who might
respond to a given location.
• Effective command and control mus t
begin immediately at the onset of the • The incident commander must consider a
incident and must take place independent “response in depth,” an d contem plate
of the use of Rapid Deployment tactics. delaying the insertion of a contact team
The on-scene commander must not until a backup team can be asse mbled, in
become personally involved in the the most threatening incidents.
response. The incid ent comm ander mu st,
instead, conduct a n initial problem • A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
assessment, coordina te the arriving must be develo ped to cover the use of
resources, and ensure commun ication is Rapid Deploym ent and th e overall
established between all responding units. management of the incident. This SOP
should include the minimum requirements
• The single greatest problem facing the for manpower, equipment and training for
on-scene commander will be the the use of Rapid Deployment teams. The
threat/risk assessment (intelligence SOP should also address complicating
gathering). Analysis of the incidents issues, such as: explosive devices;
suggests the following problems can be ambush survival; and p rocedur es to
e x p e c t e d : co n fu s in g in fo rma tio n follow in the event a team takes
describing multiple location s and multiple casualties.
suspects, a breakdown in nearly all forms
of technological and inter-personal • Agencies should pre-plan high-risk
communication, being inundated by locations. These plans should include
fleeing inhabitants and rapid ly arriving floor plans, initial perimeter points and
resources and unfam iliarity with the command post and resource staging
incident site. locations.
• All officers should have access to single- Based upon this analysis, we recommend police
projectile shoulder-f ired weapons, agencies develop procedures for three levels of
preferably a carbine chambered for a response to active shooter incidents. Ou r experts have
cartridge capable of penetrating soft body drawn up recom mendatio ns for specific tra ining and
armor. Such weapons w ill greatly equipment needs for each of these response strategies,
increase the effectiveness of contact and which will be o utlined in deta il.
rescue teams, as well as allowing some
incidents to be terminate d quickly by the The first level of response would be an Instant
first arriving officers. Response by personnel who are on-scene when the
shooting starts. This would include police officers
• The training provided by an age ncy must regularly assigned to patrol schools, business or public
include force-on-force sessions in which areas where large numbers of people congregate. In
officers move as a team, encountering some instances, this could include a n immedia te
high-stress complications and liv e response by the first arriving patrol officer.
adversaries. The training must include
tactics for team movement in both indoor The second level of response would be a structured and
and outdoor se ttings. coordinated response by team(s) of arriving officers -
Rapid Deployment. To be most effective, these teams
need to be better equipped and more fully trained than
the level at which most agencies currently operate. The
on-scene commander must have already assumed officers. In some situations, the SWA T eleme nts would
command and cond ucted a pre liminary “threat/risk be the second wave to enter a shooting location. Upon
assessment.” The on-scene comman der must also arrival of the SWAT entry team, the Rapid Deployment
begin to establish an inner perimeter prior to giving team(s) would switch from the ro le of “Pathfind er” to
authorization for entry of any “contact” team s. rescue team, working behind the SWAT element s.
However, some shooting situations may require Rapid
The third level o f response would be a Traditional Deployment teams to me rely provide c ontainmen t until
SWAT Response of highly-trained and fully-equipped SWAT assets arrive on-scene.
Rapid Deploym ent:
This response strategy is a viable alternative to waiting to an inciden t.
for a fully-trained SWAT team, in some circumstances.
In the opinion of ou r panel of ex perts, few Ra pid The training must addre ss the following issues:
D eployment training progra ms are ade quate .
Additiona lly, some situatio ns are beyond the • team command and comm unication;
capabilities of a Rapid Deployment response. While a
policy may outlin e “safety stops” to help determine • intelligence gathering/reporting and risk
when we should wait for SWAT, we know from vehicle assessment;
pursuits there will be some hard charging officers who
may exceed the bounds of prudence. • team movement indoors (diamond, wedge
or “T” formations, etc.);
In a perfect world, every police officer would be trained
in Rapid De ployment tac tics and wou ld be men tally • team movement outdoors (bounding
prepared to succeed . Realistically, some officers are overwatch, etc.);
not physically or m entally equipped for specialty teams,
like SWAT. Likewise, some of our officers may not be • improvised explosive devices (find
approp riate for assignment to a Rapid Deployment another way? ... step over and proceed?);
team. In fact, some officers want no part of this type of
police response. Forcing such officers to train for and • dealing with downed victims;
respond with Rapid Deployment tactics is probably not
a good idea. W e can assign re luctant officers to • lifting and rescue techniques;
perimeter points and other less dangerous assignments,
but most agencies are already hard pressed to assemble • evacuation and control of innocents; and,
sufficient manpower for an effective Rapid Deployment
response. If an agency chooses not to train a ll its • “failure drills,” in the event a team takes
officers for Rapid Deployment, they should devise a casualties without neutralizing the active
system for quickly ide ntifying those tr ained. Some shooter(s).
agencies are issuing a special pin or patch to denote a
Rapid Deployment trained officer. Based upon an on-scene problem assessment, the
incident commander may put seve ral “safety stops” in
A Rapid Dep loyment response team should have acc ess effect. If one of these “s tops” is enco untered, the R apid
to single-proje ctile shoulder -fired weapons equipped Deployment team must stop hunting the active shooters
with a practical sling . Weap on-moun ted light sources and shift to a static mode and maintain a tight inner
are highly recom mended . Protective gear, like ballistic perimeter. The team ’s goals in a static m ode are to
helmets and bullet-resistant shields will enhance an limit the movement of the suspect(s), keep innoc ents
officer’s survivability. The team should hav e a well from wandering into the kill zone and relay information
equipped “traum a” kit and simple breaching to ols. to the incident commander and arriving SWAT assets.
No officers without a uniform or b old “Police” garment
should ever enter the Kill Zone or man the inner
perimeter. Traffic safety ve sts can easily fulfill this
requirement for plainclothes o fficers.
Initial Rapid Deployment training should consist of not
less than eight hours of instruction, with at least 75
percent of that being practical training under high-stress
conditions. The initial training should include
minimum performance standards, with tests. The
training must follow the established SOP, w hich should
be coordinated with other agencies that might respond
A Rapid D eploymen t team should shift to an inner • hostages being held in a fixed location or
perimeter mode if there is probable cause to believe one being used as human shields;
or more o f the following co nditions exist:
• suspect is communicating dem ands;
• multiple active shooters; and/or,
• boob y trap s or other ambush • the incident involves the release of
preparations; hazardous materials (H azMat) or the use
or threat of a Weap on of Mass
• active shooter(s) barricaded in a Destruction (WMD - biological, nuclear,
defensible location; incendiary, chemical or lar ge-scale
Traditional SWAT Response:
Some agencies ha ve chosen to concen trate on Ra pid agencies train their Rapid Deployment teams to deal
Deployment tactics to the exclusion of traditional with taking casu alties. Wha t is the rate of “acceptab le
SWA T respo nse tactics. Our pan el of experts c ame to loss” for Rapid Deploym ent teams? W hat if multiple
realize two important aspects of an active shooter shooters have laid an ambush for the first Rapid
incident which point to the need to maintain SWAT Deployment team or have positioned explosive devices
assets. along likely response routes?
First, few incidents in the real world resemble our Such complica ted criminal e vents are extr emely rare,
image where a team can assemble rapidly, run to the but could devastate a Rapid Deployment team. If you
sound of the guns and quickly neutralize an active have committed the bulk of your resources to a single
shooter. Most incid ents will be ove r before a R apid team, the failure of that team could lead to disaster. An
Deployment team has a chance to gather and confusion active shooter is a terr ible event. However, sacrificing
at the scene will generally prevent a clear picture of the a number of officers in a noble, but unsuccessful
events until long after the shooting is over. response is likely to make the situation worse , not
better. Some situations still dictate the use of patrol
Second, Rapid Deployment teams are only trained and officers for containment while waiting for a S W AT
equipped to deal with relatively simple problems. Few team to arrive.
Rapid Deployment in a post 9-11 Environment
As we were completing the research phase o f this effort by multiple terrorists intended to lure in and
project, the United States was struck with the most eliminate our first responders, clearing the way for the
horrific terrorist attack yet experienced. When we terrorists to kill without interference.
consider the very real thre at of continued terrorist
attacks, parallels can be dra wn to the use o f Rapid The recommendations of this report seem to hold up
Deployment tactics. Both federal agencies and U.S. even when compared to attacks like those faced by
military assets are gearing up to deal with terrorist Israel: the best chance for neutralizing the attacker is an
attacks, but we all know that local police agencies will instant response b y someon e who is there when the
be the first to respond to an unexpected strike. And, shooting starts (or when the bomber is recognized).
we will be facing terrorists willing to die as a part of Similarly, most of these incidents will be over before
their plan. even a sma ll team can be assembled . If the incident is
still ongoing as a team arrives, there is a distinct
As a profession, law enforcement has a lot to learn possibility they could b e facing multip le terrorists who
about responding to critical incidents. Our brothers and have planned and organized their actions. We must not
sisters in the fire service have much more experience at underestim ate the terrorists; their p lan will proba bly
responding as a team and organizing themselves upon include preparations for our response. Sending a team
arrival. Still, the highest price paid by first responders to their death in a well meaning, but futile gesture will
at the World Trade Center was paid by the New York do nothing to eithe r neutralize the active shooters or
City Fire Department. Fire administrators across the save innocent lives. M ost police comm anders wo uld
nation have made a tough decision in the aftermath of never consider sending unprotected officers into the
September 11 th. Fire Departments will now make a “hot zone” of a chemical atta ck, but expect their
reasoned risk assessment before sendin g their peop le officers to run without h esitation into the “k ill zone” of
into the hostile environment of a terrorist attack . We an active shooter.
have trained for several years to expect terrorist groups
to utilize “secondary devices” with an eye toward Our worst fear is a terrorist attack using a weapon of
killing arriving eme rgency responders. The most mass destruction (W MD) . We no w know that th e
effective secondary device in history was the second response to a biolog ical attack will pro bably com e in
airliner crashing into the second tower in New York the form of an investigation, such as people suffering
City. We m ust assume the terrorists expected fire and from unexplained respiratory problems at a sporting
police responders to rush the site of the first “crash,” event. Should an attack involve chemical, radiological
thereby adding to the tally of victims killed by the or large-scale explosive weapon s, our response must be
second airliner. The te rrorists app arently did n’t slowed still further. The initial response will require a
anticipate the collapse of the Twin Towers, but we must risk assessment prior to any deplo yment of resources.
always consider a worst case scenario. While our goal Only a handful of police agencies have the specialized
is always to save as many innocent lives a s possible, to training and equip ment to resp ond to the sc ene of a
accomplish this we must stay alive ourselves. W M D attack, though these capabilities are being
upgraded at emergen cy speed. In Illinois, State
Some in the intelligence community are predicting Weapon of Mass Destruction Teams w ere in training
terrorist attacks like the Israelis have experienced for prior to September 11 th. These teams include members
several years. The Israeli attacks are committed by of several emergency response disciplines, with the core
individuals or small groups who attack with small arms of each team being T actical Response officers from the
and/or explo sive devices. The label of “suicide Illinois State Police. Thes e S W AT teams a re fully
bomber” is accurate, since these terrorists ex pect to die trained and equipped to respond to terrorist thre ats
in the commission of their strike. Like Israel, we must involving a WMD , but their response time is measured
be prepare d to engag e these attacke rs quickly and in hours, not m inutes. Local p atrol officers will alw ays
effectively, lest they succeed in spreading terror. W e be the first to respond, and the first to die if not
must also consider the possibility of a coordinated adequately trained and effectively led.
The Expert’s Opinions
Lieutenant C. W. Black, Littleton (Colorado) Police Department
Lt. C.W. "Bill" Black is with the Littleton, Colorado Police Department and was Commander of their SWAT T eam
during the Columbine High School Inc ide nt. H e wa s ask ed b y the Inc ide nt C omm and er fr om J effe rso n Co unty She riff's
Department to deploy the arriving SWAT teams and organize the rescue of students during that incident. Lieutenant
Black has been with Littleton Police Department for 23 years and is a Guest Instructor at Thunder Ranch.
Lieutenant B lack’s Comm ents:
“At last we have some empirical data that supports my view, and that of others, that Active Shooter Response is risky
and should only be attempted when no other approach is possible. I still think it is the exception and not the rule.
Unfortuna tely, our profession seems to make the exception the rule when it reacts to a horrendous event in law
This study supports the need for BAS IC training in sho oting, movin g and com municating a s an appro ach to any rap id
deployment scenario-no t some mag ic "footba ll play." Law enforc ement's strategy is that w e will respond to any "Active
Shooter" situation, wherever it may occur. Our tactics are what we do once we arrive. These tactics should include
sound, proven, patrol and SWAT tactics as well as stopping the killing where ap propriate . Our tactics should not make
things worse. But, without officers who have the will, the skill and some basic equip ment, chanc es of success a re slim.”
Mr. Richard E. Fairburn, Illinois State Police Academy
Mr. Fairburn has over 20 years of law enforcement experience in both Illinois and Wyoming. Mr. Fairburn’s experience
has included assignments in patrol, investigations, administration and training, including a stint as a municipal police
chief. Mr. Fairb urn has bee n with the Illinois Sta te Police sinc e 1996 , serving in the C riminal Intell igence Bureau,
Critical Incident Re sponse C omman d and T raining Aca demy. Dick developed th e Illinois State P olice Acad emy’s
Critical Incident Response training program and those duties served as the impetus for this research project. Mr. Fairburn
holds a B.S. degree in Law Enforcement Administration from Western Illinois University and has authored more than
100 articles on police equipment and training issues and a book on police rifle training.
Mr. Fa irburn’s Co mments:
“As the primary author of this report, my comments are already well represented. My goal when proposing this research
project was to more clearly define the mission and practicality of Rapid Deployment. In many respects, the proliferation
of Rapid Deployment training is little more than an emotional response to the Columbine High School shooting. As
professionals, we must not give in to an emotional response at a horrific incident. The citizens have a right to expect
from us an effective and measured response.
I feel that Rapid Deploym ent training is bo th practical and worthwhile. Sta tistically, however , active shoo ter incidents
are very rare and this research illustrates that almost all of them will be over long before even the quickest teams can hope
to make contact with the shooter. What we can do, is to better train and equip all police officer s for “immed iate
response” in the event they are very close when the shooting starts. In a few of these incidents, including the Columbine
High School incident, had the first arriving officer been armed with a rifle, and well trained it its use, the active shooter(s)
might have b een neutralize d almost imm ediately.
In my opinion , the single most im portant asp ect of the use o f Rapid Deploym ent tactics by pa trol officers is the ro le of
on-scene supervisory personnel. The commander on the scene must take immediate control of the responding assets and
conduct a threat/risk assess ment. The comm ander must set the response priorities, including the essential requirement
to set perimeters to minimize the number of potential victims in the “Kill Zone” and to ensure the shooter cannot escape
to endang er other are as. Before deploying a Rapid Deployment team, the commander has an obligation to ensure the
team has a re asonable chance for success.”
Mr. Thomas T. Gillespie, Criminal Justice Training & Consulting Services
M r. Gillespie began his law enforcement career in 1970 in Detroit, Michigan. He has served as a police sergeant,
municipal police chief, city manager, State of New Mexico law enforcement training director and Director of the New
Mexico Attorney G eneral’s Investigations Division. Since 1990, Mr. Gillespie has conducted over 400 Critical Incident
Management programs to more than 6,000 law enforcement supervisors and commanders throughout the United States
and abroad. He has authored a textbook on the police use of force and provides expert witness case review, evaluation
and testimony in crim inal and civil actions involving police training, supervision and use of force. Mr. Gillespie has
authored numerous articles in the field of critical incident management and use of force.
Mr. G illespie’s Comments:
“I have had the distinct honor of training thousands of police supe rvisors and comm anders in critical incident response
and mana gement ov er the past 12 years and the invitation to participate in the Rapid Deploym ent Summ it was greatly
appreciated. The perspective I was able to bring to the table was an awareness of the wide variety and types of
instruction being offered by police agencies in the area of “Rapid Deployment (RD)” training throughout the United
The participants were dedicated police commanders, trainers and tactical leaders attempting to determine the standard
protoco ls to effectively respond to active shooter events. Most were surprised at the various levels of training being
offered to police officers nationwide in the response to and handling of active shooter incidents. As mentioned in the
report, many “Rapid Deployment” training programs mere ly offer classroom instruction. There was unanimous
agreement that RD training must include realistic, hands-on skill building exercises. The failure to conduct practical and
realistic ‘team’ exercises would be similar to atte mpting to train an officer to fire a w eapon fo r accuracy w ith only
‘classroom’ instruction on sight alignment and trigger squeeze.
The RD protocols recommended in this report are simply minimum standards of training for officers facing — potentially
— the most dangerous and high-risk event they may ever deal with in their careers. Tactical officers understand the need
for on-going, rigorous and demanding training for the high -risk incidents they a re expecte d to “handle.” We must not
use shortcuts in preparing patrol officers to deal with the exact same type of incidents for which tactical officers are
training on a regular basis.
Lastly, the need to provide p roper comm and and control at these types of even ts must not be ig nored. First responding
supervisors are the key to effective and successful resolution of the incident. They mus t take charge a nd assume the role
of the COACH, not the PLAY ER. Risk and/or threat assessment, identification of the “kill zone” and establishing a
perimeter must be initiated by the on-scene commander prior to authorizing any type of tactical deployment for
It is my hope tha t this effort will attract criticism and comment. It is only through disagreement and discussion of the
issues that clarity and agreement can occur. It is only those supervisors that have nev er experien ced a po lice officer’s
injury or death at the scene of a critical incident that casually comment, “that’s what we get paid to do, it’s a dangerous
job!” We ow e our polic e officers and their families only the best training when confronte d with these type s of life
Mr. Larry Glick, Executive Director, National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA)
Mr. Glick has over 28 years experience in the criminal justice field. Mr. Glick spent seven years as a special response
team member for the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear W eapons Complex. Four of those years were at the DOE
Central Training Academy as a tactics and firearms instructor and Safeguards and Security Training Departm ent Chief.
Larry completed four years as a Regional Director with the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Contractor Support
Program. After the retirem ent of John K olman in 19 93, Mr . Glick became the Executive Director of the NTOA.
Currently he oversees the operations of the NTOA including the NTOA's Information Resources, Regional Seminar and
Training Program , Tactical U nit and Incident Review Program as well as the publication of The Tactical E dge journ al.
Mr. Glick has lectured nationally to school and police audiences regarding school and police response to active shooters
in schools and public buildings. He testified before the Colorado Governor's Commission on the Columbine High School
tragedy concerning po lice training and response to violent active sho oter situations.
Mr. La rry Glick’s Co mments:
“I want to commend your group on the resea rch and rep ort you pro duced o n Rapid D eploymen t. I have read through
the report twice and the information contained in the report is very informative.
I would add nothing.”
Associate Professor David A. Klinger, Univer sity of M issouri-St. L ouis
David A. Klinger is Associate Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Missou ri-St. Louis.
He also has held positions as A ssistant Profess or (199 2-1998 ) and Asso ciate Professor of Sociology (1998-1999) at the
University of Houston. Prior to pursuing his graduate degrees, he worked for three and one-half years as a patrol officer
for the Los Angeles and Redmond (WA) Police Depa rtments. He has held research positions at the Police Foundation
in W ash ingt on, D.C .; the Uni ver sity o f W ash ingt on, Sea ttle; the W ash ingt on S tate 's Atto rne y's Office; and the Seattle
Police Department. He has written num erous scholarly articles, book chap ters, and encyclopedia en tries that address
topics such as arrest p ractices, the use of force, and how features of comm unities affect the actions of patrol officers.
He has recently completed a research project on officer-involved shootings and is currently nearing completion of a study
of police special we apons an d tactics (SW AT) tea ms. He rec eived his Ph .D. in Socio logy from the U niversity of
Washington in 1992.
Professor K linger’s Comm ents:
“I take issue with the argument that officers who aren’t keen o n the idea shouldn’t be trained in rap id response tactics.
Since when doe s a line officer get to tell the chief to buzz off and select w hat parts of the d epartmen t mission s/he will
and wil l n o t d o ? If the b os s s ay s “M y officers will have rapid response training and they will rapidly respond to active
shooting situations” and some officer doesn’t like it, that’s too ba d. S/he can a lways find ano ther job. A s far as I’m
concerned, an officer has n o more a right to recuse h im or herself from rapid respo nse training that s/he d oes from b asic
firearms, tactics, em ergency veh icle opera tion, report w riting, or any othe r aspect of the job.”
Sergeant Patrick Kreis, Winnetka (Illinois) Police Department
Patrick Kreis is a Sergeant with the Winnetka Police Department where he manages a comprehensive Use of Force
training program . He has sixteen years combined law enforcement and military instructional experience and is certified
as a Master Firearms Instructor by the Illinois Po lice Training Institute. Sergea nt Kreis is state b oard cer tified to teach
numerous police subjects including Less Lethal Weapons , Tactical Team Operations, Patrol Tactics, Scenario Based
Training, Use of Force Policy, and Critical Incident Response. He is a primary instructor for the Rapid Deployment
Instructor training offered by Mobile Training Unit #3. Sergeant Kreis is a former SWAT (NIPAS EST) Team Leader
and an active me mber of the Illinois Tactic al Officer’s Association . He is a graduate of Northwestern University School
of Police Staff and Command and holds a Bachelors degree in Criminal Justice Science. Sergeant Kreis served eleven
years in the U.S. Army Reserve with qualifications in Special Forces and Military Intelligence.
Sergeant K reis’ Commen ts:
“We will have to disagree on the issue of perimeter establishment. I feel strongly that deploying the 10-15 initial officers
(5-10 minute response in the urban environment) on scene should be as follows: They are going to be much more
effective at protecting life if they deploy in contact teams to stop the active killing. They are going to be less effective
trying to control a perimeter that in many cases will be a square city block. My town's high school has 27 different
doorway entry points. T he first respon ders are the o fficers that I have the most confidence in. They work together and
train together. They have the same radios and are most familiar with the terrain. The second and third wave of
responders will be capable of establishing inner and outer perimeters, but less prepared to make entry. What good is a
perimeter outside the b uilding when th e bad guy is inside actively killing multiple victims? This philosophy is even more
essential in the rural communities that can't even count on a 10-15 officer response within a 30 minute response time.
It’s just not practical to tell them to set a perim eter before deciding to make entry. Regardless of when Klebold and
Harris chose to stop killing their victims, the fact of the matter is that those two killers were still seen on video walking
around with guns down without an apparent care in the world. Clearly they were not being pursued or engaged by the
Police, even 37 minutes after the killing started. Just how is a perimeter going to shorten the amount of killing
Recently, we had an example of victims being their best self-protection in Skokie, Illinois. A student brought a loaded
gun to school and showed it to a friend. The suspect stated that he was going to kill a particular girl th en get to the
cafeteria to do mass murder before suicide. Another kid spotted the gun in the would-be shooter’s bag. The second
student calmly told a girl nearby, who used a ruse to leave class and inform the Dean. Then the hero slid the bag away
from the bad-guy when he wasn’t looking. The second student turned the bag over to the Dean and the suspect was
arrested witho ut incident.”
Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II, Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department
Sergeant Edward F. Mohn II is a 12-year veteran of the Libertyville (Illinois) Police Department, a suburb of Chicago
Illinois. He has been a member of the Northern Illinois Police Alarm Systems Emergency Services Team (NIPAS-EST)
for 11 years were he currently serves as the Entry Team Leader. Sergeant Mohn has participated in the successful
resolution of numerous critical incidents, felony fugitive apprehensions and high risk w arrant service operation s. He is
an Illinois State certified instructor in a wide variety of tactical and firearms related disciplines and is the lead instructor
for the NIPAS-EST 96 hour b asic SW AT co urse. Sergea nt Mohn serves on the Board of Directo rs for the Illinois
Tactical Officers Asso ciation (IT OA) and is the lead instructo r for the ITO A's Rapid D eploymen t program . He has
personally trained over a thousand officers in Rapid Deployment technique and tactics. A Grad uate of Na tional-Louis
University, Sergeant Mo hn served six years in the US Arm y as an infantryman prior to starting his law enforcement
Sergeant E dward F. Mo hn’s Comm ents:
"Train Hard ..............For The Day Will Come. This motto has become the driving force behind the training and
preparation that I have dedicated my team, my fellow officers and myself too. While the panel of experts p resented in
this docume nt do not ag ree on all asp ects of this proj ect, we all strongly agreed and are committed to improving the
training police officers are, or should be receiving in rega rds to the response and mana gement of c ritical incidents. W hile
active shooter type incidents occur infrequently, they present a unique set of challenges and problems that many officers
and agencies are not prepared to face. The traditional response of "Contain, Wait and Negotiate" has served us well and
should still be implemented in 99.9% of the critical incidents that occur. But, when an offender is actively murdering
innocent civilians how can police officers who are sworn to protect and serve our community and it's citizens stand by
and wait? I always ask my students during Rapid Deployment Training "W hat if that was your child, your mother, your
wife or husban d inside that b uilding"? W hat would yo u do? It is, and shall always be d ebated as to how Rapid
Deployment would of made a difference in many of the active shooter situations that have occurred. It is my belief that
the immediate deploym ent of law enforcement resourc es against the active shooter can and does save lives. One mu st
only take a look a t the situation in Israe l and see that live s are saved when polic e officers arriv e quickly and deploy
against armed offenders. Is this a dangero us endeavor?.… ..Yes. Do these techniques and tactics place officers in greater
danger than the tradition al "contain a nd wait" utilized in the past?........Y es. But, if not Rapid Deploym ent, then what?
We continually ask and search for a better solution from those who say Rapid Deployment is not the answer..........but
none have been presented. As long as there are those in the world who will prey upon and murder innocent people, then
there must be those of us who are trained, willing, ab le and ded icated to see king them ou t and stopp ing their dead ly
behavior . To do less is inconceiv able.
Train Hard...........For The Day Will Come".
Commander Richard A. Ryan, Decatur (Illinois) Police Department
Commander Ryan is a twenty-nine year police veteran. He holds a BA from Eastern Illinois University and served four
years with the USMC, including one tour with an infantry rifle company in Viet Nam. He is a graduate of the FBI
National Academy. Command er Ryan’s police experience includes operational service with both patrol and
investigations functions. He has served as coordinator of the K-9 Unit and as Commander of the Professional Standards
and Investiga tions Division s of the Dec atur Police Departm ent.
Commander Ryan is currently Commander of the Patrol Division of the Dec atur Police Departm ent. He was r esponsib le
for the development of the Decatur Police Department's Emergency Response Team and is Commander of the ERT.
Commander Ryan was the on-scene Commander for all major events related to the five years of turmoil experienced by
the City of Decatur resulting from three maj or labor disputes, a major K lu Klux K lan rally and turmoil during November
1999 involving Jesse Jackson's Rainbow-Push Coalition and white supremacist organizations. The Decatur Police
Departm ent’s Emergency Response Team has served in excess of five h undred h igh-risk search w arrants and has been
involved in the resolution of both hostage and barricaded suspect incidents, including incidents where deadly force was
Commander Ryan is a member of the Nat ion al T acti cal O ffice r's A sso ciat ion (NT OA ), th e Ill ino is T acti cal O ffice r's
Association ( IT OA), is a fo rme r me mbe r of t he B oar d of Dir ecto rs o f the ITO A an d is c urre ntly C hair of th e IT OA 's
Legislative Committee. He is the owner of Ryan Crisis Management Consulting, Inc. He has presented at State and
National conferences and has provided training throughout the State for topics related to Tactical Team Operations,
Managing Labor Disputes and Interest Group Events, High Risk Strategy and Tactics for Patrol Operations, Developing
School Crisis Response Plans and Patro l Rapid R esponse T actics for Activ e Shoote r Incidents. He is Coordinator for
Law Enforcement Programming and an adjunct faculty member at Richland Community College in Decatur and an
adjunct faculty member an d Advisory Bo ard member a t the Police Training Institute of the University of Illinois.
Comma nder Rya n’s Comme nts:
“As is often the case in law enforcement, the development of active shooter policies and training were a reaction to an
incident. We have reacted by training operators (first responding officers), hopefully well and to the standards indicated
above. However, we as administrators too often feel that we have done what is expected of us by providing some training
in the area of concern to the oper ators. In a pro fessional law en forcemen t environme nt, it is essential that administration
set clear (and high) standards for the agency in terms of the outcomes expected if the "active shooter" situation develops
in its jurisdiction. Having done so, the administration has the obligation to the officers to provide the policy, training
and equip ment nece ssary to succe ssfully achieve that o utcome.
Second ly, it is important to understand that crisis situations involve much more than the first responder's response. Once
containment and isolation have been accomplished, the real work of the administration begins... mana ging whateve r is
left. That may include managing a hostage or barricade situation (in the traditional fashion), managing a major criminal
investigation and crime scene, victim a ssistance, family reu nification, facility man agement, relief of security teams, etc.
It is critical that our administrators know, understand and be ready to implement a comprehensive Incident Command
Center to ensure that the whole incident is managed professionally--not just the crisis response.
Further, it is critical for the responding officers to understand that there are NO EXCU SES if an active shooter situation
develops. Whether administration has provided the policy, equipment and training or not, those we are sworn to protect
rightfully expect us to be there for them. No matter how many officers we have to respond with, we must be prepared
to get the job done. That means that each individual officer has the moral and professional obligation to have the heart
to respond, to be tactically proficient in terms of both skill development and the wisdom to know when to apply the
approp riate tactics, and must be physically able to perform. It sim ply isn't acceptab le to sit back an d comp lain that the
Departm ent, for whatev er reason, d idn't give me eve rything I need. G ood pe ople, using go od tactics will p revail.”
Master Sergeant John Simonton, Illinois State Police - Critical Incident Response Command
M aster Sergeant John Simonton is a 20-year law enforcement veteran, beginning his career with the Boone County
Active Shooter Incidents
Case Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injure Times RD RD make a Narrative
# d used? Difference?*
001 Tampa , FL - Workplac 1 male 9mm and .38 5 15+ 1500 hours. NO NO Suspect shot specific co-workers at hotel,
Radisson e aged 36 handguns. 4+ officers except last victim (a women killed during a
Hotel Many shots on scene Gone on arrival carjacking 2 miles from scen e). Suspect
fired (unsure within 5 surrendered after vehicle pursuit. Suspect had
#). minutes fled the scene before police arrived.
002 Tampa , FL - Workplac 1 male 9mm handgun. 3 2 1100 hours. NO NO Suspect entered workplace and targeted specific
Fireman’s e mid-30's Many shots 4+ officers co-workers. Suspect fled the scene before
Fund fired (unsure on the scene Gone on arrival officers arrived and was later found dead, from
Insurance #). Probable within 5 a self-inflicted wound, at a nea rby golf course.
building reload. minutes.
003 Anaheim, Rampage 1 male 2 revolvers. 7 2 1 1040 hours. NO NO Suspect entered the hosp ital where his mot her
CA - after aged 43 shots fired. 4+ officers had recently died and shot random targets. Shot
Hospital mother Probable on scene Already in custody 3 people, reloaded revolver and was grabbed
died in reload. within 6 and detained by hospital staff before police
this minutes. arrived. First arriving officer set-up a
hospital Command Post and implemented ICS. 15-20
minutes before police entered the building and
took sus pect in to custo dy.
004 Olivehurst, School 1 male 12 gauge 4 10 1405 hours. NO - NO Former student entered school and killed the
CA - High aged 19 shotgun and 4+ officers teacher that had flunked out this student the
School .22 rimfire on scene BUT Suspect had previous year. Remaining gunshot victims were
rifle. within 5 very already barrica ded more random in nature. Suspect then barricaded
Estimated 15- minutes. rapid with hostages himself into the upstairs library with 80+
20 shots fired, SWAT entry response hostages. Two of first arriving officers were
most were 3 within 10 by SWAT, who entered as a two man team with
inch #4 shot minutes. SWAT long guns, but no other SWAT gear. This team
loads. trained withdrew with a victim. Upon re-entering, the
officers SWAT duo met a student who had been sent
from the library to announce that hostag es were
being held. The suspect surrendered through
negotiations after about 8 hours.
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
005 Pelham, AL Workplac 1 male .40 handgun. 3 0 0730 hours. NO NO Suspect shot specific targets at each of two
- multiple e aged 33 9-10 rounds 4+ officers business locations about 6 miles apart. Suspect
business fired (6-7 at on scene Gone on arrival at allowed some potential targets to leave
locations first scene/2 within 5 both scenes unharmed from each location. Sus pect had fled
killed, 3 at minutes. both scenes before police could arrive. Police
second scene/1 knew suspect’s name and description after the
killed). first shooting incident. Suspect was taken into
custody shortly after the second shooting in a
felony traffic stop.
006 Jonesboro, School 2 males, Each suspect 5 10 1220 hours. NO NO Suspects used the fire alarm to draw victims
AR - aged 11 had 5 guns, 4+ officers from the school gymnasi um and fired wi th rifles
Middle and 13 including on scene in Shooting was over from a woodline 93 yards away. The .357
School (used): .44 less than 5 by the time officers handgun was fired at a construction worker in
Carbine, .30 minutes. 15- arrived the distance. A Deputy Sheriff located the
Carbine, 20 officers suspects as they attempted to flee their shooting
scoped .30-06, on scene positio n and to ok them i nto cust ody.
.357 revolver. within 10
26 shots fired, minutes.
007 Conyers, School 1 male .22 rimfire rifle 0 6 - all 0759 hours. NO NO Suspect got off the school bus (with weapons),
GA - High aged 15 (stock cut- wounds 4th officer walked into the “commons” area and began
School down for better were arrived in 7 Shooting was over shooting with the .22 rifle. Suspect fired the
concealment) below minutes. by the time officers .357 revolver over his shoulder back towards
and .357 the Incident arrived school as he fled on foot. Suspect dropped the
revolver. Fired waist over in 12 rifle in the school as he fled. Suspect was
12 shots (11 minutes. confronted by an assistant principle (student had
from .22 at the .357 in his mouth) and surrendered the
victims and 1 revolver to the prin ciple when ordered to do so.
at school from First officer to arrive was dealing with victims.
.357). Second arriving officer placed suspect into
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
008 Sheridan, School 1 male 9mm handgun. 0 4 1100 hours. NO NO Suspect walked onto middle school playground
WY - aged 29 Fired 15-20 First officer and opened fire on a group of 20-25 students.
Middle rounds (uns ure) arrived Suspect commi tted All victims had been shot prior to the first
School with reload. within 3 suicide as the officer’s arrival. As the arriving officers
minutes and officers arrived approached the playground area, the suspect
third officer committed suicide with the handgun.
009 Newington, Workplac 1 male 9mm handgun, 4 - (3 0 0844 hours. NO NO Suspect killed co-workers at the Lottery
CT - State e aged 35. large hunting killed Four+ building. 2 shots were reported fired after
Lottery knife. 20 shots by officers Suspect commi tted police arrived. Suspect committed suicide upon
Headquarter fired (18 before gunfir arrived at suicide as the arrival of the first officers.
s. police arrived e and 0846. officers arrived
and 2 after 1 Incident
police arrived). killed resolved at
010 Wakefield, Workplac 1 male Shotgun, 7 0 Times NO - NO Suspect entered a business in a huge multi-
MA - Office e aged 43 handgun, unsure: business complex and shot employees in his
complex AK47 type reported that BUT Shooting was over former employer’s personnel office. The first
rifle. At least 7 a 3 officer very by the time officers three officers found a victim and then found the
shots fired, team entered rapid arrived suspect a few feet away from that victim. The
most from AK, the building response suspect had put down his weapons, was almost
some from in from 5-10 by patrol in a trance, and offered no resistance to arrest.
shotgun. minutes. 10 officers
by the time
Case# Location Type Suspects Weapons Killed Injured Times RD Used? RD Make a Differenc e? Narrative
011 Great School 1 male AR15. Many 2 4 2230 hours. NO NO Suspect, a student at this exclusive school, first
Barrington, aged 19 shots fired at 3 The first shot a security guard at the gate, then shot a
MA - different officer Shooting was over professor in his car. From there the suspect
Preparatory locations arrived by the time officers walked to the library and a dorm, shooting
School around the within 5 arrived random targets. Suspect barricaded himself in
campus. minutes. 4+ the cafeteria and called 911. An officer at 911
officers on center convinc ed the su spect to surrend er. At
scene within time of surrender 7 officers were on the scene
20 minutes. and had just completed setting on-scene
Incident perimeters. SWAT team had been called but
resolved at was 1-2 hours out. Shooting was apparently
about 2300 over by the time offic ers arrived on scen e.
012 Royal Oak, Workplac 1 male in Rifle and 5 4 0800 hours. NO - NO Suspect, a suspended postal employee and
MI - Post e 30's. handgun. First officer former Marine, entered the central post office
Office Unknown arrived BUT Shooting was over and targeted former supervisors and co-workers.
number of within 2 very by the time officers Suspect was found inside dead from a self-
shots fired. minutes. 3 rapid made contact inflicted gunshot wound.
entered the by patrol
building in officers
less than 5
by the time