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Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
 

Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

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Trust is a concept from the Social Sciences and can be defined as how much a node is willing to take the risk of trusting another one. The correct evaluation of the trust is crucial for several ...

Trust is a concept from the Social Sciences and can be defined as how much a node is willing to take the risk of trusting another one. The correct evaluation of the trust is crucial for several security mechanisms for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). However, the implementation of an effective trust evaluation scheme is very difficult in such networks, due to their dynamic characteristics. This work presents a trust evaluation scheme for MANETs based on a self-organized virtual trust network. To estimate the trustworthiness of other nodes, nodes form trust chains based on behavior evidences maintained within the trust network. Nodes periodically exchange their trust networks with the neighbors, providing an efficient method to disseminate trust information across the network. The scheme is fully distributed and self-organized, not requiring any trusted third party. Simulation results show that the scheme is very efficient on gathering evidences to build the trust networks. It also shows that the scheme has a very small communication and memory overhead. Besides, it is the first trust evaluation scheme evaluated under bad mouthing and newcomers attacks and it maintains its effectiveness in such scenarios.

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    Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Presentation Transcript

    • Introduction System Model Refrences Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs Mehran Misaghi1 Eduardo da Silva2,3 Luiz Carlos P. Albini3 1 Research Department - Educational Society of Santa Catarina mehran@sociesc.org.br 2 Department of Informatics - Catarinense Federal Institute eduardos@inf.ufpr.br 3 Department of Informatics - Federal University of Parana albini@inf.ufpr.br April 20, 2012Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesIntroduction Security 1 One of the most challenging issues for MANETs [WCWC06]: High vulnerability in security threats due to wireless communication and dynamic topology Adversaries can easly perfom attacks via wireless communcation channel Difficulty in implementation of security applications 2 Cryptography is the main technique used to ensure data communication security It does not provide information about the reliability of the nodes [LSY05] Key management relies on some degree of pre-established trust between nodes Trust is very difficult to be valued [BFL96] Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesIntroduction Security 1 One of the most challenging issues for MANETs [WCWC06]: High vulnerability in security threats due to wireless communication and dynamic topology Adversaries can easly perfom attacks via wireless communcation channel Difficulty in implementation of security applications 2 Cryptography is the main technique used to ensure data communication security It does not provide information about the reliability of the nodes [LSY05] Key management relies on some degree of pre-established trust between nodes Trust is very difficult to be valued [BFL96] Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Concepts I Trust Can be defined as the trustworthiness of a trustor, or how much it is willing to take the risk of trust, in a trustee [Bus02] Trust management can be used in Support in decisions as intrusion detection [ACP+ 02] Authentication [GPM05] Access control [LKZ+ 04] Isolation of misbehaving nodes for effective routing [MGLB00] Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Concepts I Trust Can be defined as the trustworthiness of a trustor, or how much it is willing to take the risk of trust, in a trustee [Bus02] Trust management can be used in Support in decisions as intrusion detection [ACP+ 02] Authentication [GPM05] Access control [LKZ+ 04] Isolation of misbehaving nodes for effective routing [MGLB00] Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Concepts II In MANETs Routing strategies, distributed storage, location management, and key management or establishment Trust evaluation schemes Support and maintain trust evidences of nodes Ant-Based Evidence Distribution (ABED) proposed by [JB04]: 1 Nodes interact with each other through agents (“ants”) 2 Nodes are able to identify an optimal path to accumulate trust evidence 3 Such a scheme was not evaluated under any type of attack Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Concepts II In MANETs Routing strategies, distributed storage, location management, and key management or establishment Trust evaluation schemes Support and maintain trust evidences of nodes Ant-Based Evidence Distribution (ABED) proposed by [JB04]: 1 Nodes interact with each other through agents (“ants”) 2 Nodes are able to identify an optimal path to accumulate trust evidence 3 Such a scheme was not evaluated under any type of attack Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Evaluation Schemes I self-organizing trust-based Physical-Logical Domains Concept for Grouping nodes and support for distributed control in the newtwork [VJCU05]: A security architecture which uses trust to establish keys between nodes Establish secure distributed control in MANETs Nodes use trust information to form groups and to establish pair-wise key in the groups Suitable just for establishing group keys The scheme was not evaluated under attacks Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Evaluation Schemes - Utilities support secure authentication for MANETs [CKLW09] SORI uses cooperation incentive based on reputation [HWK04]: 1 stimulating packet forwarding and disciplining selfish nodes through punishments 2 Nodes are able to identify an optimal path to accumulate trust evidence 3 The reputation of a node is calculated using objective metrics 4 The implementation of SORI to support other applications is very difficult Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Evaluation Schemes - Utilities support secure authentication for MANETs [CKLW09] SORI uses cooperation incentive based on reputation [HWK04]: 1 stimulating packet forwarding and disciplining selfish nodes through punishments 2 Nodes are able to identify an optimal path to accumulate trust evidence 3 The reputation of a node is calculated using objective metrics 4 The implementation of SORI to support other applications is very difficult Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Evaluation Schemes II Trust Models Model of [VLDP08]: Resistant to slander attacks, a variance of the bad mouthing ones Provides nodes with a mechanism to build a trust relationship with their neighbors Not suitable for applications that require trust information of nodes out of the radio range Model of [SHYL06] This model considers malicious attacks Secure routing operations and detect malicious nodes Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Evaluation Schemes II Trust Models Model of [VLDP08]: Resistant to slander attacks, a variance of the bad mouthing ones Provides nodes with a mechanism to build a trust relationship with their neighbors Not suitable for applications that require trust information of nodes out of the radio range Model of [SHYL06] This model considers malicious attacks Secure routing operations and detect malicious nodes Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesTrust Evaluation Schemes - Summary 1 The most os schemes were not evaluated under misbehavior attacks 2 The use of a non-secure trust evaluation scheme can harm the entire seure solution of system 3 The schemes that consider the presence of malicious nodes are limited to one network operation (routing) Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesOur work Our scheme A trust evaluation scheme for MANETs: 1 To support any application 2 Resistant to misbehavior attacks In this scheme: 1 Each node creates a virtual layer to support trust information 2 Virtual layer (trust network) contains all trust informations 3 Such informations are gathered via recommendation or direct interaction 4 Trustworthiness of node is locally computed (Trust network of the node) Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesOur work Our scheme A trust evaluation scheme for MANETs: 1 To support any application 2 Resistant to misbehavior attacks In this scheme: 1 Each node creates a virtual layer to support trust information 2 Virtual layer (trust network) contains all trust informations 3 Such informations are gathered via recommendation or direct interaction 4 Trustworthiness of node is locally computed (Trust network of the node) Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesOur scheme evaluation scenarios Two kinds of attacks: 1 Bad mouthing: consist of malicious nodes providing dishonest trust evidences to defame good nodes or enhance trust values of bad ones [Del00]. 2 Newcomer (Sybil): consist of a malicious node registering a new identity and assigning high trust values to it. Simulations with NS: 1 Proposed scheme is robust and efficient 2 Trust evidences are quickly disseminated through the network 3 Nodes are able to effectively estimate the trustworthiness of other nodes 4 Proposed scheme is resistant to false accusation attacks Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Concepts RefrencesOur scheme evaluation scenarios Two kinds of attacks: 1 Bad mouthing: consist of malicious nodes providing dishonest trust evidences to defame good nodes or enhance trust values of bad ones [Del00]. 2 Newcomer (Sybil): consist of a malicious node registering a new identity and assigning high trust values to it. Simulations with NS: 1 Proposed scheme is robust and efficient 2 Trust evidences are quickly disseminated through the network 3 Nodes are able to effectively estimate the trustworthiness of other nodes 4 Proposed scheme is resistant to false accusation attacks Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesOur scheme The scheme focuses on self-organized mobile ad hoc network Consist of a set of n nodes without losing generality Such nodes are considered to have similar functionalities Such nodes contribute to network operations and maintenance Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesExample of Trust Evaluation Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesCalculation Trust Value (TV ) After calculating the trust value for all chains, the trust value TV(nx ,nu ) can be calculated applying a weighted mean, as follows: k i i (TC(nx ,nu ) × 1/|TC(nx ,nu ) |) i=1 TV(nx ,nu ) = k (1) 1 i |TC(nx ,nu ) | i=1 weighted mean The weighted mean reduces the impact of transitivity in trust chains. This method aims to privilege small chains, following a social perspective. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesCalculation Trust Value (TV ) After calculating the trust value for all chains, the trust value TV(nx ,nu ) can be calculated applying a weighted mean, as follows: k i i (TC(nx ,nu ) × 1/|TC(nx ,nu ) |) i=1 TV(nx ,nu ) = k (1) 1 i |TC(nx ,nu ) | i=1 weighted mean The weighted mean reduces the impact of transitivity in trust chains. This method aims to privilege small chains, following a social perspective. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesEvalaution tool and scenario Evaluation with NS 2.34 Used for evaluate the performance and effectiveness of the proposed trust management scheme. Simulations were made with honest and malicious nodes. 100 nodes use the IEEE 802.11 with DCF as MAC protocol. Nodes move on an area of 1000m x 1000m, in random waypoint model (20 m/s) with 20s pause time. Total time of simulations is 2000s. Avarage of 35 simulations with 95% confidence interval Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios without Attackers Estimated trust values without attackers 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.5 Average Trust Values 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3 β 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 α Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios without Attackers Reliable nodes without attackers 0.9 100 0.8 90 0.7 80 Trust Nodes Scale (%) 0.6 70 0.5 60 β 0.4 50 0.3 40 0.2 30 20 0.1 10 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 α Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios without Attackers Time to disseminate trust evidences and percentage of nodes in trust graphs α Time (sec.) Nodes (%) 0.0 198.51 100.00% 0.1 713.54 99.99% 0.2 801.49 99.96% 0.3 885.14 99.92% 0.4 936.97 99.35% 0.5 926.96 96.94% 0.6 878.08 92.57% 0.7 768.51 78.98% 0.8 598.22 50.37% 0.9 281.08 17.34% Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios under bad mouthing attack 2% of attackers 0.9 20 0.8 0.7 16 Affected Nodes (%) 0.6 12 0.5 β 0.4 8 0.3 0.2 4 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 α Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios under bad mouthing attack 5% of attackers 0.9 20 0.8 0.7 16 Affected Nodes (%) 0.6 12 0.5 β 0.4 8 0.3 0.2 4 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 α Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios under bad mouthing attack 10% of attackers 0.9 16 0.8 0.7 12 Affected Nodes (%) 0.6 0.5 8 β 0.4 0.3 4 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 α Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios under bad mouthing attack Trust variation in scenarios under attack β Attackers 2% 5% 10% 0.0 0.0055 0.0116 0.0158 0.1 0.0271 0.0503 0.0671 0.2 0.0365 0.0655 0.0868 0.3 0.0432 0.0803 0.1045 0.4 0.0561 0.0987 0.1290 0.5 0.0884 0.1355 0.1700 0.6 0.1619 0.2081 0.2390 0.7 0.3258 0.3403 0.3574 0.8 0.4300 0.4403 0.4339 0.9 0.2829 0.3277 0.3377 Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios under newcomer attack 2% of attackers 0.9 100 0.8 90 0.7 80 Affected Nodes (%) 0.6 70 60 0.5 50 β 0.4 40 0.3 30 0.2 20 0.1 10 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 α Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios under newcomer attack 5% of attackers 0.9 100 0.8 90 0.7 80 Affected Nodes (%) 0.6 70 60 0.5 50 β 0.4 40 0.3 30 0.2 20 0.1 10 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 α Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesScenarios under newcomer attack 10% of attackers 0.9 100 0.8 90 0.7 80 Affected Nodes (%) 0.6 70 60 0.5 50 β 0.4 40 0.3 30 0.2 20 0.1 10 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 α Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesConclusions Existing Trust Management schemes No specific attack model was addressed nor evaluated on [BR08, MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Some schemes are limited only to support routing strategies [MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Support for other applications is very difficult in [HWK04]. Our scheme 1 The nodes create a virtual trust network. 2 Contains trust information about other nodes. 3 Each node estimates the trustworthiness of other nodes. 4 Simulation results show the efficiency of our scheme. 5 The scheme is able to resist up to 10% of attackers. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesConclusions Existing Trust Management schemes No specific attack model was addressed nor evaluated on [BR08, MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Some schemes are limited only to support routing strategies [MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Support for other applications is very difficult in [HWK04]. Our scheme 1 The nodes create a virtual trust network. 2 Contains trust information about other nodes. 3 Each node estimates the trustworthiness of other nodes. 4 Simulation results show the efficiency of our scheme. 5 The scheme is able to resist up to 10% of attackers. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesConclusions Existing Trust Management schemes No specific attack model was addressed nor evaluated on [BR08, MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Some schemes are limited only to support routing strategies [MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Support for other applications is very difficult in [HWK04]. Our scheme 1 The nodes create a virtual trust network. 2 Contains trust information about other nodes. 3 Each node estimates the trustworthiness of other nodes. 4 Simulation results show the efficiency of our scheme. 5 The scheme is able to resist up to 10% of attackers. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesConclusions Existing Trust Management schemes No specific attack model was addressed nor evaluated on [BR08, MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Some schemes are limited only to support routing strategies [MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Support for other applications is very difficult in [HWK04]. Our scheme 1 The nodes create a virtual trust network. 2 Contains trust information about other nodes. 3 Each node estimates the trustworthiness of other nodes. 4 Simulation results show the efficiency of our scheme. 5 The scheme is able to resist up to 10% of attackers. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesConclusions Existing Trust Management schemes No specific attack model was addressed nor evaluated on [BR08, MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Some schemes are limited only to support routing strategies [MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Support for other applications is very difficult in [HWK04]. Our scheme 1 The nodes create a virtual trust network. 2 Contains trust information about other nodes. 3 Each node estimates the trustworthiness of other nodes. 4 Simulation results show the efficiency of our scheme. 5 The scheme is able to resist up to 10% of attackers. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation RefrencesConclusions Existing Trust Management schemes No specific attack model was addressed nor evaluated on [BR08, MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Some schemes are limited only to support routing strategies [MM02, BLB02, DJQ09]. Support for other applications is very difficult in [HWK04]. Our scheme 1 The nodes create a virtual trust network. 2 Contains trust information about other nodes. 3 Each node estimates the trustworthiness of other nodes. 4 Simulation results show the efficiency of our scheme. 5 The scheme is able to resist up to 10% of attackers. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction Trust chain System Model NS - Evaluation Refrences Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs Mehran Misaghi1 Eduardo da Silva2,3 Luiz Carlos P. Albini3 1 Research Department - Educational Society of Santa Catarina mehran@sociesc.org.br 2 Department of Informatics - Catarinense Federal Institute eduardos@inf.ufpr.br 3 Department of Informatics - Federal University of Parana albini@inf.ufpr.br April 20, 2012Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model RefrencesPatrick Albers, Olivier Camp, Jean-Marc Percher, BernardJouga, Ludovic M´, and Ricardo Staciarini Puttini. eSecurity in ad hoc networks: a general intrusion detectionarchitecture enhancing trust based approaches.In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on WirelessInformation Systems (WIS ’02), pages 1–12. ICEIS Press, April2002.Matt Blaze, Joan Feigenbaum, and Jack Lacy.Decentralized trust management.In Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security andPrivacy (SP ’96), page 164. IEEE Computer Society, 1996.Sonja Buchegger and Jean-Yves Le Boudec.Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol.In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium onMobile ad hoc networking & computing (MobiHoc ’02), pages226–236, New York, NY, USA, 2002. ACM. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model RefrencesAzzedine Boukerche and Yonglin Ren.A security management scheme using a novel computationalreputation model for wireless and mobile ad hoc networks.In Proceedings of the 5th ACM symposium on Performanceevaluation of wireless ad hoc, sensor, and ubiquitous networks(PE-WASUN ’08), pages 88–95. ACM, 2008.Vincent Buskens.Social Networks and Trust.Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands,2002.Ben-Jye Chang, Szu-Liang Kuo, Ying-Hsin Liang, and De-YuWang.Markov chain-based trust model for analyzing trust value indistributed multicasting mobile ad hoc networks.59:1846–1863, 2009. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model RefrencesChrysanthos Dellarocas.Mechanisms for coping with unfair ratings and discriminatorybehavior in online reputation reporting systems.In Proceedings of the 21th International Conference onInformation Systems (ICIS ’00), pages 520–525, Atlanta, GA,USA, 2000. Association for Information Systems.Hongjun Dai, Zhiping Jia, and Zhiwei Qin.Trust evaluation and dynamic routing decision based on fuzzytheory for manets.JSW – Journal of Software, 4(10):1091–1101, 2009.Tirthankar Ghosh, Niki Pissinou, and Kami Makki.Towards designing a trusted routing solution in mobile ad hocnetworks.Mobile Networks and Applications, 10(6):985–995, 2005.Q. He, D. Wu, and P. Khosla. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model RefrencesSORI: A secure and objective reputation-based incentivescheme for ad-hoc networks.In Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE Wireless Communicationsand Networking Conference (WCNC ’04), pages 825–830.IEEE Communications Society, 2004.Tao Jiang and John S. Baras.Ant-based adaptive trust evidence distribution in manet.In Proceedings of the 24th International Conference onDistributed Computing Systems Workshops(ICDCSW’04),pages 588–593. IEEE Computer Society, 2004.Haiyun Luo, Jiejun Kong, Petros Zerfos, Songwu Lu, and LixiaZhang.Ursa: ubiquitous and robust access control for mobile ad hocnetworks.IEEE/ACM Transaction on Networking (TON),12(6):1049–1063, 2004. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model RefrencesXia Li, Jill Slay, and Shaokai Yu.Evaluating trust in mobile ad hoc networks.In Proceedings of the 2005 Workshop of InternationalConference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS’05). Springer, 2005.Sergio Marti, T. J. Giuli, Kevin Lai, and Mary Baker.Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks.In Proceedings of the 6th Annual International Conference onMobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom ’00), pages255–265. ACM, 2000.Pietro Michiardi and Refik Molva.Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce nodecooperation in mobile ad hoc networks.In Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 6th Joint WorkingConference on Communications and Multimedia Security, Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model Refrencespages 107–121, Deventer, The Netherlands, The Netherlands,2002. Kluwer, B.V.Y. L. Sun, Z. Han, W. Yu, and K. J. R. Liu.A trust evaluation framework in distributed networks:Vulnerability analysis and defense against attacks.In Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference onComputer Communications (INFOCOM ’06), pages 1–13.IEEE Communications Society, 2006.Mohit Virendra, Murtuza Jadliwala, Madhusudhanan Ch, andShambhu Upadhyaya.Quantifying trust in mobile ad-hoc networks.In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference onIntegration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems(KIMAS ’05, pages 65–71. IEEE Computer Society, 2005.P. B. Velloso, R. P. Laufer, O.-C.M.B. Duarte, and G. Pujolle.A trust model robust to slander attacks in ad hoc networks. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs
    • Introduction System Model RefrencesIn Proceedings of 17th International Conference on ComputerCommunications and Networks. (ICCCN ’08), pages 1–6. IEEECommunications Society, 2008.Bing Wu, Jianmin Chen, Jie Wu, and Mihaela Cardei.A survey on attacks and countermeasures in mobile ad hocnetworks, chapter 12, pages 103–136.Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, USA, 2006. Mehran Misaghi - mehran@sociesc.org.br Distributed Self-organized Trust Management for MANETs