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Early Warning Case Study Côte d\'Ivoire
 

Early Warning Case Study Côte d\'Ivoire

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Prevention in Côte d\'Ivoire

Prevention in Côte d\'Ivoire

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    Early Warning Case Study Côte d\'Ivoire Early Warning Case Study Côte d\'Ivoire Document Transcript

    • Preventing Mass Killing in Côte d’Ivoire: A Case Study in Early Warning Mark A. Whitlock Ivoirité. A slogan, a watchword, a normative category, ivoirité has created a new taxonomy of belonging: there are “Ivorians by circumstance” and “Ivorians by descent.” At the pinnacle, with the most ivoirité, are the Ivoiriens de souche multiséculaire - Ivorians of indubitable, multigenerational descent. At the other end of the scale, there are foreigners and “people who present themselves as Ivorian.1 The Republic of Côte d’Ivoire was once remains as constructive dialogue takes a viewed as the quintessential West African back seat to political discourse strategically success story. In a region mired by targeting ethnic divisions. The conflict in poverty, political instability, and violent Côte d’Ivoire threatens to further conflict, Côte d’Ivoire experienced destabilize the Sahel and coastal regions of unprecedented security and economic West Africa just as decade-long turmoil in growth after achieving independence from Liberia and Sierra Leone came to an end. France in 1960. Under the guidance of one of Africa’s original ‘old fathers’, Côte Nationalistic appellations to ethnic identity d’Ivoire became a regional beacon for those have marked many post-colonial conflicts seeking economic opportunity and ethnic in Sub-Saharan Africa. Complex historical inclusivity. The façade was to be short- relationships, refitted by the colonial lived, however, following an economic experience and informed by its interminable downturn in the late 1980s, and the residue, have greatly shaped the character subsequent death of the patriarch in 1993. of the conflict in contemporary Côte d’Ivoire. Identity manipulation has been a The introduction of polarizing identity key element with pre-colonial identities politics, centered on the concept of ivoirité, having been altered under the colonial started the nation down its current path of experience, and then hardened by recent dissolution and violence. Commencing in violence. The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire was 1999, a succession of coups and failed born of, as Gagnon writes, “a response by elections tore the country apart, culminating ruling elites to shifts in the structure of domestic political and economic power”.2 in a civil war marked by wide-spread abuse of civilians and, more specifically, The military coup in 1999 was an attempt genocidal violence committed by by the politico-military elite to “fend off government proxies. Today Côte d’Ivoire domestic challengers seeking to mobilize the population against the status quo”.3 sits perched atop a precipice, stalemated by the economic and political interests of various competing factions. The specter of After an authoritarian regime failed to deterioration into further genocidal violence address socio-economic concerns in Côte
    • d’Ivoire, the instrumentalization of identity counterinsurgent mass killing is one that (ivoirité) as political discourse directly engages the nature of the conflict in accompanied an extended period of Côte d’Ivoire (For more on nomenclature, economic downturn following the death of see Valentino 2004: Ch. 1, 5, 6). the long-ruling president. Political exclusion of the northern “other” by self- The recent history of violence in Côte identified “true Ivorians” of the south led to d’Ivoire exhibits several worrisome violent armed clashes resulting in a defacto characteristics - including a zero-sum partitioning of the country. Although political struggle, attempted status-quo popularly conceptualized as an ethno- revision, elite identity manipulation, and religious conflict between Dioula speaking burgeoning insurgency - that facilitated Muslims of the Sahel, and Akan speaking fundamental shifts in relationships between Christians/Animists of the coast, the current potential perpetrator groups and potential victim groups6 in previous paths to mass conflict is rooted in politics, with ethnicity brandished as an instrument. killing in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Balkans. The violent conflict has had The Ivorian saga challenges theories of significant sub-regional implications and lasting solutions to ethnic conflict - as well the Economic Community of West African as theories of identity formation - and offers States’ (ECOWAS) early warning 7 an opportunity to conceptualize the extent mechanism (ECOWARN) has been active to which identities are malleable. It is in monitoring ongoing violence through its apparent that self-interested political conflict early warning mandate.∗ entrepreneurs have utilized identity to However, a clear theoretical framework manipulate their constituencies when (See Appendix A) is necessary delineating threatened in the past. If identities are the prevention of conflict from the prone to top-down manipulation, then prevention of mass killing and genocide - domestic and international peace builders specifically highlighting temporal may alternatively utilize this strategy as an transitions from structural violence (conflict instrument of policy for constructive prevention) to targeted physical violence purposes. This case study will examine the (prevention of mass killing and genocide). current conflict in Côte d’Ivoire through the analysis of Ivorian political identity, its construction, and subsequent manipulation A working paper by the author examines ∗ by actors in the ongoing conflict. the ECOWARN sub-regional mechanism for conflict early warning. The paper This study also serves to explore early explores the following themes: warning for the expressed purpose of relationships between regional and sub- preventing Mass Killing and Genocide. regional security mechanisms and the UN, Mass Killing is defined as the intentional models of decision-making and the killing of a massive number of noncombatants.4 Genocide, according to formation of political will in the context of the Responsibility to Protect, and Benjamin Valentino, is a particular form of challenges and opportunities facing ethnic mass killing characterized by ECOWARN in the West African sub-region explicitly racist or nationalist ideologies and goals of the perpetrators. 5 for the prevention of mass killing and The genocide. delineation between ethnic mass killing and
    • Finally, I will explore policy options for French planters and they quickly turned lasting peace in Côte d’Ivoire. I argue that Côte d’Ivoire into a world-leading exporter a policy centered on transitional governance of coffee and cocoa. - marked by sequencing from an initial power sharing approach, to a program of In 1960, at independence, Côte d’Ivoire top-down identity reconstruction which was booming. Its new president Félix culminates in civic nationalism - is the best Houphouët-Boigny, had been the colony’s short and medium term strategy for long- leading political figure... A Catholic and an term peace. Several questions will animate ethnic Baoulé from the south of the this exploration; in the context of Côte country, Houphouët had risen to power d’Ivoire, what is the strategic logic behind a through the Syndicat Agricole Africain, potential mass killing? What factors might representing the new landlords and compel potential perpetrators to initiate a custodians of national wealth. This was an program of mass, identity-based political ethnically mixed class…recognizing the violence against perceived or real threats? secret of his country’s success, Houphouët Once this logic is understood, what promoted a kind of self-interested Pan- preventive policies seem most promising in Africanism… he opened his country to the future? Can individual and collective African migrants and they came by the tens of thousands.8 identities be reconstructed after periods of intense, internal violence or ethnic civil war? Also, is the top-down promotion of Many of these new arrivals came from the civic nationalism a plausible alternative to north to work on the cocoa and coffee Westphalian disintegration and ethnic plantations in the southern zones. These partitioning in Côte d’Ivoire? Competing traditional market traders came from the theories of lasting solutions to ethnic present day territories of northern Côte conflict will be treated including ethnic d’Ivoire, Mali, and Burkina Faso seeking partitioning as an alternative to well-paid work in the Akan-dominated participatory systems and civic south. The immigrants were reintegration. overwhelmingly Muslim and spoke a common market language: Côte d’Ivoire A substantial minority of the region’s population…were native CONFLICT HISTORY speakers of dialects of Manding, a northern Mande language…These Modern Côte d’Ivoire was a colonial Manding speakers called creation, meant to serve the mercantilist themselves “Dyula” (Dioula), ambitions of a handful of French elites. which in their own language The land composed two distinct means “traders”… These “Dyula” geographical zones, the northern Sahel were part of a vast Manding- (composing semi-arid scrub lands) and the speaking trade diaspora.9 southern forests. From the outset of the colonial period, these geographical Historically, relations between the myriad divisions would dictate the depth of ethnicities in Côte d’Ivoire developed in an administrative, social, and economic environment of mutual respect. engagement. It would be the southern Miscegenation was never outlawed, forestland that would attract the interest of
    • although living arrangements, according to opportunism of migratory northerners, Launay, followed a segregated pattern; “All fissures had appeared in the fabric of the Dioula, and consequently all the national identity long before the death of Muslims, lived in that half of the village Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. Quarter)”.10 (Korhogo Muslim Intermarriage was uncommon, though not In an article published in 1974, unheard of in more populated areas. Pierre Niava, gives an account of …‘some elements approaching a The first President of Côte d’Ivoire new concept, that is ivorité. It assiduously guided his fledgling nation was born of rise of conscience, of along a path of economic growth and a scale of traits and characters ostensible ethnic harmony much envied by exclusive to Ivorians’… If one his regional counterparts. Félix supposes the idea (ivoirité) Houphouët-Boigny was an astute politician, existed… in the behavior of an unabashed Francophile who had politicians before or just after masterly navigated the political minefield independence, ivoirité dates to this period”.13 of pre-independence Côte d’Ivoire, rising through the ranks of power with the aid of French patrons, bypassing traditional An important moment in the systems of authority. “Unlike the British, institutionalization of ethnic identity the French colonial system did not favor the occurred in 1990 when the President issued traditional African hierarchy. Instead, the residence cards for non-Ivorian nationals in French passed political power in their order to shore up his election bid. “…the colonies to elites they had consciously tried perception that immigrants had been to create in their own image”.11 granted illegitimate status through fraud was to contribute to considerable future Houphouët’s benign dictatorship provided problems. Many northern Ivorians and Côte d’Ivoire a political stability not found Burkinabé immigrants dated the start of in other newly independent African states. institutionalized harassment and exhortation Abidjan quickly became known as the by state security forces to the issuance of these residence cards in 1990”.14 “Paris of West Africa” and under Houphouët-Boigny’s autocratic rule, Côte d’Ivoire became a showpiece for French The Death of Houphouët-Boigny investment in Africa. “Before the outbreak of civil war, Côte d’Ivoire accounted for “The death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 forty percent of the economic output of the marked the onset of overt political tension Economic and Monetary Union of West in Côte d’Ivoire and the end of the fragile Africa (UMEOA), a group of eight mainly ethnic balance he had maintained. French-speaking countries that share the Candidates representing the key major CFA franc as their common currency”.12 ethnic groups [Henri Konan Bédié - Baoulé, Laurent Gbagbo - Bété, Alassane Ouattara But underlying this façade of economic – Dioula]…. began vying for the presidency in the run-up to 1995 elections”. 15 prosperity and multi-ethnic inclusivity ran a creeping undercurrent of ethnic Houphouët’s successor, Henri Konan nationalism. Born from southern Akan Bédié, immediately introduced an ethnicity- resentment toward the perceived economic based campaign aimed at discrediting the
    • elections”.18 During this time period state- Ivorian credentials of his primary opponent, Alassane Ouattara. Ouattara was sponsored violence became normative as disqualified for “holding Burkinabé Gbagbo’s regime suffered through a crisis nationality”, and Bédié was declared the of legitimacy. The formation of state winner. trained and sponsored militias (such as the now infamous “Young Patriots”) occurred A very effective tool for and large-scale abuses were reported in containing popular pressure for Abidjan. democratization is the use of nationalist doctrine to exclude so- What first appeared as an army mutiny on called enemies of the nation from September 19, 2002 quickly spread into a enjoying democratic rights. nation-wide rebellion as troops demanded Nationalist elites commonly argue the removal of President Gbagbo, as well as that ethnic minorities, the working fresh elections. The government response classes, rival elites [in this case, to this rebellion was harsh and operations Alassane Ouattara], or other were “accompanied by numerous serious political opponents should be human rights abuses, including arbitrary excluded from political arrests and detentions, “disappearances”, participation, often alleging that rape, and summary executions…by the end these groups lack the proper of September 2002, the rebels, composed national credentials and are in mainly of “Dioula” or northerners of other league with foreign powers.16 ethnicities were in control of most of northern Côte d’Ivoire (about 50 percent of the country).19 Consolidating the various The rift of ethnicity was quickly metastasizing into a chasm. rebel groups was a priority of their newly emerging spokesperson and later leader, “During Bédié’s six-year rule allegations of Guillaume Soro. corruption and mismanagement multiplied, and he increasingly relied on ethnicity as a As the conflict continued political elites political tactic to garner support in an increased their rhetoric. In one unfavorable economic climate”.17 Bédié’s appearance, the wife of the president, tenuous control over the state ended in 1999 Simone Gbagbo, chose strongly polarizing when disgruntled soldiers staged a coup, language to condemn an AU brokered thus beginning the current cycle of Ivorian program of concurrent disarmament and instability. Rigged elections the ensuing registration for anti-government rebels. year (Ouattara was again banned) failed to Voicing her disapproval of the proposal elect the coup leader, General Robert Guei, during an April 2006 speech, she publicly to the presidency and he fled behind a wave stated that nationality would not be granted of mass protest and violence. Laurent to “foreigners who have killed, sliced Gbagbo was named the winner. throats and sometimes even drank the blood of Ivorians”.20 The First Lady’s language “Under President Gbagbo’s regime, ethnic framed the struggle as an assault against and religious splits deepened as security “true Ivorians” by an alien entity. forces and vigilante groups again clashed with supporters of the RDR (Ouattara’s Organizers of the pro-government Young party) in the lead up to parliamentary Patriots militia have increasingly utilized
    • the media to provoke violence; “To get were cancelled multiple times throughout their supporters out into the streets… youth 2007 and 2008, and are now scheduled for leaders aired hate messages on radio and 2009. Against the backdrop of this political state TV, a favored medium for whipping stalemate, numerous human rights abuses up political sentiment in Côte d’Ivoire since occur. the country descended into civil war”.21 Discussing the institutional weaknesses of ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS newly democratizing states Snyder writes: Côte d’Ivoire is a ‘low income’,24 Many newly democratizing Third developing economy illustrated by its World states lack institutions to reliance on the export of primary break up governmental and non- agricultural commodities, namely cocoa. governmental information The global price of cocoa soared in the monopolies, to professionalize 1970s allowing Côte d’Ivoire to reap the journalism and to create common economic benefits as the world’s leading public forums… In the absence of producer of the bean. The significant such institutions, an increase in the increase in bean price led other nations such freedom of speech can create an as Indonesia and Malaysia to invest in opening for the nationalist expanded cocoa output, eventually flooding mythmakers to hijack public the market with lower quality cocoa. As discourse.22 prices were driven down, a concurrent global recession had a sobering effect on The politics of exclusion have been the once bustling Ivorian economy. prevalent dating back to Bédié’s questioning the true citizenship of former The economic roots of the current conflict Prime Minister and Presidential opponent allow us to look beyond the rhetoric of Alassane Ouattara. Belgian sociologist ethnicity, and more critically examine the Benoit Scheuer quoted in Hartill; “It was motivation behind the use of the “ethnic- the intellectuals around Mr. Bédié who card” in identity politics. Among pro- brought ivoirité back into the picture”. government southerners, the belief that Comparing the exclusionary discourse in Dioulas are foreigners, outsiders from Mali Côte d’Ivoire to that used in Rwanda and and Burkina Faso who came to Côte Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, he says Côte d’Ivoire as invited guests to work in the d’Ivoire has “a political elite that wants cocoa fields during the colonial period, is a power or is in power but has a legitimacy powerful rallying cry for their “otherness”. problem. In these cases, the elites are going Although they provided the labor that to manipulate the spirit and the mentality of helped build Côte d’Ivoire into the the citizens and are going to develop a “economic miracle” of West Africa, discourse, a rhetoric of ‘them and us’”.23 extremist ideologues claim they were merely tolerated guests. The current situation remains volatile as the country awaits perpetually stalled One author foreshadowed the coming Presidential elections. A deal between economic crisis, as well as relating French Gbagbo and Soro awarded the latter the title interests; “Costly anomalies like the Ivory of Prime Minister but elections previously Coast’s cocoa producer subsidies cannot be scheduled to take place in October 2006 sustained indefinitely, although the French
    • again provided a surprisingly generous comparison with Rwanda, a creeping bailout in late 1988 by buying a large economic downturn crippled its previously portion of the Ivorian crop at inflated prosperous (by regional standards), prices”.25 After the death of the patriarch, it agriculture-based economy in the lead up to would be this economic non-sustainability, the 1994 genocide. Rwanda’s reliance on exacerbated by the collapse in world cocoa world coffee prices exposed the prices that would lead Bédié’s handlers in vulnerability of its commodity-centered, search of a political rallying point. developing economy and, as economic, social, and political pressure mounted on The common currency of French-speaking the ruling regime, ethnic appellations West Africa, the CFA (Communauté became more attractive. Similarly, Côte Financière Africaine) Franc underwent a d’Ivoire’s reliance on cocoa had allowed it 50% devaluation in 1994 with France’s to build the most vibrant economy in West approval. The CFA had long been seen as Africa. This economic stability faltered over-valued on the world market making with the world price of cocoa during the Ivorian exports much more expensive than downturn of the late 1980s. other nations with a weaker currency. By Global cocoa and coffee prices (cents/kg) over time* *Graph is skewed in favor of the period 1990-2004, but shows the precipitous drop in world cocoa prices from an industry high in the late 1970s/early 1980s, to the period marking the end of the Boigny regime in the mid 1990s. This drop in world cocoa and coffee prices coincided with public pressure for political liberalization and democratization in Côte d’Ivoire: The gross national income of Côte d’Ivoire per capita was $660 ranking 152 globally. However, still the leader for a region mired in poverty when compared to relatively stable neighbors Ghana ($320 and 181, respectively), Burkina Faso ($300 and 183), and Mali ($290 and 187), less stable Guinea ($430 and 171), and recovering war zones Liberia ($110 and 205) and Sierra Leone ($150 and 201).26
    • SOCIAL DIMENSIONS Increased pressures resulting from demography continue to strain resources in the south of Côte d’Ivoire. A comparison of population data for the year 2000 and projections for 2025 relate the constraints on scarce resources by population stress. The population pyramid data for year 200027 shows the youth bulge during a time of economic uncertainty. A closer look details almost 5 million Ivorian males below the age of 25. This data is cause for concern when presented with the grim economic data for Côte d’Ivoire since the late 1990s and subsequent outbreak of war. Even more discouraging for peace prospects is the projected population growth over the next two decades, considering the recruitment potential of young people into armed conflict (Growth to 7 million by 2025 with an explosion in youth population).
    • attributed to governmental gendarmes alerted observers to the potential for mass CONFLICT killing and genocide; “the bodies of fifty- seven young men were discovered in DYNAMICS Youpougon, on the outskirts of Abidjan, a massacre that became known as the Early Warning and the Strategic Charnier de Youpougon…those responsible Logic of Mass Killing for the killings (the gendarmerie)…have yet to be properly investigated and brought to justice”.30 Several characteristics of the violence in Côte d’Ivoire have alerted observers to the potential for mass killing. Government Security Dimensions loyalists as well as rebel fighters have committed mass atrocities in the past28, and Côte d’Ivoire has become a highly the nature of the conflict as a potentially militarized society since the onset of high intensity insurgency and conflict in 1999. Regional insecurity has counterinsurgency proxies for greater unfortunately been the norm for the sub- violence targeting civilians and non- region dating back to the early 1990s with combatants in the future. Depending on the the onset of war in Liberia and Sierra potential for future elections or unforeseen Leone. Côte d’Ivoire’s porous borders, developments to act as triggers for mass shared with recovering conflict zone violence, policy makers would do well to Liberia and chronically unstable Guinea, revisit the empirical evidence presented by have led to both an influx of cheap the previous eight years of violence in Côte weapons, and the incentive for d’Ivoire. Understanding the nature of the decommissioned Liberian fighters to conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the strategic immigrate to the Ivorian conflict. Further interests and goals of those either in exacerbating the conflict, sophisticated positions of power29 or close to it, criminal networks for resource and arms evaluating their capability to enact flows established during neighboring wars, programs of mass violence, and examining and accelerated by the de facto partitioning possible scenarios for future conflagrations of the country in 2002, left Côte d’Ivoire serve to guide policies aimed at prevention. awash with weapons. A culture of impunity has existed in Côte The Ivorian government imported 22 d’Ivoire for sometime dating back to the million dollars US in arms in 2003 compared to 2 million dollars in 1995, 31 initial political instability. Paramilitary gendarmes, in particular, operated with before the conflict erupted. This 11-fold impunity throughout the country before increase underscored the importance the partitioning. Targets of violence have been government placed on the insurgency in the pre-meditated through the creation of north of the country, as well as illustrated opposition death lists. Summary executions the redirection of scarce state resources and the murder of civilians have occurred away from more pressing needs including on both sides of the conflict, with minimal education and healthcare. The government response from the international community. of Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso has, The earliest incident of mass murder likewise, been actively supporting the New
    • Forces rebellion in the procurement of Current Situation weapons and training of troops.32 (The conflict) ‘is inextricably tied to the The military conflict has come to an end country's regional policy and its relations with the recent formation of a coalition with neighboring states. The Ivorian government and subsequent dismantling of government has accused the Burkina Faso observation posts and checkpoints along the government, and to a lesser extent that of zone of confidence. Peace talks in Mali, of conspiring with the northern-based Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso demonstrated opposition against it, but these links have the important role Burkinabé President not been proven.’33 Considering the nature Blaise Compaoré plays in the region as of previous counterinsurgency violence in observers see his involvement as crucial to Côte d’Ivoire, it is not unrealistic to expect the new agreement. Charles Taylor’s trial coordinated efforts to eliminate opposition at The Hague has publicized Compaoré’s elements if the current attempt at complicity in the Liberian war, putting identification and presidential elections international pressure on the regime in falter and war is renewed. Despite the Ouagadougou. In an effort to deflect imposition of weapons sanctions, the international criticism, Compaoré may see intermittent period of relative calm has an opportunity to act as peacemaker in Côte allowed armament of multiple state and d’Ivoire. After calculating that Gbagbo non-state actors. may not be as dangerous to Burkinabé interests as once perceived, he cajoled Soro Benjamin Valentino discussing the threat of into the agreement. future mass killings writes, “Mass Killing is usually driven by instrumental, strategic President Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, for calculations. Perpetrators see mass killing their part, have apparently come to the as a means to an end, not an end in realization that a military stalemate exists, itself…mass killing was never the only and positioning for the stalled presidential strategy that leaders considered to achieve elections may take precedence over their ends. Mass Killing has not always continued military clashes. The formulation been a policy of last resort, but rarely has it of a coalition government with President been a policy of first resort either”.34 He Gbagbo naming Guillaume Soro the Prime continues by addressing the threat posed by Minister was received with skepticism counterguerrilla (counterinsurgency or among observers within Côte d’Ivoire and COIN) operations, “We should expect from the international community. A wait counterguerrilla mass killing to remain the and see attitude prevails among the most common [form of mass killing]” in the international actors as many observers future.35 This description should alert believe this is a short term move meant to policy makers observing the conflict in allow for future positioning in the run-up to stalled presidential elections.36 Of specific Côte d’Ivoire as, similar to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, elite architects could interest for those observers interested in the seek to frame co-ethnic opposition civilians early warning and prevention of mass as supporters of insurgent elements, killing is the strategic logic motivating the marking them as threats to the interests of decisions of various political actors in Côte the national collective, and potential targets d’Ivoire. A scenario that involves the of state-orchestrated violence. identification and registration of numerous northerners, such that Gbagbo’s position is
    • threatened at the polls, may represent an Long-term Trends aforementioned fundamental shift in relationships between various parties, The near future will remain relatively resulting in a flawed or cancelled election calm as the various elite position by the threatened elite and sparking themselves for stalled elections. Although renewed insurgency and counterinsurgency. Soro benefited greatly from the agreement The probability of mass atrocities would with President Gbagbo that gave him the then increase exponentially. Prime Minister portfolio, it remains to be seen if his constituency will continue to Potential Triggers support the unity government. He has enriched himself at the expense of Proximate causes of increased conflict numerous civilians in the north, and the include the upsetting of the status quo for brutality with which his forces treated criminal elements in the western part of the locals did little to endear the New Forces country. Years of uninterrupted business movement to the people with the passage of were placed in jeopardy through peace time. The key issues of registration and attempts in Burkina Faso. The severely political representation are slowly being damaged institutions in Côte d’Ivoire create addressed for supporters of Alassane an opportunity for a wide-range of triggers Ouattara, but this remains a central concern as the judiciary and legislative branches of for the consolidation of peace in Côte the Ivorian government are corrupted and d’Ivoire. decaying, unable to manage small pressures that quickly overwhelm the system. Bédié’s supporters have also failed to have their grievances addressed so that the The internally displaced population current situation reflects a suspicious deal combined with Liberian and Leonese between two of the four principal political refugees illustrates the demographic figures in the conflict. The long-term trend, pressures that could trigger conflict, therefore, remains President Gbagbo specifically when combined with pre- continuing to manipulate the international existing land disputes in the north and community including ECOWAS, the center of the country. Of course, the African Union, and the United Nations in a greatest potential trigger for large-scale sophisticated effort to maintain and violence is the stalled Presidential election. consolidate his power, at the expense of If the vote is perceived as unfair by a true reform. The international community significant portion of the population, remains preoccupied with France taking the violence may be accepted as a viable international lead in mediation efforts alternative to continuing the political status despite its criticized position as former quo. If the recent past is any indication, colonial overlord. Unless wide-scale Ivorians have become accustomed to human rights abuses or ethnic expulsion voicing their disapproval in the streets. occurs, the diplomatic status quo will Political violence triggered by the election continue with the UN likely engaged, remains the greatest concern in the ineffectually, in shuttle diplomacy. upcoming months, and a loss in the election could represent an intolerable outcome for multiple actors.
    • ethnic partition. International Military POLICY OPTIONS intervention remains a last resort when the government is part of the problem (and How does one recreate a tenuous perhaps justifiably so in Côte d’Ivoire equilibrium once a system has transitioned depending on the Center’s response to into disequilibrium? In the case of Côte future election outcomes). d’Ivoire, what stabilizing characteristics of Houphouët-Boigny’s regime are replicable I will briefly critique ethnic partition as a in today’s volatile environment? Given the policy option, then discuss its applicability dysfunctional nature of his client-patron in the context of Côte d’Ivoire. Lastly, I regime – current president Gbagbo’s long- promote a concurrent program of time opposition to Boigny’s ‘benign participatory systems and identity authoritarianism’ girded his initial manipulation to end the ongoing conflict. popularity - is it prudent to attempt to recreate an exploitative, unstable house of PARTITIONING TO END ETHNIC cards? The lessons gathered from analysis CIVIL WARS of differing approaches to peace in ethnically divided societies can be The outbreak of ethnic violence in Europe examined to inform contemporary Côte following the collapse of the Soviet Union d’Ivoire. I argue that a sequencing program in the early 1990s revived old debates beginning with a traditional power-sharing surrounding the plausibility of power- model, transitioning into top-down civic sharing models in ethnically divided states. nationalism is required for lasting peace in Using the Balkan crisis as a model, new Côte d’Ivoire. Although attractive at first vigor was given to the idea of ethnic contact, ethnic partitioning is implausible in partitioning as a means to stabilize deeply Côte d’Ivoire. divided societies. Chaim Kaufmann argued forcefully, from the realist perspective, for Writing about lasting solutions to ethnic the separation of ethnic groups into wars, Daniel Byman identifies four causes “defensible enclaves”, stating that partition of ethnic conflict – ethnic security dilemma, was the only realistic answer leading to a status concerns, hegemonic ambitions, and cessation of violence when ‘all else had elite aspirations37 - and prescribes policy failed’.39 However, an analysis of the options for maintaining the peace. While current reality in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire exhibits the uneven history of partitioning, calls this elements of status concerns and policy recommendation into question. marginalization among the Dioula, the primary cause of the violence has been elite Kaufmann’s argument for ethnic competition. Byman notes that elite partitioning tells much about fractured exploitation often coexists with other societies, but is less helpful when one conflict causes, “Elites exploit broader considers the empirical evidence in Sub- mass grievances concerning security, status, Saharan Africa. Although Kaufmann’s or dominance”.38 His internal policy definition of ethnic identity, “Ethnic prescriptions include control policies identities are hardest, since they depend on (preventing ethnic political action through language, culture, and religion, which are intimidation), Co-optation of ethnic groups, hard to change, as well as parentage, which manipulating ethnic identities, participatory no one can change”, 40 applies to the systems (including power-sharing), and
    • principal groups in Côte d’Ivoire, it fails to ideological identity, religious identity, and address why differing groups peacefully co- ethnic identity; existed before the introduction of Ivoirité into the national political discourse of the Ideological identity is relatively 1990s. soft, as it is a matter of individual belief, or sometimes of political The author writes “to save lives threatened behavior. Religious identities are by genocide, the international community harder, because while they also must abandon attempts to restore war-torn depend on belief, change generally multi-ethnic states… stable resolutions of requires formal acceptance by the ethnic civil wars are possible, but only new faith, which may be denied. when the opposing groups are Ethnic identities are hardest, since demographically separated into defensible they depend on language, culture, enclaves… while ethnic fighting can be and religion, which are hard to stopped by other means, such as peace change, as well as parentage, which no one can change.43 enforcement by international forces or by a conquering empire, such peaces last only as long as the enforcers remain”.41 Linguistic, religious, and cultural cleavages exist between the two primary groups in The presence of the United Nations Côte d’Ivoire, and geographical separation peacekeeping mission deployed along the is evident as the previous de facto zone of confidence in Côte d’Ivoire acted as partitioning between north and south Kaufmann’s peace enforcer, but while the indicated. Although there are very few dismantling of the zone in 2006 spurred Ivorians identifying themselves as Akan sporadic criminal violence (non-ethnic living in the north, the south previously based) in the weeks following Côte exhibited highly mixed populations of d’Ivoire’s elimination of its security northern Dioula’s living among southern buffer42 - mainly in the volatile west along Akans. This reality is a perfect example of Liberia’s porous border - results nationwide Kaufmann’s scenario. Partitioning could, have marked a relative calm. This calm therefore, be logistically viable in Côte cannot be explained by an international d’Ivoire if a future catastrophe were to ‘peace enforcer’ or by a conquering empire, occur, albeit with considerable as none has existed for two years. So what consequences (There is recent evidence explains the current peace? Political elite suggesting that voluntary and coerced have been unwilling to engage in violent migration has occurred to some degree in identity manipulation during this period as the ensuing period since the outbreak of they calculate their positions relative to war, representing a contemporary defacto partitioning44). upcoming elections. Further proof that violence in Côte d’Ivoire can be stoked as an instrument of the various political Perhaps Kaufmann’s strongest argument entrepreneurs. relates to the security dilemma present in ethnic civil wars. According to the author, Kaufmann’s description of “ethnic identity” ethnic wars create security dilemma’s “both is guiding in the context of Côte d’Ivoire. because the escalation of both side’s He draws a clear delineation between mobilization rhetoric presents a real threat to the other, and even more because
    • intermingled population settlement patterns south of the country, specifically, would be create defensive vulnerability and offensive vulnerable according to his description. opportunities…Once this occurs, the war cannot end until the security dilemma is Kaufmann’s chief criticism is reserved for reduced by physical separation of the rival those that would attempt to “reconstruct groups”.45 The intermingled population ethnic identities” according to the patterns argument is crucial to the character “Constructivist Model” of nationalism. of Côte d’Ivoire. As stated before, Akan and Dioula populations have coexisted Constructivists argue that throughout the region, for centuries. individual and group identities are fluid, continually being made and Ultimately, Kaufmann’s solution to the re-made in social discourse. security dilemma too narrowly focuses on Further, these identities are ethnic demography: manipulable by political entrepreneurs… even if The severity of ethnic security constructivists are right that the dilemmas is greatest when ancient past does not matter, demography is most intermixed, recent history does. Intense weakest when community violence creates personal settlements are most separate. The experiences of fear, misery, and more mixed the opposing groups, loss which lock people into their the stronger the offense in relation group identity and their enemy to the defense; the more separated relationship with the other group…47 they are, the stronger the defense in relation to the offense. When settlements patterns are extremely Kaufmann’s theory fails to account for the mixed, both sides are vulnerable to “peace” in Côte d’Ivoire following the attack not only by organized outbreak of war, as well as the seeming military forces but also by local willingness of disparate groups to work militias or gangs from adjacent together to build government coalitions. towns or neighborhoods… each Furthermore, this theory fails to account for side has a strong incentive-at both inter-ethnic cooperation and coexistence national and local levels-to kill or following the dismantling of the Zone of drive out enemy populations Confidence and withdrawal of before the enemy does the same to Peacekeeping troops from the zone in 2006. it, as well as to create homogenous A more pragmatic solution for a lasting enclaves more practical to peace is to continue down the road of defend.46 “constructivist” state building. Southern Côte d’Ivoire clearly falls into the Critics of Partitioning say that, “rather than “extremely mixed” pattern of human separating irreconcilable ethnic groups, settlement Kaufmann describes. In his (partitioning) foments further violence and forced migration.48 Furthermore, attempts words, both sides exhibit vulnerability to attack, and simple offense versus defense at partitioning in the Balkans have hardened calculations will dominate. Dioula identities, making attempts at civic speaking northerners currently living in the nationalism more difficult than an attempt
    • at sequencing beginning with power rudimentary security has been established. sharing. A key criticism of Kaufmann’s The sequencing entails a short-term power- argument, and partitioning in general, is the sharing agreement, as proposed by Arend recommendation that partitioning be Lijphart, to run concurrently with a instituted as a last resort measure, when ‘all program of civic nationalism. else has failed’. Identity reconstruction is an integral part of Taking into consideration Côte d’Ivoire’s Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociational recent past, current attempts at power democracy. Contrary to Kaufmann, sharing, identification, and civic Lijphart sees identity reconstruction as reintegration, how can policy makers something attainable in fractured societies; determine when relationships have entered “recent scholarship has moved away from a stage in which fundamental shifts toward the primordial view, which sees ethnicity as mass violence are likely? Ultimately, if the an unalterable given, and toward an Popular Rivalries (Ancient Hatreds) instrumental or situation approach that explanation is true, then partitioning must instead sees ethnicity as taking shape only when it is manipulated by political elites”.50 occur as a solution, or consociational democracy (elite power-sharing) where The restructuring of collective identity is partitioning isn’t feasible. However, if elite possible in this environment because much persuasion is true, partitioning would serve of the recent violent ideology present in the to lock in divisive national identities, Côte d’Ivoire conflict was introduced in the unnecessarily heightening distrust between post-colonial period. There was no history groups.49 of massacre prior to political upheaval of the last decade, and it wasn’t until the post- CIVIC NATIONALISM AS AN Houphouët-Boigny period that political ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITIONING entrepreneurs realized the rewards to be had from manipulating constituents’ identity. Central to Kaufmann’s theory of ethnic partitioning is the importance of hardened Identity manipulation has been a key identities (so-called identity ‘lock-in’). The element of the Ivorian conflict, and genesis of identity lock-in is insignificant, reconstruction of these individual and group according to Kaufmann, as once enmity has identities may be the best hope for peace hardened individual and group identities, and stability in the future. Sequencing is they can’t be reconstructed. Applied to an important aspect of civic reintegration, Côte d’Ivoire, colonial divide and rule is as prolonged power sharing could prove irrelevant as the result of the recent counter-productive to long-term nationalist violence is the hardening of group identity. prospects. The danger of prolonged power Programs of top-down civic nationalism sharing is that ethnic or religious identities will be fruitless. may be exacerbated the longer the divisions of power sharing exist.51 This has been However, I propose that since identities are particularly evident in Lebanon. Extracting socially constructed and manipulable, they power-sharing agreements from belligerents are never locked-in, and always open to by third party mediators has proved an reconstruction from the elite. A top-down increasingly popular policy option by the program of civic nationalism, is possible international community. Long-term when civil wars have ended and implementation of these agreements while
    • preventing competing elites from hijacking wreak havoc, while protecting political the process, however, has proved moderates and civilians during the exceedingly difficult with backtracking in transition pose central challenges. Burundi and Kenya - and, most recently, the debacle in Zimbabwe - serving as POLICY RELEVANCE sobering examples. International Security Policy experts have If the elite-persuasion view of ethnic debated the role of identity in conflict from conflict is correct, such separation measures differing perspectives. Agreement (consociational democracy) might serve to surrounding the nature of identity would do lock in divisive national identities, much to further policy objectives related to unnecessarily heightening distrust between current and post-conflict situations. One groups. When this is the case, a better need only examine ongoing discourse solution would be to take advantage of the concerning American Wars in Iraq and fluidity of national identity during the Afghanistan to discern the prevalence of formative stages of democratization to identity-centric debate in American policy promote more inclusive, civic identities and formulation. cross-ethnic political alignments.52 Although much less significant to US The solution should, thus, be an attempt to national interests than the painful attempts take advantage of this fluidity, focusing on at sequencing a democratic peace in Iraq, the generational reconstruction of national the Ivorian conflict provides a laboratory identity during an internationally supported for the greater exploration of identity transition from the current autocratic, reconstruction in not-yet-failed states. The ethnicity-based system, to a power-sharing cleavages present in Côte d’Ivoire have agreement composed of moderate been exacerbated relatively recently, unlike technocrats and civil society participants. the cleavages in other so-called intractable Agreed upon national school curriculums conflicts, thus providing a “real-time” and ethnically mixed national military and model for those wishing to study the police forces are two examples of a move machinations of identity manipulation by toward civic reintegration that play a vital political elites. Attempts at peace have role in the sequencing phase. These efforts failed in Côte d’Ivoire due to a failure by at identity reconstruction are potentially government and opposition elites - and the decades-long programs requiring the international community - to address local initiative of international interests - namely conflict and engage civic national identity the UN and regional/sub-regional actors as a cornerstone to the peace process. Self- including the African Union (AU) and interested parties, beneficially engaged in Economic Community of West African the violence and instability, will continue to States (ECOWAS), respectively - in manipulate ethnic identities for personal support of Ivorian civil society. The gain. Conflict transformation will require conundrum of such an ambitious cooptation or marginalization of potential reconstruction program is the potential spoilers, and the benefactors of peace must spoiler role that status quo ethnic commit to inclusive identity reconstruction. entrepreneurs and hardliners may seek to play once a possibly damaging revision has Programs of top-down identity commenced. Marginalizing their ability to reconstruction are necessary after
    • communities have been divided by the context of sustainable, just peace, a prolonged ethnic violence or civil war. The serious inquiry into the plausibility of promotion of civic nationalism and the identity reconstruction is required. Early reconstruction of these individual and group warning signals for mass violence have identities in Côte d’Ivoire may be the best been prevalent for over a decade now in hope for peace and stability in the short and Côte d’Ivoire. Domestic, regional, and long term. Civic nationalism - coupled international action that facilitates the with participatory systems and construction of civic nationalism in post- governmental representation - incorporates conflict states will be necessary if we each ethnicity into the collectivity, thus continue to adhere to the orthodoxy of the providing a stake, as well as a dividend for Westphalian system of sovereign nation peace. If the international community is states, while seeking to prevent future genuinely interested in political stability in programs of mass killing and genocide. ACTORS MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES53 FPI (Front populaire ivoirien) – Current ruling party led by President Laurent • Gbagbo. PDCI (Parti démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire) – The oldest political party in • Côte d’Ivoire, ruled from Independence until 1999 when Henri Konan Bédié was overthrown in coup led by General Robert Guei. The party of first President Félix Houphouët-Boigny. RDR (Rassemblement des Républicains) – Led by Alassane Ouattara, the RDR is • affiliated with the northern Dioula speaking population, and is linked with the Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) rebellion. • MINOR POLITICAL PARTIES MFA (Mouvement des Forces de l’Avenir) – Small, unarmed party (opposed to • President Gbagbo) that forms part of unity government. PIT (Parti ivoirien des travailleurs) – Small party makes up part of unity • government and is supportive of President Gbagbo. ARMED FORCES FA – FN (Force Armees des Forces Nouvelles) – A conglomeration of armed • groups in the north loyal to the New Forces rebellion and adopted in 2003, it has since become the FDS – FN (Force de Defense et Securites des Forces Nouvelles). FANCI (Force Armee Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire) – The national armed forces • of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire. Composed of a dilapidated Navy and Air force that was effectively destroyed by French bombing on November 6, 2004 in response to the killing of French soldiers, the national army remains the only functioning element of the armed forces. President Gbagbo’s power is consolidated via direct control of loyal elements in the army, bypassing constitutionally mandated chains of command.54 The national gendarmerie is
    • composed of 6000 paramilitary police and, along with the 1000 strong Republican Guard, comprises President Gbagbo’s most loyal force. FDS – FN (Force de Defense et Securites des Forces Nouvelles) – Previously • mentioned latest incarnation of northern rebel movement. Former members of the national armed forces comprise the core of the estimated 25,000 fighters. The governments of Mali and, in particular, Burkina Faso are suspected of supporting the New Forces.55 MILITIAS AND ARMED POLITICAL GROUPS AP – WÊ (Alliance Patriotiques – WÊ) – Well-armed, Pro-Gbagbo militia • operating in the west of the country. Operates (with FANCI support) in the former zone of confidence, involved in criminal behavior including extortion and harassment/intimidation of rival ethnic groups, particularly the Baoulé, Burkinabé, and Malinké.56 FLGO (Front de Liberation de Grand Ouest) – Pro-government militia in the • West sharing good relations with AP – WÊ. FSCO (Front de Securite du Centre Ouest) – Pro-government militia operating in • Abidjan. Jeune Patriotes – Most notorious of pro-government youth militias. Have • received military training and could fight as light infantry with regular forces. Responsible for violence throughout the south and pose a serious threat in Abidjan. ‘Lima Militias’ - Name given to mercenary and bandit gangs from the war in • Liberia who continue to destabilize western Côte d’Ivoire. MJP (Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix) – Anti-government force composed • of ethnic Yacoubas, and based around Man. MILOCI (Mouvement de Liberation de l’Ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire - Pro- • government militia operating in the west around the former zone of confidence. MPIGO (Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest) – Anti-Government • militia that forms part of New Forces Comprised predominantly of ethnic Yacoubas, but also include Liberian and Sierra Leonese mercenaries. Accused of arms trafficking throughout the region. CIVILIAN GROUPS Comites de Surveillance – Self-Defense forces raised by villagers throughout the • zone of confidence to provide protection from militias and bandits. Dozos – Traditional society of hunters that follow a strict moral code. Code calls • for them to fight oppression and many have sided with the New Forces. Operation L’Icorne – 4000 strong French military contingent tasked to support • UNOCI. EXTERNAL ACTORS ONUCI (Operation des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)) – 9000 • soldiers sent as part of UN Security Council peacekeeping mandate to Côte d’Ivoire.
    • BURKINA FASO – President Blaise Compaoré’s regime in Ouagadougou has • much at stake in the current Ivorian conflict, as anywhere from 2.5 to 4 million Burkinabe’s57 currently reside in Côte d’Ivoire. The fragility of Campaoré’s government is illustrated by his desire to keep this massive Burkinabé population abroad where it cannot mount a threat to his autocracy. Campaoré has been distrustful of Gbagbo in the past, and has been responsible for supplying the Rebellion with arms and material support. LIBERIA – The long-running civil war in Liberia has had a devastating effect on • the national economy. The slow rebuilding process has left many former fighters dispossessed and they have sought employment in Cote d’Ivoire where their skills as fighters are in demand. GUINEA – Recent political upheaval in Guinea has further contributed to Ivorian • insecurity through non-secured borders and illegal weapons flows. The calming of political tensions in the last few weeks has seen a drop in cross-border movements of armed belligerents. FRANCE – Former colonial ruler and heavily invested in Côte d’Ivoire. French • interest in the country is a rallying cry for multiple Ivorian political entrepreneurs and throughout the conflict France has been viewed domestically as hostile toward Gbagbo and the FPI. France maintains a military presence in the country in the form, ostensibly, of a peacekeeping force (see Operation L’Icorne above). 1 Mitter, Siddhartha, Ebony and Ivoirité: War and Peace in Ivory Coast. Transition Magazine, vol. 94 Duke University Press, 2003. Available online at: http://www.transitionmagazine.com/online/ivoirite.htm 2 Gagnon, V.P. Jr., ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict’ International Security 3 Ibid, p. 132 4 Valentino, Benjamin, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004. p. 10 5 Ibid. p. 152 6 Ibid. Ch. 3 on the Strategic Logic of Mass Killing pp. 66-90. 7 For a review of the ECOWARN mechanism see John Mark Opoku West African Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System: The Role of Civil Society Organizations – KAIPTC Paper, No 19, September 2007. Available at: http://www.kaiptc.org/_upload/general/KAIPTC_11.pdf 8 Mitter, Siddhartha, Ebony and Ivoirité: War and Peace in Ivory Coast. Transition Magazine, vol. 94 Duke University Press, 2003. Available online at: http://www.transitionmagazine.com/online/ivoirite.htm 9 Launay, Robert, Beyond the Stream: Islam and Society in a West African Town, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press: 1992. p. 84 10 Ibid. p. 84. 11 McNamara, Terry Francis, France in Black Africa, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989. p. 129 12 UN Integrated Regional Information Networks: November 23, 2004. West Africa; Economic Aftershocks From Côte d’Ivoire May Be Felt Around Region For Years To Come 13 Ramsés, L. Boa Thiémélé, L’Ivoirité: Entre Culture et Politique, Paris: Editions
    • L’Harmattan, 2003. 14 Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians In Western Côte d’Ivoire, August 2003 vol. 15, No. 14(A) p. 7. 15 Ibid, p. 7 16 Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 37. 17 Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians In Western Côte d’Ivoire, August 2003 vol. 15, No. 14(A) p. 8. 18 Ibid, p. 8 19 Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians In Western Côte d’Ivoire, August 2003 vol. 15, No. 14(A) p. 10. 20 UN Integrated Regional Information Networks: April 28, 2006. ‘Storms Still Brewing Over Disarmament’, 21 UN Integrated Regional Information Networks: November 1, 2005. ‘What’s In A Name? A Fight For Identity” 22 Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 269 23 Hartill, Lane 2006, ‘Clouding Ivory Coast’s Peace: Ivoirité’, The Christian Science Monitor. [On-line] http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0127/p07s02-woaf.html January 27, 2006. 24 Economies are divided according to 2005 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. Low income is $875 or less. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:2 0421402~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 25 McNamara, Terry Francis, France in Black Africa, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989. p. 232. 26 WorldBank Atlas available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:2 0421402~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 27 http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbpyrs.pl?cty=IV&out=s&ymax=250 28 For more on atrocities in Côte d’Ivoire: Rebel Massacre of 130 government gendarmes and their families in 2002 see Daniel Balint-Kurti, “Côte d’Ivoire’s Forces Nouvelles” Chatham House: Africa Programme Armed Non-State Actors Series. September 2007 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/535/ Charnier de Youpougon - Government Security Forces massacre of youths linked to opposition in Abidjan see “Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte d'Ivoire” Human Rights Watch Report 2003: 9. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/08/04/trapped-between-two-wars-0 29 Valentino, Benjamin, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004 p. 240. 30 Charnier de Youpougon Human Rights Watch Report, 2003: 9 31 http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Section5.htm Section 5.8 - Defense expenditures and arms transfers 32 Author’s interview with ICG West Africa Chief, Gilles Yabi, April 19, 2007
    • 33 “Côte d’Ivoire, External Affairs, Assessment.” Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – West Africa August 1, 2006. Jane’s Online Research http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/wafrsu /cotes080.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=cote%20d'ivoire%20world% 20armies&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=WAFR& 34 Valentino, Benjamin, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004 p. 235. 35 Ibid. p. 240. 36 Author’s interview with ICG West Africa Chief, Gilles Yabi, April 19, 2007 37 Byman, Daniel Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. p. 13. 38 Ibid, p. 42 39 Kaufmann, Chaim, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars’ International Security vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996). 40 Ibid, p. 138. 41 Ibid, p. 136. 42 ‘See Attacks increase in Ivory Coast’ James Copnall, Thursday, 26 April 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6594787.stm 43 Ibid, p. 138. 44 Author’s discussion with unnamed researcher in Abidjan – February 2009. (Identity withheld) 45 Kaufmann, Chaim, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars’ International Security vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 138. 46 Ibid, p. 141. 47 Ibid, p. 145. 48 See R. Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 1997. pp. 22-35. 49 Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 33. 50 Lijphart, Arend, ‘The Power Sharing Approach’ in Joseph Montville, ed. Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990. p. 492. 51 Snyder, Jack and Robert Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma” In Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention, edited by Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, 15-37. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. p. 19. 52 Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 33. 53 Actors synopsis is summarized from ‘A Summary of Armed Groups and Political Parties in Côte d’Ivoire’ Safer Access Online, January 17, 2007. http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/Summary%20of%20Armed%20Groups%20and% 20Political%20Parties%20in%20Cote%20d'Iv..pdf 54 Ibid, p. 2. 55 Ibid. p. 3. 56 ‘Ibid, p. 1. 57 Author’s interview with ICG West Africa Chief, Gilles Yabi, April 19, 2007
    • United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/unoci.pdf