How We State What We Know: from the Ideal to the Actual

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The problem of "knowledge transfer" makes our dependency on language usage risky. Without a defensible orderliness to terminology, language becomes arbitrary, and we don't know if what was sent in a …

The problem of "knowledge transfer" makes our dependency on language usage risky. Without a defensible orderliness to terminology, language becomes arbitrary, and we don't know if what was sent in a communication is the same as what effectively arrived and, further, may be forwarded. This notebook shows a very basic logic of consistently deciding what to use to communicate.

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  • 1. How We State What We Know From the Ideal to the Actual An archestra notebook. © 2014 Malcolm Ryder / archestra research
  • 2. How we state what we know THINK MAKE DYNAMICS ABSTRACT THEORY ? VIRTUAL CONCRETE ? ? REAL ? ? STATES ? PROPERTIES Much of our knowledge of experience is described in terms of a path starting with a theory “about” something and ending with the properties “of” something. Along the way there is attention to distinguishing what we are talking about, well enough to allow confident contrasts and similarities versus other things. As seen above, however, there is a lot of territory in between.
  • 3. The “Ideal” THINK MAKE ABSTRACT THEORY MODEL CONCRETE FUNCTION EXAMPLE The “Actual” This table explains why there are at least four different ways to distinguish the concept of something, from thinking of it abstractly to making it concretely. DYNAMICS STATES VIRTUAL PATTERN DESIGN REAL SPECS PROPERTIES In this related table we see the explanation of how corresponding different descriptions of the presence of something are distinguished.
  • 4. Representative action for formulating things The logic of deriving descriptions of the “ideal”… THINK MAKE ABSTRACT THEORY MODEL CONCRETE FUNCTION EXAMPLE The logic of deriving descriptions of the “actual”… Representative form of things we recognize Affective instance of things we experience DYNAMICS STATES VIRTUAL PATTERN DESIGN REAL SPECS PROPERTIES Manageable implementation of things we recognize
  • 5. Proposition Proof THINK ABSTRACT MAKE THEORY MODEL PATTERN CONCRETE EXAMPLE VIRTUAL DESIGN FUNCTION DYNAMICS SPECS PROPERTIES THEORY PATTERN REAL FUNCTION SPECS STATES MODEL DESIGN EXAMPLE PROPERTIES In general, we hold descriptions of the “ideal” and the “actual” accountable to each other. The simplest technique for doing that is to superimpose the way they make distinctions. The result of doing that means that we wind up expecting theories to offer patterns; specifications to constrain functions ; designs to express models; examples to demonstrate properties; etc. Consistent use of terms helps to identify how any expectations are reasonable.
  • 6. © 2014 Malcolm Ryder / archestra research mryder@malcolmryder.com