10 02 25 Chatham

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10 02 25 Chatham

  1. 1. Chatham House, London 25-26th February 2010 Mogens Schou: msc@fvm.dk New Common Fisheries Policy Wealth of fisheries More material at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish
  2. 2. Wealth of fisheries 1. When the capital used to catch the fish does not exceed the necessary 2. When the value of the resource is obtained on basis of its full productive capacity, not just the highest valued fraction. 3. When impacts other than outtake of target species are competitive to other uses or to protection
  3. 3. First issue: Optimizing capital input 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,4 1,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Note: World Bank Catch pr unit vessel – The more you invest the lower the productivity !
  4. 4. Second issue: Optimizing stock output 120 100 80 '000 tonnes 60 Unallocated mortality 40 Discard 20 Landings 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year Cod in the North Sea
  5. 5. New Fisheries Policy Two strategic principles - and a facility to solve Relative Stability rigidity 1. Management by transferable rights gives the optimal incentive to optimize capital input It is the key to balancing fleet capacity to catch opportunities and to regain a sound economy 2. Management by catch quotas will replace the incentive to discard with the incentive to fish selectively and to bring all fish to the market It is the key to optimal outtake of fish stocks
  6. 6. Danish ITQ expectations ITQ would result in • Balance in fleet capacity • High profitability • Freedom to plan the fishery • Increased investment in added value ITQ could offer • A competitive coastal fishery • Thriving fishing communities • Improved entrance for young fishermen • Reduction of discards
  7. 7. Danish ITQ model Allocation and Ownership • Only for active fishermen • Initial allocation based on historic fishery • Public resource (withdrawal with 8 years notice) Flexible transferability • Structural adaptation: Selling of rights • Daily adaptation: Leasing and pooling Societal policies • Rules of concentration • Fishfund • Support young fisher’s entrance • Coastal fishery premium (demersal vessels below 17 m)
  8. 8. Danish ITQ effects • Balance in capacity v Obtained in less than 2 years • High profitability v from 9% to 20% • Freedom to plan the fishery v landing pattern have changed • Increased investment in added value v Investments doubled+ • Coastal communities are competitive v • A viable coastal fishery v Increased share of total catch • Improved entrance for young fishermen v The FishFund • The “blue license” attractive to young fishermen v • Reduction of discards (v) less capacity and a new code Reports by the Danish University and The Nordic Council. The results are prior to the ”levelling down effect ”of the financial crisis
  9. 9. Conclusion on ITQ • ITQ is a strong tool – and it works • It will adapt fleet capacity to fishing opportunities • Objectives must be clear • It can be designed to support policy issues e.g. coastal fishery and exit/entry policy
  10. 10. Are ITQ’s enough to ensure sustainability? No It gives the fisher the choice of quota portfolio and planning of fishery It will balance capacity to catch opportunities (which may include upgrading) - It does not exclude upgrading or ensure selective fishing - It may lead to specialized one-species catches in mixed fisheries
  11. 11. Catch quota management (CQM) 1. Allocate catch quotas – not landing quotas, and make the fisher accountable for his total catches 2. Make it voluntary and give the fisher a quota premium, reflecting that all fish are registered and counted 3. To participate in the scheme, the fisher must take upon him to document his fishery by CCTV ---------------- It will exchange the fisher’s incentive to optimize the value of the fish landed by discarding with his incentive to optimize the value of his total catch by fishing selectively
  12. 12. CQM effects • Precise outtake of each stock (single stock management) • Reliable biological data – better advice • User driven development of selective fishing methods • General rules to protect most vulnerable species (e.g. kW, by catch rules etc) are replaced by a requirement for the individual fisher to adapt his fishery to the catch quota available
  13. 13. “We believe there are strong arguments for making fishermen more accountable for their total catches. It would improve information and management of removal levels of fish stocks and incentivise the development of selective fishing methods…..We would wish that fishermen choosing such an option carry the responsibility of documenting their total catches”
  14. 14. Can it be done? England, Denmark, Germany, Scotland, Sweden plan for app. 80 vessels in 2010 with CCTV Danish results september 2009 (6 vessels with CCTV and sensors) See report and video at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish) •Technically simple with high reliability •Positive incentive effect •Better utilization pattern •Reliable data
  15. 15. Comparing landing quota with catch quota management Simplified figures for cod based on findings in Danish camera project Size Vessel A Vessel A Vessel B Vessel B Fish Share of grades Tonnes 1.000 Tonnes 1.000 price catch DKK DKK DKK/kg kept on vessel A Size 1 10 290 8 224 28 1 Size 2 18 453 14 3500 25 1 Size 3 48 1053 37 814 22 1 Size 4 19 272 30 420 14 0,5 Size 5 4 34 11 88 8 0,3 Total 100 2101 100 1896 Discard 29 0 A landing quota management (A) compared to catch quota management (B) If ICES figures had been used the discard would be 65 instead of 29
  16. 16. Wealth to be made by ITQ and CQM Baseline ITQ ITQ and CQM Landings (tonnes) 100.000 100.000 100.000 Profit (million €) 9 46 39 Profit (million €) discard included -16 21 39 Note: Model calculations by www.foi.dk, for assumptions used, contact Hans Frost, associate professor at Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Cph. See background paper at www.fvm.dk/yieldoffish Baseline: Landings of 100.000 tonnes demersal fish. An over capacity of 38% and a discard of 20% is assumed ITQ show the improvement in profit with an ITQ system with full market effect (discard 20%). This can generate a catch surplus of 34.200 tonnes that can be distributed for sociopolitical purposes ITQ and CQM show the profit introduction of an ITQ and CQM management
  17. 17. What is in it for the fisher? 1st year • Quota premium • Correct data for biologists 2nd year • Doing away with kW restrictions • Simplified regulation and control • Better advice Succeeding years • Market appreciation – reliable certifications • Multiannual management and effective year to year flexibility • Simplified gear regulation • Establishing the fishers own integrated management system for optimal use of the resources
  18. 18. A ”tracebase” for documentation, control and certification vessel 1. sale process sale consumer CCTV added data added data added data Documented catch data Data base Output of informations designed for individual user groups control certification Process and consumer labelling sale
  19. 19. Relative Stability – a new facility for 2012 Objective Optimal use of yearly quotas No need of: • Changing relative stability • EU ITQ’s Introduce a facility for Relative Stability 1. An EU quota pool for swapping or leasing between fishermen 2. Let Member states define the level of transnational activity Effects Reduction of discards , improved economy, better planning
  20. 20. The Danish pool • Transparency • Swap fish to fish • Lease fish Cover your by-catches by leasing Do it from day to day
  21. 21. New Common Fisheries Policy Wealth of fisheries A comprehensive CFP model based on CQM, that can • Be implemented gradually in a ”second management track” • Be adapted to national or regional priorities • Release of fisher’s choice of methods and innovation

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